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Research Justification 
Richard Kearney is one of the leading global thinkers in both Continental 
philosophy and post-metaphysical philosophy of religion. He is an esteemed Irish 
professor in philosophy, currently teaching at Boston College, Massachusetts, 
USA. Professor Kearney first visited South Africa in May as joint visiting academic 
of the Universities of Stellenbosch, Pretoria and North-West. The visit prompted 
the publication of this scholarly collected work, authored by South African and 
international scholars. These specialists in philosophy and religious studies 
analysed Kearney’s influential work and brought his scholarly perspectives into 
dialogue with other leading thinkers in the field, both from Africa and abroad. 
This publication will be the first collective attempt to engage his work from the 
perspective of the African continent. This collected work contributes significantly 
in an interdisciplinary way to Ricoeurdian studies. The target audience of the 
book is peers and specialists in the field of Continental philosophy and philosophy 
of religion. None of the chapters contains plagiarism. Twelve of the 16 chapters 
are completely original and have never been published before. Four of the 
16 chapters are based on formerly published material but have been substantially 
reworked with a changed scope and objectives. They are:
 • Aspects of Pieter Duvenage’s chapter, entitled ‘Phenomenology in South 
Africa: An indirect encounter with Richard Kearney’.
• Sections in Yolande Steenkamp’s chapter, entitled ‘Kearney between poles: Is 
too much lost in the middle?’ have been reworked from her Master of Divinity 
dissertation (2011), as well as from her Master of Theology dissertation (2012), 
later published by Scholarium (2014).
• Some of the analyses in the introductory part of the collected work, authored 
by Schalk Gerber, and titled ‘Strangers, Gods and Africa: In dialogue with 
Richard Kearney on Otherness’, have similarities with an article, published 
under the Creative Commons licence (cf. Gerber, S. H., 2018. ‘From dis-enclosure 
to decolonisation: In dialogue with Nancy and Mbembe on self-determination 
and the Other’, Religions 9[4]).
• A re-publication of the article co-authored by Daniël P. Veldsman and Mirella 
Klomp titled ‘After God but behind the Cross: The procession as a way to 
re-encounter God in a culture beyond classical liturgy’ was published in a 
non-Department of Higher Education and Training accredited journal 
(cf. Studia Liturgica 47/1[2017], 15–29) and in a section of a book published 
by Rowman and Littlefield (London).
Prof. Daniël P. Veldsman: Department of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics, University 
of Pretoria, South Africa.
Dr Yolande Steenkamp: Department of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics, University 
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As a child, I was always fascinated by how the adults around 
us interacted, the way they used gestures and linguistic expressions 
and the patterns of greeting that unfolded in their conversations 
into rich dialogue to welcome familiar faces and strangers alike. 
My father’s interaction with the men and women who came to his 
shop intrigued me the most. My parents owned a general dealer’s 
store in a shopping centre in the heart of Langa Township, a black 
residential area near Cape Town where I grew up. Langa was the 
first black township built after the passing of the Urban Areas Act 
of 1923 that forced black people out of areas where they lived in 
close proximity with whites throughout South Africa and moved 
them to areas designated as black ‘locations’. One might expect 
only stories of misery and destruction of the soul and spirit to 
emerge from this kind of social engineering of the pre-apartheid 
and apartheid eras. It is easy to assume, as Jacob Dlamini (2010) 




more than objects of state policy’ during the bad old days and that 
the effect of colonial and apartheid oppression on black life was a 
‘vast moral desert’ that produced no social orders and sense of 
values in black community life. Yet, many in my generation 
remember with  fondness the values of care and community 
instilled by our parents and the wider community – the capacity to 
welcome a stranger – despite apartheid.
My father was known as a ‘people’s person’ – umntu wabantu – 
and my mother’s name, given to her after marriage by the elders 
in my father’s family clan because of her natural kindness, was 
Nobantu – she who cares for others. In my parents’ shop, my 
father often stood near the entrance, and he would greet a 
person approaching the shop with his or her clan name – ‘Dlamini!’ 
‘Mthembu!’ ‘Qwathi!’ ‘No-Zulu!’ These clan names became a 
familiar sound in my childhood. Not only the first given clan 
names but also the long list of clan names that each was 
associated with, for one’s given clan name is a product of a long 
lineage of others through which her or his origins can be traced. 
Calling someone by her or his clan name is one of the most 
respectful forms of welcome. Being able to trace the person’s 
line of descent by saying the various other clan names associated 
with the given clan name is the highest form of welcoming a 
stranger. My father’s knowledge of the various clans and his 
capacity to trace the genealogy of each of the clan names was 
something to behold. He would shout his welcome of a person 
approaching the shop using the person’s clan name: ‘Dlamini!’ 
Then the rest of the names of the Dlamini clan would roll off like 
a praise poem: ‘Zizi, Fakade, Jama ka-Sjadu, Ngxibinoboya!’ And 
when he was encountering someone for the first time he would 
ask: Ndizakuthi ungowasemanini kanene? [To which clan shall 
I say you belong?]. Note that the question is not ‘what is your 
name?’ Rather, the question asks who are your ancestors, or 
what is the wider ‘story’ of your ancestral lineage by which you 
can be identified? The question seeks to recognise the position 
of the other’s dignity and worth as a person with a history, a 
member of a line of honourable others with names imbued 
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with  meaning. It is recognition that extends far beyond the 
person before you and says, ‘your worth and dignity is a given by 
virtue of this long line of others to which you belong’. The person 
would then respond by giving their clan name. My father might 
then say, ‘Oh, are the so-and-so’s [the clan name given] of such-
and-such a clan?’ I would later realise that this was not so 
much a question seeking confirmation, but rather a manner of 
communication that showed respect in order for the stranger to 
have agency in the encounter as the one giving the blessing for 
my father to roll out the ‘praise poem’ for the person’s ancestry.
I begin with this story to show what the concept of ubuntu 
means in action. When we say in my language, Xhosa, umntu 
ngumntu ngabanye abantu [which, loosely translated, means 
‘a person is a person through other people’], we imply an ethic 
based on the understanding that one’s subjectivity is 
inextricably intertwined with that of others in one’s community 
through reciprocal mutual recognition of the other’s human 
dignity. In other words, a person is a person through being 
witnessed by and engaging in reciprocal witnessing of other 
persons. Alternatively, human subjectivity is defined by the 
multiplicity of relationships with others. The meaning conveyed 
by the expression is twofold. Firstly, human subjectivity 
depends on being witnessed; the richness of subjectivity flows 
from interconnectedness with the wider community and from 
the reciprocal caring and complementarity of human 
relationships. Secondly, the phrase conveys the kind of 
reciprocity that calls on people to be ethical subjects. Mutual 
recognition inspired by ubuntu is fundamental to being a 
fellow human being, a relational subject in the context of 
community. This becomes an experience that allows entry into 
the other’s life in a way that makes it possible to reconstitute 
the other’s experience within the self. In this sense, then, 
recognition is not simply recognition of the physical face of 
the other – it may not even be about the other’s physical 
presence – but rather about something subtler, less visible 
than any of the physical elements of the encounter. When my 
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father asks the question ungowasemanini? – ‘to which ancestral 
lineage do you belong, or who are your ancestors?’ – the 
question seeks to know the other’s identity as part of a wider 
human community and already creates the possibility of 
crossing any boundary that may separate the self from the 
other. In contrast to the ‘I think therefore I am’ philosophy that 
positions the self at a distance from the other, this is a stance 
that allows the self to feel the other, and to stand within the 
other’s historical circumstances in order to evoke a sense of 
shared humanity across time and place.
This, in my view, is what drives the stories of reconciliation 
between survivors and victims that seem to defy comprehension 
in Rwanda. I have just returned from Rwanda, where I participated 
in a workshop in which young Rwandans presented their research 
on various aspects of the post-genocide period in their country. 
One of the studies described an encounter in a facilitated group 
process between a woman survivor of the genocide and one of 
the men who perpetrated this crime. The woman described 
the  horrific scene of mass killing that she survived during the 
genocide in Rwanda. She then told the group that the last time 
she saw the man was in the church where he shot and killed 
families who had sought refuge in the church. ‘His hands are full 
of the blood of an incredible number of the Tutsi he killed in the 
church’, the woman said. ‘He was like a killing machine […] and 
I am sure he honestly does not know how many Tutsi he killed 
Ntigurirwa (2018:n.p.). Her testimony led to uncontrollable 
sobbing in the room. The man then crawled out of his chair and 
went to kneel in front of the woman, sobbing and asking for her 
forgiveness. After some relative calm, the woman, now standing 
next to the kneeling man, extended her hand and helped him to 
get up. She then embraced him and told him that she wanted to 
forgive him and not to think of him as a killing machine, ‘but as a 
fellow human being and brother’. Hyppolite Ntigurirwa, the 
researcher reporting on this encounter describes the moment as 
follows: ‘[They] stood in an embrace with arms folded tight 
across each other’s backs’.
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This is recognition of the other not from the distance that 
bestows such recognition from a position of power but one that 
does so from a place of proximity to the other’s life-world. It is an 
‘experience-near’ that opens up the possibility of an embodied 
recognition that seeks to repair the brokenness of the other – 
because now it has become (it is like) one’s own brokenness. 
A story that crystallised this for me is that of Lindiwe Hani, the 
daughter of Chris Hani, who was assassinated in the driveway of 
his home in April 1993. Chris Hani was believed to be Nelson 
Mandela’s heir apparent, and Mandela described his killing as an 
act that was ‘so foul’ that it led to countrywide protests that 
brought South Africa ‘on the brink of disaster’. When Lindiwe 
Hani’s memoir, Being Chris Hani’s Daughter was launched, I was 
asked to facilitate a public conversation about the book. In the 
book, she describes her first visit to meet the man who killed her 
father, Janusz Waluś, and shares ‘little human moments’ that 
emerged during the visit. One of these is when Waluś thanked 
her for her visit before expressing deep regret for killing her 
father: ‘If it means anything to you, Lindiwe, I am very, very sorry 
for what I did to you and your family […] I am very, very sorry’ 
(Hani & Ferguson 2017:n.p.). Hani writes that Waluś seemed 
overcome with emotion, and that she too, could feel a lump in 
her throat. At the end of that first visit, she resolved to visit him 
again, and by the time she wrote the book, she had visited him a 
few more times. During the public conversation organised for her 
book, she told the audience about Waluś daughter, who is the 
same age as hers. ‘My wish’, she said, ‘is for Waluś to be released 
from prison so that his daughter may have her father back. If one 
of us has her father back, for me it will be as if my own father is 
returned to me’.
In his Intellectual Biography in this volume, Richard Kearney 
writes about the capacity to ‘remake history by imagining 
otherwise’ (2018:53). The stories from South Africa and Rwanda 
in the aftermath of the tragic histories in these countries exemplify 
the transformative moments that open up reparative possibilities 
that transcend recognition. It is reclaiming humanity in order to 
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remake a new humanity that gives ‘a future to the past’, in 
Kearney’s words (2018:53). There is no word for ‘stranger’ in my 
language; you would have to say something more descriptive in 
Xhosa to capture its English meaning, which might be along the 
lines of this explanatory phrase: ‘a person you do not know’. Even 
so, the fact that the stranger is a human subject – umntu – 
demands recognition of the person in the way that I have 
illustrated in the first part of this foreword. It does not mean that 
one avoids the truth about a person’s dark past. Staring into the 
abyss, confronting it and talking about it allows a level of 
reflection, an entryway that may lead us to discover that a person 
is not merely his or her deeds. The vision of ‘hosting a stranger’ 
opens up the space for the unfolding of much more than what is 
suggested by words that imply a goal (such as ‘reconciliation’, or 
‘forgiveness’). It is a vision that invites us to stand within the 
other’s brokenness in order to transcend our own. As I write this 
foreword, the world is celebrating International Nelson Mandela 
Day. If people can learn to hate, Mandela said, they can also be 
taught to love, ‘for love comes more naturally to the human heart 
than its opposite’. Hosting a Stranger is a model that gives us 
hope for the kind of human solidarity that Mandela’s life 
exemplifies and opens an ethical path for us to expand the 
horizon of what is possible in our relationships.
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Transfigurational events often typify our crossing of borders. 
Not only has this notion long characterised the work of Richard 
Kearney, but we were reminded of it once again during his visit 
to South Africa in May 2017. While the scholars whose thoughts 
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are presented in this volume were indeed to a greater or lesser 
degree already familiar with Kearney’s work, the arrival of Richard 
and his wife, Anne, was anticipated with the usual interflow of 
fascination and trembling that the strange often elicit from us. 
For the Kearneys, however, the encounter that awaited them 
was utterly strange. They had not engaged with scholars from 
Africa to any significant degree, and neither had they ever set 
foot on this continent of final frontiers.
The story of Africa’s strangeness to the (Western) world is 
written across the pages of history in many forms. These range 
from well-to-do ladies of society, sitting captivated while gripping 
the tales of explorers in their hand, brave men describing how 
they dared cross ocean, jungle and desert to discover lands so 
foreign that their sketches and sagas sounded more like fiction 
than accounts of real people. At the other end of the spectrum 
are the consequences of such objectification, ranging from 
versions of blackface to ethnological exhibitions or ‘human zoos’, 
as well as slavery and the colonisation of the continent on a 
massive scale.
Not surprisingly, then, welcoming strangers leaves a bad taste 
in the mouth of many Africans. It is exactly for this reason that 
Kearney’s work on otherness, storytelling and hospitality to the 
stranger is of particular significance to the continent of Africa. 
But it is also the reason why, in many ways, Africa may serve 
as a crucible for this sort of philosophy, laying its darker finger 
on  oversimplifications and further objectifications that remain 
hidden to Western eyes and enriching it with a perspective that 
reflects powerlessness rather than historical abuses of power.
When, through such critical dialogue, an exchange of 
Otherness is allowed to take place on its own terms, the results 
may be, of course, transformational in unpredictable ways, 
creating new worlds. We know of such a story of semantic 
innovation from the New Testament’s account of Philip’s 
encounter with the Ethiopian eunuch (Ac 8), at a time when 
Christianity was beginning to cross many borders, both seen 
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and unseen. So captivating is this story of an African encounter 
with Otherness that we wish to begin our contemplations in this 
volume from this typically narrative point of departure.
The eunuch in our story goes without a name, though he is 
said to come from Africa and to be an important official in the 
court of the Ethiopian kingdom. This is, of course, not the same 
Ethiopia as we know today, but refers to a geographical area 
south of Egypt in the area of what was known as Nubia (or Cush 
in the Old Testament). Between the fifth and sixth cataracts of 
the Nile, the Nubian kingdom was a significant African power 
between 540 BCE and 339 CE,1 and it is here that our African had 
the prominent position of treasurer of the Candace (Witherington 
1998:295; cf. Holladay 2016:188; Huizing 2016:252; Yoon 2016:15).2 
He is an official with access to political power and wealth, literate 
and eloquent, as seen from his command of the Greek optative 
(Wilson 2015b:115; cf. Pilch & Malina 2008:65). If we can say 
nothing more exact about this location, we can at least surmise 
that, in the mind of the biblical author, this man came from Africa 
proper. The eunuch was a black man,3 in skin tone and language 
a foreigner,4 and he will have had to cross many boundaries to 
reach Jerusalem, the destination of his sacred voyage.
1. This finds a biblical parallel in Job 28:19 and Isaiah 45:14, which bear witness to the wealth 
of Ethiopia, and 2 Kings 19:9, 2 Chronicles 14:9–13, Isaiah 37:9 and Jeremiah 46:9, which 
reflect its military power (Talbert 2005:75).
2. ‘Candace’ was a title for the female ruler of this land, not a personal name for the queen 
(Talbert 2005:75; Witherington 1998:296; cf. Yoon 2016:16).
3. Cf. Talbert (2005:75) and especially Jabini’s discussion of ancient sources that refer to 
inhabitants of Nubia as ‘black’ or having ‘burnt faces’ (Jabini 2012:53; cf. Holladay 2016:188; 
Witherington 1998:295; Yoon 2016:19–21).
4. While interpretations of this story have traditionally underplayed the ethnicity of the 
eunuch, the text intends quite the opposite (Huizing 2016:253). Through the narratives of the 
eunuch and Cornelius, the author shows that the gospel reaches different ethnic groups 
and  thus engages and challenges the insider–outsider boundaries of formative Judaism, 
reinterpreting it to a Roman mindset (Huizing 2016:254). Together with other landmark 
texts in Acts (e.g. Pentecost; the inclusion of gentiles through the story of Cornelius; Paul’s 
appointment as apostle to the gentiles), this text signals the fulfilment of the prophecy in
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Such political and geographical boundaries were, it seems, 
the lesser of his obstacles. It was the socio-religious boundaries, 
drawn so clearly by the Israelites to denote themselves as 
a  people set apart from the ‘other’ nations, that proved 
insurmountable to the stranger. In some way, this stranger had 
learnt of the Israelite faith, and despite the fact that he most 
likely could not become a full proselyte (Huizing 2016:251) 
nevertheless did everything within his power to approach the 
inner sanctum of this faith. Yet, despite his considerable devotion 
to the God of the Israelites and despite his considerable effort 
to draw near to the most holy navel of the earth, the city of God, 
he would forever, it seemed, remain an outsider. Israelite law 
prohibited eunuchs from setting foot in the temple in Jerusalem.5 
The holiness of Yahweh, signified by the progressively holier 
sections of the sanctuary, was strictly safeguarded against the 
questionable bodies of foreigners, women and anyone whose 
(footnote 4 continues...)
Acts 1:8, which itself gives voice to the Old Testament vision of God’s final restoration, which 
includes the ends of the earth. Indeed, ancient authors often referred to Ethiopia with the 
phrase ‘end of the earth’ (Jabini 2012:52; Wilson 2015b:116; Witherington 1998:290; Yoon 
2016:17), and so the link between this story and the prophecy of Jesus and the prophets is 
clear. Huizing rightly remarks that, ‘[I]t should be with some degree of shame that the church 
has minimised this passage throughout its history. Ethiopia becomes the anticipated 
fulfilment of Jesus’s words and the ushering in of the restoration of God and yet Ethiopia 
rarely ever makes it onto Bible maps (Martin 1989:121). Luke does not seem to know of any 
such diminishment because of race or geography. He rejoices, along with the Ethiopian 
eunuch, that God’s restoration has begun’ (Huizing 2016:256). It is important to see how this 
text functions within the larger Lukan development of the salvation history theme, which he 
developed from the Old Testament, through the life of Jesus and the history of the early 
believers, culminating in Paul’s ministry. As the final of the three synoptic authors, the 
immediate expectation of the Parousia necessitated the shift in focus for Luke–Acts (Dube 
2013:2). So significant is this focus in Luke–Acts that Charles Talbert has called it a ‘narrative 
of fulfilment’: ‘What is being actualized in the various prophecies’ fulfilment is the plan of God 
that stands behind the events narrated’ (Talbert 2005:xv).
5. Talbert notes how Josephus mentions foreigners who made the difficult journey to 
Jerusalem to worship in the temple, only to find themselves excluded from it or from full 
participation in cultic activities, on account of ritual impurity (Ant. 3.15.3 paras. 318–319; War 
6.9.3 paras. 426–427; cf. Talbert 2005:76).
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body had been made unclean by physical ailments or any lack of 
wholeness.6 Eunuchs could never enter the temple of God.7
Apart from boundaries that excluded the eunuch from the 
Israelite faith, he was also faced with the challenge of negotiating 
an identity amidst the complex intersection between status 
(treasurer), gender (eunuch, therefore unmanly)8 and ethnicity 
(Ethiopian) in the Graeco-Roman world, as so clearly illustrated 
6. This applied specifically to eunuchs, see Deuteronomy 23:1. While eunuchs were at times 
valued in antiquity, both the Israelite and early Judaic textual tradition regarded them with 
hostility, seeing them as ‘emasculated’, ‘physically blemished’ and ‘in a permanent state of 
ritual impurity’ (Talbert 2005:75; cf. Holladay 2016:189; Witherington 1998:296).
7. Huizing provides a good summary on scholarly debate on this matter (Huizing 2016: 
252–253; cf. also Jabini 2012:54–56; Yoon 2016:22–27). Opinions on the extent of the eunuch’s 
participation in the Israelite faith range from, on the one hand, those who argue that he was, in 
fact, a full-fledged Jew who served in the courts of Nubia, or was at least a proselyte, or even 
was not necessarily a physical eunuch (any court official could be described by the word 
eunuch, which did not mean they were necessarily one physically). On the other hand, we have 
those scholars who take seriously the restraints placed upon him as both a foreigner and a 
eunuch. Huizing himself follows the indicators in the text that the eunuch’s participation in the 
Israelite faith was limited, which is also the position taken here. As a God-fearer, the eunuch 
may have been permitted to worship in the Court of the Gentiles (1 Ki 8:41–43), but the fact that 
the Acts 8 text mentions ‘eunuch’ and ‘court official’ in the same sentence (Ac 8:27), and the 
fact that the eunuch is said to serve a queen, suggests that this eunuch was indeed one 
physically and for this reason would be excluded from becoming a full proselyte and entering 
the temple (Dt 23:1; Huizing 2016:253; cf. Wilson 2015b:118). Perhaps, Wilson solves the scholarly 
stalemate well by regarding both the ethnicity and gender of the eunuch as ‘liminal’, ‘The 
eunuch may appear to be a Gentile within Acts 8 itself and a Jew within the larger Acts 
narrative, but either way, he overlaps with both these ethnic categories and that is precisely the 
point. Indeed, Acts 8:26–40 is at a pivotal point in the narrative by virtue of its liminal posture: 
the eunuch’s conversion sits at the intersection of the acceptance of the gospel by Jews 
(2:1–8:25) and Gentiles (10:1–11:18), signalling that something new is occurring even as it provides 
continuity with what has transpired beforehand.’ (Wilson 2015b:117, cf. Barreto 2010:25).
In the book of Acts, then, this narrative illustrates that, ‘the gospel was taken not only to 
the “half-breed” Samaritans, but even to those who could never fully participate in Judaism 
(Martin 1989:109), not to mention the first gentile’ (Spencer 1992:173; Huizing 2016:253; 
cf. Yoon 2016:27).
8. Philo described eunuchs as ‘neither male nor female’ (Somn 2.184), while Josephus encouraged 
the excommunication of ‘those who have deprived themselves of their manhood […]’ because 
‘their soul has become effeminate […]’ (Ant. 4.290–291; Wilson 2015b:123). Cf. Yoon’s analysis 
of the Ethiopian eunuch’s complex identity, where he considers Graeco-Roman dynamics, Old 
Testament (LXX) allusions to the Elijah–Elisha narratives and the quotation in the narrative from 
Isaiah 53:7–8 (Yoon 2016, esp. 32–34 regarding gender categories).
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by Wilson.9 Indeed, according to these standards, too, the eunuch 
did not quite live up to elite representations of masculinity. For 
various reasons, then, the African stranger returns home still an 
outsider but perhaps more so now that he had done everything 
conceivable to draw as near to the Israelite God as possible. An 
educated man, and wealthy because he possessed his own scroll, 
he reads aloud on his chariot during his journey to Jerusalem. 
Most reading in the ancient world was out loud, but in our story 
it serves to enable Philip to hear the words of the foreign traveller 
and to pose an important question (cf. Witherington 1998:297), 
‘[d]o you understand what you are reading?’ (Ac 8:30).
The hermeneutic question is central to any encounter with 
otherness,10 and as we read along we will see that our narrative 
proceeds by means of questions. The wager of opening to the 
stranger can take place only amidst questions of how to interpret 
what arises before me, how to reinterpret myself in view of it 
and how to conceive of an (im)possible new world where such 
strangeness might enter into and forever change me. Risk lies at 
the heart of every encounter with the stranger, for in some way 
it predicts the end of the familiar: the other may destroy me or 
may leave me enlarged by its otherness. Philip’s question to the 
African official invites such an exchange, and the eunuch’s answer 
is poignant, ‘[h]ow can I, unless someone guides me?’ (Ac 8:31).
Is it small wonder that, following his repeated exposure to 
cold shoulders and relentlessly persistent (and excluding) 
boundaries, this educated man, evidently from the well-born elite 
(Pilch & Malina 2008:66), still experiences himself as an outsider 
to the Israelite faith? Although his education, status and exposure 
would certainly make him a teacher to Philip,11 an uneducated 
9. Cf. Chapter 4 of Wilson’s (2015b) publication, or the earlier article in New Testament 
Studies (Wilson 2015a:403–422).
10. This is one of Richard Kearney’s central points regarding hospitality (cf. Kearney 2011:37–39).
11. The irony of the eunuch’s status as government official, likely traveling with his full 
entourage (Huizing 2016:252), meeting with the simple, singular character of Philip should be 
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follower of the Jesus movement, the African nevertheless 
imagines that he needs someone to guide him into the intricacies 
of the Israelite faith and disclose to him the meaning that he 
yearns for. These words capture what could in itself be called an 
African lament, consisting in the continent’s struggle for self-
definition amidst versions of imposed leadership–followership 
identities whenever Africa engages with the Western world.12
But it is here, in the words that Luke has the eunuch read, that 
the seed of transfiguration lies, for Luke places in the mouth of 
the stranger words about yet another outsider.13 When Philip 
ascends the chariot and sits next to the Ethiopian, he interprets 
the words of Isaiah’s Suffering Servant as referring to a strange, 
unlikely messiah. In Jesus of Nazareth, the African official meets 
someone who shares his own experience of being ostracised 
by the religious powers centralised in Jerusalem.14 The servant of 
(footnote 11 continues...)
seen against the other ‘dichotomy in status’, namely, between what the eunuch enjoyed at 
home and what was denied him in Judaism (Huizing 2016:252). The roles are completely 
reversed in the present narrative, where the lowly becomes the teacher (Philip), while the 
excluded becomes an insider – one of the first non-Israelite believers in the book of Acts.
12. Consider Zorodzai Dube’s deliberation on Philip’s question, ‘Do you understand what you 
are reading’, as reflecting the Western missionary and academic perspective ‘that they were 
dealing with illiterate, uncouth and unenlightened people who were in need of their mission 
and cultural salvation’ (Dube 2013:1).
13. The passage from Isaiah 53:7–8 about Isaiah’s Suffering Servant is interpreted by Philip to 
refer to the ‘good news’ of Jesus, which within the perspective of Luke–Acts means that 
God’s raising of Jesus from the dead established him as Messiah and Lord, signalling the 
imminent Israelite theocracy (Pilch & Malina 2008:66). Cf. Talbert for his understanding of 
what such a Christological interpretation meant in light of the interpretation of scripture by 
Jesus in Luke and by the church in Acts (Talbert 2005:77–78).
14. Pilch and Malina have pointed out that Luke–Acts is concerned with ‘what the God of 
Israel gives to faithful Israelites by means of Jesus with the help of the apostles, while being 
opposed by Israelite elites’. The intended audience of this gospel clearly identifies with this 
faithful Israelite in-group, who recognise God’s activities in and through Jesus. In this way, 
and as is clearly seen in the narrative of the Ethiopian eunuch as well, Luke polemicises the 
Israelite elite who denied Jesus as an agent of God. This indicates that the main social 
opposition of the intended audience came from Israelite Jesus-deniers (Pilch & Malina 
2008:10). Read in context, then, the Lukan theme of the ‘Gentile mission’ means firstly the 
expansion of the gospel to Israelites living in far-off lands. This could include proselytes or 
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Isaiah is described as someone without offspring15 who, like him, 
was deemed unworthy and ‘unclean’.16 Someone whose following 
consisted of the similar ‘questionables’ of society. Someone who 
was ostracised to the point of a shameful death on a cross but 
whose honour was affirmed through the resurrection by the God 
that this outsider had dared call ‘Father’. Philip calls this story 
that he shares with the Ethiopian the ‘good news’ about Jesus, 
and it is indeed good news to anyone whose religious life had 
been characterised by the same exclusion as that of both the 
Ethiopian and the Nazarene.
‘Look, here is water! What is to prevent me from being 
baptised?’ (Ac 8:36). The Ethiopian’s next question, as they 
happen to pass a body of water by the roadside, raises the 
concern of his acceptability, calling to memory his experience of 
exclusion at the temple because of his bodily disfigurement. The 
fact that he finds the boldness to ask the question illustrates that 
one moment of understanding has left him transfigured and his 
entire world changed. In contrast to the multiple experiences of 
exclusion, in this instance, the response, which is never spoken 
(footnote 14 continues...)
God-fearers, of course, who had accepted the Israelite faith even though they were ethnically 
non-Israelite. Given such narratives as that of the Ethiopian eunuch and Cornelius, this constitutes 
an important element in Acts. The Israelite in-group, therefore, here consists of all those who had 
drawn near to the Israelite God, seen as having acted through Jesus, irrespective of ethnic identity.
15. For this reading, see Witherington (1998:298–299).
16. Four lengthy quotations from Isaiah illustrate the prophet’s significant influence on Luke–
Acts (Lk 3:4–6; 4:17–19; Ac 8:32–33; 28:25–27). Significantly, third Isaiah anticipates a time 
when boundaries and the exclusion of eunuchs and foreigners would cease, promising to 
eunuchs a name that ‘shall not be cut off’ (Is 56:3–8). Reading of the excluded Suffering 
Servant whose descendants were ‘cut off’, therefore, would lead to the eunuch’s identification 
with both the servant and Jesus. The fact that Jesus was proclaimed to him as raised from 
the dead, and therefore exonerated and honoured by God, would recall the promise of Isa 
56 and lead to further identification with Jesus, but this time as one included by God. In the 
words of Witherington (1998:296), ‘In view of the focus on the Servant Songs in this very 
passage, it may be that Luke wishes us to see this story as a whole being about the fulfillment 
of that promise in Isaiah 56. The point would be that nothing hindered the eunuch from being 
a full-fledged follower of the one in whom Isaiah’s promises were being fulfilled in the 
present, even though he could not be a full-fledged Jew.’
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but enacted through the rite of baptism, is that nothing prevents 
him from fellowship with the community of God’s followers 
(cf. Wilson 2015b:124).17 The African has passed over from one 
identity, that of an excluded stranger, to that of radical inclusion 
in a community characterised by radical hospitality. This is 
affirmed by the fact that, following the baptism, Philip immediately 
disappears, ‘snatched away’ by the Spirit of God, so that the 
‘guide’ the Ethiopian thought he needed is no longer present. 
Instead, the man goes on his way rejoicing and, as tradition would 
have it, becomes instrumental in bringing the gospel to the early 
church in Africa.18 While this later tradition does not shed light on 
the author’s intention, what is clear is that through the author’s 
inclusion of this narrative in the Book of Acts, he establishes the 
transfigured eunuch as a prototype19 for the new community that 
is being formed, where outsiders become insiders (Huizing 
2016:248).20 Even the location of the wilderness emphasises this 
17. The conditional clause in verse 37 is not original and therefore not included in many of the 
newer translations. Cf. Holladay (2016:187–188, 191).
18. Irenaeus (Haer 3.12.8–10) relates that the eunuch was instrumental in evangelising the 
Nubian Kingdom, even though official Christianity only reached the region in the later part of 
the 4th century CE (Huizing 2016:249–250; Witherington 1998:301).
19. He was already a person of influence before his conversion, ‘as an ideal convert who 
joyfully receives the good news (v. 39), the Ethiopian eunuch appears at a pivotal point in the 
progression of ‘the Way’ and in turn models the way to receive the gospel’ (Wilson 2015b:115). 
Insofar as his gender liminality ‘exemplifies Jesus’ own embodiment of paradoxical power’, 
Wilson has pointed out that Luke represents the Ethiopian eunuch as a ‘model convert’ who 
embodies ‘impotent power’ (Wilson 2015b:115, 137–140).
20. Like the Gospel of Luke, the Book of Acts can be divided into two sections along insider–
outsider lines. In the Gospel of Luke, this takes the form of Jesus among Galileans, on the one 
hand, and his activities among Judeans on the other. In Acts, the activities among Judeans 
living in traditionally Israelite lands and surrounding regions (such as Antioch), with a 
majority Israelite population, progress to Judeans living in traditionally non-Israelite regions, 
where Israelites were a distinct minority (Pilch & Malina 2008:9). It is important to remember 
that Luke writes not for outsiders but for members of the Jesus in-group (Pilch & Malina 
2008:9). By his including narratives of outsiders becoming insiders in this gospel to the Jesus 
in-group, we catch a glimpse of what we may call a Lukan ecclesiology, where the in-group 
has become radically redefined. The story of the Ethiopian eunuch is such a narrative, 
exemplifying the ‘boundary-crossing nature’ of the gospel (Wilson 2015b:115). Indeed, ‘all 
sorts of people are included in the messianic community: Ethiopians, Samaritans, eunuchs,
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point, because the wilderness symbolised that which lay beyond 
the boundary of the known world, often associated with 
questionable spirits and wild animals. No holds are barred for the 
radical hospitality of the new community, however, epitomised 
by the fact that the transition from insider to outsider takes place 
in the wilderness, simultaneously calling to mind the activity of 
John the Baptist in the wilderness (Pilch & Malina 2008:65). Yoon 
(2016) aptly captures the intent of the story in the summary to 
his doctoral thesis:
First, Luke depicts the Ethiopian eunuch as the consummate 
outsider – geographically, morally, socially, ethnically, and in terms of 
gender – and indicates that the eunuch represents other marginalised 
outsiders. The eunuch shows no one can prevent outsiders like 
him  from inclusion in the kingdom of God. Second, Luke portrays 
Philip as a prophet, specifically a prophet like Elijah and Elisha. Philip 
emulates Elijah and Elisha by reaching out to the outsider (in this 
instance, the Ethiopian eunuch). Third, Luke presents the Isaianic 
Suffering Servant as a religious and social outsider and identifies 
the character with Jesus and the Ethiopian eunuch. The indescribable 
descendants of the Suffering Servant signify a universally inclusive 
messianic community and fulfil the outsider’s inclusion within 
the people of God as Isaiah prophesied (Is 56:3–8). (p. iv)
This story of how the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth managed to 
cross boundaries during its early expansion touches upon many 
aspects that still inform our discussion around otherness in 
general, and Africa’s engagement with the world in particular.21 
That the author of the eunuch story finds it necessary to justify 
the inclusion of this outsider by having not only an angel of God 
(footnote 20 continues...)
women as well as men, magicians as well as those impressed by magic. All can believe in 
Jesus, all can be baptized, all can receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, all can be fully included 
in the church. In Luke–Acts, however, inclusiveness is not an absolute value. It is a contingent 
value. Such inclusion demands radical repentance’ (Talbert 2005:80).
21. Cf. especially Dube’s reading of the text from the perspective of the eunuch rather than 
within the context of the Lukan salvation history theme, and then especially through the lens 
of migration studies. Read in this way, he also regards it as a story about an outsider who 
wishes to be regarded as an insider, which reflects the experience and longing of migrants 
who undergo a similar renegotiation of their identity (Dube 2013:1–7).
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prompt Philip to follow the road to Gaza but also the Spirit of 
God tell him to approach the chariot (Witherington 1998:293), 
points to just how formidable our boundaries may seem, and 
how impossible hospitality to the other may appear. Many of 
the chapters in this volume indeed huddle together around this 
very theme.
A central point in the narrative is certainly the quotation 
from Isaiah 53. The image of the Suffering Servant was so easily 
transferrable to Jesus of Nazareth in the early church precisely 
because, compared to the religious elite centralised in Jerusalem, 
this outsider from Galilee embodied strangeness at the heart 
of the gospel. Perhaps, the reason why Kearney’s philosophy has 
facilitated such a fruitful exchange on the theme of hospitality is 
that he did not start out merely writing about hospitality for 
hospitality’s sake. Instead, his hospitality project formed part of 
a larger search for new ways to conceive the sacred. Kearney’s 
God question, namely, of finding new ways to speak of God in 
a world that in many ways narrate its existence after God, has 
led  him to formulating conceptions of God that locates 
vulnerability in the God-concept itself. The idea that we may 
encounter God in the otherness of the stranger at our door, and 
may possibilise God to be God by offering impossible hospitality, 
intersects with the hermeneutic lines of our political, economic, 
spiritual and even artistic ways of being-in-the-world. It 
renegotiates identity in dialogue with the other in ways that 
expose our denial of the other in our own discourses of power 
and therefore places our own God-talk in parenthesis, suddenly 
vulnerable for the way it exposes and reveals our will to power.
The African lament
The story of the eunuch, an ‘outsider’, black man from Nubia, 
finds a significant transfigurational ‘insider’ echo almost 
2000 years later, and on the very same African soil, 
although semantically and existentially clothed in a different 
socio-religious garment. The innovative echo sounds from 
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Ugandan Catholic theologian Emmanuel Katongole’s recent Born 
from Lament, with the directional subtitle, The Theology and 
Politics of Hope in Africa (2017). In his book, Katongole speaks of 
a ‘turning to God’, and at the outset we wish to indicate how we 
relate his ‘turning to God’ to the ‘re-turn to God’ by the Irish 
philosopher Richard Kearney. We do this for two reasons, firstly 
to sketch the context for and space of this publication in its 
connectivity to existential lament and anatheism (cf. section 
‘Turning to God and the return to God’), and secondly to provide 
a guiding map for the reader with regard to the chapters to 
follow (see section ‘Katongole and Kearney: Africans debating 
otherness with a continental philosopher’).
Turning to God and the return to God
Katongole’s work is hailed on the back cover of his book by the 
Cameroonian-American academic Elias Kifon Bongmba of Rice 
University as a ‘refreshing political theology’ that represents a 
‘compelling invitation to rethink the theology of hope’. It is a 
theology, according to the Catholic scholar Stan Chu Ilo from 
DePaul University, that gives ‘voice to those on the margins’ by 
arguing that (Katongole 2017):
[H]ope in Africa should be presented not simply as a wish or pious 
claim but as light that one can discover in Africa by following stories 
of faith, courage, and the practice of hopeful living among many 
African Christians. (n.p., back cover text)
Reformed pastor Mark Gornik of the City Seminary of New York 
appreciatively states that Katongole is ‘one of the most 
remarkable and transformational theological leaders of our time’, 
helping us ‘to see how God and the everyday, lament and hope, 
Scripture and prayer, church and public life all hold together’ 
(Katongole 2017:back cover). For Katongole himself there is 
no more urgent theological task than to provide an account of 
hope in Africa (cf. Katongole 2017:xvi). This is because of the 
challenge posed by its endless cycles of violence, war, poverty 
and displacement (cf. Katongole 2017:21, 260). In such contexts, 
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hope takes for Katongole the form of arguing and wrestling 
with  God in the midst of suffering (Katongole 2017:xi, xiii, xvi 
[especially], 57–61, 261). He existentially labels his theological 
accounting of hope ‘lament’, in telling the stories of Christian 
activists for nonviolent change in the Great Lakes Region of 
eastern Africa. Lament for him is not merely to be understood 
as  a ‘cry of pain’ but as a way of ‘mourning, protesting, and 
appealing to God’ (Katongole 2017:xvi). It implies not only 
listening to their cries and stories but also listening for a particular 
story (Katongole 2017:37ff., 260–261). He carefully explains that 
the notion of lament holds the key to a full explication of the 
nature and reality of hope in the midst of Africa’s turbulent 
history (Katongole 2017:xiii), because lament is a form of turning 
towards God in the midst of ruins. In short: lament is a way of 
dwelling amidst ruins (Katongole 2017:19), an active engagement 
with the world of suffering.
When the stories of the African eunuch and the African priest 
are read together, one may notice a certain progression that 
we  wish to connect with Kearney’s concept of anatheism and 
hospitality to the stranger. Whereas the eunuch responds as 
outsider to the question ‘[d]o you understand what you are 
reading?’ with words implying dependence on some insider 
insight to which he can lay no claim – ‘[h]ow can I unless someone 
guides me?’ – the priest approaches God in protest with the faith 
and confidence of an insider. This progression is seen as well 
in the changing of the question – from the possibly patronising 
‘[d]o you understand’ to the engaging and challenging ‘[w]hat 
carried a person forward through the dark nights of not knowing?’ 
(Katongole 2017:xiii). Katongole finds the answer to this question 
in lament, representing a wrestling and arguing with God. Read 
together, we can clearly see the movement from an outsider 
‘questioning’, to an insider ‘questioning’. A movement from that 
of an African eunuch, seeking to be let in and for boundaries 
of  exclusion and alienation to be abolished, to that of the 
African theologian, engaging the tradition with a deep sense of 
dependency that comes with belonging. In the questions posed 
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by Katongole, we hear a gripping contemporary voice of an 
African theology confident enough to engage God critically. 
In this sense, both outsider and insider represent an arguing and 
wrestling in search of God, although from very different socio-
religious spaces and with different objectives. While for the first 
African, the outcome of his search was transfiguration as he 
found the boundary between outsider and insider obliterated, 
the second challenges the tradition as insider, overwhelmed by 
the penetrating existential questions that flow from the mouths 
of those who have suffered or continue to suffer in dehumanising 
ways. How can and does one turn to God when foundations are 
destroyed? What does the turning look like in the midst of violent 
destruction and the shattering of the foundations of human and 
social existence? What words and what kind of language does 
one use to express the ineffable (Katongole 2017:19)?
As insider wrestling with ‘destruction and shattering of 
foundations’, Katongole reflectively turns to God anew in hope 
through the portraiture methodology of Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot 
and Jessica Davis (2017:33ff.). He adapts their methodology for 
his own aim of theological storytelling for the purpose of bringing 
a theology of hope to Africa. For Katongole, an account of hope 
in Africa would have to be shaped around narratives or portraits 
of hope on this continent, but then not only in listening to stories 
but also in listening for a story. The latter he finds as the reason 
for hope at the intersection of Christ’s suffering and the gift of his 
resurrection. Although the Jesus story represents for him the 
more immediate story to listen for, it is itself located within a 
broader story of God’s journey with humanity and creation 
(cf.  Katongole 2017:38). The story of hope begins and finds 
expression in lament as a way of wrestling and arguing with God 
(cf. Katongole 2017:41, 106–107), a turning towards God and also 
a turning around God (cf. Katongole 2017:107, 119) that ultimately 
reflects a deep immersion in the covenant relationship with 
God and the community of faith. In short: biblical lament is for 
Katongole (2017:107) a structured and complex language of 
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complaint, protest and appeal directed to God. It is faith language. 
It is a way of knowing through tears (Katongole 2017), a:
[W ]ay to hurt with God when one is in the midst of a storm [… the] 
potential to bring one to a new place, to a new depth. And thus to 
a new song of praise which is qualitatively different from the praise 
before. This new place is also a kind of seeing, not simply in terms 
of  mental insight, but in the sense of knowing and experience. 
(pp. 108–109)
While both Africans have yearned for a spiritual homecoming, and 
while this homecoming took different forms, we wish for a moment 
to reflect on the ‘turning to God’ present in both narratives in view 
of Kearney’s anatheistic ‘re-turn’ to God. While the first narrative 
points to the human boundaries that separate outsiders from the 
divine, or from insider spaces, the second narrative of an Africa all 
but destroyed by suffering, yet still calling upon her God in the 
voice of protest demanded by the suffering, brings together two 
strands of Kearney’s anatheism. It is, firstly, in the willingness to 
question the God of triumph, according to which all will be well with 
the in-group, who find themselves at the receiving end of omnipotent 
benevolence, that a new way is opened to a totally new, totally 
strange, totally unexpected God, not simply one who confirms but 
also one who destabilises the past experience of God (Katongole 
2017:112). It is a ‘re-turn’ that now carries both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
dimensions, a deep-reaching mixture of a sense of belonging and 
an atheistic hermeneutic moment. It is a movement to an acoustic 
place where God’s call can be heard anew. This God is to be heard 
and found, secondly, in the telling of the small stories of hope as 
they persist and insist on embodying to a suffering continent the 
story of hope – that of the Suffering Servant who paid no boundaries 
between strangers any respect. In Kearney’s words, to continue to 
speak of God after some of the most horrifying terrors of our world 
is an insult, unless we find new ways of speaking (Kearney 2011:xvi). 
It is in the stories of hope where boundaries between strangers 
become obsolete in the face of kindness to the widow, orphan and 
enemy that a new possibility for thinking about God is born.
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Katongole and Kearney: Africans debating 
otherness with a Continental philosopher
From Katongole’s risk of finding in our lamentations of arguing 
and wrestling with God a totally new, totally strange and 
unexpected God, we turn in our African initiative to enquire into 
the radical stranger, the God of otherness and the radical 
hospitality that we find in the philosophical discourse of Richard 
Kearney. The discourse concerns an anatheistic wager and return 
to God, having lost God altogether, and is marked by a deep 
fusion of outsider–insider dimensions. Do Katongole’s turn to 
and around God in lament and Kearney’s anatheistic re-turn to 
God have anything to say to each other?
Although this dialogical question is neither the explicit 
vantage point of the chapters that follow nor pursued in any 
of  the questions posed in them, it nevertheless represents 
an  implicit existential–theological vantage point of God-talk in 
the spaces and contexts of African cries and longing for hope. 
Through this vantage point, we wish to locate within the larger 
continent of Africa the specifically South African engagement 
with Kearney’s insider–outsider discourse on God with another 
contemporary discourse on God. This ‘placing’ is informed 
by  certain guiding questions posed specifically within the 
African context by South African scholars on the philosophical 
contribution of Richard Kearney. Such questions include the 
following:
1. How do the philosophical ‘third way’ discourse of the 
anatheistic wager, the welcoming of the stranger and 
otherness, and radical hospitality relate to the African lament, 
that is, arguing and wrestling with God amidst suffering on the 
African continent?
2. Are there boundaries to be deconstructed and borders to be 
crossed in a constructive manner that may render us 
transfigured, giving birth to new and hopeful ways of 




In the first chapter on Kearney’s work (Ch. 1), American postdoctoral 
fellow Justin Sands from North-West University, Potchefstroom, 
poses a hermeneutical question that sets the stage for what follows 
in the book - ‘Where do you come from, Richard Kearney?’ (Sands 
2018:22). Sands remembers how he encountered the same 
persistent question as an American scholar in Potchefstroom, in this 
way creatively opening the engagement with Kearney in the African 
context by reminding us that narrative matters (Sands 2018):
From Afrikaners, Indians, Coloureds, to Xhosas, Zulus and everyone 
in between, the stories and histories that one tells about themselves 
matter more than mere introduction. It announces a lived history and 
connection to others. It is in this vein that I welcome Richard Kearney 
to our ongoing discussions in South Africa and ask him: ‘Where do 
you come from, Richard Kearney?’ (p. 22)
Kearney takes up Sands’ important question in Chapter 2 by 
telling his own story, explaining and describing in biographical 
detail how he came to the philosophy of the Stranger. His story 
unfolds as the explication of the relationship between hermeneutics 
of hospitality and his intellectual itinerary.
With the Kearney intellectual narrative as background, the 
South African philosophers Pieter Duvenhage (University of 
the  Free State, Bloemfontein) and Anné Verhoef (North-West 
University, Potchefstroom) delve exploratively into and around 
his philosophical story. In Chapter 3, Duvenhage poses the same 
probing questions against the background of the main trajectories 
of the institutionalisation of a philosophical discourse in South 
Africa, exploring from where (which horizon) Kearney is coming. 
Verhoef, in turn, engages with another philosophical horizon, 
namely, that of metaphysics. In Chapter 4, Verhoef turns his 
philosophical focus to the question of what type of transcendence 
is described, implied or motivated by Kearney’s anatheism.
Chapters 5–10 represent engagement with Kearney’s 
philosophical viewpoint on the stranger, otherness, anatheism 
and radical hospitality.
In Chapter 5, the practical theologian and philosopher Johann-
Albrecht Meylahn, from the University of Pretoria, sketches in a 
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gripping manner how the poetics of Kearney’s Anatheism drew 
him into its wager and captured his imagination. It challenged 
him but at the same time inspired him. From the very words that 
Kearney has provided him with, then, he moves to question the 
possibility of a book such as Anatheism itself.
Is there not too much lost in the middle? This is the question 
posed in Chapter 6 by the systematic theologian Yolande 
Steenkamp, research associate of the University of Pretoria. She 
critically engages with Kearney’s preference for middle ways as 
a means of steering clear of polar opposites.
In Chapter 7, the doctoral philosophical student Schalk 
Gerber of Stellenbosch University takes a relevant question as 
the starting point of his engagement with Kearney: What may 
the thought of Kearney contribute to the challenge of thinking 
otherness – translated as decolonisation – in the context of 
South Africa?
The thought-provoking title of Chapter 8, ‘Approaching the 
threshold: Hospitality as a pedagogical wager in the work of 
Richard Kearney’, captures what Helgard Pretorius, systematic 
theologian from Stellenbosch University, asks of Kearney 
concerning the heart of his philosophical approach: How does 
one learn of the other? Is it possible to become better at 
responding to the experience of strangeness? If the presence of 
the Stranger calls for hospitality, is that something one could 
cultivate in oneself or in others?
Chapters 9–12 focus on God-talk, with the different 
contributions pursuing the significant question in related but 
diverse ways. Daniël P. Veldsman, systematic theologian from 
the University of Pretoria, explores in Chapter 9 the relationship 
between God-talk within biblical prophetic literature and 
Kearney’s philosophical contemporary discourse on God, 
searching for possible comparative elements of continuity and of 
discontinuity. In turn, the systematic theologian Wessel Bentley 
of University of South Africa explicates in Chapter 10 the scene 
that Kearney sets for a re-appraisal of God-talk in his philosophical 
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construct of the encounter of God as stranger and subsequently 
explores the implications of such a ‘strange’ theology in the 
practice of Holy Communion. In Chapter 11, systematic theologian 
Rian Venter from the University of the Free State takes up the 
interesting engagement as conversation between a theology of 
the Trinity and a theopoetics of anatheism, which respects 
otherness, and generates the possibility of new self-understanding. 
Venter emphasises how Trinitarian theology could be enriched 
by this conversation, through a greater attention to imagination, 
possibility, everyday life, alterity, human agency and space. 
In Chapter 12, ‘After God but behind the Cross: The procession 
as  a way to re-encounter God in a culture beyond classical 
liturgy’, practical theologian Mirella Klomp from the Protestant 
Theological University, Amsterdam, and Daniël P. Veldsman 
pursue a deeper understanding of public liturgical ritual after 
the demolishing impact of secularisation on religious institutions 
in contemporary late modern Western Europe. They do this 
in  direct appropriation of The Passion, a popular musical 
representation in the Netherlands of the suffering, death and 
resurrection of Christ – a ritual that has grown into a large, open-
air media event that is celebrated annually on a square of one of 
the country’s larger cities. The authors pose the question: How 
do participants from a 21st-century secularised society encounter 
God in the processional shapes of The Passion?
Chapters 13 and 14 shift the focus to the contextual heartbeat 
of South African society, considering the country’s deeply 
disturbing and complex processes of dealing with its traumatic 
past in light of Kearney’s viewpoint of radical hospitality. The 
systematic theologian from Stellenbosch University, Robert 
Vosloo, discusses in Chapter 13 the work of the South African 
clinical psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela against the 
backdrop of Ricoeur’s articulation of the tension between love 
and justice. Her work is marked by the question of how notions 
such as remorse, forgiveness, empathy and restitution can play 
a  role in the complex processes of dealing with the trauma of 
the past in a way that has the potential to rehumanise victims 
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and perpetrators. He explores possibilities for responsible 
engagement with the past by stating that it requires an embodied 
historical hermeneutic, akin to what Kearney, in conversation 
with Ricoeur’s thought, calls ‘carnal hermeneutics’. In Chapter 14, 
‘Towards hospitality between enemies’, Wilhelm Verwoerd, a 
peace practitioner and senior researcher at Historical Trauma 
and Transformation, University of Stellenbosch, focuses on the 
profound and challenging question of what it really means to 
extend genuine hospitality to the stranger, especially when the 
stranger turns out to be a sworn enemy.
Chapter 15 consists of a transcribed dialogue with Richard 
Kearney that transpired on 16 April 2018, in which Kearney 
addressed questions and concerns posed by the various scholars 
who engaged with his work in the chapters included in this 
volume. We consider it a thought-provoking contribution to offer 
in print such an exchange between African scholars and one of 
the thought leaders in contemporary Continental philosophy.
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When I first arrived at Potchefstroom in October 2015, the one 
persistent question I was asked by now-friends and friendly 
strangers was, ‘Why are you here? What brings you to South 
Africa?’ At first, I thought that this was basic curiosity – what is 
an American doing in Potchefstroom? – yet, it was not until later 
that I recognised this question’s significance to South Africans: 
in  this country of 11 national languages and various cultures, 
narrative matters. This is something that Kearney also recognises 
Chapter 1
Introduction to Richard Kearney’s intellectual autobiography
22
in On Stories (2002), a work devoted to exploring narrative and 
identity. From Afrikaners, Indians, Coloureds, to Xhosas, Zulus 
and everyone in between, the stories and histories that one 
tells  about themselves matter more than mere introduction. 
It announces a lived history and connection to others. It is in this 
vein that I welcome Richard Kearney to our ongoing discussions 
in South Africa and ask him: ‘Where do you come from, Richard 
Kearney?’
Richard Kearney readily and continually asks himself this 
question, especially in the introductions to many of his works. 
Drawing from his mentor Paul Ricoeur, Kearney often begins his 
work by asking himself, ‘D’où parlez-vous?’ In effect, ‘From where 
do you speak?’22 Not just what is your historico-cultural context, 
but who are you and what brings you to this discussion? In both 
the following and final chapters, where he will engage the authors 
of this anthology in dialogue, I anticipate that Richard Kearney 
will give us many details about from where he speaks and what 
brings him to this discussion, but I would like to modestly focus 
our understanding of his intellectual autobiography through 
three smaller, more accessible questions:
1. Where have you been?
2. Where are you now?
3. Where are you going?
In what follows, I will say a little bit about these questions from 
my own perspective in hopes of opening this conversation.
Where have you been?
Richard Kearney is widely influential in philosophy of religion, 
particularly after his Trilogy: Philosophy at the Limit, which, in 
addition to On Stories (2002), consists of The God Who May Be 
(2001) and Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (2003). One often 
22. Cf. the introduction to Kearney (2001:5–6).
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sees academics in this field mainly explore his understanding of 
the God of possibility. After Kearney published Anatheism (2011), 
research on this possible God and what an anatheism may entail 
became a central and prevailing theme throughout the field. 
However, even though his notions on God have progressed the 
field greatly, I wonder if his works on hermeneutics and alterity 
have been overlooked. Interestingly, only the God Who May Be 
solely focuses upon God, whereas the other two works mainly 
explore alterity and narrativity.
Kearney’s work before this trilogy was extremely diverse, 
focusing on poetry, Irish culture and nationalism, and 
hermeneutics, in addition to more straightforward 
phenomenological enterprises. If I may, I would like to ask him 
to emphasise and review some of his work before his trilogy – 
giving us an understanding of what important earlier texts of 
his we may need to read or otherwise revisit while also telling 
us how they set him upon his current trajectory. I imagine that 
his  new research on carnal hermeneutics finds its headwaters 
in these prior texts, and shedding some light upon them would 
help us better understand from where he comes and where he 
is going.
Where are you now?
Speaking of which, this leads me to my second question 
for  Richard Kearney, ‘where are you now?’ One of the main 
constants in Kearney’s work is his fidelity to the hermeneutical–
phenomenological method. In my own research, I explored this 
connection with Merold Westphal, another devotee of Paul 
Ricoeur (Sands 2016). I found two primary divergences between 
Kearney’s and Westphal’s appropriation and employment 
of  Ricoeur’s thought: For Kearney, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology is solely a method of description, a seeking of 
understanding, and his use of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion 
mainly keeps him on track when employing the sympathetic 
imagination; he always walks alongside the believing soul or the 
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person in question, he never inhabits their shoes but re-feels their 
steps along the way to better understanding. Westphal, on the 
other hand (and in the process of developing great insights, 
I should add), employs Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology 
not only for description but also for prescription. He uses 
hermeneutical phenomenology to locate instances where onto-
theology occurs but also appropriates the hermeneutics of 
suspicion as a tool for the believing soul to better enact and 
understand his or her faith. Kearney, in other words, always 
maintains a rigour to Ricoeur’s method, whereas Westphal, 
among others as well, develops it and appropriates it beyond 
phenomenological description.
I find that a fidelity to method and an understanding of the 
limits to that method is a running thread throughout Richard 
Kearney’s work. Whereas Ricoeur’s trilogy, The Philosophy of 
the Will, ran up to the limits to a Husserlian phenomenological 
method – a project that he never completed – Kearney’s work, 
particularly Philosophy at the Limit, in addition to his other 
articles and books, also seeks the limits of its methodology while 
never traversing over these limits. He only peeks over at what 
may be. This is especially so in Anatheism, where he often states 
that the work should not be considered a theology nor even a 
part of a theological tradition (Kearney 2002:xvi). Thus, I wonder 
about his new project, carnal hermeneutics, and how this might 
be a continuation of his exploration and adaptation of his chosen 
methodology (or methodologies), and I ask him ‘where he is 
now?’ Where have his philosophical endeavours taken him, 
particularly his fidelity to methodological rigour, and where does 
he currently stand? Or, in simpler terms, how has his previous 
work revealed to him the necessity of a carnal hermeneutics?
Where are you going?
This ultimately leads me to ask, ‘Where are you going?’ Again, 
I  think Richard Kearney’s hermeneutics may prove to be his 
most  important contribution to our discussions today and to 
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South African society at large. For how does a country with 
11 national languages and cultures survive? In South Africa, a 
young nation crafted in the wake of a historic and systematic 
delegitimisation of several of those cultures, this question 
arises often in daily living. Currently, I think it is safe to say 
that many are cynical about a ‘rainbow nation’ and think the 
task of understanding alterity, of co-existing and integrating 
with other cultures, is nigh impossible. It is here that I find 
Richard Kearney’s carnal hermeneutics to be the most 
influential, and I would like to spend the rest of my time 
elaborating how.
In his programmatic essay, ‘What is Carnal Hermeneutics?’ 
(Kearney 2015:99), Kearney argues that we must unfold our 
understanding of sense, particularly touch, in order to ‘discern 
the world as this or that, as hospitable or hostile, as attractive 
or repulsive, as tasty or tasteless, as living or dying’. By sense, 
he means sensation - for example, the sight, sound, smell and 
taste of the world around us – secondly, as how we derive 
‘meaning’ in the world – in the gist of ‘I get the sense of what 
you say’ – and finally as ‘direction’ – denoting ‘how we orient 
ourselves in space and time, how we move towards or away 
from, fore and aft, hither and thither’. ‘Wisdom’, he (Kearney 
2015) states:
[I]s about taste and tact. That is what we mean, isn’t it, when we 
say someone sensible is someone sensitive, they have ‘the touch,’ 
as healer, teacher, artist, lover. They are attentive, careful, tentative. 
They get it. To have the right touch is to touch and be touched 
wisely. (p. 100)
His carnal hermeneutics, then, explores how this wise touch is 
exhibited in both a textual and embodied understanding of 
the  world around oneself. The separation between the two is 
replaced with a cooperation, because a person, according to 
Kearney, cannot wisely interpret the world without sense, without 
sensation, without the touch of the world. His carnal hermeneutics, 
then, explores how this wise touch is exhibited in both a textual 
and embodied understanding of the world around oneself. 
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The separation between the two is replaced with a cooperation, 
as a person, according to Kearney, cannot wisely interpret the 
world without sense, without sensation, without the touch of 
the world.
Kearney first turns to Aristotle to show how this emphasis 
on touch runs deep within our understanding of the world. He 
also shows how this sense of touch is eschewed through 
various strands of philosophical thinking, particularly within 
Platonism and Kantianism, but I will let him and others explicate 
this for the sake of time. What I would like to emphasise here, 
and what I think Richard Kearney can share with us, is how this 
touch reveals the world to us and how it in turn reveals us to 
the world.
Following Aristotle, Kearney (2015:103) states that ‘in touch, 
we are both touching and touched at the same time, but we do 
not for all that collapse into sameness. Difference is preserved’. 
We feel the other as they are feeling us; we are both exposing 
ourselves but also remain ourselves while the other does so in 
turn. There is difference but also a connection. This is similar to 
Husserl’s description of one hand touching the other, where my 
left hand feels this sense of being touched, but my right hand 
does not lose the sense that it is touching my other hand. This 
touch with identity and difference can reveal how we are ‘exposed 
to otherness across gaps, to navigate and negotiate sensitively 
between other embodied beings. From the beginning, contact 
always involves an element of tact’ (Kearney 2015:103). This 
sensing, which involves not just touch but also the other senses – 
smell, taste, sight – is a pathway to ‘making sense and receiving 
sense from someone or something other than myself. Flesh 
mediates this otherness, crossing back and forth between self 
and strangeness. This is where hermeneutics arises’ (Kearney 
2015:104). Or, when we touch we do so through a fleshy mediation, 
which causes us to discern, to tactfully make sense of what or 
who we touch and to form an understanding or opinion of it; 
is what I touch disgusting or is what I touch pleasing?
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Touch is an affective action that changes our sense of things 
within the world. Yet, what is remarkable about this carnal, fleshy 
interpretation is that it also reveals ourselves to the world. It is an 
empathetic action that feels the other over a distance while also 
revealing who we are to that other. ‘As such’, Kearney (2015:105) 
explicates, ‘touching finds its social beginnings in the handshake: 
open hand to open hand – the origin of civilisation. War and 
peace are skin deep in the profoundest sense’. What this means 
is that touch enables us ‘to feel with others, flesh mediates what 
is strange and alien’ but it also allows us to expose ourselves to 
the others, where we ‘risk being bare-skinned, feeling the other 
who is making me feel – from outside, from what is not me’ 
(Kearney 2015:105). So carnal hermeneutics is more than just 
hermeneutics – it takes on a phenomenological character that 
describes our own exposition to the world; we touch and feel, 
taste and savour the world and thus interpret the world. In doing 
so, we also expose ourselves to that world. This double action, or 
reversibility, keeps the world at a distance while also bringing it 
close to us in quite literal fashion.
I will let Richard Kearney expand further on the importance of 
carnal hermeneutics to our understanding of the world. However, 
I anticipate that where he is going with carnal hermeneutics 
may  provide a bridge between current trends in Western 
phenomenology and decolonial thought, where the latter’s 
emphasis on black bodies and consciousness – as well as those 
bodies’ inscriptions into local and global narratives – has become 
a prevalent issue. Achille Mbembe, for example, expresses that 
his thought is an attempt to ‘Write Africa’, or make his body and 
thought an inscription into the historico-cultural soul of this 
continent, as a rupture that criticises and questions pre-existing 
colonial narratives (Mbembe 2013; Spivak 2007). Mbembe (2013), 
it seems, may also follow carnal hermeneutics of a different sort.
Mbembe draws heavily from Frantz Fanon, who also expresses 
a carnal necessity throughout his work. In the chapter, ‘The Fact 
of Blackness’ of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon (1967) describes 
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his blackness as a nausea that is inflicted upon him by an outside 
world that sees him as an other. ‘When people like me’, he says:
[T ]hey tell me it is in spite of my colour. When they dislike me, they 
point out that it is not because of my colour. Either way, I am locked 
into the infernal cycle. (p. 88)
Here, one can see that sensation, the gaze of whiteness, inflicts 
upon Fanon and other black men and women an ontological 
disposition as othered, as non-white. He goes on to describe 
how  reason and ‘un-reason’ develop a strange relation where 
the  Negro, in the words of Fanon (1967), can be understood 
scientifically as human along with white humans but that:
There will always be a world – a white world – between you and us 
[he is speaking about an encounter with a Jewish person who links 
antisemitism to racism]. The other’s total inability to liquidate the 
past once and for all. In the face of this affective ankylosis of the 
white man, it is understandable that I could have made up my mind 
to utter my Negro cry. Little by little, putting out pseudopodia here 
and there, I secreted a race. (p. 92)
What Fanon is describing, in crucial detail, is how the world he 
inhabits cannot move beyond its past, for the ‘past will not pass’, 
as the French say, and how the fact of his blackness will always 
bring itself about within the world. His race is crucial to how the 
world sees him; his identity is linked to the gaze, the sight, levied 
upon him by a white world. One can see how the senses – a carnal 
hermeneutics – make sense of this world and this black man. ‘We 
are in the world’, Fanon (1967:96) writes, ‘and long live the couple, 
Man and Earth! Besides, our men of letters helped me to convince 
you; your white civilisation overlooks subtle riches and sensitivity’.
Perhaps, Richard Kearney is going somewhere, showing us a 
better way to reveal – and not overlook – this sensitivity through 
sense. I do not wish to levy upon him such a burden of solving all 
the world’s crises – especially the issue of race in South Africa! – 
yet, I still think that he has something to share with us, something 
that we have overlooked. Perhaps, something that can, ever so 




I would like to close with an example of what carnal 
hermeneutics might look like within this paradigm. It is an 
American example, admittedly, but one that I think opens a 
discussion of how our touch opens us to the world while leaving 
us exposed, revealed, to the world. I think it also shows the 
significance of how carnal hermeneutics may uncover the subtle 
riches and sensitivities of which Fanon speaks.
In 2009, at the beginning of President Barak Obama’s 
presidency, White House photographer Pete Souza took a picture 
of President Obama and a little African-American boy named 
Jacob in the Oval Office. The picture has President Obama 
bending over to let Jacob touch his hair. As Pete Souza (Calmes 
2012) recounted the story to the New York Times, Jacob asked:
‘I want to know if my hair is just like yours’, he told Mr Obama, so 
quietly that the president asked him to speak again. Jacob did and 
Mr Obama replied, ‘Why don’t you touch it and see for yourself?’ He 
lowered his head, level with Jacob, who hesitated. ‘Touch it, Dude!’ 
Mr Obama said. As Jacob patted the presidential crown, Mr Souza 
snapped [the photo]. ‘So what do you think?’ Mr Obama asked. ‘Yes, 
it does feel the same’. (n.p.)
Numerous commentators have argued that this picture 
symbolises  the reality of Mr Obama’s presidency with the 
actuality of the first black body to embody the power and 
authority of the USA. For me, this picture represents carnal 
hermeneutics at play. For Jacob, this touch opens to him 
a  plenitude of realisations and possibilities – of impossible 
possibilities, even. He probably does not know the historical 
significance of this presidency but still feels it in his touch. 
For  Obama, this touch allows him to fully recognise the 
significance – symbolic and literal – of his historical role as the 
first black president of the USA and he eventually placed 
this photograph in a place of honour in the White House to remind 
him of this significance, a remarkable event given his reticence to 
evoke his race in public. For Americans like myself who gaze upon 
this picture, of this touch within the picture, we ultimately see 
where we have been, who we are and where we are going.
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Carnal hermeneutics, then, might provide us with a better way 
to understand moments such as this one. It will not save the 
world, for carnal hermeneutics is not just about the hopeful, 
joyful and sacred sensation but also describes the despair, 
sadness and profane sensations of the world. However, it may 
help us realise how important these moments are to our own 
consciousness as well as to our cultures and perhaps our national 
consciousnesses. When I ask Richard Kearney, ‘where are you 
going?’, with this picture that I have in mind, this particular touch 
that touched all who looked upon it in some way, I foresee 
an answer that will help us better understand where we all are 
going, who we are now as carnal subjects and who we have been 
as well.
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Where I speak from: 
A short intellectual 
autobiography
Richard Kearneya,b 
aCharles Seelig Chair of Philosophy, Boston College, 
United States of America
bResearch Associate, Department of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa
I am grateful to have the opportunity to respond here to the 
question posed by my hosts during a recent visit to South Africa: 
How did I come to the philosophy of the Stranger? Or more 
precisely, what is the relationship between a hermeneutics of 
hospitality and my own intellectual itinerary?
In what follows, I will attempt a brief response by tracing the 
genealogy of my thoughts on God and religion – a key theme of 
‘anatheism’ as a hosting of the Other – from my early education 
in Ireland through some critical junctures in my professional 
life as a philosopher abroad. In so doing, I will retain something 
of the ‘personal’ and ‘anecdotal’ tone of the presentations I gave 
Chapter 2
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at the Universities of Pretoria and Johannesburg and Stellenbosch 
in May 2017. I am very grateful to Professors Daniël P. Veldsman, 
Robert Vosloo and Dr Yolande Steenkamp for so generously 
welcoming me and arranging some of the memorable exchanges 
featured in this volume.
Family upbringing and early 
schooling
To begin: I grew up in the city of Cork, in Southern Ireland, in 
a  Catholic family with devout loving parents, Kevin and Ann 
Kearney.
My father was a good man who suffered from severe war 
trauma23 and had a streak of survivor guilt mixed with old-
fashioned Irish Jansenism. This made for a melancholic version 
of  Christianity, but he was never judgemental and when, for 
example, my unmarried elder sister became pregnant at the age 
of 20, losing her job as a teacher ‘for fear of scandal’, he was the 
first to stand by her. My father had a horror of what he called 
‘holy Joes’ (who put rules before compassion); and he was always 
humble before his God: he would kneel and say the night rosary 
with our family during the Easter Season and was always discreet 
in the public practice of his faith. But he never missed Sunday 
Mass and went on a (‘dry’) pilgrimage to Lough Derg’s healing 
waters in Northern Ireland every spring – which managed 
somehow to salve his hurting soul for a while.
As for my mother, Ann, she was also a devout Christian, 
combining a deep love of the Catholic sacraments with a sense 
of compassionate liberty in the face of punitive church 
orthodoxies regarding ‘sex and morals’ – a dissident liberalism 
perhaps inherited from her father’s Protestant background. Some 
of my earliest memories were of us both preparing beautiful May 
23. He had served as a naval doctor in the Red Cross during the Second World War.
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altars to Mary on the window sills of our house, brimming with 
vases of lily of the valley and bluebells. We would sing hymns – 
‘O Mary we crown thee with blossoms today, Queen of the Angels 
and Queen of the May’ – and smell the spring flowers and laugh 
together. I also still recall how she would wake me from my sleep 
in the early morning when I was seven years old and walk me 
through freezing winter streets to a convent on Montenotte Hill 
where I served as an altar boy at 06:00 Mass for the nuns. I loved 
my mother and Mary with equal fervour (with Mary a close 
second, to be honest) and could never believe, for the rest of my 
life, that the God they loved could be anything but a God of love. 
The Eucharist always remained for me a host of the mother as 
much as of the father of God; and to this day, bread and wine are 
my favourite food.
My five brothers and one sister were uniquely spiritual people 
and very close siblings. Four of them worked as healers of 
the  sick, dying or disabled (two with Jean Vanier’s L’Arche 
communities in Europe and Africa). They are all more spiritually 
evolved than me and I continue to learn from them, especially 
during annual walks on the Camino de Compostela and on the 
windy hills of Myross, West Cork, where all the family congregates 
every summer – a wild, sacred sanctuary throughout our lives. 
And a powerful reminder that God lives in and through nature, as 
Ireland’s first pantheist philosopher, John Scotus Eriugena, 
already taught in the 9th century: Deus currens: a divine current 
runs through all things.
***
Then there was school. My education began with the Christian 
Brothers in Cork where I first learnt that the church could also 
have a violent streak. I regularly witnessed cruel beatings 
delivered to unfortunate fellow pupils for not knowing the 
right  Catechism answers or not wearing clean white shirts for 
Communion. And that was not the only wrong (as recent national 
tribunals on child abuse revealed). The ‘first naiveté’ of faith was 
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over and I never forgot the lesson that Christianity can be the 
best and worst of religions. Corruptio optimi pessima [The 
corruption of the best is the worst].
At the age of 13, my parents sent me to Glenstal Abbey, a 
boarding school in County Limerick, run by very enlightened 
Benedictine monks. There I learnt the beauty of Gregorian chant, 
elegant liturgy and theological excitement. I was introduced to 
philosophies of religion – both atheist (Sartre, Nietzsche, Camus) 
and theist (Marcel, Buber, Simone Weil) – and learnt the invaluable 
lesson that one most genuinely embraces faith when one has 
read the strongest arguments against it. In class, we read the 
arguments of non-believers before those of believers – observing 
Dostoyevsky’s adage that ‘true faith comes forth from the crucible 
of doubt’. My first teacher of religion at Glenstal was Father 
Andrew Nugent, who looked like a dried prune with foggy glasses 
and dandruff but constantly glowed with great ideas! Another of 
my influential mentors there, Brother Patrick Hederman, remains 
one of my closest intellectual friends to this day. I return to 
Glenstal Abbey regularly with a wonderful group of artists – 
among them Fanny Howe, Sheila Gallagher and Nóirín ní Ríain – 
and have had the great privilege of working with them on a recent 
volume entitled The Art of Anatheism (2018). A regular meeting 
point of our Glenstal group has been a special underground 
chapel housing ancient Russian icons, one of which, Christ the 
Healer, remains an abiding focus for my daily meditation.
I might also mention that Glenstal was famous for hosting an 
annual ecumenical meeting for all the Christian denominations of 
war-torn Ireland in the sixties and seventies – Anglican, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Catholic – and serves to this day as a place of 
daring dialogue with the Orthodox Church and non-Christian 
religions of the East.
***
At 17, I received a scholarship to study literature and philosophy 
at University College Dublin (UCD). This was in the mid-seventies 
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when a 30-year war between Catholic nationalists and Protestant 
loyalists raged in Belfast and Derry north of the ‘border’ (Belfast 
was only 160 miles from Dublin). The philosophy department at 
the time was largely run by Catholic clergy – including a future 
Cardinal of Ireland, Desmond Connell. But this clerical hegemony 
did not prevent the mandatory dose of metaphysical ‘Realism’ 
(another word for scholastic Thomism) being accompanied by 
new thinking coming in from Continental Europe, and especially 
post-sixties Paris: existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
structuralism, humanist Marxism and critical theory. This opening 
was further aided by the ‘Lonergan movement’ of Vatican II 
renewal, which argued for dialogue with innovative forms of 
secular and scientific thought. Of particular influence on my 
thinking as an undergraduate in UCD was Patrick Masterson, 
author of Atheism and Alienation (1971), who introduced me to 
the intellectual splendours of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and 
Ricoeur. And I was also deeply moved by the brilliant lectures of 
Denys Turner, who taught me the power of humanist-Sartrean 
Marxism, and of Dennis Donoghue, who introduced me to the 
dazzling enigmas of Derridean deconstruction. It was Masterson, 
a close friend to this day, who encouraged me to apply for a 
scholarship to do graduate work with Charles Taylor – author of 
A Secular Age (2007) and Sources of the Self (1989) – at McGill 
University in Canada. Taylor was a kind and compelling teacher, 
drawing generously from both Continental (Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty) and analytic (Austin, Wittgenstein) traditions. His lectures 
on the philosophy of language in the Fall semester of 1976 were 
spell-binding. During my time in Montreal, I was also deeply 
impressed by his role as a public intellectual in Canadian 
politics24 – a role that has remained a model of ‘applied philosophy’ 
for me ever since. Taylor showed how one could be a practising 
Catholic and a politically engaged thinker, making a mark in the 
public media in important popular debates. Once I completed 
24. He was a founder member of the National Democratic Party and ran against Trudeau for 
the premiership.
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my master’s with Taylor in 1977, he recommended that I pursue 
my doctoral studies in the phenomenology of imagination with 
his friend Paul Ricoeur in the University of Paris.
Paris apprenticeship
I arrived in Paris in September 1977. I will never forget my first 
encounter with Ricoeur. I walked into a packed seminar room at 
the Centre Herméneutique et Phénoménologique at Avenue 
Parmentier where a number of Ricoeur’s close colleagues sat 
around a table – including Emmanuel Levinas, Stanislas Breton, 
Jean Greisch and Françoise Dastur. In a second outer circle sat 
a  dozen or so doctoral students. I joined them and waited 
for  Ricoeur to arrive. When he did he was wearing a bright 
multicoloured jacket that he had just bought in Chicago, where 
he was teaching for a semester each year. I was expecting a 
sober Protestant intellectual dressed in black. Ricoeur warmly 
welcomed everyone and proceeded to ask each student his initial 
hermeneutic question: D’où parlez-vous? [Where do you speak 
from?] When it came to me, I explained that I came from Southern 
Ireland and had been educated in philosophy at UCD – at which 
Ricoeur happily observed, ‘that is excellent, I will call on you 
whenever we need commentaries on Aquinas!’ Little did Ricoeur 
know I was a rebellious refugee from orthodox scholasticism.25
From then on it was plain delightful sailing through multiple 
theories of narrative in phenomenology and the philosophy of 
history and religion. Each Wednesday seminar was a treat and 
Ricoeur always proved his commitment to ‘intellectual hospitality’ 
by inviting visiting scholars and friends to give presentations. 
The title of one of his volumes, Le conflit des interprétations, 
took on real meaning as different voices chimed and clashed in 
what Ricoeur liked to call un combat amoureux (a phrase he 
25. Although as Joyce wrote of Stephen Dedalus – he had ‘the cursed Jesuit strain in (him), 
only injected the wrong way’. Metaphysics was in the blood whether I liked it or not.
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learnt from Jaspers). When it came to religious questions, 
Ricoeur  was invariably open to ‘interconfessional translation’ 
between Christian, Jewish and Muslim perspectives.26 The model 
of traversing multiple ‘hermeneutic detours’, where one exposed 
oneself to a ‘polysemantics’ of diverse readings, was central to 
Ricoeur’s method of teaching and writing. As he liked to say, ‘the 
shortest route from self to self is through the other’. Looking 
back, I can now see the seeds of my interest in the Guestbook 
project, with its central themes of ‘hosting the Stranger’ and 
‘exchanging narratives’27 – themes that, as a public intellectual in 
Ireland, I tried to translate into a number of philosophical 
proposals for a peace agreement in Northern Ireland in the 
nineties.
I became a good friend of Ricoeur over the years, hosting him 
twice on visits to Ireland once I returned to UCD in the early 
eighties to take up my first job as a professor of Philosophy. 
I  completed my doctoral studies under his direction – with 
Levinas and Breton as examiners – at the University of Paris in 
1980 and went on to publish several books on his work and 
organise international conferences on his thought (including co-
directing the Cérisy Colloque on Ricoeur in 1987). Without a 
doubt, Ricoeur has been the most formative influence on my 
thinking about narrative imagination, hospitality and religion. 
Indeed, I think it is true to say that without Ricoeur there would 
have been no God Who May Be (2001), Strangers, Gods and 
Monsters (2003) or Anatheism (2011).
But there were other figures in my philosophical apprenticeship 
in Paris. Breton, Levinas and Derrida were also critical interlocutors 
on the ‘God question’ during that time and since. So let me say a 
brief word about each.
26. In the seventies in Paris, the turn towards Eastern religions had not yet made a big mark – 
though Mircea Eliade was a close friend of Ricoeur’s at Chicago.
27. Refer to Chapter 15 in this book.
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Levinas invited me to attend his last lectures at the Sorbonne 
in 1979 on ‘Kant and Ethics’ (co-taught with his ex-Dominican 
friend, Jacques Colette). Levinas spoke in stuttered whispers 
that Colette translated for the class – about ten of us – in a 
cold, bare room with no handle on the door. This was just 
before Levinas’s fame spread widely in the eighties when the 
French embargo on philosophy conversing with theology 
was  finally lifted. Levinas challenged Heidegger’s absolute 
separation of phenomenology and religion (outlined in his 
‘Phenomenology and Theology’ lecture of 1927 [1998]) and 
dared invoke the word ‘God’ in his first classic work, Totality 
and Infinity, published in French in 1961. But Levinas, like his 
Sorbonne colleague Ricoeur, was still sensitive to the séparation 
universitaire between philosophy and theology: the latter was 
not permitted in any public academies of the French Republic 
but only in denominational establishments like the Instituts 
Catholiques or Facultés Protestantes. Levinas published his 
more phenomenological work as philosophy and his more 
religious work as Talmudic lectures (although the border was 
sometime porous). I think it was in some sense thanks to his 
Judaism – which demanded tolerance in post-Holocaust 
Europe – that Levinas was allowed more latitude than other 
religious thinkers in France (e.g. the Protestant Ricoeur, the 
Catholic Breton or Marion) in blending secular and religious 
thinking. And one cannot underestimate the importance 
of  Levinas’s disciple, Derrida, in making the God question 
respectable again in public discourse in France, with the 
publication of his ground-breaking essay on Levinas 
(‘Metaphysics and Violence’ in Writing and Difference [1978 
{1967}]). The fact that Derrida was both Jewish and the master 
of fashionable deconstruction was not irrelevant. The God who 
was cautiously re-entering French intellectual discourse during 
my time in Paris was in many respects a deconstructed 
messianic God, a factor that surely informed my own thinking 
about God – up to a point – in La Poétique du Possible (1984b) 
and The God Who May Be (2001).
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But before leaving Levinas, let me say a word about a very 
special meeting I had with him in his home on Rue Michel-Ange 
in 1980. He invited me for tea shortly before my doctoral 
defence – of which he was a jury member along with Ricoeur and 
Breton – and kindly gave me the questions he would ask me 
the next day. As we talked, his son, Michaēl, a concert pianist, 
rehearsed his scales in the background to the evident delight 
of  his father. The main topic of our conversation – and of my 
dissertation – was the relationship between a poetics of the 
possible and an ethics of justice. When I confessed to Levinas 
that I found his ethics of asymmetrical responsibility to the 
other – I am always more responsible for the other than the other 
is for me – impossible to actually live, he gave me two simple 
examples of such a hyperbolic ethical demand working in 
everyday practice. Firstly, he spoke of how one says après toi 
when going through a doorway with someone. That is ethics: 
standing back to let the other go first (without the other being 
expected to do likewise). And secondly, he cited his recent 
experience of a group of young scholars who travelled all the way 
from Latin America to ask him how his ethics was practicable – 
to which he replied, ‘your travelling thousands of miles to ask me 
the question is itself ethics’. The concern to do justice is the first 
act of doing it. Several weeks after my defence, Levinas made 
another gesture of generosity in agreeing to participate in a 
colloquium I was organising with my compatriot, Joseph O’Leary, 
in the Collège des Irlandais in Paris. It was the first time Levinas 
had agreed to meet with France’s leading Heideggerians 
(Beaufret, Fédier, Vézin) since he had lost relatives in the 
Holocaust. Ricoeur and Marion also agreed to join the conference, 
which was published a year later as Heidegger et la Question de 
Dieu (1980). I never forgot Levinas’s act of intellectual trust and 
forgiveness. Ethics in action.
And then there was Stanislas Breton, the third member of 
my doctoral dissertation (June 1980). A professor at the Ecole 
normale supérieure and a priest of the Passionist Order 
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(who presided over my marriage in Normandy), Breton had a 
unique ability to combine mysticism, Marxism and metaphysics. 
He remained a lifelong friend and confidant and was what I would 
call a ‘holy’ man. He loved to play with children (including our 
daughters Simone and Sarah), getting down on all fours and 
becoming a child himself as he did so. He gave credence to the 
idea that children are first in the Kingdom; and like other genuinely 
holy people I have encountered in my life – Jean Vanier, Chokyi 
Nyima, the Dalai Lama, my mother – he knew how to laugh from 
the core of his being as the best response to the contradictions 
and complexities of existence. It was Breton who introduced me 
to the illuminating trope of perichoresis – the Greek orthodox 
figure of three divine persons moving in a circle – by drawing a 
picture on a white table napkin in my Paris apartment the night 
before my dissertation defence. The image still returns again and 
again in both my academic and spiritual life. He was also the 
person who helped me find the title for my first single-author 
book, Poétique du Possible (1984b), and who introduced me to 
Duns Scotus’ notion of haecceitas (thisness) as the particularity 
of each person created by God. I always think of Breton when 
I read these lines by Gerard Manley Hopkins (Hopkins 1996):
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves – goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.
[…] for Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men’s faces
(‘When Kingfishes Catch Fire’).
It is an image that has remained central to my thinking on 
hospitality ever since – namely, the call to host the quintessential 
inimitable strangeness of each human person. Responding to the 
other’s singular ‘thisness’ co-responding to one’s own. So that 
each one is saying, in their bodies and souls, ‘Behold (ecce!) this 
(haec)!’ The Latin term, spelled variously haecceitas or ecceitas, 
plays on this double sense of annunciatory wonder and singular 
address. Or as Joyce puts it in Finnegans Wake, ‘here comes 
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everybody’ (HCE – Haec-Ecce). Each person, Breton taught me, 
is everyone. The particular is the universal. The concrete is the 
cosmic. The infinitesimal the infinite. Epiphanies are ordinary, 
everyday things. God is a god of little things – the last and the 
least (elachistos). The strangeness of every stranger (Mt 25). It is 
a lesson I never forgot.
There is one other mentor and friend I came to know during 
my Paris days whom I would like to honour here: Jacques Derrida. 
My first encounter with Derrida was in 1980 when I invited him to 
participate in my forthcoming book, Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers (1984a)28. To my great relief, he said yes – 
largely because I was introduced by his mentor Ricoeur – and 
proceeded to share his intellectual confidences and convictions 
(later published in our exchange, ‘Deconstruction and the Other’, 
1984). This somewhat surprised me as Derrida had taken vehement 
critical exception, around that time, to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of 
dialogue, reciprocity and metaphor. But it became quickly clear 
to me that Derrida had a profound generosity that went beyond 
philosophical differences to welcome a fellow student of his 
former master.29 My 1980 exchange with Derrida was to be the 
first of several published conversations between us over the 
years, the last two appearing as ‘Desire of God: an exchange’30 
and ‘Terror, Religion and the New Politics’31.
In each of our exchanges over two decades, Derrida was always 
charming, modest and humane – belying the common caricature 
of him as a cranky, egotistical intellectual rock star. For many 
who did not read Derrida closely, deconstruction spelled nihilism 
28. Which also featured conversations with Levinas, Ricoeur, Marcuse and Breton.
29. Derrida had been a maître assistant for Ricoeur – presenting the material for his first 
breakthrough book Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (1987) in one of Ricoeur’s 
doctoral seminars.
30. Villanova dialogue (1997), published as Derrida, Caputo and Kearney 2006:301–308.
31. Conducted in New York City in the shadow of the fallen Twin Towers in October 2001, 
published as Kearney and Derrida (2004:3–14).
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and relativism. Indeed, I recall when I invited him to give a talk in 
Dublin in 1998, his notoriety preceded him in the form of a British 
media campaign berating Cambridge University’s decision to 
award him an honorary doctorate. Thousands turned up to hear 
him in Dublin. He arrived at UCD with a massive wad of pages 
that he had every intention of delivering. But as we walked down 
the aisle of the amphitheatre, I swept it from his arms and said – 
‘You are not reading that!’ He clung to it like a mother to a baby 
the social services are taking into custody; but he soon let go and 
faced the public, paperless and disarmed. He spoke from the 
heart about the ‘lie’ (the topic of his talk) for a brisk 50 min rather 
than the 3 hours his paper would have taken to deliver (a month 
previously he had spoken for 6 hours at the Freud Museum in 
London). The audience, both academic and popular, were utterly 
entranced. Derrida could charm birds off trees when he was 
not  hiding behind a 200-page paper. And he did just that. 
The question–answer session afterwards was a lesson in good 
listening and responding. No question, no matter how naïve (e.g. 
‘Mr Derrida, what does it mean to be human?’), was considered 
unworthy of response. Indeed, the final questioner of the evening 
added this remark, delivered in a broad Dublin accent: 
Monsieur Derrida, I am delighted you came all the way from Paris 
to talk to us today. Reading the British gutter press this week I was 
expecting to see a vampire here today. But you are a grand good 
man. I always believed the Marquis de Sade to be the most maligned 
man in philosophy, but now I realise it is Jacques Derrida! If I was the 
Lord Mayor of Dublin I would offer you keys to the city. (n.p.)
The audience broke into applause and Derrida was deeply 
moved, bowing deep, his two hands clasped in thanks.
Another incident I would like to share concerns a conference 
we both participated in at Philadelphia in the nineties. It was the 
second Villanova University meeting on postmodernism and 
religion and at one point my good friend, John Caputo, objected 
to my challenging Derrida with the question: 
[H]ow can deconstruction’s maxim that ‘every other is every other’ 
(tout autre est tout autre) be reconciled with a hermeneutics of 
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discernment: namely the need to differentiate between different 
kinds of others – e.g. a madman or a messiah? (n.p.)
But Derrida took my question on the chin and graciously 
responded: ‘Richard’s problems with my thought are my own 
problems with my thought’. I was saved a lynching and all three 
of us went on to discuss the issue in perfectly cordial fashion.
One last story I am moved to mention here, but which, for 
reasons of discretion, I have not done before, concerns Derrida’s 
final reconciliation with Ricoeur. After Derrida’s Dublin lecture on 
the lie we retired to my house for dinner. During the course of the 
conversation, the question of Derrida’s depression came up – we 
had both experienced ‘dark nights’ in our lives – and he happened 
to mention how one of his worst bouts followed his doctoral 
defence when Ricoeur (his director) never showed up for the 
post-dissertation toast. Derrida confided that this withholding of 
the ceremonial blessing (as he read it) had devastated him, 
because Ricoeur had been an intellectual father for him since 
leaving his own family in Algeria to come to Paris as an émigré 
student. When I informed him that Ricoeur had not come to my 
doctoral toast either, Derrida was speechless. You too? He 
exclaimed. ‘Were you not shocked?’ I said not at all. I had simply 
picked up the phone and asked Ricoeur why he had not shown 
up – and had received this frank and moving response: 
I am sorry Richard, but I never attend any of my student’s dissertation 
toasts. I have so many and must also look after my own family. I am 
a bad father to both my intellectual and actual children. I never give 
either enough time. Such is my life. I do two jobs badly, but it is all 
I can do. (n.p.)
Derrida was deeply affected and as soon as he returned to Paris 
the next day phoned Ricoeur. They agreed to meet that same 
afternoon in the Jardin du Luxembourg (it was early May) and 
stayed talking non-stop until the gardiens sent them home when 
the gates closed at 21:00. What they realised during their 
exchange was that for 30 years their respective philosophical 
positions (deconstructive and hermeneutic) had been speaking 
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past each other – mishearing, misreading, miswriting – in part 
because of a dialogue manqué at a pivotal moment in their lives: 
Derrida looking for a surrogate father, Ricoeur unable to respond 
to a surrogate son.
Ricoeur confessed to me subsequently that after this reunion, 
they continued to talk on a weekly basis right up to Derrida’s 
untimely death from pancreatic cancer in 2002. Ricoeur wept at 
Derrida’s passing, confiding to me: ‘It was not fair. He should not 
have died before me’. Ricoeur joined his adopted spiritual son 
two years later in 2004. In one of the last conversations I had 
with Ricoeur, he told me that when he and Derrida had read my 
book, The God Who May Be, Derrida thought it too hermeneutic 
while Ricoeur thought it too deconstructionist! I shared with him 
a line from Seamus Heaney: ‘Two buckets are easier carried than 
one, I grew up in between’. He smiled.
In addition to these philosophical friendships during my 
Parisian sojourns, I also had the good fortune to enjoy the 
intellectual acquaintance of other good colleagues like Jean-Luc 
Marion, René Girard and later Julia Kristeva, with whom my 
French wife, Anne, and I spent many memorable evenings 
discussing God, Being and the Unconscious with much good 
cheer. And I should also mention that my Paris apprenticeship 
included learning from several other inspirational thinkers ‘at 
a  distance’, from Sartre and De Beauvoir (whose funerals 
I attended) to such teachers as Barthes, Foucault, Deleuze, Lacan, 
Eliade and Lévi-Strauss, whose Paris lectures I was fortunate to 
attend in the late seventies. It was indeed a golden age.
And a final debt: It was also during my Paris years that 
I developed a creative and lasting relationship with my compatriot, 
Joseph O’Leary, who was studying theology at the time and went 
on to become a collaborator on many intellectual projects, 
beginning with our co-chairing the Heidegger et Dieu conference 
at the Collège des Irlandais in Paris in June 1979 (published as 
Heidegger et la Question de Dieu in 1980 and republished as a Livre 
de Poche in 2009). Joe went on to teach for three decades at 
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Sophia University, Tokyo, where I had the pleasure of visiting the 
Buddhist temples of Yanaka and Kamakura in his company. He has 
become a leading international scholar of East–West philosophical 
relations (especially Christian–Buddhist) and remains one of 
my  closest intellectual colleagues on questions of interreligious 
dialogue. We were both born in the same city of Cork, Ireland, in 
the 1950s and will probably die there too, in good time, God willing.
Between Dublin and Boston
After my doctoral studies at the University of Paris, I married my 
French partner, Anne Bernard, and returned to a post in the 
department of metaphysics at UCD. Here I taught from 1981 to 
1999, when I moved to take up a Chair of Philosophy at Boston 
College. During my two decades in Dublin, I had the joy of 
introducing undergraduate and graduate students to the radical 
questions of existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics and 
post-structuralism. I also edited a journal, The Crane Bag, with 
my Benedictine friend, Mark Patrick Hederman, which brought 
together writers, artists, educators, politicians and journalists in a 
common questioning of Ireland’s present and future cultural 
condition. We were denounced in the British House of Commons 
for being ‘too nationalist’ and by ministers of the Irish government 
(at the Forum for a New Ireland at Dublin Castle in 1984) for 
being ‘not nationalist enough’. To boot, senior members of the 
Irish Church condemned us for impiety and iconoclasm, while the 
media often dismissed us as too utopian and elitist. Because so 
many disliked what we were doing, I  suppose we were doing 
something right. The driving principle of our journal was to open 
Ireland to ‘other’ modes of thinking, beyond the narrow tribal 
nationalisms fuelling much of the violence in the North. We 
followed James Joyce’s vow ‘to Europeanise Ireland and 
Hibernicise Europe’.
During the eighties and nineties, I worked with academic 
colleagues north and south of the Irish border on a number of 
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proposals for peace in Northern Ireland, including ‘Towards Joint 
Sovereignty’, ‘Towards a Council of the Isles’ and ‘Towards a 
Post-Nationalist Archipelago’. These and other essays on political 
and cultural reconciliation on our island were later published 
under the title Postnationalist Ireland (1997a). The main idea 
running through these projects for a shared governance of 
Ireland was a pooling of hitherto exclusivist sovereignty claims – 
to ‘one and indivisible nation states’ – in the name of greater 
regional or transnational power sharing. It was, throughout the 
Ulster Troubles, an attempt to shake hands with one’s traditional 
adversary and exchange narratives.32 
During my time back in Ireland, I also served as a so-called 
public intellectual on a number of semi-state bodies like the Irish 
Arts Council, the Irish Higher Education Authority and the Irish 
Film Center Board. This service brought me into contact with 
public life and politics in a way that was exciting and enlightening 
but also acted as a reminder, after a number of bruising polemical 
encounters, that politics was not for me. I also enjoyed a number 
of years combining my academic life with an extra-curricular 
career as public broadcaster on Irish and European media (RTE, 
BBC, ITV, France Culture). I presented several programmes on 
literature, philosophy and culture, which included exchanges 
with philosophers like Marcuse, Gadamer, Lyotard, Umberto Eco 
and Martha Nussbaum, as well as more political figures like 
Vaclav Havel, Mary Robinson and Noam Chomsky.33 In the mid-
nineties, I ventured into fiction and published two philosophical 
novels, Sam’s Fall (1995b) and Walking at Sea Level (1997b), 
which were translated into several languages34. There followed a 
modest volume of poetry, Angel of Patrick’s Hill (1991). They 
were heady days – endeavouring to conflate the struggling 
32. I will return to this later.
33. The dialogues were later published in the collections States of Mind (1995c) and Debates 
in Continental Philosophy (2004).
34. The French and German translations drew more readers than the English.
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efforts of a public intellectual with the responsibilities of a regular 
academic life involving teaching at UCD and annual visiting 
semesters in the USA (Boston) and France (Paris in 1992 and 
Nice in 1994). But it could not last. The double fidelity to academic 
and public life proved too much and I suffered a series of burnouts 
and black nights leading to my decision in 1999 to pack my 
bags and migrate with my wife and daughters to Boston, where 
I have been living and teaching since.
The move to Boston was in many ways ‘a retreat’. Retreat 
in  the dual sense of a withdrawal from an over-committed life 
in  Ireland and a philosophical stepping-back in order to take 
stock. Or as Heidegger put it: ein Schritt zurück in order to 
engage in ‘another thinking of beginning’ [Andenken als ein 
anderes Denken und ein anderer Anfang]. This also involved, 
truth to tell, a certain ‘come down’. Right after the move to 
Boston College, I began to experience what my old McGill friend, 
John McNamara, called the ‘silence of the phones’. No one ringing 
to ask for a media interview or book review in the The Times 
Literary Supplement or Irish Times. No one calling in with agendas 
for the next crisis meeting of some semi-state cultural venture or 
organisation. No one announcing that the cameras were rolling in 
15 min. But with this eclipse from public life, I found time to reflect 
more on the direction of my own intellectual and spiritual life and 
to spend more time with my family. Boston College offered a 
much lighter teaching load than UCD and a half sabbatical every 
3 years for research and writing. It afforded me the opportunity 
to teach advanced doctoral seminars with leading thinkers in 
my  field of  contemporary European philosophy. I succeeded 
Hans-Georg Gadamer as professor of hermeneutics at Boston 
College and worked closely with Continental thinkers like Bill 
Richardson (expert on Heidegger and Lacan) and Jacques 
Taminiaux (expert on Arendt and phenomenology), while also 
conversing with non-Continental thinkers in the Boston area like 
Noam Chomsky (MIT) and Hilary Putnam (Harvard). The former 
became a family friend while the latter exchanged ideas and 
writings on Levinas, as he began to mix analytic with Continental 
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thinking in his last years. And then there was the extraordinary 
Boston Consortium, which permitted gifted graduate students 
from different Boston universities to cross-register courses – 
meaning that my seminar rooms had students from Boston 
College sitting beside counterparts from Boston University, MIT, 
Harvard, Brandeis and  further afield. It is, to my knowledge, a 
system of pooled intervarsity collaboration almost unique in the 
great university cities of the world, and one of the highlights of 
my teaching at Boston College to this day.
The move to Boston also afforded me the chance, as mentioned, 
to re-evaluate my path in philosophy. It was during my initial 
years at Boston College that I began to concentrate explicitly on 
a hermeneutic phenomenology of the Stranger. This work on a 
‘narrative imagination of otherness’ resulted in a sequence of 
seminars, leading to the publication of my trilogy, Philosophy at 
the Limits, in 2001–2003, namely, Strangers Gods and Monsters 
(2003), On Stories (2002) and The God Who May Be (2001). 
Whereas most of my books in the 1980s and 1990s had focused 
on imagination – from The Wake of Imagination (1998b) and 
Poetics of Imagining (1998a) to Poetics of Modernity (1995a) 
and Transitions (1985) – at the beginning of the new millennium 
I decided to revisit the hermeneutics of religion first adumbrated 
in Poétique du Possible (1984b). The publication of the trilogy 
was followed by a series of books on interreligious hermeneutics, 
including Traversing the Heart (2010), Hosting the Stranger (2011) 
and finally Anatheism (2011). As I look back now, I realise that 
these writings on religion were deeply informed by a series of 
research trips I made abroad where I engaged in dialogue with 
thinkers of other religious traditions. These intellectual odysseys 
included meetings with Sufi masters in Egypt, with Hebrew and 
Talmudic scholars in Jerusalem, with wise lamas in Nepal (most 
memorably Chokyi Nyima in the White Monastery of Kathmandu) 
and finally with Hindu gurus and sadhus in India. Two extensive 
research journeys to India involved stays in the Sivananda Ashram 
in Rishikesh, the Fireflies Intercultural Centre in Bangalore, the 
interreligious monastery of Kurisumala (Kerala) and, perhaps 
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most movingly, the Ramana Maharshi Ashram in Arunachala, 
where the Benedictine pioneer of Christian–Hindu dialogue, 
Abhishiktananda (Henri Le Saux OSB), spent many formative 
years in the 1950s. My reflections on these Indian itineraries 
were published in Traversing the Heart: Journeys in Interreligious 
Imagination (co-edited with Eileen Rizo-Patron), so I will not 
repeat them here. Suffice it to say that these encounters with 
great teachers from other wisdom traditions had a lasting impact 
on my philosophy of religion – almost exclusively Christian up to 
then – and confirmed Ricoeur’s maxim that ‘the shortest route 
from self to self is through the other’. The impact was, I readily 
avow, as much spiritual as intellectual, a transformation of heart 
as much as mind. Returning from these foreign trips, I brought 
home practices of yoga and meditation that I continue to this 
day. Though I am always still a beginner.
But my testimony of debt to ‘other lands’ would not be 
complete without mention of one last journey. In 2015, I visited a 
series of Buddhist temples in Japan and China (Taipei and 
Shanghai), where I was profoundly moved by the sacred figure 
of Guan Yin. Guan Yin means ‘one who hears the cries of the 
world’ and was originally known as Avalokiteshvara – an East 
Asian bodhisattva associated with compassion and venerated 
by Mahayana Buddhists and followers of Chinese folk religions. 
She was invoked as a female Buddha or ‘Goddess of Mercy’ and 
was known by Christian missionaries as the ‘White Mary’. This 
sacred woman of heart-wisdom and compassion recalled for me 
my childhood in Cork making shrines to a White Mary of May 
with my mother and raised again the vexed question of why 
Mary was never celebrated as a fully-fledged female divinity in 
the Christian tradition? For all the talk of immaculate conceptions 
and heavenly assumptions, Mary remained the ‘handmaid of the 
Lord’ – a gender subservience evident throughout the long 
history of misogynist patriarchy in Western Christendom35. 
35. With the exception of the Celtic devotion to Brigid as both saint and goddess – known 
as ‘Mary of the Gaels’.
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Not  that Orthodox Judaism or Islam fared much better. Men 
ruled there, too. But perhaps in the growing encounter with non-
Abrahamic spiritualties of the East, patriarchal monotheism can 
learn from ‘strangers’ to let women back into divinity. We might 
then recall that the female ‘Sophia’ who plays with the Lord in 
Proverbs 8 was there from the beginning and calls to be 
reintegrated into the biblical tradition. Sophia speaks in many 
tongues and shows herself in multiple ways – from Genesis and 
the books of Wisdom to Hosea and the Song of Songs. If 
Heidegger was struck, on reading Brentano, by the ‘manifold 
meanings of Being’, I confess to being struck, on my short 
journeys to the East, by the ‘manifold meanings of God’. This 
persuasion has made me a committed follower of the interreligious 
Centering Prayer and Contemplation movements pioneered by 
people like Thomas Merton, Thomas Keating, Richard Rohr and 
Cynthia Bourgeault. A commitment that chimes with the 
ecumenical spirit of Benedictine monasticism, which nourished 
my early education in Glenstal. The key maxim of St Benedict’s 
Rule still rings in my ears: ‘Ausculta! Listen! […] Treat every 
stranger who knocks as Christ’.
The Guestbook Project: From Boston 
to South Africa
As a last chapter of my odyssey through otherness, I would like 
to mention the work of Guestbook – a project that ultimately 
brought me to South Africa in the spring of 2017 and enabled me 
to participate in a series of animated philosophical exchanges 
that gave rise to the present volume. This concluding section 
takes a somewhat more formal tone, while remaining largely a 
matter of narrative testimony.
I founded Guestbook in 2008 as a largely scholarly venture. 
It began as an interdisciplinary seminar at Boston College 
on  the theme of ‘Hosting the Stranger: Between Hostility 
and Hospitality’. The idea was based on the fact that, in most 
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Indo-European languages, the word for ‘guest’ and ‘enemy’ is 
the same – for example, hostis in Latin is the common root of 
both ‘hostility’ and ‘hospitality’. Our aim was to explore how 
enmity could be transformed into empathy, how cycles of 
violence could be overcome in imaginative moments of 
welcoming the stranger. The first year of the project 
(2008–2009) consisted of 13 seminar presentations, two 
international conferences (philosophical and theological), an 
internationally streamed poetry festival (Poetries of the 
Stranger), a music concert (Songs of Sacred Strangeness) and 
a number of visiting lectures by artists like Dorothy Cross and 
Ann Carson. The activities were archived on guestbookproject.
org and resulted in the publication of two special journal issues 
(New Arcadia [2009], Religion and the Arts [2010a, 2010b]) 
and two academic books (Hosting the Stranger [2011], 
Phenomenologies of the Stranger [2011]).
In the second year, I was joined by my Boston College 
colleague and professional artist, Sheila Gallagher, as co-director 
and we jointly embarked on a decade-long project of expanding 
Guestbook beyond a university programme to embrace an 
international outreach of partnerships in five continents under 
the umbrella title ‘Exchanging Stories Changing Histories’. This 
was to become our signature tune, comprising a Peace Story 
project where two young people shared their respective 
narratives across a divide and co-created a new third narrative. 
These were recorded as short videos and posted on our 
Guestbook website, serving as a ‘classroom without walls’ freely 
accessible to peace leaders, teachers and community activists in 
diverse educational contexts throughout the world.
When I was asked once what motivated me to set up 
Guestbook, I gave a number of philosophical reasons – invoking 
the hermeneutics of hospitality learnt from Ricoeur, Levinas and 
Derrida – and then avowed the more biographical reason of 
growing up in Ireland in the 1960s–1990s during a 30-year war of 
sectarian strife, culminating in the Good Friday Peace Agreement 
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of April 1998. The following is a personal testimony from the 
time:36
In the 1980s, at the height of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, 
I was invited as a young professor of philosophy to come to Derry, 
a city divided by war, to moderate a workshop between republican 
and loyalist prisoners. During the workshop, one of the IRA [Irish 
Republican Army] prisoners told of how one night he was asleep in 
his bed when a loyalist gang broke into the house, bound, gagged 
and blindfolded him, threw him into the boot of a car, and drove him 
to a barn outside Derry. Strapped to a chair and about to be shot, he 
asked if he could smoke a last cigarette. His captor consented and 
offered him one. And as he smoked the cigarette – very slowly – he 
told the story of how he had become involved in republican violence: 
how his grandfather had been brutally murdered by the British armed 
forces, how his father had been incarcerated and tortured, how his 
mother had become an alcoholic and suffered a nervous breakdown, 
how his brother had been knee-capped and maimed for the rest of 
his life […]. And he went on until he finished his cigarette. Then waited 
for the gun to go off. But it didn’t. There was no sound. No movement. 
He waited for five minutes, ten minutes, 15 minutes, 20  minutes – 
Nothing. Eventually, he managed to free himself and looked around. 
There was nobody there; the barn was empty. He walked home. When 
the IRA prisoner finished sharing this in the workshop I was chairing, 
another man, a loyalist paramilitary prisoner, stood up at the back of 
the hall and said, ‘I was the assassin who gave you that cigarette. And 
I would have shot you. But I couldn’t shoot you because, when I heard 
your story, I realised it was my story’. (n.p.)
I was very struck by how this basic act of narrative imagination 
could trigger a transfer of empathy between these two sworn 
enemies, leading eventually to reconciliation.
A second story that inspired Guestbook was that of ‘chancing 
your arm’. This goes back to 1492 when a terrible civil war was 
raging in Ireland and the Earl of Kildare, Gearóid Mór FitzGerald, 
hunted and eventually besieged James Butler, Earl of Ormond, in 
St Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin. At one-point FitzGerald realised, 
36. What follows is a rewritten version of the testimony from an opening promotional video 
on www.guestbookproject.org (under the ‘Who we are’ section). For a transcription of this 
video, see Kearney (2015).
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‘It can’t go on, this vicious cycle of blood-letting must end’. He 
asked his adversary, Butler, to open a hole in the door and 
announced: 
I’m going to remove my armour and stretch my arm through the gap – 
you can cut it off or shake my hand. If you cut it off war continues, if 
you shake my hand, war ends. (n.p.)
Fitzgerald ‘chanced his arm’, as the saying went. Butler shook his 
hand and peace happened.
These two stories, from the history of my native war-torn 
Ireland, told of transformative acts of enemies becoming friends, 
of strangers becoming guests.
Guestbook now operates as an international non-profit, 
devoted to the fostering of peace stories through the work of 
empathic imagination, straddling divides of religion, class and 
culture in places as far afield as Asia, Africa, the USA and the 
Middle East. Examples to date include young Turks and Armenians 
sharing forbidden histories, Israeli and Palestinian students 
exchanging symbols (hijab and Star of David), Ulster Protestant 
and Catholic school girls switching school uniforms, Congolese 
and Rwandan refugees confiding traumas, Bangalore Muslims and 
Hindus performing rituals, Korean and Japanese youths trading 
memories and dreams. Each of these exchanges involves crossing 
borders of heart and mind where young people in divided 
communities dare remake history by imagining otherwise. They 
give a future to the past by transforming deep legacies of 
transgenerational hurt into narrative forms of healing. The aim of 
Guestbook is to empower young people to ‘chance their arms’ – 
to make bold leaps of imagination towards impossible possibilities 
of peace.
My philosophical work with the Guestbook project finally 
brought me to South Africa. In May 2017, I flew to Johannesburg 
at the invitation of Professors Willie Van der Merwe and Daniël P. 
Veldsman, and was privileged to engage in conversations 
with  philosophers and theologians at the University of 
Pretoria, University of South Africa and Oos Gemeente (Ooskerk). 
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The visit also included the negotiation of an international 
partnership between Guestbook and the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation in Cape Town and featured what for me was an 
unforgettable exchange with South African peace activists and 
scholars Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Wilhelm Verwoerd at 
Stellenbosch University. I was deeply moved by these visionary 
people – Wilhelm, a former academic before becoming director 
of the Irish Peace Center in Glencree, County Wicklow (bringing 
together former belligerents from Ulster and South Africa), 
and  Pumla, a brilliant scholar who served on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the 1990s and since. One 
story related by Pumla – and recorded in her book A Human 
Being Died That Night: A South African Woman Confronts the 
Legacy of Apartheid – reminded me of the Irish legend of 
‘chancing your arm’, although this time it was a case of ‘chancing 
your hand’. It is an episode that recalls the handshake as the first 
gesture of civilisation, epitomised in great peace breakthroughs 
in history, taken by people bold enough to dare the impossible 
and shake the hand of their sworn enemy. Think of Mandela and 
De Klerk, Martin McGuiness and Ian Paisley, Begin and Sadat, and 
Gandhi and Mountbatten. Pumla’s story also exemplified for me 
the basic wager of my Carnal Hermeneutics (2015), that the most 
humane of the senses is ‘touch’, for it alone involves a ‘double 
sensation’ of touching and being touched, as Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty both showed in their phenomenologies of sensation.
Here is the story: Pumla resolved, during a sensitive moment in 
the reconciliation process, to meet Eugene de Kock, a brutal 
apartheid executioner known popularly as ‘Prime Evil’, then 
imprisoned. She bore no illusions (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:6): 
‘De Kock had not just given apartheid’s murderous evil a name. He 
had become that evil’.37 Pumla was prompted to meet with this 
37. I am indebted to Robert Vosloo’s illuminating essay (2016), ‘Touch Gives Rise to Thought: 
Paul Ricoeur and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela on Dealing with the Past, Mutual Recognition and 




notorious assassin after she heard a widow of one of his victims 
express a willingness to forgive him after witnessing his testimony 
to the TRC in September 1997. ‘I would like to hold him by the 
hand’, the widow had said, ‘and show him that there is a future, 
and that he can still change’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:14–15). 
Pumla interpreted the widow’s readiness to reach out to her 
husband’s murderer as an astonishing, almost impossible, act of 
empathy, for the widow was not only shedding tears for the loss 
of her own executed spouse but for the loss of De Kock’s moral 
humanity. For Pumla (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:15) this raised the 
crucial question: ‘Was De Kock deserving of the forgiveness shown 
to him […] Was evil intrinsic to De Kock, and forgiveness wasted 
on him?’ Or as Augustine would have it: Was it possible to unbind 
the agent from the act? (Ricoeur 2009:489–493).
Robert Vosloo, who convened the colloquy between myself, 
Wilhelm and Pumla at Stellenbosch University, offers this lucid 
analysis of the moral dilemma involved in Pumla’s meeting with 
De Kock (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002): 
What Pumla drew from this enigmatic gesture of pardon between the 
widow and De Kock was that a remorseful apology can contribute to 
the vocabulary of forgiveness in the context of evil. She is aware of 
the asymmetrical relationship between the admission of guilt and the 
word of forgiveness, and that the request for forgiveness can have 
an empty ring to it, adding insult to injury. (p. 13)
However, the power and significance of an apology lies in its 
ability ‘to perform and to transcend the apologetic words’ 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2002:13).38 The emphasis on embodied 
‘performance’ is key here. Why? Because, as Pumla insists 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2002):
[E ] mpathy is what enables us to recognise another’s pain, even in 
the midst of tragedy, because pain cannot be evil. Empathy deepens 
our humanity […]. When perpetrators apologise and experience the 
pain of remorse, showing contrition, they are acting as human beings. 
(p. 20)
38. The larger citation is from Vosloo’s chapter included in this volume.
Where I speak from: A short intellectual autobiography
56
During her encounter with De Kock in prison, Pumla (Gobodo-
Madikizela 2003) was at one point moved by his tears as he 
confessed not only his regret at murdering the widow’s husband 
but his desire to undo the wrong: 
I wish there was a way of bringing the (body) back alive. I wish I could 
say, ‘Here (is) your husband,’ he confided, stretching out his arms as 
if bearing an invisible body, his hands trembling, his mouth quivering, 
‘but unfortunately […] I have to live with it’. (p. 32)
And then the impossible happened – an unthinkable act of 
embodied empathy was enacted in a moment of carnal 
transference. Almost unbeknownst to herself, Pumla found 
herself reaching out her hand towards his, only to find it was 
‘clenched, cold and rigid’. Reflecting back on this gesture 
afterwards, she (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003) observed: 
This made me recoil for a moment and to recast my act of reaching 
out as something incompatible with the circumstances of an 
encounter with a person who not too long ago used these same 
hands, this same voice, to authorise and initiate unspeakable acts of 
malice against people very much like myself. (p. 32)
Clearly this was no matter of cheap grace, no act of facile 
sentiment. If anything this strange unpredictable moment 
signalled what Jacques Derrida terms an act of ‘impossible 
hospitality’. Summing up the encounter, Vosloo (2002) astutely 
notes: 
This unsettling encounter with De Kock left Gobodo-Madikizela with 
a sense of feeling guilty for having expressed some empathy, and 
this made her wonder if she had not ‘crossed the moral line from 
compassion, which allows some measure of distance, to actually 
identifying with De Kock’. (p. 33)
The encounter also had an impact on De Kock himself, who 
confessed during one of their later meetings: ‘You know, Pumla, 
that was my trigger hand you touched’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 
2003:39). This chillingly candid admission left Gobodo-
Madikizela with a mixture of feelings. On the one hand, she felt 
vulnerable, angry and invaded, and on the other hand she 
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realised that De Kock’s statement might also carry another 
underlying subtext (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003): 
My action may well have been the first time a black person touched 
him out of compassion. He had previously met black people only as 
enemies, across the barrel of a gun or, for those who were on his side 
of the firing line, as comrades in murder. Perhaps de Kock recognised 
my touch as a kind of threshold crossing, a new experience for him. 
(p. 42)
As is plain, such liminal crossing was far from self-evident. Pumla 
was painfully aware of the complex contradictions involved in 
touching the ‘trigger hand’, but in that moment of carnal exchange 
she did not withdraw her hand. She made a wager in the 
impossible possibility of a shared humanity. ‘His world was a cold 
world’, she (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003) realised: 
[W]here eyes of death stared accusingly at him, a world littered with 
corpses and graves [...] But for all the horrific singularity of his acts, 
de Kock was a desperate soul seeking to affirm to himself that he 
was still part of the human universe. (p. 39)
What is so revealing about this ‘trigger hand’ episode is, I submit, 
that it was Pumla’s carnal experience of De Kock’s remorse that 
reciprocally triggered her ability to acknowledge his humanity 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:67–68).39 That momentary gesture 
worked, it seems, because both De Kock’s remorse and Pumla’s 
empathy were carnally performed rather than conceptually 
calculated. It was less about cognition than recognition, less 
about sense than sensibility. ‘A genuine apology’, as Pumla 
subsequently observed (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003):
[F ]ocuses on the feelings of the other rather than on how the one who 
is apologising is going to benefit in the end. It seeks to acknowledge 
full responsibility for the act, and does not use self-serving language 
to justify the behaviour of the person asking forgiveness. It must 
communicate, convey, and perform as a ‘speech act’ that expresses 
39. Cf. our analysis of such critical carnal encounters with the stranger/other/enemy in 
Kearney (2003); Kearney and Treanor (2015), Kearney and Semonovitch (2011).
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a desire to right the relationship damaged through the action of the 
apologiser. (pp. 98–99)
In short, the act of double performativity embodied a dual 
recognition of common humanity between self and stranger, 
forgiver and criminal, peacemaker and perpetrator. Or as Pumla 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2008) herself put it: 
When remorse is triggered in the moment of witnessing […] the 
perpetrator recognises the other as a fellow human being. At the 
same time, the victim, too, recognises the face of the perpetrator not 
as that of a ‘monster’ who committed terrible deeds, but as the face 
with enough humanity to feel remorse. (pp. 176–177)
Such moments of forgiveness – to the extent that they are 
humanly possible (which is perhaps why Ricoeur calls them 
‘miraculous’) – lie in the search ‘not for the things that separate 
us but for something common among us fellow human beings, 
the compassion and empathy that bind our human identity’ 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2014:1, 35).40
So why, we might ask again, the importance of hands? 
Triggering or counter-triggering, acting or suffering, fallible or 
forgiving? I think what most struck me about Pumla’s account 
was the witness to a kind of practical wisdom that operates 
at the level of the body, a discerning sensibility that functions at 
the level of skin and flesh, nerve endings and sinews, complexion 
and touch. This is a carnal knowing prior to reflective knowing, a 
form of tact within contact, of savvy as savoir in the original 
sense of  tasting and testing (from savourer-sapere-sapientia). 
This embodied wisdom operates in the three senses of sens – 
sensation, orientation and meaning – and it is at this level that 
the primal scenes of openness to the Other are recorded in the 
great wisdom traditions. One recalls Abraham and Sarah turning 
40. One might ask here why a similar miracle of pardon and healing, of remorse and 
empathy, did not occur between SS officer Adolph Eichmann and his benign jailor (Captain 




hostility into hospitality by extending empathy to the three 
strangers at Mamre, offering them food rather than the sword. Or 
the scene in Homer where the nurse Euryclea welcomes Odysseus, 
the disguised beggar, home to Ithaca by touching the childhood 
scar (trauma) on his thigh. Or the scene in Ovid where Baucus 
and Philemon host Hermes the masked stranger in their home 
and give him all the food they have. Or Jesus feeding his 
disciples at the last supper or on the shores of Galilee or at the 
Inn at Emmaus. These classical and biblical scenes of radical 
hospitality feature hands offering nourishment or healing (almost 
all Jesus’s cures, for example, work through touch). And one 
finds similar instances of healing and hosting throughout the 
history of art and literature (right down to the table scenes 
between Jean Valjean and Monseigneur Myriel in Les Misérables 
and between Babette and her townsfolk in Babette’s Feast). 
All these scriptural–literary scenes – and we already cited a 
number of iconic political handshakes – testify to a carnal power 
of savvy and tact, of flair and taste, pre-existing our conceptual 
consciousness: an embodied navigation between enemy and 
friend, hostage and host, often miraculously turning the former 
into the latter.
Commenting on one of Pumla’s exchanges during the TRC, 
Archbishop Tutu remarked: ‘We should all be deeply humbled 
by  what we’ve heard […]. Now we’ve got to turn our backs 
on this awful past and say: life is for living’ (cf. Krog 1998:30). 
‘After such knowledge what forgiveness?’ asks T.S. Eliot. And we 
might add, in the spirit of Tutu and Pumla: ‘After such forgiveness 
what knowledge?’ For if there is knowledge, what do we do with 
it? Do we go on remembering, working through wounds, setting 
the record straight? Or do we decide to forgive and forget? 
This  is a key problem not only for the TRC in South Africa but 
for  other truth tribunals and memorials in post-traumatic 
communities throughout the world. It has been a real question, 
on a smaller scale, for my own performative therapy work with 
Sheila Gallagher, both in Guestbook’s Exchanging Stories in 
Northern Ireland and in our recent multimedia performance, 
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Twinsome Minds.41 Complex and challenging questions of 
memory and forgetting confronted us here. For story often 
comes up against history and has to rub it against the grain if one 
is to revisit hidden sufferings. Genuine remembrance goes 
beneath the Grand Narratives of Official History to identify 
hidden or neglected ‘micro-narratives’ – stories that turn 
‘backward memory’ (addicted to repetition compulsion) into 
‘forward memory’ (alert to unfulfilled possibilities of the past). 
Or  to use Freud’s term: we need a working-through of pain 
(Durcharbeitung) that can turn ‘melancholy into mourning’. Such 
work involves a difficult process of therapeutic anamnesis – while 
always mindful that ‘amnesty is never amnesia’ (Ricoeur). We 
must remember rightly before we can rightly forget. We must 
pay our ‘debt to the dead’ before we can live again. Reliving 
through cathartic imagination.
I think it is no accident that one of the most powerful 
testimonies to the traumas of apartheid – Country of My Skull – 
was written by a South African poet, Antjie Krog. And I am also 
reminded here of Atom Egoyan’s extraordinary testament to 
the  Armenian genocide in his film Ararat as well as countless 
writers, artists and film-makers who have kept the memory of 
the Holocaust alive – Amos Oz, Paul Celan, Claude Lanzmann, 
Stephen Spielberg and Art Spiegelman – all observing Primo 
Levi’s plea to ‘keep retelling the story of Auschwitz so that it 
can  never happen again’. But we must also honour Adorno’s 
question – ‘after Auschwitz who can write poetry?’ – 
acknowledging the limits of narrative imagination. (Is not silence 
sometimes the most appropriate response to horror?) And yet 
one cannot deny the indefatigable call of healing. It does not go 
away. History needs story to bring the past to life again, so that 
we can ‘feel what wretches feel’, empathise with the pain of the 
41. The latter comprised an act of ‘double remembrance’ regarding the historical traumas 
of 1916: those sacrificed in the Dublin Easter Rising and on the battlefields of Flanders and 
France during the First World War – often Irishmen from the same parish or family wearing 
the different uniforms of opposing armies.
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persecuted and be ‘struck’ by the terror of it all. Or to repeat 
the  lesson of Aristotle’s Poetics: we often need a narrative 
plot  to  reconfigure past sufferings into a meaningful act of 
katharsis. Otherwise there would be no purgation, no reckoning, 
no release – just a bare chronicle of facts: irresistible fatality. 
Story and history need each other for unspeakable wounds to 
become visible scars. For archive to become art. In sum, a poetics 
of imagining is necessary for inexperienced experience to be 
re-experienced – again and again.
Last words
In conclusion, I would like to record with gratitude several other 
special moments during my visit to South Africa: In Stellenbosch, 
the challenging and illuminating conversations with Professor 
Louise du Toit at her graduate philosophy seminar on carnal 
hermeneutics and with Prof. Bernard Lategan at the Institute for 
Advanced Studies on intercultural hospitality; the very fruitful 
encounter with peace activists Ayehsa Fakie and Sindi Nosindiso 
and their team at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in 
Cape Town – a meeting that resulted in the signing of a partnership 
with the Guestbook Project for Exchanging Stories (already 
underway). In Pretoria, the exchanges with Professor Christo 
Lombard and his students at the University of South Africa and 
with his ‘anatheist’ colleagues afterwards chez lui where we 
explored together possibilities of a new ‘acoustic space’ for the 
call of the Stranger; the meetings with Professor Anné Verhoef 
and his passionately committed students from Potchefstroom on 
the hermeneutics of religion at our seminar at the Faculty 
of  Theology, University of Pretoria; and finally the deeply 
enlightening and engaging dialogues with Yolande Steenkamp 
and members of the Dutch Reformed Church on the subject of 
theopoetics in Ooskerk, Pretoria.42
42. I am also very grateful to a number of people not mentioned in my text who kindly hosted 
me and my wife Anne during our visit to South Africa. These include Bernard, Esther and 
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I returned from my trip to South Africa to begin work 
on  another project of narrative reconciliation, ‘Stories at the 
Borders’ – an event at Boston College in 2018 marking the 10th 
anniversary of the founding of Guestbook and the 20th 
anniversary of the Good Friday Peace Agreement in Northern 
Ireland. All I can say after my encounters with such remarkable 
South African thinkers and peacemakers is that I feel newly 
emboldened to re-engage the daunting task of changing pain 
into peace through storytelling. A double work of heart and hand: 
striving to give a future to the past through narratives of healing 
and gestures of touch. The shortest route from self to self is 
indeed through the other. There are many others and there is 
much to be done.
(footnote 42 continues...)
Nerina Lategan, and their families, who welcomed us to their homes and to the Stellenbosch 
Institute for Advanced Studies, of which Bernard is director; Reza Hosseini of the University 
of Stellenbosch, who escorted us on a beautiful journey to the Cape of Good Hope with 
Professor Chielozona Eze; Keran Elah, Bernice Serfontein, Marinus Schoeman and Philomene 
Rust, who introduced us to the culture and nature of Pretoria and its environs with so much 
expertise, grace and generosity.
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Introduction
It is interesting to study the main trajectories of the 
institutionalisation of a philosophical discourse in South Africa. 
Such a kind of intellectual historical thinking enables one to start 
reconstructing a broad outline of what could be called a South 
African philosophical approach.43 Because of its (post)colonial 
past, South African philosophy has been generally influenced by 
43. For earlier versions of my interest in this topic, see Duvenage (2005, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014).
How to cite: Duvenage, P., 2018, ‘Phenomenology in South Africa: An indirect encounter 
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philosophical movements of Anglo-American and Continental 
origins. In a sequence of waves (since the latter part of the 
19th century), philosophy in South Africa has been influenced by 
British idealism, analytical philosophy, European Continental 
thinking (which includes phenomenology, existentialism, 
hermeneutics, and critical theory), religious philosophical 
approaches (such as Reformational philosophy and neo-
Thomism) and African philosophy. 
In this contribution, my main focus, but not exclusively, is the 
kind of phenomenology that emerged in the Afrikaans world 
from the 1940s onwards. In dealing with this intellectual tradition, 
I cannot but acknowledge the perspective or the horizon I am 
coming from. My own philosophical training and education in 
South Africa is closely intertwined with the kind of 
phenomenological philosophy that mainly Protestant-influenced 
philosophers in Afrikaans passed on to their students in the last 
100 years or so. Here, I am thinking more specifically about the 
Pretoria and Stellenbosch schools of philosophy – where 
I  received my initial philosophical formation. The outstanding 
figures here are C.K. Oberholzer (1904–1983) and P.S. Dreyer 
(1921–1999) with their students at Pretoria, and Johan Degenaar 
(1926–2015) and Hennie Rossouw (b. 1936) at Stellenbosch with 
their students.44 The training I received in Stellenbosch and 
Pretoria introduced me to three fields of philosophy that still 
remain at the heart of my interests: phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, critical theory and South African intellectual 
history. My training in these three fields by South African 
philosophers is obviously not to be divorced from the international 
figures who have shaped these fields – especially the first two. 
This is why I start this contribution, in the next section, with a 
short reconstruction of Richard Kearney’s work on phenomenology 
and hermeneutics and how it has been relevant for my own work 
as a philosopher in South Africa. 
44. In a recent book on Afrikaans philosophy (Duvenage 2016), I refer to at least six 
systematic research fields that have emerged in this context – an issue that will be explored 
further (in the section titled ‘Phenomenology in Afrikaans’) later in the chapter.
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After these more personal remarks on my training and influences 
in the broad field of what could be called critical hermeneutics, we 
take a step back in history, by considering the institutionalisation 
of philosophy and the migration of ideas (Duvenage 2012) in the 
South African context (the section titled ‘Institutionalisation of 
philosophy in South Africa and British idealism’). At the end of this 
section, the institutionalisation of philosophy in South Africa is 
linked to the interesting phenomenon of British idealism in the last 
part of the 19th century. The section ‘Three reactions to British 
idealism’ then problematises the phenomenon of British idealism 
by considering the reaction against it from (1) analytical philosophy 
(2) Afrikaans philosophy and (3) African philosophy. It is at this 
point of the contribution that the horizon that has shaped my 
work, namely, Afrikaans philosophy and phenomenology, will be 
sketched (the section titled ‘Phenomenology in Afrikaans’). In the 
final section, the historical and more systematic features of this 
contribution are brought to a close by reflecting critically on how 
the horizon that has shaped my thinking could possibly play a role 
in the future of philosophy in South Africa.45 
Encountering Richard Kearney
I first came across the name Richard Kearney through his (first) 
book, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers 
45. When it comes to critical hermeneutics, historical arguments are used in a manner where 
there is a dialectic between culture and power. This is an alternative to arguments that 
freeze cultural and material aspects in an ahistorical and apolitical manner. André du Toit 
(1991:6) has argued that South African intellectual history is the result of historical forces 
characteristic of a colonial and postcolonial society. Philosophy is thus part of a larger 
picture reflecting the complex relation between those intellectual and material factors that 
contributed to the scientific, industrial and technological revolutions of ‘first world’ societies 
in the ‘centre’, on the one hand, and its impact on the processes of social and intellectual 
development in ‘peripheral’ (post)colonial societies, on the other. Consequently, indigenous 
cultures were displaced, and ‘central’ ideas and values introduced and imposed, often in 
advance of the relevant and corresponding material and social development in the local 
society (Du  Toit  1991). Against this background, the liberation from the political rule of 
‘central’ powers does not mean that the history of postcolonial societies has been adequately 
addressed.
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(Kearney 1984), in 1987 and 1988, when I was finishing my master’s 
on hermeneutics as practical philosophy and postmodernism 
(1988). In this study, I considered the work of Gadamer, Arendt 
and Lyotard. When I did my doctorate afterwards on Habermas 
(1994), I also considered his other early book, Modern Movements 
in European Philosophy (Kearney 1987). What is interesting in 
this latter book is that Kearney not only considered thinkers 
from  the phenomenological–hermeneutical tradition (Husserl, 
Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida) but also from critical theory 
(Benjamin and Marcuse to Habermas) and structuralism 
(De Saussure to Kristeva). Kearney (1987) writes in this regard:
Phenomenology and existentialism attempt to relocate the 
origins of meaning in our lived experience prior to the impersonal 
‘objectivism’ of a narrow scientific attitude. Structuralism 
emphasises the hidden or the ‘unconscious structures’ of language 
which underpin our current established discourses – social, cultural, 
and economic. Critical Theory develops the insight of Hegel and 
Marx into a radical interrogation of ideologies at work in advanced 
industrial societies. (p. 1)
Throughout the years, Richard Kearney’s work has influenced me 
in at least three ways:
 • Firstly, the creative way in which he discussed phenomenology 
and critical theory in his Modern Movements has influenced 
me profoundly. These two philosophical traditions as well as 
South African intellectual history are still at the heart of my 
interests and research in philosophy today.
• Secondly, his earlier works, as mentioned above, have not 
only been influential for me as a postgraduate student 
but also in my career as a scholar in writing a recent book. 
In this regard, the mentioned early book on interviews 
(Kearney 1984) and its later incarnations (Kearney 1995, 
2004), as well as a book that Peter Dews edited of interviews 
with Habermas (Dews 1986), served as inspiration when 
I published my book on Afrikaans philosophy. In it (Duvenage 
2016), I used interviews to complement my interpretation 
of the phenomenon of Afrikaans philosophy and the role of 
phenomenology in the last 100 years.
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• Thirdly, after my initial encounter with Kearney’s work, 
I followed his career and saw how it took shape by addressing 
important issues such as the image and imagination, history, 
visions of Europe and Ireland’s role within Europe, peace and 
reconciliation, religion and the issue of faith and reason, the 
stranger, the nature of stories and narratives, and carnal 
hermeneutics.46
My aim in this contribution is not to engage with Kearney’s work 
in philosophy directly. I leave this to the other contributions in 
this book on important themes such as faith and reason, 
anatheism and the reimagination of the sacred today. All of these 
themes are of the utmost importance in a world (especially 
Western Europe) where secularism has brought about a profound 
cultural crisis. In this regard, I would rather like to engage with 
Kearney indirectly by asking: From where (what horizon) is he 
coming? Is there specifically something Irish that set him on a 
path to becoming a very important interlocutor in the broad 
post-phenomenological debate globally? What is there 
specifically in Irish Catholicism that finds an alliance with a 
philosophical movement in the 20th century? Who were 
Kearney’s Irish influences here, mentors that set him on his way 
to do his postgraduate work under the Catholic-influenced 
Charles Taylor in Canada and the Protestant-influenced Paul 
Ricoeur in Paris?47
As stated, I am not going to answer these questions directly 
but rather bring them into conversation with the intellectual 
history of phenomenology in South Africa in the spirit of 
Horizonverzmelzung [the melting of horizons], as Gadamer 
puts it. The rest of this contribution will thus be a reconstruction 
46. See in this regard works on image and imagination (Kearney 1988), visions of Europe 
and Ireland’s role within Europe (Kearney 1997), religion and the issue of faith and reason 
(Kearney 2001, 2011), the stranger (Kearney 2003), the nature of stories and narratives 
(Kearney 2002) and carnal hermeneutics (Kearney & Treanor 2015).
47. For his interpretation of Ricoeur, see Kearney (2005).
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of the phenomenological horizon I am coming from – as an 
invitation to encounter Kearney in the spirit of mutual learning.
Institutionalisation of philosophy in 
South Africa and British idealism
It is only after Britain took over the Cape (from the Dutch) as the 
colonial power in 1795 (finally in 1806) that a formal educational 
system emerged during the 19th century. The first institutions of 
higher education, such as the South African College (SAC) in 
Cape Town (1829), St Andrews in Grahamstown (1855), Grey 
College in Bloemfontein (1855) and the Victoria College in 
Stellenbosch (1874), were all strongly influenced by British 
intellectual and administrative traditions.48 In 1873, the University 
of the Cape of Good Hope was established to coordinate the 
examinations of these colleges. In the northern parts, the first 
tertiary institutions only emerged after the Anglo–Boer War 
when the Transvaal University College was founded in 
Johannesburg (1906) and in Pretoria (1908). In 1910, the name of 
the university college in Johannesburg was changed to the South 
African Mine School, while Pretoria continued under the original 
name. 
In 1918, the University of the Cape of Good Hope became the 
University of South Africa with its seat in Pretoria, while the SAC 
and Victoria College became the Universities of Cape Town and 
Stellenbosch, respectively. They were followed by the Universities 
of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) in 1923 and Pretoria in 
1930. Although other universities were subsequently founded, 
48. The first known philosophical textbooks in South Africa dates back to the first half of 
the 19th century (Bacon 1836; Changuion 1848), while the first institutions of philosophy 
have only relatively lately been instituted (from the latter part of the 19th century). For 
example, there has only been a national South African philosophical society in existence 
for a few decades (since 1951). It is thus, as indicated, premature to refer to South African 
philosophical tradition and more prudent to study the history of the institutionalisation of a 
philosophical discourse in South Africa.
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‘these four can be considered as the founding residential 
universities in South Africa’. 
It is also at these four universities where philosophers found 
an institutional foothold. In the British colonies, philosophy 
was  established in the context of universities, which were to 
a large degree funded by the state. This is also a context where 
the political order of the day could not be separated from 
knowledge  production.49 At issue here is the specific colonial 
situation where thinking starts to migrate from the centre (in this 
case London) to the colony (in this case South Africa). Such a 
perspective on the history of British academic institutionalisation 
in South Africa allows one also to gain a deepened understanding 
of further developments in the 20th century – the way that 
philosophical discourses were influenced by social and historical 
forces. A reflection on the relationship between knowledge and 
power is further necessary, because subjects (individuals) are 
embedded in institutional power relations, which makes it difficult 
to see philosophical reflection as a pure and neutral activity. It is 
against this background that the influence of British idealism on 
philosophy in South Africa can be mentioned.
The initial institutionalisation of philosophy in South Africa 
(1873–1920) took place in an atmosphere closely associated with 
a movement called ‘British idealism’, one in which figures such as 
Bradley, Bosanquet and Green played a central role. This 
movement is an interesting deviation of British philosophy, which 
is usually characterised by being empirical, practical and ‘common 
sensical.’ For Isaiah Berlin, the British empirical approach stands 
in close relation with the everyday British mentality. During the 
second half of the 19th century, though, British philosophy was 
influenced by a kind of Hegelian idealism. Various aspects were 
important in this interpretation of Hegel. Here, history, as the 
unfolding of spirit, is a movement of progress that leads eventually 
49. Not all universities and their forerunners were centrally created by the state. In the case 
of Stellenbosch, Potchefstroom and to a certain extent Pretoria, local communities played an 
important role in the institutionalisation of these universities.
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to the highest good (Absolute). Other aspects are the relationship 
between subject and object, a dialectical way of thinking, the 
central place of freedom in modern life and an understanding of 
the common good (Sittlichkeit). Hegel also considered the 
relationship between state and civil society and education 
(Bildung).
The interesting question, though, is how did British idealism 
interpret Hegel with reference to imperialism and colonialism? In 
this process, it made the arguable point that certain cultures or 
peoples (and the individual among them) had the task to lead 
other people. One possible interpretation of this argument was 
that the peoples of Europe had to lead the way. In the British 
context of imperialism and colonialism of the 19th century, the 
‘white man’s burden’ entailed that it was their task to assist 
the  colonised people on the long and winding road to the 
absolute spirit. In the context of South Africa, the concept of 
trusteeship was also used. It is thus possible to argue that this 
specific reading of Hegel was used by British idealism to provide 
some form of legitimation for colonialism.50 
The first philosophers who gained institutional positions at 
places such as Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Pretoria and 
Johannesburg were almost without exception products of British 
idealism.51 The prime example in this regard is R.F.A. Hoernlé. 
More than his predecessors at Cape Town (Bindley, Foot, 
Fremantle and Loveday) he interpreted his appointment as 
professor in philosophy at the SAC (1908–1911) as a calling. 
Andrew Nash (1985) provides a fine reconstruction of how 
Hoernlé arrived with this idealistic-inspired philosophy at this far 
off corner of the world, Cape Town, to be confronted with totally 
different circumstances than he was used to at Oxford. 
50. It is important to note that another aspect of Hegel’s legacy, for example, his view of the 
tension between master and slave, did not figure prominently in this context.
51. These philosophers were trained in the United Kingdom, just like many of the first 
philosophers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India. On the phenomenon of British 
Idealism, see Sweet (2010), Boucher and Vincent (2012) and Mander (2011).
Chapter 3
71
At Stellenbosch Thomas Walker was professor in philosophy 
from 1874 to 1916. Walker, who was not known for his academic 
prowess, was also a product of British idealism; he identified with 
the local Dutch-Afrikaner community. In the northern parts of 
South Africa, the philosophy department at Pretoria University 
was established by the Oxford-trained Scot W.A. Macfadyen.52 
At the University of the Witwatersrand, Hoernlé, after a spell as 
lecturer at Harvard, returned to fill the chair (1923–1943).53
Three reactions to British idealism
It is interesting to note what happened to the philosophical 
legacy of British idealism at Oxford and in South Africa (and 
specifically at the institutions mentioned above) in the 
20th  century. These reactions, and especially the second one, 
bring us back to the topic of phenomenology in South Africa – 
and more specifically in the Afrikaans world. 
First reaction
Within the first decades of the century, analytic philosophy 
became the dominant force at Oxford (and most of the English-
speaking world), thereby eclipsing British idealism completely. 
It is an open question whether the decline of British idealism was 
in a way connected to the collapse of British colonialism.54 The 
reaction of analytic philosophy, led by Moore and Russell, against 
British idealism was no coincidence, because it linked up with 
the  earlier British empirical and common-sense tradition. The 
neutrality of science, logic and the analysis of everyday language 
play an important role in this approach. In South Africa, analytical 
52. For a case study of Pretoria under MacFadyen, see Duvenage (2005).
53. British Idealist philosophers were also the founders at philosophy departments elsewhere 
in South Africa. At Grahamstown and Bloemfontein, the first philosophers were Richie Lord 
and Thomas Forsyth.
54. The move away from idealism almost coincided with the Anglo-Boer War.
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philosophy became influential at different times at all the historical 
English-speaking white universities. The first department to 
follow the analytical line was Witwatersrand after the death 
of Hoernlé. This department was followed by the University of 
Natal, Rhodes University (under the influence of Daantjie 
Oosthuizen since the 1960s), the University of South Africa (from 
the 1960s until around 2000) and lastly the University of Cape 
Town.55 It is interesting that of all the so-called homeland 
universities under apartheid (Fort Hare, Zululand, North and 
Transkei) only the latter department became analytical. 
Second reaction
In comparison to the historically white English-speaking 
universities, another reaction against British idealism stemmed 
from the historically white Afrikaans-speaking universities 
(Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Bloemfontein). The 
earliest Afrikaans philosophers at these institutions were all 
influenced by the three branches of the Dutch Reformed Church, 
whose theological positions were determined by Continental 
debates (stemming from Holland and Germany) rather than 
Britain. The biggest of the three, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Kerk, though, had strong links with Scotland, while the other 
two (Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk and Gereformeerde Kerk) 
had strong links with the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent 
Germany). Against this background, philosophers who had links 
with these churches were open to religious experience and they 
were critical about an overly scientistic weltanschauung. Their 
outlook was further influenced by the struggle of Afrikaner 
nationalism against British imperialism, the Afrikaans language 
struggle against English and a certain historical consciousness.56 
55. On the University of Cape Town being an interesting case study in this regard, see 
Duvenage (2005).
56. For an elaboration of these aspects, see the six systematic research fields in Afrikaans 
philosophy mentioned in this chapter.
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Afrikaner philosophers such as N.J. Brümmer and Tobie Müller 
(Stellenbosch), Tommie (T.J.) Hugo, C.H. Rautenbach and C.K. 
Oberholzer (Pretoria), Hendrik Stoker (Potchefstroom) and 
Nico Diederichs (Bloemfontein) found themselves culturally in 
opposition to British traditions in the first half of the 20th 
century. In these circles, Oxford and Cambridge were not the 
intellectual reference points, but the emphasis was rather on 
debates in Continental Europe. Although all of these philosophers 
associated themselves with the social and cultural struggle of 
Afrikaners (white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans), there 
are also notable differences between Stellenbosch and Pretoria, 
on the one side, and Potchefstroom and Bloemfontein, on the 
other. 
At Stellenbosch, Brümmer (and his successors F.J. Kirsten, 
Johan Degenaar, Hennie Rossouw and Anton van Niekerk) were 
all influenced by a certain blend of Continental philosophy and 
Protestant theology (influenced by the powerful Dutch Reformed 
Church Seminary). Kirsten was influenced by Bergson; Degenaar 
by phenomenology, existentialism, analytical philosophy (in a 
qualified sense), Marxism and postmodernism; and Rossouw and 
Van Niekerk by philosophical hermeneutics. Of the four, Degenaar 
is an interesting figure because of his open critique of apartheid 
from the 1950s onwards. The Pretoria tradition also followed a 
Continental tradition like Stellenbosch, but Rautenbach, 
Oberholzer and Dreyer took a more conservative political line 
than Degenaar at Stellenbosch. Some of their most important 
students include Fanie de Beer, Bert Olivier, Marinus Schoeman 
and Danie Goosen.57 
At Potchefstroom, Stoker started an indigenous Calvinist 
philosophy – philosophy of the Idea of Creation (Wysbegeerte 
van die Skeppingsidee). This religiously informed philosophy also 
became very influential in an altered form (via the work of 
Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven) from the 1950s at Bloemfontein. 
57. For interviews with Bert Olivier and Danie Goosen, see Duvenage (2016:164–193, 221–248).
Phenomenology in South Africa: An indirect encounter with Richard Kearney
74
In the latter case, Danie Strauss is the outstanding figure. As 
indicated above, most of the so-called homeland universities 
under apartheid (Fort Hare, Zululand, North and Transkei) 
overwhelmingly followed a Continental line in philosophy, mostly 
influenced by Stellenbosch and Pretoria.
Third reaction
Although the broad trajectories of the institutionalisation of 
philosophy have so far followed the contours of a kind of ‘white 
writing’ (J.M. Coetzee), it does not imply that there were no black 
voices. Already in the 1940s, Anton Lembede wrote a fascinating 
MA study on the concept of God from Descartes to the present day. 
Writers such as Eskia Mphahlela and Credo Mutwa contributed to 
an indigenous thinking and writing tradition. There was also the 
influential Black Consciousness movement of the 1960s, with figures 
such as Steve Biko, Barney Pityana and Mamphele Ramphele. In 
academic circles, it is well known that Black Consciousness 
philosophers such as Magobe Ramose, Percy More and Joe Teffo 
found their philosophical grounding in the 1960s and 1970s at the 
University of the North from Freek Engelbrecht and the kind of 
phenomenological training that he received from the Pretoria 
school of philosophy. Although there were obvious political 
differences between Engelbrecht and his students, they still used 
the kind of existential–phenomenological training they had received 
as a basis for their later thinking on Black Consciousness philosophy. 
The appointment of philosophers of mixed race in the South 
African academy only followed from the 1960s onwards. The first 
lecturer of mixed race in philosophy, Adam Small, was only 
appointed in the early 1960s at the University of Fort Hare. He was 
followed by a sprinkling of black philosophers at the homeland 
universities from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards. Since 
1994, the number of black South Africans with tenure has increased. 
In 1995, Joe Teffo was appointed as the first full professor in 
philosophy at the University of the North. Appropriately, he titled 
his inaugural lecture ‘The Other in African Experience’ (1995). 
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In 2000, Ben Ramose was appointed as professor and head of the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of South Africa, while 
Percy More has become an important voice for African philosophy 
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and after his retirement at the 
University of Limpopo. Although themes in African philosophy 
made earlier inroads at the historically black universities in the 
1970s and 1980s, it only entered the curricula of philosophy 
departments at the historically white universities in the 1990s, 
where it was much on the periphery until the #RhodesMustFall 
and #FeesMustFall campaigns of 2015–2016.
Phenomenology in Afrikaans 
Returning to the reaction against British idealism, as mentioned 
in the previous section (the second reaction), the focus here will 
be on the type of phenomenological thinking that started among 
philosophers at Pretoria and Stellenbosch that was eventually 
also important for my own philosophical training in the 1980s 
and onwards. Before this issue is addressed, this section will start 
with a succinct definition of phenomenology, followed by the 
different directions that have emerged from phenomenology as 
it has been formulated by Husserl initially.
Phenomenology stems from the Greek word phainomai 
[I  appear verskyn, I give vertoon myself]. It means that 
phenomena disclose themselves and secondly legoo [I speak, 
I let myself hear] (Oberholzer 1967:86). Phenomenology as 
we know it today, though, starts with Edmund Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations [Logische Untersuchungen, 1900–
1901]. This start is closely intertwined with the catchphrase 
zu den Sachen selbst (to the things themselves).58 In this 
58. Before Husserl the concept of phenomenology was already used in the 18th century 
amongst German thinkers such as Lambert, Kant, Herder, Fichte and Hegel (Moran 
2000:6). Hegel, for example, calls his investigation of the unfolding of human history the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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process, the concept of intentionality is important. For 
Gadamer (1977), Husserl asks:
[H ]ow what is intended is revealed, for which consciousness it 
is revealed, and in what form. Hence from the very beginning he 
did not conceive of the situation in terms of a subject existing for 
itself and choosing its objects. Instead he studied the attitudes 
of consciousness correlated with the phenomenal objects of 
intentionality – the ‘intentional acts’ as he called them. Now 
‘intentionality’ [Intentionalität] does not mean ‘an act of meaning’ 
[Meinen] in the sense of a subjective operation. (p. 118)
This description of intentionality makes it possible to describe 
phenomenology as a radical, antitraditional seeking for truth – a 
practice rather than a system. In the early phases of Husserl’s career, 
he worked descriptively and transcendentally. Here, phenomena 
are described as they appear to the consciousness of the experiencer. 
In this process, what restricts experience must be avoided – such as 
cultural practices of tradition, folk assumptions or indeed the 
practice of the natural sciences itself. The point is that explanation 
cannot be imposed before phenomena are understood from within. 
In this sense, phenomenology comes against encrusted traditions 
and the domination of external methods. Criticising any dogmatism 
is a return ‘to the things themselves’ – the living contact with reality. 
In this sense, there is a return to the existence of the living human 
subject – with his or her concrete and living experience. A mere 
empirical and psychological explanation of human beings is 
challenged as well as a representalist account of knowledge, in the 
Lockean sense, which explained knowledge in terms of an inner 
mental representation or copy of what exists outside the mind 
(Moran 2000:4–5).
As an alternative, ‘Husserl proposed a number of steps, most 
[notable] the phenomenological epoché or suspension of the 
natural attitude, as well as a number of methodological reductions 
and alterations of viewpoint’ (Moran 2000:11). Moran (2000) writes:
Husserl thought phenomenological practice required a radical shift 
in viewpoint, a suspension or bracketing of the everyday natural 
attitude and all ‘world-positing’ intentional acts which assume the 
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existence of the world, until the practitioner is led back into the 
domain of pure transcendental subjectivity. (p. 2)
Not all of Husserl’s followers, though, were comfortable with his 
reconstruction of transcendental subjectivity, because it came 
close to a kind of neo-Kantian idealism from which he wanted to 
protect phenomenology. The following five reactions to Husserl’s 
phenomenology can be mentioned:59
 • Firstly, there is realistic and constitutive phenomenology, 
which still stands relatively near to Husserl’s original descriptive 
method of experience. In constitutive phenomenology, 
transcendental phenomenological methods such as epoché 
and reduction play a role.
• Secondly, there is ontological or existential phenomenology, 
which has a close link with Martin Heidegger’s work Sein und Zeit 
(1927). With a more fundamental critique of Husserl, Heidegger 
steers phenomenology in a new direction. Heidegger challenges 
Husserl’s concept of transcendental idealism and first philosophy 
as ego-logy with his concept of Dasein where phenomenology 
asks the question of Being. Here phenomenology becomes 
ontology. Moran (2000:21) aptly writes that phenomenology is 
here, ‘attentive to historicity and the facticity of human living; to 
temporality, or the concrete living in time, and furthermore it 
must not  remain content with description of the internal 
consciousness of time. […] all description involves interpretation; 
indeed that description was only a derivative form of 
interpretation.’
• Thirdly, there is hermeneutical phenomenology, which takes 
Heidegger’s insight in Sein und Zeit, about the interpreting nature 
of human existence, further. The best example here is Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s phenomenological study of Plato’s ethics (Gadamer 
1931) and his later masterly Wahrheit und Methode (Gadamer 
1960). Although Heidegger’s ontology remains a source of 
inspiration, Gadamer developed hermeneutical phenomenology 
in the direction of a ‘method’ of the human sciences in 
59. This is an elaboration of the three reactions that Embree (1998) mentions.
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which  interpretation plays an important role.60 One could also 
place the work of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney here.
• Fourthly, there is the post-structuralism of Derrida. From 
Derrida’s arrival in Paris in 1949 until his work in 1967, he 
almost exclusively worked on Husserl, Heidegger and 
Levinas. This is the basis of his post-structuralist project of 
deconstruction. In Derrida’s first public lecture of 1959, 
‘Genesis and Structure’, as Powell (2006:41) indicates, the 
Husserlian transcendental subject is challenged: ‘This is 
achieved by reading the outline of the transcendental 
subjectivity as a structure with a history. But a structure 
cannot have an explicable history unless it changes beyond 
recognition at each stage of its history, that is, its change 
cannot be explained. This means that the structure must not 
be as structured as Husserl thinks, but more fluid, more open, 
less exclusive, and less unjust than it attempts to be. It is 
Derrida’s task always to paint the totality and the imposing 
mastery of a system first, so that he then can undo it.’
• In the fifth place, one could position critical theory as a further 
reaction to phenomenology through the work of Horkheimer, 
Adorno and Marcuse.
Six systematic reactions in Afrikaans 
philosophy
These five reactions (as sketched above) indicate a diversity in 
the practice, interpretation and application of phenomenology 
(Moran 2000:3). On the other hand, there are quite a number of 
aspects that phenomenological and post-phenomenological 
thinkers share: for example, a healthy scepticism of naturalism 
(or objectivism or positivism) – a worldview that has been the 
basis of Western natural sciences and technology since the 
Renaissance. As an alternative, the research and the knowledge 
process is rather understood as an encounter – an approach 
60. Embree (1998) refers to the following hermeneutical phenomenologists: Paul Ricoeur, 
Patrick Heelan, Don Ihde, Graeme Nicholson, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Calvin O. Schrag, Gianni 
Vattimo and Carlo Sini.
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that entails reflexive reciprocity between subject and object 
(Embree 2008). These basic insights also play a role if we look 
at six systematic reactions of Afrikaans philosophy, against 
British idealism, from a phenomenological point of view:
 • Firstly, there is the issue of modern life or modernity, which is 
most of the time synonymous with the natural scientific way of 
looking at the world, which is closely allied with technology. In 
South Africa, this way of looking at the world has been strongly 
influenced by the sudden development and expansion of the 
mining–industrial complex since the 1880s and the sudden 
move of the vast majority of South Africans (including Afrikaans 
people) from the rural areas to the cities – especially from the 
1930s onwards – and their struggle to come to terms with it.
• Secondly, there is the issue of science and faith (or faith and 
reason). This is a sort of primordial issue in Afrikaans philosophy 
and it stems, among others, from the 1862 synod of the Dutch 
Reformed Church at Stellenbosch, where liberal and orthodox 
positions came to loggerheads. In the 20th century, this issue 
has also been broadened in the secularisation debate where 
atheism has become an option for an influential group.61 
• Thirdly, there is (hopefully) the creative tension between 
particular and the universal. This is not just an epistemological 
issue but also a political–ethical one, where the latter links 
with issues such as diversity, pluralism and a more political–
federal perspective – where an Aristotelian concept such as 
phronesis could be possibly helpful.62 
• Fourthly, there is the relationship between language and 
thinking. Since Herder in the 18th century argued that language 
influences thinking, it has been on the philosophical 
agenda.63The way you think in Afrikaans or Zulu (or Welsh or Irish) 
61. The work of Richard Kearney on religion is obviously relevant for contemporary debates 
within this systematic area.
62. See my inaugural lecture on the issue of practical wisdom (phronesis) in a divided society 
(Duvenage 2013).
63. One can just think of Heidegger and Gadamer’s 20th century formulation of language 
being the house of being; or that we do not speak a language, but a language speaks us; or 
being that can be understood is language.
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is different than in English – and it must be respected. The 
point here is not language relativism but rather a plea for 
multilingualism and the wonderful challenge to translate and 
interpret between the languages in South Africa (and in 
Europe). In this sense, South Africa is not an English land but 
a translating land. 
• Fifthly, there is the issue of historical trauma (with the Anglo–
Boer War and apartheid as central reference points), which no 
authentic thinking in South Africa can escape. 
• Finally, there is the issue of the kind of criticism that a more 
phenomenological-influenced philosophy could follow. In the 
Afrikaans world, the debate about committed or non-
committed critique in literary world of the Sestigers has its 
version in Afrikaans philosophy. Here, Walzer’s distinction 
between an attached and non-attached critic is important, 
with regard to a thinker such as Albert Camus and a poet 
thinker such as Breyten Breytenbach, as examples of attached 
critics (Duvenage 2018; Walzer 2002 [1988]).
In summary, it should be clear that these systematic fields within 
phenomenological-influenced Afrikaans philosophy (science, 
religion, politics, language, historical trauma and criticism) can all 
be fruitfully brought into encounter with the thinking of Richard 
Kearney. There are good grounds to believe that the specific Irish-
phenomenological horizon Kearney is coming from has much to 
offer for philosophers working in the South African context.
On the future of philosophy in 
South Africa
Phenomenology in South Africa, and more specifically in the 
Afrikaans world, has been the focus of this contribution. After some 
more personal notes on a specific philosophical career in South Africa, 
being influenced by South African and international scholars in the 
broad field of phenomenology (including the work of Richard 
Kearney), a case study in South African intellectual history followed. 
Here it was shown how Afrikaans philosophy, as a reaction to British 
idealism, was influenced by a kind of Continental phenomenological 
thinking. This kind of phenomenology was influenced by Husserl’s 
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phenomenology and its offshoots in the 20th century – for example, 
Heidegger’s ontological thinking, existentialism, hermeneutics, post-
structuralism and Critical Theory. The way that a phenomenological 
kind of thinking became influential in South Africa, though, was not 
sketched as a type of one-way traffic from Europe to Africa but in 
more dialectical terms. This was done with reference to six systematic 
fields in Afrikaans philosophy, namely, modernity and science, 
religion, the universal and the particular, language and thinking, 
historical trauma and critique. Against this background, it is now 
possible to make some (preliminary) remarks about the future of 
thinking (and philosophy) in South Africa.
In the first place, it should be clear by now that a critical 
hermeneutical approach takes intellectual history very seriously. 
The issue here is not just the historicity of ideas and concepts, 
but the challenge is to explore those intellectual traditions that 
have shaped philosophy in South Africa, to know where they are 
coming from and to understand how they were transformed 
under (post-)colonial conditions. 
Such an approach (which is related to Foucault’s genealogical 
perspective) ‘is worthwhile by providing a historical and material 
corrective to arguments that might otherwise strive to reconcile 
cultural values and ideas in an apolitical and ahistorical manner’. 
It further entails a good understanding of the development of 
(post)colonial societies, how the colonial centre is of primary 
significance here and how it provides much of the intellectual 
context for an emergent (post)colonial thinking. As André du 
Toit (1991:6) has indicated, (post)colonial societies do not 
develop autonomously, but they are the result of the 
transplantation of fragments of cultures and traditions rooted in 
the parent societies. Against this background, ‘local traditions 
[have] to define their own ideas, values and aims within the ambit 
of “foreign” discourses even (perhaps especially) where they 
deliberately set themselves against these’. In such a situation, 
there is a need for sensitive interpreters.64 
64. Sensitive interpreters is my version of André du Toit’s concept of ambiguous intermediaries.
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Apart from having a good historical sense, a sensitive interpreter 
should have the ability to deal with difference and the lived 
experience of pluralism or diversity. A training in phenomenology 
and its offshoots can be of help here in an epistemological, ethical 
and political sense. Epistemologically we know the danger of just 
one truth or metanarrative for a complex and even divided society. 
In such a context, the Gadamerian concept of the melting of horizons 
could be helpful. Such a melting takes place where the horizon of 
another culture (artwork or historical text) is brought into critical 
dialogue with the horizon of the interpreter. In other words, the 
interpreter opens the horizon of the other (culture, text and artwork) 
by allowing it to question the interpreter’s prejudices towards the 
case at hand. The point is that my own cultural horizon must be in 
principle open to the horizon of the other’s culture so that we can 
question one another in the dialogue about one another’s prejudices. 
What follows is a dialogue of question and answer where the 
interpreter not only questions the truth claim of the case at hand 
but also allows his or her prejudices to be questioned by that with 
which he or she is confronted. This is a risk, because one puts one’s 
theoretical positions (and prejudices) on the line in an open dialogue 
of question and answer. An authentic fusion of horizons leads to a 
situation where the respective interlocutors in a discourse can 
understand differently (Wright 1998). So, the fusion of horizons in a 
multicultural society is the precondition for taking the right ethical 
decisions when a decision concerns me and the other. 
Obviously, the issue of a certain kind of Western thinking, but 
also its counter-discourse in the form of Western philosophy 
itself or African philosophy, is at stake here. There are examples 
of philosophers who got their training in phenomenology in 
South Africa, and more specifically in the Afrikaans world, who 
have used their position as sensitive interpreters to problematise 
Western intellectual traditions. In philosophical terms, it means a 
problematisation of both analytical and Continental philosophy 
and how they have been practised in South Africa.65
65. Here one can think of the work of philosophers such as Johan Degenaar, André du Toit 




From the preceding discussion, which is mainly epistemological 
by nature, a more ethical and political perspective is possible. 
An  important concept in this regard is Aristotelian phronesis 
[practical wisdom], which has been reactivated in our time by 
Gadamer. This concept is not only important for our practical 
in-the-world-being (Heidegger), against a scientific–theoretical 
stance, but it also enables us to mediate the particular with the 
universal in our actions of the life-world. Phronesis as practical-
oriented understanding and interpretation is important for 
actionable insight and self-knowledge in the life-world. It is action-
driven [handelende] insight that cannot be learnt as a blueprint or 
by recipe (Malpas 2009). Gadamer uses this Aristotelian concept 
to mediate between the universality of the law, which relates to 
the necessity of absolute and unqualified responsibility, on the 
one hand, and the multitude of concrete lived life situations, which 
constitute the historicity of humankind, on the other. For Gadamer, 
phronesis as an intellectual virtue is a form of hermeneutical 
knowledge. It is not pure or without interests (or objective in the 
sense of the natural sciences), because deliberation and application 
are basic elements of practical wisdom. Phronesis is thus not a 
logical deductive application of universal truth on a particular 
case.66 It rather attempts to mediate the human striving for the 
universal with the reality of historically informed situations (Lawn 
& Keane 2011:114–115). 
This bring us to the political side of a critical hermeneutical 
approach. In the first place, an atomistic conception of the 
individual is challenged – especially whereby he or she supposedly 
floats around in the infinite ocean of the present without any 
historical and cultural moorings. 
The target here is that form of liberalism that Michael Sandel 
(1984) calls the unencumbered self, that is, the idea of the self as 
completely non-aligned, detached and only responsible for her 
66. Paul Ricoeur (1992:269) writes in this regard, ‘[p]ractical wisdom consists in inventing 
conduct that will best satisfy the exception that solicitude requires by breaking the rule to 
the smallest extent possible’.
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or his own interests.67 This question is important because it is 
ironically enough precisely in divided societies where a shared 
fate is not so apparent that such an atomistic idea of the self can 
easily take root. The extent to which such a conception took root 
in South Africa after 1994 can be seen in the scale on which a civil 
ethos characterised by the common care for one another and for 
infrastructure is undermined by the ruthless pursuit of instant 
wealth acquired through dubious means. 
Secondly, as discussed earlier on, ‘we must not deal with the 
world in an exclusively rigid, law-like technocratic fashion but in 
a practically enquiring fashion’. There are obvious dangers 
attached to planning or managing a multicultural or divided 
society according to a technical or technocratic blueprint – for 
example, where we read the constitution of a country in a purely 
technical sense without any contextualisation or where we 
enforce quotas, racial or otherwise, in a complex society.
Thirdly, Gadamer’s alternative on these two points again 
makes us aware of the historical dimension of understanding as 
explained above (Chen 1987:186). He links such an attitude to the 
working historical consciousness that each of us must have. The 
lessons ‘for multicultural societies is that any attempt [to 
construct] an argument, theory or institution [must] be [acutely] 
aware of [their] historical roots’. The hermeneutic circle implies 
that the dialogue or conversation between different elements of 
a multicultural society must never stop. In other words, one-
sided views of history that often characterise divided societies 
can precisely not be afforded in such societies and must always 
again be subject to further dialogue and mutual deliberation. 
It should be a never-ending conversation, even though the 
melting of horizons could end in some kind of fragile consensus. 
Such a consensus, though, must always be open to further 
improvements. We must hold onto dialogue.68
67. See about this in Sandel (1984:9) and more fully, Sandel (1982).
68. On hermeneutical citizenship, see Alejandro (1993).
Chapter 3
85
Obviously, the place to hold onto dialogue is a vibrant public 
sphere and civil society. A space where metanarratives and 
binaries in a divided society can be tested and critically discussed. 
A space where not only race, but class, culture, gender speciesism, 
our relationship to nature and to technology and so on can be 
critically discussed, and where the forceless force of the better 
argument (Habermas) can hopefully prevail. As the various 
South African perspectives are moving nearer to one another 
at  the start of the 21st century – because of industrialisation, 
modernisation and the founding of a political unitary state – the 
need for such a critical public sphere is of the utmost importance. 
A public sphere in which there is an awareness for cross-cultural 
communication and sensitive interpretation. 
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Transcendence and 
anatheism
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This chapter sets out to analyse Richard Kearney’s concept of 
anatheism in terms of transcendence. The main question is what 
type of transcendence is described, implied or motivated by 
Kearney’s anatheism. In the first part, the importance of this 
question will be highlighted by first giving an overview of the 
current post-metaphysical philosophical debate with regard to 
transcendence. In the second part, the focus will be on the 
concept of anatheism and its link to transcendence. The question 
here will be why Kearney opts for this type of transcendence of 
anatheism. Some possible critiques of this position will also be 




transcendence’ will be brought into conversation with the work 
of other contemporary philosophers who have explored this 
theme. The aim is to provide further elucidation of Kearney’s 
anatheism and its transcendence.
Transcendence in a 
post-metaphysical age
To live in a post-metaphysical age implies, at least at face value, 
the end of transcendence, or ‘post-transcendence’ (Verhoef 
2016:3). Ironically, in the past 15 years, a variety of disciplines 
have shown renewed interest in the concept of transcendence. 
This interest is especially evident in Continental philosophy, in 
which various philosophers and theologians have engaged in 
exploring the concept of transcendence. To a large extent, this 
interest arises from the publication in 2007 of the influential 
book Religion and Postmodernism 4: Transcendence and Beyond, 
edited by John Caputo and Michael Scanlon.69 After 2007, other 
important books followed like Homo Transcendentalis (Du Toit 
2010), Looking Beyond? Shifting Views of Transcendence 
in  Philosophy, Theology, Art, and Politics (Stoker & Van der 
Merwe 2012b) and Culture and Transcendence – A Typology of 
Transcendence (Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a). These books 
not only ‘give an indication of the importance of the concept 
transcendence in contemporary philosophical–theological 
discourses but also [highlight] the need to reconceptualise 
[transcendence]’ (Verhoef 2016:2). Hence, it may be emphasised 
that (Verhoef 2016):
One of the main reasons why transcendence is attracting [renewed] 
attention is [that] the [recognition of] the transcendence–immanence 
pair [was shaped] in the late modern period by the critique of 
metaphysics. (p. 2)
69. This book of Caputo and Scanlon was preceded by Mutations culturelles et transcendence 
(Gaudette 2000), Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion (Faulconer 2003) and 
Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond (Schwartz 2004).
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This must be understood in a broader historical context. The 
composition of the word transcendence, with the prefix trans- 
(from the Latin trans, ‘across’) and the action of ascending (from 
the Latin scandere, ‘to climb’), points to a type of ‘crossing over’ 
to some place above or outside the world – an ascension to an 
‘outside’.70 In philosophy, the question of ‘an outside’ has been 
linked to the Supreme Being, the divine and the ultimate cause or 
foundation. ‘Such a metaphysical way of speaking about the 
transcendent (as mostly God) was immensely criticised in the 
modern period by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger, among others’ (Verhoef 2016:2). They all criticise in 
their unique ways that there is no ‘true’ foundation, no 
ontotheology, no other reality that determines our reality. This 
critique of metaphysics urged philosophers to move away from 
metaphysics as a whole. This led to the notion of our age as being 
‘post-metaphysical’, which seems to imply a ‘post-transcendence’ 
as well.
In light of the above, the inevitable and intriguing question is: 
Why is there still an interest in and a search for transcendence in 
our post-metaphysical age? Why are there ‘recurring appearances 
of transcendence, wittingly or unwittingly’ (Stoker & Van der 
Merwe 2012b:1) in our apparently post-metaphysical landscape? 
Some of the ‘main reasons for the persistence of transcendence 
in post-metaphysical philosophy, theology and [even] in our 
secularised Western culture [include] the [following]’ (Verhoef 
2016:3–6).
 • The experience of self-transcendence. There is a need to 
account for our human experience of ‘transcending our world’ 
and of ‘transcending ourselves’, and the notion of having or 
70. While the origin of the concept of transcendence can be found in Parmenides, Plato’s 
distinction between the world of phenomena and the world of ideas is better known (Stoker 
2015:514). Phenomena in the material world are only copies or images of the true forms 
which are in the real ‘outside’ world. For Plato, the idea of the good, for example, is radical 
transcendent, beyond all being, and the cause of all right and beautiful things (Warmington & 
Rouse 1956:316), but the archetype form of it is in an unchanging and unseen world of forms.
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living in radical immanence normally does not allow for the 
expression of this experience (Verhoef 2016:4).
• The need for value and meaning of the world. Traditional 
concepts of transcendence fulfilled the role of helping people 
to understand the world and to value their and others’ 
existence. These concepts have been strongly criticised by 
Nietzsche, as being nihilistic, but he also points to the necessity 
of finding new ways of conceptualising transcendence.71
• The problem of the self-referential character of immanence. 
The problem is that (Van der Merwe 2012:509), ‘a valuation of 
radical immanence’ as the only and ultimate reality is ‘either 
circular (what is ultimate is immanent because what is 
immanent is ultimate), and thus self-refuting, or clandestinely 
rests on some assumption of ultimate value or necessity’. 
Transcendence, metaphysics and its ‘ontotheological 
constitution’ seems to be inevitable (Schrijvers 2013:29).
• The normative character of transcendence. ‘Traditionally 
transcendence determined people’s orientation in life’ and has 
provided humanity with ethical normativity (Verhoef 2016:4). 
The attempt and the need to reconceptualise transcendence 
thus aim at finding new normative frameworks for living 
ethical lives. 72
• The problem of the reductionist nature of immanence. ‘Critique 
of immanence as our final and total closed off reality is [to be 
found] in different interdisciplinary [counter movements] and 
voices’ (Verhoef 2016:5). In art and (post-)phenomenology, 
this critique arises from an existential longing for or an 
experiential claim related to ‘an ultimate sense of life breaking 
71. The Dutch philosopher Paul van Tongeren (2012:180) says, for example: ‘[…] in an age 
in which God is supposedly dead, reflection on transcendence is not just interesting, but of 
utmost importance’.
72. In his book, The Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche described the ‘death of God’ in his well-
known parable of the madman searching for God at the marketplace. Nietzsche argues 
here that belief in God has effectively died – God is no longer a convincing hypothesis. 
This death of God (as the traditional concept of transcendence) has the implication that 
we have no grounding for moral values and that morality must be created anew by us. We 
cannot anymore ground one universal system of moral values in one overarching reason 
(transcendence), religious or not. All values argues Nietzsche (most thoroughly in his On the 
Genealogy of Morals [1887]), must be revalued and recreated.
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in from beyond human relations and history’ (Van der Merwe 
2012:510). This ‘ultimate sense of life’ and the experiences of 
reality as a subjective force (Being, God, the Other and fate) 
lead to the continuous shifting views or ‘frontiers of 
transcendence’ (Du Toit 2011:1) in philosophy, theology, art, 
politics and literature.73
• Transcendence as an outcome of postmodern thinking. The 
dimension of transcendence is reintroduced by various 
‘postmodern’ philosophers in new guises like (Schwartz 
2004:viii), ‘the postmodern notion of transgression, the 
phenomenological notion of the other, the scientific notion of 
the impenetrable mystery of an infinite universe, the aesthetic 
notion of excess, the psychoanalytic notion of subjectivity, 
the political notion of revolutionary ecstasy.’ In this postmodern 
context, the interest in transcendence is not to return to (or 
rehabilitate) transcendence as principle beyond question or 
critique, neither as an authority beyond reason, nor as a 
totalitarian deity, but as the ground of humility: epistemological, 
ethical, aesthetic and political (Verhoef 2016:5).
• The future as something transcendent. One of the main 
reasons for the persistence of transcendence in contemporary 
post-metaphysical thought is the ‘inescapable link’ between 
transcendence and the future. This is especially true when 
the  future is defined as the unknown, the unexpected, the 
undefinable and the unforeseeable – all terms that imply 
the transcendent as that which ‘lies beyond’ or ‘surpasses’ our 
experiences of time and reality (Verhoef 2016:6).
In the introduction of Religion and Postmodernism 4: 
Transcendence and Beyond (2007), John Caputo and Michael 
Scanlon emphasise the need to investigate postmodern and 
post-metaphysical thinking in respect to transcendence. They 
explain the aim of this book as an attempt to ‘press forward 
beyond the beyond’ (Caputo & Scanlon 2007:2). In this process, 
they identify two tendencies in post-metaphysical thinking 
about transcendence, namely, ‘hyper-transcendence’ and 
73. In theology, transcendence resurfaces, for example, as ‘the mystical’, and in literature it points 
to ‘that within representation that nonetheless exceeds representation’ (Milbank 2004:212).
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‘post-transcendence’. These two tendencies represent the two 
main positions (Wessel Stoker identifies more) within the 
contemporary debate about transcendence, and for that reason 
Kearney’s concept of transcendence (as it crystallises from his 
concept of anatheism) should be positioned within that debate. 
This will help one to understand the uniqueness of Kearney’s 
position on transcendence but also to see how he challenges the 
dominant tendencies within the debate.
Hypertranscendence is a transcendence that is evermore 
beyond. It is a still more transcendent transcendence – a hyperbolic 
transcendence. Jean-Luc Marion is a paradigmatic representative 
of this tendency. For him, the classical idea of transcendence does 
not prove to be enough because it ‘remains caught up in an 
ontological idolatry’ (Caputo & Scanlon 2007:3). He argues that the 
word ‘being’ is an ‘idol’ because it is a mirror in which we see 
ourselves and not God. We should therefore seek to think of God 
‘without being’. Transcendence (which referred to being) must 
therefore give way to a certain ‘ultratranscendence or more radical 
or hyperbolic transcendence beyond being’ (Caputo & Scanlon 
2007:3). Marion ultimately makes a sharp distinction between 
transcendence and immanence. In doing so, he shares an interesting 
commonality with Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth who stress the 
difference between God and human beings (Stoker 2015:516, 518). 
Stoker typifies this transcendence as ‘radical transcendence’ 
(Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a:13), and it implies that the absolute 
is the wholly other and is clearly distinct from mundane reality.
Some of the problems with hypertranscendence (apart from 
the critique of metaphysics that is often not overcome in this 
position) are that it creates a ‘too distant/removed’ (unknowable, 
unreachable and eventually irrelevant) transcendence it creates 
a nihilistic world because it is ‘the other/outside’ world that 
has true meaning; it devalues the immanent on a bodily level – 
only the spiritual becomes important as it connects with the 
transcendent; and it locates the transcendent in brief moments 




Post-transcendence tries to avoid these problems by attempting 
to leave behind classical transcendence. Post-transcendence 
emphasises the ‘notion that we should put transcendence behind 
us and be content with our mundane immanent world’ (Verhoef 
2016:2). In post-transcendence, the concept of transcendence is 
redundant. It has lost its power and meaning, and it has virtually 
disappeared into immanence. Stoker describes this position of 
post-transcendence as ‘radical immanence’ (Stoker & Van der 
Merwe 2012a:15). In radical immanence, the absolute or transcendent 
is no longer sought outside mundane reality because both realities 
converge. The problems associated with post-transcendence are 
listed above as reasons why there is still an interest in and a search 
for transcendence in our post-metaphysical age.
Hypertranscendence and post-transcendence, as the main 
tendencies of post-metaphysical thought on transcendence, 
indicate that it is difficult to move beyond the dichotomy of 
transcendence and immanence. In a way this is what Kearney 
attempts through his concept of anatheism. This needs to be 
explained before we come back to the broader contemporary 
debate on transcendence – one in which Stoker presents more 
options to locate Kearney’s transcendence.
Anatheism and transcendence
Kearney’s philosophy has explored the concept of transcendence 
throughout his career, sometimes implicitly and sometimes more 
directly in terms of the concept of God. In this regard, his work 
has been hugely influential as evidenced by the book After God: 
Richard Kearney and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy 
(edited by John Manoussakis 2006a). Kearney returns to the 
main themes of his work as discussed in After God in his book 
Anatheism: Returning to God after God (2010). Kearney’s earlier 
works, On Stories (2002), The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics 
of Religion (2001) and Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (2003), to 
a large extent, form the platform on which Anatheism is written. 
In my analysis of transcendence in Kearney’s work, I will therefore 
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mainly focus on his concept of anatheism. However, I will take 
care in this analysis to keep in mind that it is the fate of every 
philosophical system to be dismembered and have its fragments 
bandied about in ongoing debate. While it would be a great pity 
if anatheism were not understood in terms of the rest of Kearney’s 
work, there is great gain to be had from ongoing debate about 
his thought-provoking conceptualisation of anatheism.
Anatheism should, of course, not be understood as a system. 
Although Kearney does not present it as such, anatheism 
proposes a ‘third way beyond the extremes of dogmatic theism 
and militant atheism’ (Kearney 2010:3). Anatheism is ‘not an end 
but a way’ (Kearney 2010:166); it is a ‘movement – not a state – 
that refuses all absolute talk about the absolute’ (Kearney 
2010:16); it is not some new religion or ‘Master narrative’ (Kearney 
2010:6) but ‘attention to the divine in the stranger who stands 
before us in the midst of the world’ (Kearney 2010:166). Anatheism 
is not a new belief but simply the invitation to ‘see what has 
always been there a second time around – ana’ (Kearney 2010:167, 
[emphasis in original]). Important for Kearney is that anatheism 
is not atheism or theism, not anti-atheism or antitheism, but it is 
a ‘form of post-theism’ (Kearney 2010:57); ‘amor mundi, love of 
the life-world as embodiment of infinity in the finite, of 
transcendence in immanence, of eschatology in the now’ 
(2010:166). This ‘transcendence in immanence’ of anatheism, as 
Kearney describes it, provides the first clue of how to understand 
anatheism’s transcendence, but it needs further explanation.
Transcendence in anatheism is consistently described by 
Kearney as an immanent transcendence (Kearney 2010:80, 99, 
166). Transcendence is the ‘surplus of meaning’ (Kearney 2010:xiv, 
[emphasis in original]) to be found in this world; it is about the 
‘encounter with a radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t 
choose, to call God’ (Kearney 2010:7); it is transcendence 
‘inscribed in everyday immanence’ (Kearney 2010:102). 
Furthermore, the transcendent is described as a ‘source beyond 
and beneath oneself, a superfluity one does not possess or 
manipulate’ (Kearney 2010:179), as an ‘untranslatable kernel’ 
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(Kearney 2010:180), an ‘irreducible enigma’ (Kearney 2010:180), 
‘a deep mystical appreciation of something Other than our finite 
human being’ (Kearney 2010:180), but it is found in the immanent – 
a ‘retrieving of the sacred in the secular’ (Kearney 2010:130). 
Again, it is a transcendence in immanence. Kearney formulates 
and qualifies it as a ‘transcendence in and through immanence 
which, far from diminishing humanity, amplifies it’ (Kearney 
2010:182). It is in the alien, the Other, the stranger that we may 
meet this transcendence – this ‘ultimacy that surpasses the limits 
of humanism and naturalism’ (Kearney 2010:184). Kearney (2010) 
says that:
[R]ecognising something ‘more’ in the stranger than the human is 
a way of acknowledging a dimension of transcendence in the other 
that – in part, at least – exceeds the finite presence of the person 
before me. (p. 182)
The transcendence Kearney presents through the concept of 
anatheism, as transcendence in immanence, is clearly not a return 
or rehabilitation of classic transcendence. It is a transcendent 
(God or divinity) that is – in following his thoughts from Strangers, 
Gods, and Monsters – ‘free from the three-headed monster of 
metaphysics – the Omni-God of omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence – and the “triumphalist teleologies and ideologies 
of power” that it has provoked’ (Manoussakis 2006a:xvi). 
Transcendence as immanent transcendence (as in anatheism) is 
an acknowledgement that transcendence can be experienced in 
our immanent reality. This type of transcendence is identified by 
Stoker as a possible in-between position, between the sharp 
dichotomy of transcendence and immanence. Stoker describes 
immanent transcendence as a form of transcendence where 
‘both realities are viewed as closely involved with each other – 
the absolute is experienced in and through mundane reality’ 
(Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a:11). The starting point of immanent 
transcendence is the experience people have of the Ultimate in 
this world. This can happen, for example, by seeing the face of 
the Other (Levinas and Kearney), by meeting the stranger or by 
giving attention to the epiphanies of the ordinary universe (what 
Kearney calls a micro-eschatology) or in the surplus of a given 
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phenomenon. In Anatheism, Kearney gives various possibilities in 
and through which such experiences of the ultimate, the 
transcendent, can take place.
Kearney’s description of the concept of immanent 
transcendence is meaningful in terms of the broader contemporary 
post-metaphysical debate about transcendence. It is clear from 
the outset that Kearney does not opt for a post-transcendence. 
He does not accept a radical immanence where there is no 
transcendence left, where the absolute is no longer sought 
outside mundane reality. The transcendent and immanent do not 
converge or conflate into the immanent in his thought. However, 
Kearney also does not opt (at least so it seems at first sight) for 
hypertranscendence – where the transcendent is always more 
beyond – or a ‘radical transcendence’, where the transcendent is 
‘wholly other’ and ‘sharply distinguished’ (to the extent that it is 
unconnected) from mundane reality. Kearney consistently 
describes transcendence as being connected with the immanent, 
as ‘inscribed in everyday immanence’, as the ‘sacred in the 
secular’. With his emphasis on the inevitable connectedness 
between transcendence and immanence he persistently tries to 
articulate a middle way (a via tertia) between the two extremes 
of this post-metaphysical debate on transcendence.
However, the fact that Kearney insists that the sacred remains 
‘distinct’ and that it is ‘never the same thing’ as the secular 
(Kearney 2010:166) begs the question: Is it possible to keep the 
balance between, to stay in the middle of, transcendence and 
immanence with the notion of immanent transcendence? Does 
Kearney’s concept of anatheism allow him to succeed in this 
endeavour?
Transcendence as immanent transcendence is not by default 
a successful middle position. In other words, just by opting for 
immanent transcendence does not ensure that one is in the 
middle of transcendence and immanence. This middle position is 
rather fragile and tends to go either in the direction of immanence 
or transcendence. To position oneself thus in this middle position 
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of immanent transcendence is a very difficult balancing act, 
something that might even be impossible, as Merold Westphal 
(2012:151) argues. This difficulty will be illustrated by discussing 
the theologian Paul Tillich and the philosophers Jacques Derrida 
and Emmanuel Levinas’ respective concepts of transcendence. 
They all try to avoid the extremes of transcendence and 
immanence, but all fail to some extent. The similarities of their 
position will be compared with Kearney’s understanding of 
immanent transcendence to see where and how Kearney 
struggles with the same problems and develops some new 
possible ways of resolving them. Firstly, more clarification of 
Kearney’s position is needed.
As stated above, Kearney clearly tries to avoid a move back to 
radical immanence and post-transcendence. He explicitly says 
that anatheism is not pantheism (Kearney 2010:166). He says 
anatheism does not collapse the secular and the sacred into one 
but retains the distinction between the transcendent and the 
immanent, although they are integrally connected. He says 
anatheism (Kearney 2010):
[D]oes not say the sacred is the secular; it says it is in the secular, 
through the secular, towards the secular. I would even go so far 
to say the sacred is inseparable from the secular, while remaining 
distinct. Anatheism speaks of ‘interanimation’ between the sacred 
and the secular but not of fusion or confusion. They are inextricably 
interconnected but never the same thing. (p. 166; [emphasis 
in original])
This connectedness and at the same time the distinction between 
the sacred and the secular, which Kearney makes, moves 
anatheism past pantheism in the direction of panentheism. For 
example, in his chapter on sacramental imagination (SI), Kearney 
shows an affinity with what he calls the Franciscan ‘mystical 
panentheism’ (Kearney 2010:100). Panentheism takes the view, 
as Kearney does, that the sacred is not only the secular but that 
there is something more to the secular. The ‘ultimacy’ of 
transcendence ‘surpasses the limits of humanism and naturalism’ 
(Kearney 2010:184). Or, to rephrase him, the sacred is something 
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distinct; it is not the same thing as the secular, but at the same 
time it is inseparable and inextricably interconnected to the 
secular.
The balancing act between immanence and transcendence 
becomes risky at this point. On the one hand, radical immanence 
is rejected, but, on the other hand, the option remains open for 
an experience of the more, the surplus of meaning, the diacritical 
hermeneutics of the microeschatologies, the epiphanies of the 
everyday, God in the presence, transcendence in a more radical 
way – a possible move towards hypertranscendence as something 
distinct. Kearney does not see being distinct (not the same) as 
being disconnected. This might look like a contradiction if one 
understood this transcendence in a panentheistic way, and it 
thus needs more clarification. It is at this point where the types 
of immanent transcendence of Paul Tillich and alterity of Jacques 
Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas need to be discussed.
The problem of anatheism as 
immanent transcendence (and alterity)
Paul Tillich
Variants of immanent transcendence can be found in 
Schleiermacher, Hegel and Tillich. Tillich attempts to examine 
transcendence and immanence together, because he was 
opposed to an ‘isolated transcendence of God as a perfect being 
far away and highly exalted in heaven’ (Stoker & Van der Merwe 
2012a:11). His starting point is the experience people have of the 
Ultimate, the power of being, of Being-itself. This Being is 
transcendent because ‘Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity, 
otherwise it would be conditioned by something other than itself 
[…]’ but also immanent, because ‘[…] everything finite participates 
in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the 
power of being. It would be swallowed by non-being […]’ 
(Tillich  1953:263). Tillich speaks in this vein of the ‘depth of 
existence’ (Tillich 1948:52) and he identifies the ‘deepest ground 
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of our being and of all being’, the depth of life itself, with God. He 
says (Tillich 1948):
The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all 
being is God. That depth is what the word God means. And if that 
word has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the 
depths of your life, of the source of being, of your ultimate concern, 
of what you take seriously without any reservation. (p. 57)
For Tillich, the initial point for the concept of religion is the 
experience of the ultimate, the holy or God, which gets translated 
to one’s ‘ultimate concern’. Tillich defines religion famously as 
the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern (Tillich 
1951:12–14). This means that God’s transcendence only makes 
sense when accompanied by immanence and vice versa. In this 
model of ‘immanent transcendence’, the term immanence is 
privileged; God (the transcendent) becomes nothing more than 
the ultimate concern, the depth of our being, what is found in this 
immanent world.74 Transcendence as ‘Being-itself [that] is 
beyond finitude and infinity’ (Tillich 1953:263) is determined, and 
it seems therefore restricted, by the immanent. For Tillich, God is 
‘an utterly impersonal concept, such as energy, and not a being, 
and, a fortioti, not a supremely personal being’ (Westphal 
2012:155). The primacy is here of pantheistic immanence over 
theistic transcendence, a naturalism over a theism, an immanence 
over transcendence.
The immanent transcendence of anatheism relates in an 
ambiguous way to that of Tillich. Firstly (in disagreement), it 
maintains a stronger emphasis on transcendence. Anatheism 
pleads consistently for more than the immanent, for transcendence 
as the ‘surplus of meaning’ (Tillich 2010:xiv); the ‘encounter with 
a radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God’ 
(Tillich 2010:7); a ‘source beyond and beneath oneself, a 
superfluity one does not possess or manipulate’ (Tillich 2010:179); 
74. Kearney, in ‘Sacramental Imagination and Eschatology’ (Kearney 2009:55–68), recasts 
eschatology in terms of our everyday experiences rather than as a grand narrative of the 
end-times utopia. He focuses on the ‘flesh’ in its multiple phenomenological layers in order to 
show ‘that the mundane world is infused with divine depth’ (DeRoo & Manoussakis 2009:9).
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as an ‘untranslatable kernel’ (Tillich 2010:180), an ‘irreducible 
enigma’ (2010:180) and ‘a deep mystical appreciation of 
something Other than our finite human being’ (Tillich 2010:180). 
In this sense, Kearney emphasises the transcendent and maintains 
a ‘middle’ position between transcendence and immanence. 
Kearney puts a stronger emphasis on transcendence through his 
concept of anatheism than Tillich does in his ‘ultimate concern’.
Secondly (in agreement with Tillich’s ‘ultimate concern’), 
anatheism is not so clearly a ‘theism’ but rather a ‘form of post-
theism’ (Tillich 2010:57). It is not a state but a movement that 
‘refuses all absolute talk about the absolute’ (Tillich 2010:16). The 
transcendent is not a personal God, a necessary theistic creator 
or Absolute, but an embodiment of infinity in the finite as ‘amor 
mundi, love of the life-world’ (Tillich 2010:166). This transcendence 
can be described (as indicated previously) as panentheism – and 
the ‘ultimacy’ of transcendence surpasses the limits of naturalism. 
The primacy here – in the immanent transcendence of Kearney’s 
anatheism – is of panentheistic immanence over theistic 
transcendence, a supernaturalism over an absolute theism. If this 
is true, the concept of anatheism may create a misunderstanding 
here, because it implies a return to God after God. Why ana-
theism if Kearney moves away from theism to ‘post-theism’? 
Why is panentheism the privileged term and not supernaturalism? 
We will return to this question after the discussion on Derrida 
and transcendence.
Jacques Derrida
Stoker (Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a:5–26) identifies four types 
of transcendence, of which the first three have been discussed 
so far, namely, radical transcendence (hypertranscendence), 
radical immanence (post-transcendence) and immanent 
transcendence. The fourth type is transcendence as alterity, 
and here the relationship between transcendence and 
immanence is no longer viewed as an opposition. It is to think 
‘beyond opposition, whereby the wholly other can appear in 
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every other’ (Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a:18). This type of 
transcendence can be found according to Stoker in Levinas, 
Derrida, Irigaray and De Dijn. Kearney’s anatheism refers 
typically to the ‘encounter with a radical Stranger who we 
choose, or don’t choose, to call God’ (Kearney 2010:7). Kearney 
(2010) says furthermore that:
[R]ecognising something ‘more’ in the stranger than the human is 
a way of acknowledging a dimension of transcendence in the other 
that – in part, at least – exceeds the finite presence of the person 
before me. (p. 182)
The close affinity here of Kearney to Levinas and Derrida is 
immediately visible, and therefore transcendence as alterity (as 
Stoker typifies Derrida and Levinas’s transcendence) should be 
explicated.
According to Verhoef (2014), transcendence: 
[A]s alterity can be described in terms of Derrida’s search for the 
intangible wholly other. Derrida intends the wholly other, of course, 
to encompass a much broader meaning than simply indicating the 
biblical God. (p. 264)
But he develops his position by viewing the biblical God, who 
sees what is secret (Mt 6:4), as absolute alterity, ‘as alterity in 
myself, an alterity that is more internal to me than I myself’ 
(Stoker & Van der Merwe 2012a:20). Derrida says, ‘God is the 
name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible 
from the interior but not from the exterior’ (Derrida 1992:108). 
My existence is in other words determined by an appeal that 
makes itself known in the conscience. It is in the relationship 
humans have with ‘an absolute alterity’ from which ‘a call goes 
out’. This absolute alterity is not a supernatural being but 
experienced in every other who is wholly other. Transcendence 
concerns thus not only God as the wholly other, but every 
other is the wholly other (tout autre est tout autre). Derrida 
(1992) says:
It implies that God, as the wholly other, is to be found everywhere 
there is something of the wholly other. […] Every other (in the sense 
of each other) is every bit other (absolutely other). (p. 78)
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With this view, the absolute responsibility to the transcendent or 
God is generalised to an absolute responsibility that everyone 
has to others. Derrida makes thus a shift from faith to ethics, 
because he generalises the wholly other. He argues, in other 
words, that ‘God’ is like all others – completely transcendent and 
completely other. Therefore, he can say that the infinite alterity 
of the wholly other belongs to every other, to every man and 
every woman, to every living human being (Derrida 1992:83f., 87). 
God is everywhere that the wholly other is. In short, transcendence 
as absolute alterity does not necessarily imply a transcendent 
God but rather a ‘God’ or a transcendence who is everywhere 
where the wholly other is, especially in the ethical situation 
(Verhoef 2014:264).
This type of transcendence is a correction of radical 
transcendence, which emphasises the wholly other in mundane 
reality too little. It is also a correction of radical immanence, 
which accepts the world as it is through denying the wholly 
other. The transcendent is no longer found in a ‘vertical’ relation 
to God but in a ‘horizontal’ relation to others as the Other. This 
alterity of transcendence found in the wholly otherness of the 
other can be described as a ‘horizontal transcendence’. One finds 
a strong link here with Levinas’s understanding of transcendence, 
whose ideas Kearney developed further in his concept of 
anatheism. Before this is analysed, some problems with 
transcendence as alterity must be mentioned, because (again) it 
questions the balance-seeking position between transcendence 
and immanence of immanent transcendence.
Emmanuel Levinas
Westphal argues that in the case of Derrida it is not so much a 
matter of deconstructing the opposition between immanence 
and transcendence but rather its relocation. He says Derrida 
‘challenged the ideal of the autonomous, self-sufficient self, the 
self-grounding self’, but it is in the ‘Levinasian turn in the mid-
nineties of the last century that the theme of transcendence as 
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alterity comes to fullest expression’ (Westphal 2012:158). Levinas 
is concerned with ‘an intentionality of a whole different type’ 
(Levinas 1969:23), namely, an inverted intentionality in which the 
same (the self) is addressed by the other, and he thereby takes a 
linguistic turn. The other that is ‘wholly other and cannot be 
enclosed within my projects, or even within my language’ 
(Westphal 2012:158) is ‘the Stranger who disturbs the being at 
home with oneself, and the relation between same and the other 
[…] is language’ (Levinas 1969:39). The other is defined by Levinas 
in terms of the human face and not as the object of intentional 
acts. Levinas (1969) says:
To think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence 
not to think an object […] the difference between objectivity and 
transcendence will serve as a general guideline for all the analyses of 
this work. (p. 49)
This is because in the face to face relation, ‘[t]he face speaks. The 
manifestation of the face is already discourse’ (Levinas 1969:67).
Levinas emphasises the inverted intentionality as being 
addressed, as well as language. In his linguistic version of inverted 
intentionality, the self is commanded, or ‘called upon’, by the 
other. What calls me to unconditional and infinite responsibility 
is not what is said by the other but ‘the mere fact that I am 
addressed by the other’ (Westphal 2012:158). Derrida, like 
Levinas, also defines transcendence in terms of inverted 
intentionality – my world and I are defined not by my gaze 
(or discourse) but by that of others. Transcendence is transferred 
in this process to finite subjects, a ‘horizontal transcendence’, as 
mentioned. It is not a move away from transcendence but located 
in the ‘wholly otherness of the other’. This can be interpreted as 
a move in the direction of hypertranscendence, because (for 
Derrida and Levinas) immanence is the futile project – ‘of 
incorporating the other’s gaze and voice within my conceptual 
and volitional horizons, immunising the self from any 
heteronomous interruption, and putting the other in my service’ 
(Westphal 2012:159). Transcendence is in this case the real and 
full immanence illusory. This is why Westphal, for example, 
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categorises Derrida and Levinas’s alterity as ‘radical 
transcendence’. He says that what Levinas and Derrida do is 
to  transfer divine predicates, including transcendence, from 
God  to the human other. The question is now to what extent 
Kearney’s anatheism develops the same type of transcendence.
Transcendence as part of the wager 
of anatheism
There is an agreement and difference between Kearney and 
Derrida and Levinas on transcendence. The agreement is in the 
understanding of transcendence as the alterity of inverted 
intentionality, of being seen and being addressed by the other. 
The other is the wholly other that cannot be enclosed within my 
projects, or even my language, and in that sense it remains the 
transcendent. Kearney says, for example, that ‘recognising 
something “more” in the stranger than the human is a way of 
acknowledging a dimension of transcendence in the other’ 
(Kearney 2010:182). In the last paragraph of the book Anatheism, 
Kearney (2010) emphasises this notion again: 
[A]natheism is a matter of hope, love, and wonder. Hope that the 
stranger is more than we expect. Love of the stranger as infinitely 
other. And wonder at the very strangeness of it all. (p. 185)
This ‘wonder’ must lead to the ‘ethical act of transfiguring our 
world by caring for the stranger’ (Kearney 2010:185). The ‘wholly 
otherness’ of the other – the location of transcendence here in 
the immanent – and the ethical call in the ‘face of the other’ are 
clearly in agreement with the Levinasian line of thought.
The difference between Kearney, Levinas and Derrida on 
transcendence is that Kearney does not want to deconstruct the 
opposition between immanence and transcendence but rather 
to opt for a transcendence in immanence. Anatheism ‘speaks of 
“interanimation” between the sacred and the secular but not of 
fusion or confusion. They are inextricably interconnected but 
never the same thing’ (Kearney 2010:166). This nuanced position 
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of Kearney allows him to keep the concept of transcendence – 
albeit qualified – distinct and open, rather than attempting to 
move beyond or past it. It is with this ‘openness’ of transcendence 
where Kearney’s ‘wager’ in Anatheism comes into play. It is within 
this open transcendence where he wants to find a post-
metaphysical and post-transcendental notion of transcendence 
that allows a ‘hypertranscendence’ that is more hopeful than just 
the ‘other as the wholly other’ or a ‘radical (dogmatic) absolute’. 
Again, it is in this ‘open space’ where the wager comes into play, 
as will be explained.
As mentioned, the Otherness (transcendence) of the ‘other as 
wholly other’ remains for Derrida and Levinas a transcendence on 
a horizontal level. This transcendence as alterity has an atheistic 
slant (Westphal 2012:161), while anatheism wants to move beyond 
theism and atheism – it is ‘not anti-atheism or anti-theism’ (Kearney 
2010:57). Anatheism is not a new belief but simply the invitation to 
‘see what has always been there a second time around – ana’ 
(Kearney 2010:167, [emphasis in original]). This ‘what has always 
been there’ might be called God, and therefore anatheism is about 
a return to God after God. It is not the same God – oppressive, 
absolute – as before, but still a ‘God’ that implies more than the 
immanent. It is a transcendence in immanence or, to turn it around, 
an immanence that is open to transcendence on a horizontal and 
vertical level. Horizontality and verticality should not be understood 
here in the literal or spatial sense but rather the transcendence can 
always imply more. It can imply more than the horizontal 
transcendence of Derrida and Levinas’s Otherness as the ‘wholly 
other of every other’. Kearney argues that it should entail more 
because there is the risk that deconstructive faith can become ‘so 
empty that it loses faith in the here and now altogether’ (Kearney 
2010:65). Kearney (2010) says that:
In the name of a universal openness to any other at all (tout autre 
est tout autre), Derrida’s ‘religion without religion’ seems to have no 
visage to speak of, no embodied presence in space and time. (p. 64)
Anatheism describes a transcendence that is more than the 
inverted intentionality of Levinas and Derrida, but an opening, a 
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return to a possible ‘radical transcendent’ – beyond, below and 
above us. It is a ‘source beyond and beneath oneself, a superfluity 
one does not possess or manipulate’ (Kearney 2010:179). Such a 
notion of transcendence opens up Kearney’s concept of 
anatheism to the critique of hypertranscendence, metaphysics 
and ontotheology. There is a risk in considering such a 
transcendence. This is why in the preceding quote there is 
immediately a qualification added. This is the reason why most of 
his book on anatheism explains why anatheism is a wager. Indeed, 
it is a high risk and an impossibility to return to God after God if 
God is still the same absolute, dogmatic and oppressive god, but 
it is a wager to ‘see a second time around’, to have a look to see 
if something has perhaps changed. Kearney argues for this 
wager, because if we do not take the wager, we might lose too 
much. This needs further explication because it forms an integral 
part of the motivation and development of anatheism and its 
transcendence in immanence.
Why does Kearney not opt for ‘horizontal’ transcendence, 
alterity, like Levinas and Derrida did, and thereby avoid the 
critique on radical transcendence? Why the need for ana-theism? 
Why the need for religion and a return to God after God? Why 
should one take the anatheistic wager? Of course, Kearney 
qualifies and justifies this wager very extensively in his book and 
makes a huge effort to move away from ‘absolute talk about the 
absolute’ (Kearney 2010:16), but it remains a wager. There are 
some important reasons why Kearney wants to take this wager, 
and why the word theism remains part of his post-theistic 
anatheism.
A first reason is that he thinks too much will be lost if spiritual 
traditions such as religions are lost. The specificities of each 
spiritual tradition are important for him, because there is ‘at the 
root of each religion, a silent, speechless openness to a Word 
that surpasses us’ (Kearney 2010:176). Each confession, he says, 
has its own hidden foundation where a drive towards hospitality 
and healing can be discovered. Derrida, for example, saves the 
‘Name’ but this ‘Name does not entail a return to the Named’ 
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(Kearney 2010:65). Kearney does not want to lose ‘the Name’ 
and its particularities: ‘[…] universality is only guaranteed, it 
seems, at the cost of particularity; it forfeits the flesh and blood 
singularity of everyday epiphanies […]’, so that ‘[…] faith becomes 
an empty waiting’ (Kearney 2010:64). Therefore, Kearney asks 
that ‘any faith must be prepared to purge itself of the inherent 
temptation to violently impose its own version of the Absolute 
on others’ (Kearney 2010:175). This is where the wager comes in, 
because religion too often wants to master, and it is too often 
‘rendered into dogmatic formulae and ideological manifestos’ 
(Kearney 2010:179). The good of religion, so to speak, should not 
be lost because of the bad, and one should rather seek to 
appreciate the uniquely ‘powerful’ good offered by and found in 
the particularities of religion.
The second reason is that the alternative to this anatheistic 
wager is presumably worse for Kearney. He says, ‘I have no wish 
to endorse an empty secularism that merely aestheticises religion 
by removing its faith content’ (Kearney 2010:130). Empty 
secularism cannot ‘purify our desires and free us from idols’ 
(Kearney 2010:171); it cannot accommodate or comprehend ‘the 
feelings, acts and experiences’ people have ‘in their solitude so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever 
they may consider the divine’ (Kearney 2010:171). Secularity, he 
says, ‘should be humble enough […] to acknowledge the 
possibility of a certain untranslatable remainder, a surplus of 
meaning that surpasses the limits of normative rationality’ 
(Kearney 2010:173).
In contrast to this empty secularism (or post-transcendence), 
anatheism does not want to evacuate ‘the sacred from the 
secular’ but wants to retrieve the sacred in the secular (Kearney 
2010:130). The sacred, the divine, the godly – the openness to 
vertical transcendence – is something Kearney does not want to 
let go, because ‘deconstructive faith’ is too empty; it loses faith 
in the here and now altogether (Kearney 2010:65). In other 
words, the post-metaphysical ‘religion without religion’ of Derrida 
and Caputo offers too little for Kearney, who sees it as empty 
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secularism: too little content, too little inspiration, too little 
certainty, too little hope. Anatheism wants to suggest therefore 
the ‘possibility of retrieving a rich grammar, vocabulary, and 
imaginary of radical hospitality from traditions not readily 
available in an exclusively secular discourse’ (Kearney 2010:184). 
The problem is that ‘religion without religion’, post-transcendence 
or deconstructive faith, only elevates, according to Kearney, 
alterity to the status of undecidable sublimity – signalling the 
paradox of the undecidable mystery of God as an ‘infinite 
questionability’, which is at the same time ‘endlessly questionable’ 
(Manoussakis 2006a:xvii).
It is in this light that Kearney wants to retrieve and 
reappropriate  God as presence and therefore he moves away 
from the radical hermeneutics of Derrida (Caputo) to a more 
Romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher through his own 
diacritical hermeneutics. This entails reinterpreting, for example, 
rituals, liturgies and traditions. This is all part of the anatheistic 
wager, of the return to God after God, of the purging of faith 
from the illusions of power, expiation and escape (Kearney 
2010:171). To find an openness for transcendence in immanence 
is part of the anatheistic wager. It is a delicate balancing act 
between transcendence and immanence with real risks if one 
leans to either side. The tension in Kearney’s work is clear on this 
point. On the one hand, there is the need to have something 
more than ‘religion without religion’, more than faith without 
content, more than empty secularism. The need is for religion 
with its specificities, with its own foundation and spiritual depth, 
with its Word, rituals, liturgies and traditions, or as formulated 
earlier: a notion of theism in anatheism, radical or ‘vertical’ 
transcendence. But on the other hand there is the continuous 
move away from dogmatic formula, a refusal of all absolute talk 
about the absolute and especially an opposition to religions that 
violently impose their own view of the Absolute on others. 
Religion should thus have content (it cannot be empty secularism), 
but on the other hand it should not be taken too seriously, too 
dogmatically. The question, of course, is whether this is possible. 
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Can one have religion with only a ‘little bit of religion’? When is 
the particularity, the content of the religion too much?
The tension is something Kearney is of course aware of and it 
is nearly impossible to avoid or to solve. Even just to say the 
‘absolute requires pluralism to avoid absolutism’ (Kearney 
2010:xiv) is already referring to the absolute. This yes and no for 
religion, for God and for transcendence, of anatheism, links to my 
second question.
While it is true that some sources beyond and beneath ourselves 
for hospitality and love can be found in religion, without 
understanding one’s religion as the exclusive access to the Absolute, 
the question, my second question, remains: Can we not perhaps 
find in secularism the same fulfilment, inspiration, hospitality and 
meaning such as that which religions offer, and thereby avoid the 
risk of hypertranscendence and Absolutism? Is it not better to 
speak of ‘religion without religion’, to move so to speak away from 
the specificities of religion altogether and to avoid the risky wager 
of anatheism, to embrace a more horizontal transcendence? Is this 
risk of the anatheistic wager necessary or worth taking? Perhaps, 
there are ways in which the notion of transcendence can be kept 
‘open’ so that it can fulfil many of the same roles ascribed to it in the 
book Anatheism, for example, Jean-Luc Nancy’s transimmanence 
(Verhoef 2016:12–13) and Ludwig Binswanger’s phenomenology of 
love (Schrijvers 2016:223–244).
With these questions I am not promoting an antitheistic 
stance. Rather, I want to know if the wager is necessary. Is 
secularism, or at least horizontal transcendence, really that 
empty? Is there not another way in which we can respect the 
unfathomable, the mysterious, the poetic, the surplus of meaning 
that we find in this life (Kearney 2010:174)?
Conclusion
The renewed interest in transcendence in the post-metaphysical 
era is ironic. This ironic recurring appearance of transcendence 
Transcendence and anatheism
110
can be described – using Kearney’s concept of anatheism – as 
Anatranscandere: returning to the beyond after the beyond. In a 
way this is what Kearney attempts with his book Anatheism, but 
here ‘theism’ is the ‘beyond’, the transcendent. However, it is not 
that simple. Kearney is not arguing for a theistic position. He is 
not arguing for a traditional concept of transcendence either. 
What he wants to do is find ‘a third way beyond the extremes of 
dogmatic theism and militant atheism’, and a middle way between 
transcendence and immanence. The type of transcendence 
presented by his concept of anatheism entails an ‘immanent 
transcendence’, a delicate middle position.
Kearney formulates this transcendence of anatheism very 
carefully so that it steers clear of the dangers of 
hypertranscendence and post-transcendence – the two main 
tendencies in the contemporary debate on transcendence. 
Although Kearney’s position has a very strong affinity with 
panentheism, it would not do justice to his work to reduce 
anatheism’s immanent transcendence to panentheism or to 
mere supernaturalism. There is more to the transcendence, 
more particularity and specificities, apart from the theism of 
anatheism. It is also somewhat different from the immanent 
transcendence of Paul Tillich, which might be read as an 
inclination towards immanence. Neither is it a ‘pure’ form of 
radical transcendence, because it remains connected to the 
immanent mundane world.
The book Anatheism (2011) by Kearney draws on Levinas and 
Derrida to a large extent, as well as on biblical materials in order 
to make ‘hospitality to the stranger a central theistic virtue’ 
(Westphal 2012:fn.12, 130). One may then ask to what extent 
Kearney uses Levinas and Derrida’s concept of transcendence, 
or rather alterity, as inverted intentionality. It is here that Kearney 
makes an interesting and risky move: he makes provision in his 
concept of immanent transcendence for more of the ‘horizontal’ 
than Levinas and Derrida do. His transcendence is open to a 
more radical, ‘vertical’, theistic transcendence, but in a 
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qualified way. It is here where the wager of anatheism crucially 
comes into play. Kearney is aware of the risks associated with 
this wager, but he gives good reasons why he still opts for this 
more open, vertical transcendence.
Although I have raised some critical questions related to this 
‘vertical’ transcendence of Kearney, his attempt to find space for 
the particular of religions, without moving back to traditional 
(dogmatic) views of God and religion, must be appreciated. The 
philosopher William Desmond’s thoughts in his God and the 
Between (2008) stand very much in the same trajectory and it 
creates fruitful space for discussion between philosophy and 
theology (Verhoef 2012:425–426).75
Anatheism is not an attempt at Christian apologetics. Kearney 
makes this very clear when he says anatheism opposes triumphal 
theism (and militant antitheism). It is also not little more than an 
attempt to move away from the concept of theism. In this regard, 
the implied transcendence of anatheism is also not a defence or 
rehabilitation of traditional transcendence. Neither is it a post-
transcendence. As anatheism is a nuanced way of saying 
‘returning to God after God’, its implied transcendence is also a 
very nuanced way of saying ‘returning to the beyond after the 
beyond’ – Anatranscandere. For both a wager is involved, but in 
both cases more might be gained than lost.
75. The influence of Kearney’s Anatheism on the relation between philosophy and theology is 
tremendous if one just looks at all the publications that have resulted. In this edited volume, 
the theologian Rian Venter writes for example about ‘A Trinitarian theologian in conversation 
with Richard Kearney’ (Venter 2018).
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In this chapter, which is based on a paper delivered in response to 
Richard Kearney’s book Anatheism, at a conference in conversation 
with Kearney, I will specifically focus on Anatheism, which I have 
read numerous times, and each time its poetics draws me into its 
wager and imagination. It challenges, while inspiring me. It has 
given me words and provided me with a language with which to 
think my own faith in a post-metaphysical figuration. 
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The possibility of the book 
Anatheism 
From my own struggle for language (configuration) to express 
my faith or my unfaith, my primary question is about the 
possibility of such a book. A book, a written text, interpreted as 
an attempt to capture (configure) that which is believed to be 
beyond capture: the Other, the beyond figuration, the non-
figurable (the transcendent, perhaps). However, this other, 
even if it is believed to be absolutely other, is only present 
(even in its absence), is only spoken of, which is only possible 
in and through figuration. In other words, even that which is 
believed to be beyond figuration is and can only be thought or 
contemplated in figuration. This leaves one with nothing but 
figurations (Derrida 1997:158) and perhaps the non-figurable, 
but any mention or thought or contemplation of the non-
figurable is still a figuration. A book (figuration) is a response, 
a response to an imagined call, a response to a pathos as 
Waldenfels (2006) might argue. In that sense, the book, as any 
figuration, stands in and with the here I am. The here I am of 
Dasein, of being present, interpreted as the response to the call 
and the responsibility taken or given for the call. Dasein (here 
I am) in responsibility to the call that is imagined or believed is 
to be calling one. The book, writing, con-figuration is an 
imaginative response to the call in which the imagined caller is 
given a specific embodiment and in relation to that embodiment 
the author (implied or narrator), as well as the reader (implied 
or refigured), is offered the space for individuation (to become 
subject): to be embodied so as to be able to respond with the 
words: Here I am. 
In response, in responsibility to this pathos or call, the world is 
populated with bodies and thus the world is carried out as 




Saving the name ‘God’
The call is first identified (in the mode of imagination), as Kearney 
argues, ‘it reminds us that religions are imaginary works, even if 
what they witness may be transcendent and true’ (Kearney 
2010:14). It is in this fictive mode that God is saved from the 
literal; as Kearney argues, the figural saves God from the literal 
(Kearney 2010:14). The call is identified, given a name – 
interpreted (imagined) as a stranger, for example, but all this 
happens in the response and as the response (fiction) in the 
figuration. Kearney seems to argue something similar in reference 
to Jacques Derrida when he says, ‘unpredictable Other par 
excellence who calls the text forth and is called forth by the text’ 
(Kearney 2010:106). Yet, Kearney (2010) specifically argues that 
Anatheism is not a fiction:
I do not mean to equate the anatheist wager with fiction. If poetics 
invites a ‘willing suspension’ of first belief and disbelief, it neither 
includes nor excludes a leap of second faith. (p. 15)
The main reason why it is not a fiction for him is that such a 
fiction would not include nor exclude the leap of a second faith 
(Kearney 2010): 
The fictive as if is not the same as the anatheist as (where I see the 
stranger as divine); though the poetical may, as noted, serve as a 
powerful prelude to the creedal for those who so choose. In fact, 
I would go further and say that without some poetic release into a 
free variation of possibles, the return to God beyond God is virtually 
impossible. (p. 15)
Kearney contrasts a creedal as to the fictive as if, maybe a way to 
save the name God; I am specifically referring to Derrida’s (1995: 
35–85) essay, ‘Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)’, where he unpacks 
the saving of the name, and specifically the name ‘God’, where the 
name ‘God’ is saved as well as God is saved from idolatry. 
It is this move beyond the fictive as if towards the as that 
I would like to question, that is, the possibility of the non-fictive as. 
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Why not embrace the fictive as if wholeheartedly? A love for 
literature and love (desire for the other in the desire of the other) 
as literature. In the three modern novels Kearney refers to, he 
leaves the creedal as to the possible re-figuration in the reader 
(implied or actual) rather than pre-scribing (pre-writing) it in the 
pre-figuration (in the implied author or narrator) or in the 
configuration of a novel,76 and yet it seems that in his own book 
(Anatheism) he inscribes it. What would be the difference between 
a creedal as and the dogmatic it has-to-be-thus? 
In relation to the three novels, Kearney leaves the possibility 
for creedal as to the reader.77 My question, should it not be left 
there – the text or even texts in general, remaining sacramentally 
open, as Kearney refers to the texts of Proust, Joyce and Woolf 
as sacramental texts78 – texts remaining Messianically expectant 
to the to come? 
The impossibility of the book 
Anatheism
Kearney argues that Anatheism is not a fiction. What is it then? 
Is  it then a philosophical–theological book as it is not a novel, 
a creedal book as it is not a fiction? 
76. Ricoeur goes so far as to construe the double surrender of (1) the author to the implied 
author (or narrator) and of (2) the implied author to the reader, as an act of kenotic service to 
the other that ultimately amounts to a transubstantiation of the author into reader: ‘Whereas 
the real author effaces himself in the implied author, the implied reader takes on substance 
in the real reader’. In short, the author agrees to die so that the reader may be born (Kearney 
2010:106).
77. This triadic model of epiphany – celebrated in the sacrament of word-made-flesh – 
always implies rebirth. It constitutes an event of semantic reinvention where the impossible 
is transfigured into the new possible (Kearney 2010:109).
78. Kearney reflecting and Marcel Proust’s text, In Search of Lost Time, ‘The ultimate 
definition, perhaps, of an open text. Or what we might call – taking our cue from Merleau-
Ponty’s model of Eucharistic reversibility – a sacramental text’ (Kearney 2010:117).
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I would like to talk about the impossibility of such a non-fictive 
book. A book, a theological–philosophical book about being 
hospitable to the stranger, cannot itself be hospitable to the 
stranger and therefore the book’s possibility denies the book’s 
message. 
A book, like a civitas, or like the polis, is created through 
establishing limits on hospitality and denying hospitality to 
some. The beauty of the three novels Kearney mentioned is 
their sacramental character, where the writing (configuration) 
remains consciously fictive and thereby remains an invitation 
to respond theistically as faithful subjects or atheistically as 
faithful subjects. The wager is not closed but left open. My 
argument, in full appreciation of the book, is that the book 
failed in its intention and necessarily so, as it could not but fail. 
In a book, things are configured, inscribed, entombed and 
cursed to their death. In this specific book, the Other, who is 
every Other – see Derrida (1995:76), who argues that ‘every 
other is wholly other (tout autre est tout autre)’ – has been 
entombed in the Stranger, with very good reasons given, good 
arguments offered to substantiate the Other as Stranger. But 
thereby the Other, who is every other, is entombed, is 
configured as Stranger. In the book Anatheism, the Other as 
Stranger is systematically developed and argued from an 
interfaith perspective, hermeneutically drawn from the sacred 
texts of the three great monotheisms, traversed with the texts 
of great fathers of suspicion and the holy texts of atheism, so 
as to present to the reader a postmodern configuration of 
faith, which is a faith, if I might add, that is politically correct 
for the times we are living in. Would anatheism not be the 
perfect state-religion of the liberal–intellectual centre of the 
European Union, as it brings together the best (politically 
acceptable) of the three monotheisms with the ethics and 
criticisms of the fathers of suspicion and thereby bringing 
together what has shaped and formed contemporary Western 
European thought? 
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The anatheist wager
Kearney develops his anatheist wager in five movements: 
imagination, humour, commitment (truth), discernment and 
hospitality (Kearney 2010:40ff.). In my interpretation, the wager 
is developed in the first two, but I believe the wager is destroyed 
in the next two movements. The last movement creates a 
possibility for a return to the wager. I will not unpack all five 
movements but will only focus on the two movements where 
I believe the wager is lost. 
Commitment
In the third movement, Kearney turns to commitment (truth); 
I place ‘truth’ in brackets, as it is a commitment, a betrothal to 
truth, in a sense perhaps like Badiou’s subjects of truth: the 
faithful subject (Badiou 2009:53f.). That through commitment, 
betrothal, truth is revealed as facere veritatem, where one does 
not know the truth but lives the truth (Kearney 2010:44). It is 
exactly this identifiable truth in action, through the subject of 
truth that makes a book possible, that commits the book to a 
certain as (configuration), no longer the as if of a fiction. Through 
commitment the as if of fiction is transformed into the as of a 
book, holy book, the as that binds a community together 
(religare), the as that makes the polis, or a congregation of the 
faithful, a possibility. My concern is with the victims of such 
subjects of truth, the victims created through the committed 
faithful subjects, namely, those labelled as the uncommitted. Or 
let me rather say those committed (labelled) by the committed 
(faithful subjects) to being uncommitted. Those who are 
committed by the subjects of truth to the realm or the non-realm 
of the uncommitted through the actions of truth of the faithful 
subjects, thereby truth is saved in action, while the uncommitted 




Discernment is the opposite of a leap of faith and rather a wise 
choice (Kearney 2010):
We do not, as Ignatius knew, consent to just any kind of Other 
simply because they are other. And this is where we take issue not 
only with Kierkegaard and the fideists but also with Derrida and the 
deconstructionists for whom ‘every other is every other’ (tout autre 
est tout autre). Not every stranger is divine. (p. 44)
I would argue that every other is every other and only becomes 
divine or evil in the imaginative response of the ‘here I am’. 
In Woolf’s text, every other is not the stranger but the ‘Real’, 
and the Real is interpreted as divine. Of the three modern 
novelists, Joyce, Proust and Woolf, all three turn towards a 
certain sanctification of the Real, sacramentalisation of the 
Real – materialism as divine, the given as divine, the gift as 
sacred. In that sense, they are all three true modern novels. 
Schleiermacher (2001:44) in his understanding of religion 
argues that religion should not be understood as metaphysics 
or ethics but in and as the affect that das Universum has on 
humans, in the experience of infinitude. Religion as the affect 
the Real, das Universum, has on people. 
Commitment into community and thereby 
exclusion of the non-committed
Indeed, how can one not be at home and break bread with Joyce, 
Proust and Woolf? Are we not all children of modernity, seeking 
a non-religious religion that can bind us (religare) into the home 
where we break bread and drink wine, Eucharistically celebrate 
the ‘Real Presence’, the transubstantiation of the immanent into 
a transcendent sacred, or the transcendent into a sacred 
immanent? In a sense, anatheism is the religion of our late modern 
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existence that speaks to our prefiguration and offers us a 
configuration in which to refigure ourselves, post-metaphysically 
and beautifully done. Its language is truly the Eucharist of 
re-figuration, of re-birth offered and given for us, thereby binding 
(religare) me into a new community, a new polis. A polis of all 
those of uncertain faith, the subjects of a material or immanent 
transcendental truth, a community (or maybe even a church) 
of the anatheists – the liberal and intellectual centre of Europe. 
Is that not the danger with any move towards commitment? 
Should one not rather remain with imagination and humour, as a 
certain love of literature? A community of literati, lovers of 
literature and literature as love (desire for the other in the desire 
of the other). My suggestion is a more radical turn to literature 
as if literature (fiction) is all there is.
Discernment with the knowledge of good 
and evil, death and life 
How to discern the difference between the other who kills and 
the other who brings life? How to know if the other who kills is 
not the one who brings life? This knowledge that enables 
discernment between the good other and the bad other – is that 
not a return to the fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden, when 
Eve and Adam ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil? 
Is such discerning knowledge not the root cause of all evil: sin? 
Does it change anything to call the moment of discernment 
(Kearney 2010): 
[A] matter of prereflective carnal response to the advent of the 
Other before it becomes a matter of reflective cognitive evaluation? 
The body already ‘ponders’ in dia-logue with the stranger. (p. 45)
The body is none other than the embodiment into primary, 
secondary, tertiary retentions and protentions (cf. Stiegler 
2014:87) that predetermine or prereflect judgement. This is 
similar to Kearney’s argument, ‘[w]hich is why cognition of the 
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stranger is always a matter of re-cognition’ (Kearney 2010:45). 
If I can discern a friend from a fiend how different am I from the 
tax collectors who love their friends and families and hate their 
enemies (Mt 5:46)? Is the wager of faith and grace not destroyed 
through this discernment, as the choice is no longer a choice, but 
a logical outworking of my pre-figuration of my pre-cognition 
and a survival instinct? 
Is the wager, the wager between friend 
and foe?
It is the embodied pre-figuration that judges, that sees the 
stranger as enemy come to destroy the city, the home, the 
configuration. There is no wager, because the pre-figuration, or 
embodied judgement, is knowledge and therefore there is no 
choice but the logical outworking of a judgement (pre-reflective 
judgement). Is the wager not perhaps the wager of death, the 
wager of destruction, the wager of the crucifixion? The wager 
that knows the enemy will destroy, the guest invited will become 
host and thereby be the enemy that takes my home and yet still 
inviting the enemy as guest in the full knowledge that all will be 
destroyed. The wager is in not knowing what that destruction 
means, the impossibility of knowing if the death (absolute not-
knowing), the crucifixion, is nihilism or liberation and the 
possibility of resurrection? A wager, a choice, a decision can only 
be made in absolute non-knowledge, that is in death. The moment 
there is knowledge, discernment, there is no longer a choice or a 
wager, but logic. 
A friendly stranger who brings joy is a friend, but the challenge 
is to love enemies. It is a love of death that is our only true 
friend, but as enemy. The wager: this can end in death and 
destruction or liberation and new life, but that is beyond our 
knowledge. It is in death, in the death of knowledge, that there 
is a wager. Death is the only wager of truly non-knowing. Is 
death my enemy or is death my only true friend? In this sense is 
Response to Richard Kearney’s Anatheism: Anatheism and holy folly
122
death not the ultimate other? Although even with death there 
is pre-figuration or re-cognition, which will determine if death is 
seen as friend or foe. Thus, death can easily be identified as 
friend or as foe. Yet, the radical discipleship is to love the enemy. 
Love the foe, love the destruction of death; the wager has then 
shifted not from friend or foe, but the embracing of death as 
enemy, yet in love and the unknown consequences thereof. 
That is for me where the wager lies. Is death the final nihilism or 
is death the crucifixion and the hope of resurrection?
But here I have myself moved beyond the perhaps, transfigured 
a fiction into creedal knowledge whereby to clearly identify 
death as my gambling friend–enemy.
Hospitality
The problem with con-figuration is that the subject and the other 
are both conned. Thus, I remain with imagination and irony: the 
tragic-comedy of being conned. Respond in laughter like Sarah 
and call our configurations Isaac (laughter), but who in turn 
called his son (configuration) Jacob, who after conning his father 
and his brother, meets darkness and, struggling with an unknown 
darkness (shadow), is reconfigured as Israel (the one who 
struggles with God-shadow). 
A fool and a joker am I, who has fallen, has been conned, by 
none other than my own imagination: my response to an imagined 
call. In the end, only fools remain, and perhaps some holy fools, 
who wager not God or truth but themselves and their sanity and/
or vanity and thereby protect or save the name ‘God’ and save all 
but the name (the fiction) God. God as fiction (literature), yet 
embodied in the immanence of Dasein’s figuration, or rather God 
as if fiction. Embodied in the immanence of Dasein’s response to 
the imagined call: embodied together with and in the here I am, 
and in this year of 500 years after the Reformation, give it a 
Lutheran twist – Here I stand, and can do no other!
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To what degree may we hold it possible that one may be, 
existentially and simultaneously, ‘both/and’? Isn’t such a wager 
somewhat grandiose, when our lived realities repeatedly 
confront us with one of two scenarios: either that of polar 
opposites continually forcing each other into ever more 
extreme versions of themselves, or with the passifying, even 
stifling middle ground of compromise, where the strange 
uniqueness of both realities are sacrificed for the sake of 
apparent commonality?
Chapter 6
Kearney between poles: Is too much lost in the middle?
124
Richard Kearney, in his work, and I would venture in his person 
as well, is someone who habitually strives to bring opposites into 
 dialogue. Or, one could say, build a house with many rooms, 
where the strangeness of polar opposites may be hosted as 
guests in a space for  dialogue. As such, he has been referred to 
as a ‘philosopher of middle ways’  (cf. Gregor  2008:148).
It is this space in between polar opposites that we will explore 
in this paper – or rather, ‘third space’ – as it has taken form in 
virtually every aspect of Kearney’s  philosophy. Dialogue between 
opposing ends, views or persons is a fundamental point of 
departure that has informed everything from his phenomenology 
and hermeneutics to his philosophy of  religion. I hope to show 
that this third space, as envisioned and carved out by Kearney, is 
not a point located at equal distances between opposing 
 viewpoints. It is in fact not a static point at all but may be better 
understood as a way, for it traverses and creates the possibility of 
alternative living  spaces. It continually visits opposing viewpoints, 
remains informed by them and seeks to narrate new worlds 
where the otherly strange may become strangely at  home.
Meeting Richard Kearney
Before we venture into this task, let us pause to consider where our 
guest, living philosopher in the flesh, ‘speaks  from’. In his fairly 
recent Anatheism: Returning to God after God, Kearney sets his 
interest in the God debate in a context of politics, religious 
background and philosophy  (2011:xi–xvii). Having grown up in 
Ireland during the 30-year period of religious violence, Kearney was 
witness not only to the most arrogant forms of religious triumphalism 
on the one hand but also to religiously motivated ecumenical 
dialogues and peace efforts on the  other. In this context, Glenstal 
Abbey, where he studied for five years, proved a lasting influence 
with its Benedictine commitment to uncompromising hospitality to 
the  stranger. Kearney’s very first exposure to otherness was in his 
childhood home,  however. Concerning his spiritual heritage, he 
speaks of a ‘dual belonging’ (Kearney  2011:xiv). His upbringing in a 
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devout but liberal Catholic Irish family, fostering a deep sense of 
sacramental spirituality, was supplemented by the more critical 
consciousness of his Protestant maternal family (Kearney  2011:xiv). 
This same sense of double belonging was reinforced by Catholic 
and Protestant artists from Northern Ireland who reimagined their 
stories from the ‘other side’, how ‘Catholics and Protestants got into 
each others’ minds, swapped stories, and began to feel what the 
“enemy” felt’ (Kearney  2011:xiv). This sort of interreligious hospitality 
only expanded through Kearney’s dialogues with Jewish thinkers 
(e.g. Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida), the Islamic tradition 
and finally beyond the three Abrahamic faiths through his 
encounters with Buddhist and Hindu thinkers  (e.g. Choqui Nyma 
and Swami Tyagananda) (Kearney  2011:xiv–xv). Religiously, 
spiritually and artistically, then, Kearney has traversed many 
boundaries and extended many confessional  circles.79
In some ways, Kearney is himself a  stranger. An Irish thinker, 
yet now resident in the USA, he teaches philosophy at Boston 
 College. The author of radical hospitality has thus become a 
witnessing voice in a land that elects leaders whose most 
imaginative approach to the stranger in our midst is to build a 
wall to keep them  out. We have come a full circle, and the growing 
boy who found that life may be lived in dialogue with what others 
find irreconcilably strange now embodies the strange other, in 
the form of his philosophy, to the land who hosts him as  guest. 
As such, he speaks from both sides of various spaces as much as 
from both sides of the North-Atlantic: a prolific author whose 
work traverses boundaries and covers interests ranging from 
philosophy, theology and religious studies to politics, literary 
theory, aesthetics, even including works of poetry and fiction 
(Gregor 2008:147;  cf. Ward  2005:369).
 79. Kearney’s philosophical endeavours are likewise characterised by a commitment to 
dialogue between diverse  approaches. In this, he follows in the example of Paul Ricoeur, 
his supervisor for his doctoral studies, who published more than 30 major works during 
his lifetime that ranged from ‘existentialism and phenomenology to psychoanalysis, politics, 
religion, and the theory of language’ (Kearney  2005b:4). 
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Between polar opposites: An 
overview of some of Kearney’s 
‘third ways’
For the sake of those less familiar with Kearney’s work, I will 
attempt to provide everyone a chance to dip their toes into just 
what is meant by these middle ways I keep referring  to. Because 
it impacts on all his work, I will provide a brief overview of 
Kearney’s hermeneutical ‘third  way’. We will then move on to an 
unfairly brief treatment of Kearney’s third way between apophatic 
and cataphatic theology and how this relates to his third way 
between onto-theology and eschatology, namely, the God Who 
May Be, or the God of  posse. We will remain within the larger 
framework of Kearney’s hermeneutics of religion for our final 
section, which will be a slightly more in-depth treatment of how 
Kearney’s phenomenology of the Other informs his reimagination 
of God as an ethical response, and specifically in such a way that 
it maps out a third way between transcendence and  immanence.
Between romantic and critical 
interpretation: Diacritical hermeneutics80
Kearney navigates between romantic and radical hermeneutics – 
an approach that he terms ‘diacritical hermeneutics’ (Kearney 
 2003:17). By romantic hermeneutics, Kearney (2003) means:
[T ]he view – endorsed by Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Gadamer – 
that the purpose of philosophical interpretation is to unite the 
consciousness of one subject with that of the  other. This process 
is called ‘appropriation’ which in the German, Aneignung, means 
becoming one  with.  (p. 17)
Radical hermeneutics, on the other hand, refers for Kearney to 
Caputo’s rejection of the ‘model of appropriation, insisting on the 
 80. This section has been reworked from a previous overview of Kearney’s thought in the 




unmediatable and ultimately “sublime” nature of alterity’ – an 
approach inspired by the deconstructive turn of Derrida, Blanchot 
and Lyotard (Kearney 2003):
To this end Caputo promotes the ‘hyperbolic hypothesis’ of Levinas 
and Derrida, defined as an ‘unphenomenological model’ in which ‘an 
invisible infinity comes over me and demands everything of me, the 
food out of my mouth’ – a new model ‘for the friend and for politics, 
which have always been understood in egalitarian  terms’. In this light, 
radical hermeneutics invokes an irreducible dissymmetry of self and 
 other.  (p. 17)
In his proposed diacritical hermeneutics, as a third way to traverse 
these polar opposites, Kearney follows in the direction chartered 
by Ricoeur, whom he compliments as having developed his own 
brand of philosophical hermeneutics through his much-noted 
ability to negotiate between competing schools of thought 
(Kearney 2005a):
Determined to find a path between a) the romantic hermeneutics 
of Schleiermacher and Gadamer and b) the more radical 
hermeneutics of the deconstruction (Derrida, Caputo) and critical 
theory (Habermas), Ricoeur endeavoured to chart a middle way 
that combined both the empathy and conviction of the former 
and the suspicion and detachment of the  latter. He himself never 
gave a name to this third path (he was wary of founding a new 
ideology or  -ism). But I think we would not be far wrong in naming 
it dialogical or diacritical  hermeneutics. There were not many major 
figures in contemporary thought – Husserl, Freud, Rawls, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, Saussure, Austen, Arendt, 
Jaspers, Marcel, Habermas, Levinas, Derrida – with whom he did not 
engage in robust  debate.  (p. 4)
Kearney’s approach to hermeneutics therefore provides us with 
a first glimpse of how his attempted middle ways traverse polar 
opposites and also provides us with a basis on which to consider 
the way he applies his mediating approach to philosophy of 
 religion.81
 81. As Nichols has remarked on Kearney’s approach to hermeneutics, and specifically how 
he has applied it to his proposal of God as posse, ‘[…] this new dialectic has raised the bar 
for hermeneutic discourse one new level, both forbidding and demanding a resolution at 
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Between apophatic and cataphatic 
theology: Hermeneutics of religion82
Let us now explore how diacritical hermeneutics, and specifically 
Kearney’s appreciation for religious metaphor, enables a third 
way for a hermeneutics of religion between that of apophatic 
and cataphatic  theology. In this regard, he borrows, in his 
own  words, ‘liberally’ from Ricoeur’s notion of ‘semantic 
augmentation’: the ‘surplus of meaning’ that may result from 
inventive hermeneutic readings of religious texts, giving rise to a 
‘rich play of metaphoricity’ (Kearney  2001:7).83 Contrary to the 
narrowly platonising use of allegory, where meaning is transferred 
only vertically from the sensible to the intelligible, and from the 
human to the divine, Ricoeur’s new model of religious 
hermeneutics regains some of the original etymological charge 
of metaphor as meta-phora [to transfer, transit, carry across], so 
that the production of metaphorical meaning becomes a two-
way movement – ‘like Jacob’s ladder with angels passing up and 
down’ (Kearney  2001:7). Greater awareness of the fertile 
metaphorical interplay at work in religious texts enables the 
(footnote 81 continues...)
the same time’ (Nichols  2006:115). He remarks that the sheer weight of the task Kearney has 
laid on himself would make it understandable if his weight shifts to one or the other side, at 
 times. Indeed, what Kearney attempts in terms of a hermeneutics of religion is the impossible 
possible, so that Nichols suggests, later on (Nichols 2006:125): ‘to those who enter the orbit 
of Kearney’s discourse that his diacritical hermeneutics, despite the attempt to remain “in 
between” romantic and radical hermeneutics, must necessarily lean more closely to the 
romantic side if it is to retain the possibility of having a real  God-who-may-be. One could 
even say that diacritical hermeneutics is a version of romantic hermeneutics, but one that 
strives with incessant vigilance to remember its own potential for violent  domination.’ 
 82. This section has been reworked from a previous overview of Kearney’s thought in the 
author’s master of theology dissertation (Steenkamp 2012), later published by Scholarium 
(Steenkamp 2014:103–105,  108–111).
 83. To illustrate, Kearney refers to Ricoeur’s discussion of hermeneutic interpretations of 
the Song of  Songs. Here Ricoeur makes the point that, because no single writing or reading 
could ever capture the meaning of divine desire referred to in this textual tradition, it is 
by interanimating this text with other texts from both scripture and the later traditions of 
interpretation ‘that we can begin to approximate to some notion of divine desire with live 
metaphors that conjoin heterogeneous semantic fields’ (Kearney  2001:7).
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hermeneutic retrieval of certain lost meanings ‘within and 
between (metaxy) the texts themselves’ (Kearney  2001:8).84
For Kearney the theological value of this ‘metaphorising role 
of hermeneutic mediation’ lies in the fact that it steers a middle 
way through the apophatic85 and cataphatic86 approaches to 
 God. Traversing this frontier zone where the human imagination 
uses stories, parables and images to think the unthinkable and to 
say something about the unsayable, Kearney attempts to 
navigate a third way between the poles of negative and  onto-
theology. Here, God is not approached as being or as non-being 
but as the possibility-to-be, and where the intersecting of 
metaphors disclose latent and new meaning (Kearney  2001:8).87
Kearney’s phenomenologico-hermeneutical exploration of 
the topic of the God-who-may-be is best understood as an 
 84. Kearney illustrates by quoting Ricoeur’s example of the two lovers in the Song of Songs at 
length, ‘The idea of an intersecting metaphor invites us to consider the different and original 
regions of love, each with its symbolic  play. On the one side, the divine love is invested in the 
Covenant with Israel and later in the Christic bond, along with its absolutely original nuptial 
metaphorics; on the other, there is human love invested in the erotic bond and its equally 
original metaphorics, which transforms the body into something like a  landscape’. The double 
‘seeing as’ of intersecting metaphors then finds itself as the source of the ‘saying otherwise’ 
(Ricoeur 1998:302–303 in Kearney  2001:7–8). Ricoeur concludes from this that it is the mark 
of the, ‘power of love to be able to move in both senses along the ascending and descending 
spiral of metaphor, allowing in this way for every level of the emotional investment of love 
to signify, to intersignify every other level’ (Ricoeur 1998:302–303 in Kearney  2001:8). The 
sheer diversity of ways for metaphorising the desire of God points to the fact that none 
can claim superiority to the other, and that it is precisely from ‘the productive friction of 
the “intersignification” that some transfer (metaphora) of meaning is eventually, if always 
tentatively, achieved’ (Kearney  2001:8).
 85. The apophatic tradition, with its negative theologians like Clement of Alexandria, 
Dionysius, Levinas, Derrida and Marion, ‘stresses the impossibility of saying anything 
meaningful about God’, so that God is placed too far beyond being (Kearney  2001:8).
 86. The cataphatic tradition risks embracing overly positive or foundationalist propositions 
when talking about God, so that God is sometimes reduced to being – ‘either as the most 
general or highest being: ontos on – theion’ (Kearney  2001:8).
 87. In terms of the desire of God that Kearney has been exploring as illustration in the Song 
of Songs, we here ‘encounter the nuptial nexus where divine and human desires  overlap. The 
still point of the turning world where the timeless crosses time’ (Kearney  2001:8).
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attempt to poetically say the unsayable and thus engage the 
radical schools of thought that emphasise the otherness of 
alterity to the point where it becomes irredeemably  strange. 
Kearney engages hermeneutically the textual treasure chest of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, as well as works of literature, 
with the freedom that his philosophical point of departure 
lends  him. His aim in this venture is not to suggest a final or 
even authoritative interpretation, but rather to engage 
poetically in an act of reinterpretation or, more aptly, 
reimagination – an act that can be described as applying 
Ricoeur’s ‘semantic innovation’ and ‘surplus of meaning’ in the 
field of Philosophy of  Religion.
Ricoeur advances a hermeneutic dialectic that ‘passes through 
the detour of the text in the name of something beyond it – what 
he calls the “matter of the text”’, and that brings us to the 
ontological potential of a text: ‘the ontological horizon of world-
meaning opened up by the textual workings of language’ 
(Kearney 2004):
This ultimate reference – to a world not merely represented by the 
text but disclosed by the text – brings us beyond epistemology to 
 ontology. Thus the ultimate horizon of Ricoeur’s work remains, from 
beginning to end, the horizon of being which signals to us obliquely 
and incompletely: a promised land but never an occupied  one. 
We encounter here a truncated ontology – provisional, tentative, 
 exploratory. And this limitation on the pretensions of speculative 
reason signals for Ricoeur a renunciation of Hegel and all other 
versions of systematic  closure. The interpretation of being is always 
something begun, but never  completed.  (p. 4)
This detour into the hermeneutic philosophy of Kearney’s mentor, 
as explained by Kearney, helps us to gain a better understanding 
of what Kearney attempts – and does not attempt – through his 
hermeneutics of  religion. Ricoeur has namely led us beyond both 
Husserl’s understanding of meaning as some essence to be 
intuited and Kant’s idea that it is a transcendental condition of 
possibility to be reflected upon, and he has in effect freed the 
text from the circuit of internal reflection, opening it to 
‘intersubjective horizons of language and history’, which ‘involves 
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a “long” intersubjective detour through the sedimented horizons 
of history and tradition’ (Kearney  2004:4). Kearney’s attention 
to the ‘second-order reference’ that hermeneutics produces 
in front of the text – and he speaks about God to a postmodern 
world – precludes the idealist claim of occupying an absolute or 
total standpoint, and yet still involves someone saying something 
to someone about something (Kearney  2004:4–5). Entering into 
his poetical exploration of biblical narratives, Kearney rereads 
these ancient symbols in a way that produces new worlds of 
 possibility.
Between transcendence and 
immanence: Kearney’s quasi-
phenomenology of Otherness 
and ethics as integrating force of 
Kearney’s hermeneutics88
We come now to Kearney’s middle way between transcendence 
and  immanence. We will treat this attempt at dialectics in far 
greater detail than the two examples above, and as such this 
attempt at creating a philosophical third space will serve as our 
most extensive illustration of how middle ways function in 
Kearney’s  philosophy.
Kearney portrays the way in which the ‘[O]ther’ and the ‘same’, 
God and humankind, transcendence and immanence can be 
related together, in ethical terms, denying the deconstructionist 
notion that human consciousness has no access to the radically 
‘Other’ (Masterson  2008:258). Furthermore, rejecting onto-
theology in favour of eschatology (Masterson 2008):
Kearney envisages the divine as an ethically enabling  possibility. 
This possibility, he claims, enables us to achieve, beyond our 
 88. This section has been reworked from a previous overview of Kearney’s thought in the 
author’s master of divinity dissertation (Steenkamp 2011:50–57) and her master of theology 
dissertation (Steenkamp 2012), later published by Scholarium (Steenkamp  2014:131–133).
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own intrinsic resources, an ethical order of justice and love 
through which the kingdom of God – the God Who May Be – 
is  accomplished. There is a co-relativity between the divine 
as enabling possibility and humanity which accomplishes this 
 possibility.  (p. 247)
For Kearney, God is present as transfiguring, desiring, poeticising 
and possibilising, where transfiguring is something that God 
does to us even as we do it to God through our creations of 
art,  justice and  love. Kearney pictures God as the possibility 
enabling humans to respond ethically to an eschatological call 
(Masterson  2008:249). This transcendent deity is perceived by 
human consciousness, though, as a beckoning possibility of 
ethical existence rather than some supreme Being (Masterson 
2008:256), so that any encounter with the true God must of 
necessity invite humans to sensitivity and care of their neighbours 
(Bloechl  2005:733).89 From his phenomenological perspective, 
avoiding questions of ontology, the point of speaking of God as 
‘possible and possibilising eschaton or finality of human 
aspiration, who is affirmed precisely as the not yet accomplished 
fulfilment of  ethico-religious desire’, becomes  clear. God 
encounters humans as the ‘impossible-possible,’ ‘transcending 
yet transfiguring human capacity by enabling it to achieve a 
kingdom of justice and love beyond its intrinsic own resources’ 
(Masterson  2008:259). Eschatology flows back into ethics, 
for  the God that arrives as transformative possibility from 
the  eschatological future turns the attention to the other 
persons in the world (Bloechl  2005:733). I will now briefly attempt 
to provide an overview – as briefly as possible – of how Kearney’s 
phenomenology of Otherness functions in this larger 
hermeneutics of  religion.




The problematic of the Other is the question of how to 
(Manoussakis 2006b):
[T ]hink and speak of the Other on the Other’s terms, that is, without 
reducing otherness to a reflection of the Same – while, at the same 
time, being able to think and speak of the Other without falling into a 
sort of apophatic mysticism of the  ineffable.  (p. xviii)
Kearney’s approach to this dilemma is to seek a middle way 
between the unmediated, uncritical rapport with the Other 
(Levinas’ infinity, Derrida’s différance and Caputo’s khora) and 
the rigid, outdated onto-theological and metaphysical conceptions 
(Manoussakis 2006b:xix).90 We will examine Kearney’s approach 
to this conundrum by turning to his exploration in The God Who 
May Be of the theme of transfiguration in terms of a phenomenology 
of the persona – an approach in which he ‘draws liberally from 
post-Heideggerian accounts of the self-other relation’ (Levinas, 
Merleau-Ponty, Kristeva, Ricoeur, Derrida) (Kearney  2001:9).
  Persona: Figure of the Other
While, for Kearney, ‘person’ refers to others in terms of what is the 
same or similar (empirically, biologically, psychologically,  etc.), he 
uses ‘persona’ to denote the otherness of the  Other. Each person 
embodies a persona, which he understands as (Kearney 2001):
[T ]hat eschatological aura of ’possibility’ which eludes but 
informs a person’s actual presence here and now [...]. At a purely 
phenomenological level, persona is all that in others exceeds my 
 90. As an illustration, we may consider Derrida’s remark to Kearney in a 2001 dialogue 
between them: ‘Now on a more, radical kind of reconciliation, beyond the political – the 
political is just a layer – I would not suspend every relation with the other for the sake of 
hope, salvation, or resurrection (I have been reading your admirable book these days on this 
 subject). This is perhaps a difference between us: this indeterminacy of the messianic leaves 
you  unsatisfied. To speak roughly, you, Richard, would not give up the hope of redemption, 
resurrection, and so forth; and I would not  either. But I would argue that when one is not 
ready to suspend the determination of hope then our relation with the other becomes again 
economical […]’ (Manoussakis  2004:5).
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searching gaze, safeguarding their inimitable and unique  singularity. 
It is what escapes me towards another past that I cannot recover 
and another future I cannot  predict. It resides, if it resides anywhere, 
beyond my intentional horizons of re-tention and  pro-tention. The 
persona of the other outstrips both the presenting consciousness of 
my perception here and now and the presentifying consciousness 
of my imagination (with its attempts to see, in the mode of as-if, 
that which resists perceptual  intuition). The persona of the other 
even defies the names and categories of signifying  consciousness. 
It is beyond consciousness tout  court. Though this ‘beyondness’ 
is, curiously, what spurs language to speak figuratively about it, 
deploying imagination and interpretation to overreach their normal 
limits in efforts to grasp it – especially in the guise of metaphor and 
 narrative.  (p. 10)
The self cannot encounter another without configuring them in 
some way, and to configure another as a persona implies the 
paradox of configuration: ‘to grasp him/her as present in absence, 
as both incarnate in flesh and transcendent in time’ (Kearney 
 2001:10). This paradox must be accepted, for to refuse it is to 
regard another as pure presence (thing), or pure absence 
(nothing), and thus to disfigure the Other (Kearney  2001:10). The 
Other can be held in disregard not only by overlooking his or her 
transcendence but also by ignoring his or her ‘flesh-and-blood 
thereness’: ‘There is a thin line […] between seeking to capture the 
other as divine (qua idol) and receiving the divine through the 
other (qua icon)’, and as such the matter calls for hermeneutic 
caution (Kearney  2001:11).
 Persona as eschaton
In contrast to the fictitious totalities whereby we often respond 
to the enigma of persona as presence–absence (Kearney 2001:11), 
the eschatological notion of persona allows the irreducible 
finality of the Other as eschaton,91 reminding us that we have no 
 91. Eschaton should here not be confused with telos  ‘(i.e. a fulfilable, predictable, foreseeable 
goal)’ (Kearney  2001:12). Instead, Kearney understands eschaton here ‘precisely in the sense 
of an end without end – an end that escapes and surprises us, like a thief in the night – rather 
than some immanent teleological closure’ (Kearney  2001:12).
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power over him or her (Kearney  2001:12). Once we confront this 
primary disablement in front of another, it is the Other who 
re-enables us (Kearney  2001:12). With the eschaton as persona, 
Kearney refers to the future possibilities of the Other, which I am 
unable to realise, grasp or possess: the ‘vertical “may-be” of the 
other’ that ‘is irreducible to my set of possibilities or powers: my 
“can-be”’ (Kearney  2001:12). Appropriating the Other’s persona 
would rob the Other of his or her otherness, temporality, futurity 
and alterity (Kearney  2001:12). For the absence of the Other 
refers to a temporal absence – the sense in which ‘we might say 
that my persona is both younger and older than my person – pre-
existing and post-existing the seizure of myself as presence (qua 
sum of totalisable  properties)’. The persona is (Kearney 2001):
[A]lways already there and always still to come […] there where 
there is no one, and takes the place of the no-place without itself 
taking place  […]. Yet it does give place to the person and without 
it the person could not take its  place. It is the non-presence 
that allows presence to happen in the here and now as a human 
person appearing to me in flesh and  blood. It is, in short, the quasi-
condition of the other remaining other to me even as s/he stands 
before me in this  moment. But however non-present it is, persona 
is not to be understood as some impersonal anonymous presence 
 (i.e., a Monarchian deus  absconditus). Nor is it to be taken as a merely 
formal condition of possibility (Kant); nor indeed as some archaic 
and formless receptacle (Plato’s and Derrida’s  khora). Persona is 
always inseparable from this person of flesh and blood, here and 
 now.  (pp. 12–13)
While it always reminds us that there is always ‘something more to 
flesh and blood than flesh and blood’, it is not some disembodied 
soul but ‘gives itself in and through the incarnate body’, even as it 
absolves and withholds itself (Kearney  2001:14).
 Beyond fusion
The persona refuses to be turned into an alter ego – into some 
version of me by which I can quench my desire to grasp it or to 
fuse with it (Kearney  2001:13–14). And against the fusionary 
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sameness of the onto-theological relation of ‘one-for-one’ or ‘the 
one-for-itself-in-itself’, Kearney proposes the ‘eschatological 
universality of the Other’  (2001:15). Insofar as this notion of the 
universal envisions a possible coexistence of unique personas 
where their transcendence is secured, it is more  ethical. And insofar 
as such an ethical universal remains an eschatological possibility 
that calls at us from the future, it resists contentment with the 
accomplished and instead creates ‘a sense of urgency and exigency, 
inviting each person to strive for its instantiation, however partial 
and particular, in each given situation’ (Kearney  2001:15).
In the same way that the  eschaton  is a promise (not an 
acquisition), a possibility of a new future (but impossible in the 
present where ‘the allure of total presence risks reigning 
supreme’), the eschatological persona also defies my power and 
transfigures me before I can configure it. By acknowledging the 
asymmetrical priority to the other, that particular persona 
transfigures me and empowers me to transfigure in turn, to 
‘figure the other in their otherness’ (Kearney 2001):
The asymmetrical priority of the Other’s persona over my person 
(qua ego-cogito) finds expression in the fact that the other comes 
to me not as some fulfillment of my intentional consciousness; but 
as a figure-face which eludes and shatters my intentional horizons. 
The face of the persona discountenances me before I countenance 
it. Which is another way of saying that the persona never actually 
appears at all, as such, in that it has already come and gone, leaving 
only its trace; or is still to come, outstripping every figuration on 
my part. The persona hails and haunts me before I even begin to 
represent it as if it were present before me. (p. 16)
These temporal idioms signal a specifically ethical time that 
expresses itself in the (Kearney 2001):
[T ]emporal ek-stasis of the self, surpassing itself towards the other 
who surpasses it, responding to the call of the persona issued from 
a time which exceeds my beginning and my  end.  (p. 16)
The achronic persona therefore ‘disrupts me before and after 
every as-if synchronism’ that I would impose upon  it.
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 Persona as chiasm
With the persona superseding all presentations and re-
presentations that seek to capture it as intuitive adequation, 
the persona can be said to surpass phenomenology that is 
‘understood in the sense of an “eidetics of intentional 
consciousness,” and strives towards a “rigorous science of 
transcendental  immanence”’. For this reason, the phenomenon 
of the persona calls for a new or quasi-phenomenology, 
which, Kearney suggests, is mobilised more by ethics than 
by eidetics (Kearney  2001:16). As a quasi-figure that appears 
as if it was an appearance, the persona of the Other ‘announces 
a difference which differentiates itself ad infinitum’ (Kearney 
2001):
Persona is infinitely premature and invariably overdue, always 
missed and already  deferred. Persona comes to us as a chiasmus 
or crossover with person […] That is precisely its eschatological 
stature – the messianic achronicity which breaks open the continuous 
moment-by-moment time of everyday  chronology.  […] It marks 
a time that is always more, remaindered, excessive, sabbatical, 
 surplus. And yet this extra-time reveals itself in time, in what Walter 
Benjamin called the Jetzzeit – the incursion of the eternal in the 
 moment.  (p. 17)
The time of the eschaton is therefore best explained as anti-
clockwise, or even post-clockwise, in that the persona remains 
forever anterior and posterior to its manifestations, so baffling all 
cognitive attempts at understanding it (Kearney  2001:17). It is for 
this reason (the persona never being there on time, or never 
adequately there at all) that Kearney suggests that persona is 
literally personne (Kearney 2001):
It is no-one, if some-one means a person who is phenomenally 
symmetrical to  me. But it is this one and no one but this one, if my 
neighbour appears to me eschatologically, defying the as-if 
figurations by means of which I try to tell its  story. For the persona 
is always other than the other-for-me here and  now. It is the figure 
which transfigures by absenting itself as personne in the very moment 
that it hails and holds  me.  (p. 17)
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This calls for us to view the Other as an icon for ‘the passage of 
the infinite, but without construing the infinite as another being 
of some kind hiding behind the  Other. For persona is the in-finite 
other in the finite person before me’ (Kearney  2001:17). It is 
not  the idolatry of seeing the other person as divine, but it is 
about the divine (as trace, icon, visage and passage) in and 
through that person (Kearney  2001:18).
 Persona as prosopon
Kearney uses the term prosopopoeic substitution in a 
phenomenological and ethical sense to refer to (Kearney 2001):
[T ]he otherness of the other in and through the flesh-and-blood 
person here before  me. Trans-cendence in and through, but not 
reducible to,  immanence. Prosopon is the face of the other who 
urgently solicits me, bidding me answer in each concrete situation, 
‘here I  am’.  (p. 18)
It is telling that, in the original Greek usage, where prosopon 
refers to the face of a person facing another, revealing itself from 
within itself, the term appears almost always as a plural noun, 
suggesting that the ‘prosopon–persona can never really exist on 
its own (atomon), but emerges in ethical relation to others’, so 
that it can be said to be ‘radically intersubjective, invariably 
bound up in some ethical vis-à-vis or face-to-face’ (Kearney 
2001):
Reinterpreted hermeneutically from a post-Levinasian perspective, 
one can see just how appropriately this Greek–Latin pair of prosopon–
persona may serve to translate the Judeo-Christian primacy of  ethics. 
It perfectly captures the double sense of someone as both proximate 
to me in the immediacy of connection and yet somehow ineluctably 
distant, at once incarnate and otherwise, inscribing the trace of an 
irreducible alterity in and through the face before  me.  (p. 18)
Kearney calls this paradoxical phenomenon – an Other ‘inscribing 
the trace of an irreducible alterity in and through the face before 
me’ – prosopon-transfiguration, which we allow, finally, to 
transfigure us (Kearney  2001:18). It is for this reason that he 
proposes that we prefer icons over idols, for the counter-tradition 
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of eschatology challenges the priority granted to being over the 
good by the tradition of onto-theology (Kearney 2001):
Against Heidegger I say: it is not our being that cares for itself, as 
being-towards-death, but the good of the persona that cares for 
being, as promise of endless  rebirth. Natality transfigures  mortality. 
Openness to the persona of the neighbour in each instant is, as 
Matthew 25 reminds us, the ultimate in eschatological  awareness. 
And so we find ourselves, on foot of the above analysis, at the 
threshold of a phenomenology of  religion.  (p. 19)
 A hermeneutics of Otherness
But Kearney’s description of persona and person is only one 
side of the coin, and an analysis of his phenomenology of 
otherness would be incomplete without considering his 
hermeneutical and phenomenological consideration of 
otherness in Strangers, Gods and Monsters (Kearney  2003). 
Here, Kearney reflects on various modalities of otherness that 
influence our viewpoint of both the world and ourselves 
(Masterson  2008:252). He considers those experiences of 
alterity that so transgress the familiar and so expose our 
existential insecurity that they manifest themselves as strangers, 
gods and monsters – the threatening unfamiliar that we often 
ostracise in fear and trembling, sometimes even envisaging 
them as ‘both monster and god, fascinating yet terrifying’ 
(Masterson  2008:252). Hederman (2006)92 suggests:
Beyond the reach of the omnidirectional human spotlight, whatever 
lurks in exterior darkness is the irrevocably  other. This is unidentifiable 
alterity that remains uncategorisable and therefore is as likely to 
be an alien as an ally, a monster as a messenger, a stranger as a 
 neighbour. Kearney is still confident that within the orbit of human 
interpretation and narrative imagination we can detect and discern 
the benevolence of such presence when it emanates from the  divine. 
 (p. 275)
 92. Republished in Manoussakis (2006a:270-278, 421).
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Masterson points out how Kearney argues that the ‘challenge of 
the Other appearing as the Alien’ calls for a critical hermeneutical 
engagement of self-and-Other, which in turn ‘calls for a form of 
narrative interpretation capable of tracing interconnections 
between the poles of sameness and strangeness’ (Masterson 
 2008:252). This requires an account of the Other that steers 
clear of the extremes of radical transcendence and radical 
immanence  – the first extreme rendering the Other ‘utterly 
unthinkable, anonymous and terrifying’, and the second extreme 
rendering the Other as ‘indistinguishable from a self-projection’ 
(Masterson  2008:252). It is Kearney’s position that we can 
mediate between absolute transcendence and absolute 
immanence by means of narrative imagination ‘which envisages 
the other as an ethical appeal which, precisely as other, is 
constitutive of my conscious self and not merely derived from or 
projected by it’ (Masterson  2008:254). Kearney implies, in 
other words, that such a practical ethical approach to the Other 
overcomes, at least to some extent, the antimonies that a purely 
cognitive perspective  presents.
Is too much lost in the middle?93
At this point, we are ready to consider one argument that 
Kearney’s third ways – at least in the case of transcendence and 
immanence, sacrifices too  much. For this we turn to Patrick 
Masterson, emeritus professor of philosophy of religion at  UCD. 
While for Kearney absolute transcendence or absolute immanence 
must both be surpassed and hermeneutically negotiated, for 
Masterson, ‘this multi-dimensional intimation of Otherness via 
unfamiliar, frightening images of strangers, gods and monsters’ 
begs the question of whether the Other is ultimately accessible 
to human consciousness (Masterson  2008:253).
 93. This section has been reworked from a previous overview of Kearney’s thought in the 




Postmodern and deconstructionist philosophers are not so 
easily convinced by Kearney’s approach to the Other via a 
hermeneutics of ethical discernment and do not find this 
‘practico-ethical resolution of the tension between immanence 
and transcendence, between the same and the other’, satisfactory 
(Masterson  2008:254). Conceding that this approach to the 
Other may be helpful in addressing the difficulty of the same and 
the Other in interpersonal human encounters, deconstructionists 
argue that, through its anodyne view of the Other (which makes 
it ultimately agreeable to human ethical categories), it finds itself 
still in the traditional perspective of according ‘priority and 
ultimacy to a unified context of goodness, reason and sameness’ 
(Masterson  2008:254).
It is here that the deconstructionists pose the question of God 
or  khora. An emphasis on the uncontainable character of radical 
otherness brings us, beyond the limits of all particular experience, 
to the matter of primordial origin or foundation – that which ‘we 
encounter in fear and trembling when faced with the bottomless 
void of our existence’ (Masterson  2008:255). And it is here, at 
the ‘foundational otherness’ that underlies our existence and that 
can be imagined as either (or both) and sublime deity and/or 
monstrous evil, that deconstructionists such as Derrida and 
Caputo pose their question of God and khora and indeed appear 
to ‘opt for the khora alternative of meaningless indeterminate 
chaos as the more likely face of radical otherness’ (Masterson 
 2008:255).
Kearney’s philosophy of religion, while it engages in the 
contemporary ‘pre-occupation’ with otherness, profoundly 
disagrees with the deconstructionist interpretation that, 
ultimately, the face of otherness is entirely inaccessible to human 
consciousness – a claim that, in his view, leads to both intellectual 
and ethical paralysis (Masterson  2008:256). He would supplement 
the deconstructionist approach with a hermeneutics of practical 
wisdom that would enable us to discriminate between justice 
and injustice, monster and loving God (Masterson 2008):
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Prompted by a sensitive phenomenology of the self–other dyad, 
this hermeneutics involving narrative imagination and judgement 
suggests that the other is never absolutely transcendent nor 
absolutely immanent but somehow between the  two. Others are 
intimately bound up with selves in various ways which constitute real 
ethical relationships between  them. In this perspective there is no 
otherness so absolute as to be utterly inaccessible to  consciousness. 
 (p. 256)
This would mean – if applied to the biblical God – that the 
divine is ‘in some way present or quasi-present in its absence, 
and hence able to disclose itself’ (Masterson  2008:256).94 
But what does this ‘in some way’ mean, exactly? How precisely is 
a transcendent deity accessible to human consciousness? 
Kearney works out his unique answer to this question from a 
hermeneutical–phenomenological perspective in The God Who 
May Be, characteristically according the possible priority over 
speculative reason through his re-imagination of a ‘vertically’ 
transcendent actual supreme being as ‘a “horizontally” beckoning 
possibility’ of ethical existence (Masterson  2008:256). But the 
relationship that the God of posse has with the world is not that 
of teleology or latent purpose but rather of eschatology and 
ethical invocation, for as a transfiguring possibility God enables 
acts of justice and love beyond the intrinsic possibilities of the 
historically evolving world (Masterson  2008:257). Furthermore, 
just as the God of posse has a bearing on human history, Kearney 
controversially claims that human history has a comparable 
bearing upon God as well and must ‘help’ God to become God by 
remaining open to the ‘loving possible’ and making the impossible 
more and more possible through our actions in each concrete 
 94. As Kearney (2003:107) remarks in Strangers, Gods, and Monsters: ‘I believe such 
indistinction between God and horror poses a real problem for ethical  judgement. For how 
can we tell the difference between (1) a God of justice, memory and promise and (2) the 
sheer indifference of the il y a, unless the divine is in some way present or quasi-present in 
its absence, and so able to disclose itself as a God of justice, memory and promise? In short, 
can a deity be narratively recorded and remembered in scriptures, parables and psalms if it is 
not somehow capable of being seen  (e.g. as a burning bush), heard  (e.g. as a call to freedom) 
and believed  (e.g. as a promise of the  kingdom)?’
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moment (Masterson  2008:257). Kearney gives content to the ‘in 
some way’ in which the Other and the Same, God and humankind, 
and transcendence and immanence can be related by integrating 
them by means of his ethical concerns, which also lie at the heart 
of his resistance against the deconstructionist emphasis on 
radical alterity (Masterson  2008:258).
Masterson is critical of Kearney’s ethico-eschatological 
enthusiasm and doubts whether it is satisfactory to provide a 
legitimation for an experiential affirmation of divine transcendence 
within a phenomenological frame of  reference. He is not convinced 
that divine transcendence can be at once unbounded by, but yet 
situated within, experience – a doubt that brings him to his 
argument that, however compatible with religious sentiment, 
Kearney’s type of thinking should be ‘philosophically repositioned 
by more metaphysical considerations’ (Masterson  2008:260). 
Masterson approves of the phenomenological approach but 
claims that one can go further than talking about God ‘as though 
what is meant by “God” involves necessarily and irreducibly his 
relationship to us as the “possible” or not yet achieved goal of 
our ethical and religious  desire’. For such a God ‘appears 
inextricably, in however privileged transcendent or eschatological 
terms, as God for humanity – a co-relative component with 
human subjectivity, of human experience’ (Masterson  2008:260). 
Should Kearney’s discourse not be qualified by metaphysical 
considerations, Masterson sees a dilemma resulting that will 
involve either idolatry or atheism (Masterson 2008):
For a God inextricably inscribed in human experience is inextricably 
a human god, and a God not so inscribed must ultimately not even be 
a possibility from a strictly phenomenological  viewpoint. On the one 
hand, the relative dependence of God, described in phenomenological 
terms as a possibility co-relative to human desire (rather than in 
terms of his independently possessed actual existence – his esse) 
appears to compromise his alleged radical  transcendence. On the 
other hand, insistence on the radical alterity of his transcendence 
calls in question the claim that he is most appropriately spoken of as 
‘possibility’ or ‘the God Who May Be’, which refers inextricably to his 
reality for  mankind.  (p. 260)
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Masterson’s proposal for avoiding this impasse involves 
appreciating the fact that ‘the transcendence which is apprehended 
or given in experience cannot be phenomenologically legitimated 
as an experience, however indistinct or eschatological, of divine 
transcendence’  (2008:260–261). For this reason, admitting that 
phenomenology represents a necessary and appropriate 
approach to the ‘pre-philosophical lived experience of divine 
transcendence’, Masterson argues that it cannot be sufficient 
because transcendence that is phenomenologically given is by its 
very nature a transcendence that is accessible to ‘my disclosing 
capacity for experience’ and as such is a transcendence that is 
relativised as ‘transcendence-for-humans’  (2008:261). It is 
because of this claim that an experientially inscribed transcendence 
can never be phenomenologically legitimated as an experience 
of  divine transcendence that Masterson argues for a different 
approach to such experienced transcendence that will 
consider  the experience as significant, even if it cannot be 
phenomenologically legitimated (Masterson 2008):
It will ask questions not just of meaning, but of existence and  truth. 
It will ask for the conditions of the possibility of this experience 
of transcendence – an experience which appears to orientate 
our thought beyond the limits of  experience. It will ask whether 
beyond the intrinsic conditions of the experience anything exists 
independently which somehow corresponds to what is intimated, 
however inadequately, by the phenomenologically describable 
 experience. It will address the question ‘Might God be the source of 
our experience of transcendence?’ – a question which, we have 
argued, cannot itself be answered  phenomenologically. For God, as 
such, is not a phenomenological ‘given’ – neither psychologically, 
socially, culturally or  otherwise.  (p. 261)
The question whether God is the source of our experiences of 
transcendence can for Masterson be addressed either 
theologically or philosophically, and he proceeds with a brief 
outline of what each approach might  entail.95 While he is positive 
 95. Briefly, a theological approach would be ‘based upon faith in a divine revelation accepted 
as such’, for while faith in the Judeo-Christian God of salvation history does not affirm divine 
transcendence phenomenologically, it legitimises the experienced salvation history for the 
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about Kearney’s attempt to ‘rescue discourse about ultimate 
transcendence or “Otherness” from the nihilistic implications 
of  deconstructionist insistence on its terrifying and radical 
unknowability’, he cautions that Kearney (Masterson 2008):
[S]eeks to hermeneutically navigate a conscious reconciliation 
of transcendence and immanence, of God and man, by way of a 
phenomenological account of ethical openness in interpersonal 
relationships to a divine transfiguring  possibility. However, these 
ciphers of divine transcendence, disclosed in ethical endeavour, 
are not an indistinct awareness or ‘presence through absence’ of 
divine  transcendence. Here it seems to me, the deconstructionists 
are  right. Radical ‘Otherness’, or the utterly transcendent God, is 
not accessible phenomenologically and if this is the only access to 
divine transcendence then it is indeed  unknowable. My suggestion is 
that the ethical ciphers of transcendence so engagingly delineated 
by Kearney can be deciphered by metaphysical argument which 
enables a non-experiential but informative affirmation of a radically 
transcendent  God.  (p. 263)
Masterson’s suggestions, then, involve the sort of metaphysical 
arguments that Kearney resists  (cf. footnote  18). But Masterson’s 
view of phenomenology is a narrow one that seems hurdled by 
commitments to epistemology and  ontology. Yet, the question 
that preoccupies phenomenology today is less:
[T ]he question of the that or the what than the how’  […]. Being never 
merely is; there are always modes in which it is being  intended. 
By performing reductions from diverse angles, we pass from being 
to the phenomenon, the self-showing of something, and, having 
been enabled to reflect on the movements of our consciousness, 
we can pay heed to the precise manner in which the phenomenon 
is actually given to us: its  phenomenality. How the phenomenon 
is disclosed will depend on the intentional horizons in which it is 
concretely embedded, and that will turn on the sort of phenomenon 
it  is.  (p. 714)
(footnote 95 continues...)
believer as ‘a genuinely revealing trace of what exceeds this-worldly human experience’ 
(Masterson  2008:261). On the other hand, a philosophical approach should, in Masterson’s 
view, ‘proceed by way of indirect metaphysical analysis of the implications of this experience 
to arrive finally at a non-experiential affirmation of God as its ultimate real foundation’ 
(Masterson  2008:262).
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Like Husserl, Masterson would put divine transcendence beyond 
the reach of phenomenological  investigation. Hart questions this 
sort of prioritising of phenomenology as the preferred method 
for doing philosophy of religion, while denying that there is any 
theology  involved. He suggests that it may be helpful to think of 
phenomenology as a means of exploring ‘revelation as well as 
manifestation, the style of attention we call prayer, especially 
contemplative prayer, as well as the attention we call the 
converted gaze’ (Hart  2009:715). In his opinion, when properly 
understood, phenomenology is strictly neutral to all academic 
disciplines, so that it would be (Hart 2009):
[O]f as much help in thinking theologically as it is in thinking 
 philosophically. If we must bracket God as Creator and Judge, so 
too we must bracket the existence of many other things about 
which philosophy  talks. We are in need of a critical examination 
of what ‘theology’ means for those philosophers who endorse 
phenomenology as working within the limits of philosophy alone and 
whether it is at all  justified. My suspicion is that it will usually be a 
caricature at  best.  (p. 715)
Following in the footpaths of Heidegger, Levinas, Scheler and 
Bergson, phenomenology today has broadened its playfield to 
include affective and axiological concerns along with 
epistemological ones, and to address counter-intentionality just 
as carefully as intentionality (Hart  2009:716). Phenomenology 
has also come to acknowledge:
[T ]he priority of intuition with respect to intentionality in a wide range 
of phenomena, and to asterisk the truth that phenomenality has no 
formal conditions to  satisfy. Horizons of intentionality are breached 
more often than we have thought, and we need to acknowledge that 
phenomenality has the power to surprise us, and indeed that surprise 
is a not uncommon response to  phenomenality.  (p. 716)
Most importantly, with respect to Masterson’s criticism of 
Kearney’s phenomenology of religion, Hart points out that 
phenomenology, by detailing the diverse ways in which 
phenomena become present to us – ways ‘that exceed the familiar 
triad of epistemic, ontic, and ontological presence’ – has moved 
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beyond the epistemological prejudice that the ‘phenomenon 
must give itself to us by way of representation’ (Hart  2009:717). 
And because divine transcendence means that God is not 
constrained by any mode of self-revelation or structure of 
intentionality, it follows that God can reveal Godself in anticipation 
and imagination as much as in perception (Hart  2009:722). 
Phenomenology has now become wider in its scope and 
application, so that the spiritual life need no longer be restricted 
to the same protocols and requirements of evidence required of 
physical and intellectual objects (Hart  2009:724).
Kevin Hart’s arguments in his review essay of 2009, briefly 
sketched above, offers one suggestion as to how one may 
navigate these stormy phenomenological  waters. If anything, our 
slightly more thorough treatment of one of Kearney’s third ways 
in this section has illustrated the sort of challenges that one may 
encounter when attempting to take opposing viewpoints 
seriously, while avoiding falling prey to  polarities. It has also, 
however, illustrated the potential benefits of such an approach, 
enabling dialectical philosophy, in between poles, to say more, 
not  less.
Conclusion
In Kearney we encounter both a person, and consequently a 
philosophy, in  dialogue. Kearney’s work could be rightly termed 
‘dialogical’, for not only does he dialogue with various 
philosophers, but his philosophy also dialogues with different 
schools of thought and opposing vantage  points. The description 
of Kearney as a philosopher of ‘middle ways’ is perhaps best 
illustrated by his own description of his work from the perspective 
of his mentors and fellow  philosophers. As such he states that, 
for Ricoeur, he was at times too deconstructive (but for Derrida 
too hermeneutic) and that Levinas found him overly aesthetic 
and ‘inordinately susceptible to the lures of imagination’ (while 
Stanislas Breton thought him too ethical) (Kearney  2007:xi). 
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Kearney’s willingness to re-engage the figures, images, poetic 
gestures and voices of his inherited Christian tradition so 
imaginatively from a philosophical perspective has made him an 
excellent and engaging dialogue partner for theology as well, so 
that also in this regard, he has come to occupy a middle space, 
enabling dialogue and resisting polarising tendencies in a time 
when this is urgently  needed.
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Introduction
The problem concerning the interpretation of Otherness or the 
experience of strangeness has a long history not only in South 
Africa but in the rest of the world. One way of understanding 
the challenge of interpreting otherness96 is in terms of the 
96. The analyses of the problem of Otherness as outlined in the introduction and first section 
of this paper is also discussed in Gerber (2018).
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classic philosophical question concerning the relationship 
between the particular and the universal. ‘In short, problems 
arise when either the universal or the particular is overemphasised 
and dictates the meaning for its counterpart’ (Gerber 2018:2). 
The question is also to be found in the debate concerning the 
quest for self-identity in the so-called African philosophical 
tradition between the ethnophilosophies97 that focus on the 
particularity of African cultures to the point of cultural relativism 
and the anti-ethnophilosophies that try to make room for 
cultural universalism.98 More specifically, the question 
concerning the interpretation of Otherness is framed by, and 
explicitly contextualised within, a South African history that 
includes eras of colonisation (an overemphasis of the universal 
character of Western identity), apartheid (an overemphasis on 
particular differences) and democracy (the attempt to rethink 
the relationship between the universal and particular), among 
other significant events.
What is thus important is the way in which these events 
shaped the relationship between the so-called Western subject 
and the African other. On the one hand, they shaped this 
relationship in ways that may be described as the domination by 
the so-called all enclosing Western world view, that is, a 
universalist perspective that became incarnated in various 
oppressive political, economic, social and intellectual practices 
and institutions. On the other hand, the term decolonisation, 
which is currently a buzzword especially around the various 
tertiary campuses across South Africa after the student protests 
of 2015–2016, is advocated as an alternative to the ‘Western 
world view’ with an appeal to the particularity of African cultures. 
97. Scholars that form part of this group according to Fayemi (2011:260; Gerber 2018) 
include Abraham (1966), Mbiti (1969), Sodipo (1973), Anyanwu (1983), Tempels (1959) and 
Senghor (1963).
98. Philosophers that are included in this classification according to Fayemi (2011:260) are 
Bodunrin (1985), Hountondji (1983), Appiah (1992), Towa (1991) and Wiredu (1980). Mbembe 
could also be placed among these thinkers.
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The discourse of decolonisation, although not new to postcolonial 
Africa, is becoming more imperative in the young and fragile 
democracy of South Africa.
But what is meant by the term decolonisation within the South 
African discourse is by no means clear or generally accepted. 
One of the most common meanings thereof in these discussions 
seems to rest on a variation of the ideology99 advocated as 
Afrocentrism or Pan-Africanism (the overemphasis of 
particularities), which has dominated African philosophy in 
recent decades100 and is represented by the thinkers referred to 
earlier under the term ethnophilosophy. This stream of thought 
may be understood as encompassing responses of the aim to 
liberate Africa and African personhood from Western epistemic 
oppression (Appiah 1992; Eze 2015; Mudimbe 1988; Mbembe 
2001a, 2001b). The main problem, however, with this line of 
thought, as delineated by Achille Mbembe (2001a) in African 
Modes of Self-Writing, is that it does not escape the problematic 
logic of the coloniser it seeks to overcome.
Richard Kearney, in turn, holds that the experience and 
interpretation of otherness, or the discernment between others 
and aliens,101 which is also a task that concerns our own identity, 
is not predetermined but rather we have two choices in this 
regard ‘(1) to try to understand and accommodate our experience 
of strangeness, or (2) to repudiate it by projecting it exclusively 
onto outsiders’ (Kearney 2003:4). The second choice leads to 
99. Ideology may be understood here according to Hutchens’ (2005:40) definition as 
‘thought that does not critique or think through its own provenance and its relation to reality’.
100. For a brief outline of the history of the African intellectual development and some of its 
important figures, see Eze (2015:408), Ramose (2005:1–9) and Wiredu (2004:1–28).
101. Kearney (2003:67) distinguishes between the terms ‘other’ and ‘alien’ as follows: I take 
the term ‘other’ here, as frequently invoked by contemporary Continental theory, to refer 
to an alterity worthy of reverence and hospitality. I take the term ‘alien’, by contrast, to 
refer to that experience of strangers associated with (1) discrimination (as in certain 
immigration policies or acts of separating natives from foreigners) (2) suspicion (as in UFOs, 
extraterrestrials or other unwelcome invaders), and (3) scapegoating (as in xenophobic, 
racist or anti-Semitic practices). Others hence may become aliens, gods or monsters.
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transforming these strangers into either monsters, gods or a 
hybrid of both. Where the first option follows a diacritical 
hermeneutics, the latter option may also be described by either 
a romanticised hermeneutics (overemphasising the universal) or 
that of a radical hermeneutics (overemphasising the particular), 
to which we return further. Hence, with these choices in mind, 
I propose that if we want to constructively engage with a sense 
of what decolonisation might be as a countermeasure to the 
subjugating logic of the coloniser, then we may enter into a 
dialogue with the thought of Richard Kearney to explore possible 
alternative paths.
Western gods and African monsters: 
The critique of the logic of the 
coloniser
Mbembe (2001b) poses the problem of interpreting Otherness 
within the Western philosophical tradition102 clearly when he 
writes the following:
We should first remind ourselves that, as a general rule, the 
experience of the Other, or the problem of the ‘I’ of others and of 
human beings we perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed 
virtually insurmountable difficulties to the Western philosophical and 
political tradition. Whether dealing with Africa or with other non-
European worlds, this tradition long denied the existence of any ‘self’ 
but its own. (p. 2)
To make sense of the logic that underlines the problem of the 
Western philosophical tradition of dealing with Otherness that is 
the logic of the coloniser for our purposes, we may briefly consider 
102. See also Kearney (2003:66), where he summarises the critique of Western thought as 
follows: ‘Most ideas of identity, in short, have been constructed in relation to some notion 
of alterity. Contemporary thinkers like Levinas and Derrida have made much of the fact 
that the Western metaphysical heritage, grounded in Greco-Roman thought, has generally 
discriminated against the Other in favour of the Same, variously understood as Logos, Being, 
Substance, Reason or Ego. This prejudice is called the ‘ontology of Sameness’ by Levinas, 
and ‘logocentrism’ by Derrida.’ 
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the critique of Western metaphysics. Martin Heidegger (2006:64) 
outlines that Western metaphysics103 is constituted by onto-
theology,104 a logic that grounds the meaning and unity of things, 
that is, the onto- of onto-theology, by reference to a highest 
principle, that is, the theo- of onto-theology. The space of the 
grounding and highest principle have been filled with various 
‘figurations like God, History, the Subject and more recently 
Nationalistic Identities’ (Gerber 2018:4). Restated, the figure, also 
understood as substance or essence, acts as the double ground 
that provides meaning to beings and the system they fit into as a 
whole. In Jacques Derrida’s (2005) terms, the figure, which in 
relation to colonisation is the Western identity, serves as the archai 
point of reference at the centre of the structure. Or following 
Emmanuel Levinas’s critique of Western metaphysics – the other is 
synthesised into the Same, that is, the knowing subject par 
excellence (le Moi connaissant) (Levinas 1996:89). Once more, the 
colonised other is synthesised into the categories of the Western 
subject, which served as the highest and grounding reference point 
within the colony.105 Thus, the African subject received its identity in 
relation to that of the Western subject – as its negative opposite.
In turn, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe (1997) also explicate that 
(cited in Gerber 2018): 
The figuration of the identity of the ‘social body’ operates in the 
same fashion as the metaphysical identity of the subject, i.e. all other 
areas of reference are excluded, and the world is [synthesised] into 
103. A draft version of this section on the critique of Western metaphysics was presented 
at the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa conference in 2017 under the title ‘On the 
Critique of Western Metaphysics: A Dialogue between Nancy and Mbembe’. See also Gerber 
and Van der Merwe (2017).
104. For a discussion on onto-theology, see Gerber and Van der Merwe (2017) and Sands 
(2017). For a discussion on how Kearney manages the relationship between philosophy and 
theology, see Sands (2016), who argues that he keeps the two methodologically separate; 
and Boeve (2005:310), who argues that Kearney seems to ‘mix up philosophy and theology’.
105. For an overview of how the South African philosophical tradition was influenced by 
colonialism, where ‘thinking starts to migrate from the centre (in this case London/Oxford/
Cambridge) to the colony (in this case South Africa)’, see Duvenhage (2017:3). 
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the figuration of the ‘social body’, with the renewed telos and utopia 
of a homogenous society. (p. 128)
The totality is totalised into a closed structure, or enclosure, with 
nothing that may arise that is not already determined by the 
totalised structure, to echo Hannah Arendt’s (1966:437–459) 
analysis of totalitarianism. Conversely, the totalitarian tendency 
of identitarian thinking may also be understood according to 
Claude Lefort’s (1988:17) definition of democracy, which refers to 
‘the empty space of power’. Democracy is, thereby, the keeping 
empty, or in tension, the space previously held by an onto-
theological figuration in a totalitarian fashion. The empty space 
in Derrida’s terms refers to khora,106 taken from Plato, ‘the 
groundless ground of the play of differences or the trace, of 
spacing-and-timing’ (Caputo 2011:60).
More importantly, the main consequence of such an onto-
theological figuration of the subject or the social body is the 
inevitability of exclusion (Nancy 2000:24) – that is, the exclusion 
of everything that does not fit into the identity of the subject or 
social body, or in a reversal of terms, included as excluded. 
By  the latter phrase is meant that the exclusion proceeds 
ultimately in the denial of alterity, of difference, that is, the 
existence of the other, where the other is physically expelled, 
excluded or exterminated so as to be included into and make 
sense according to the perspective of the Same. Kearney (2003) 
refers to these excluding practices that reinforce identity in 
terms of the strategy of sacrificial scapegoats107: 
This sacrificial strategy furnishes communities with a binding 
identity, that is, with the basic sense of who is included (us) and who 
is excluded (them). So the price to be paid for the construction of the 
106. See Derrida (2002), Kaufman (2014) and also Kearney (2003), Chapter 9 – ‘Khora 
or God’, where he discusses Plato’s explanation of khora as a: ‘space which is eternal and 
indestructible, which provides a position for everything that comes to be, and which is 
apprehended without the senses by a sort of spurious reasoning and so is hard to believe 
in – we look at it indeed in a kind of dream […]’ (Timaeus 52)’ And the various postmodern 
interpretations of the notion.
107. See Kearney (2003), Chapter 1, ‘Strangers and Scapegoats’.
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happy tribe is often the ostracising of some outsider: the immolation 
of the ‘other’ on the altar of the ‘alien’. (p. 4)
Whence, the creation of Western gods and African monsters108. 
In On the Postcolony, Mbembe (2001b:178) also discusses the 
critique of Western metaphysics and the effects of scapegoating, 
alienating and constructing the African subjectivity as monstrous. 
Firstly, the effects of colonisation may be described as the 
experience of the excluded other in a state of totalitarianism 
(Mbembe 2001b:178) – ‘colonial discourse ends up producing a 
closed, solitary totality that it elevates to the rank of a generality. 
And so reality becomes enclosed within a pre-ordained madness’. 
The colonised other becomes excluded in the denial of their 
subjectivity.
Accordingly, the African subject forms a negative binary 
opposite as the other to the Western metaphysical subject. Two 
examples from Mbembe may be considered. Firstly, the African 
subject became alienated and scapegoated as an animal (or ‘the 
beast’), which stands in opposition to the rational human found 
in, for instance, the text of Hegel, dealing with Africa in his Reason 
in History (Mbembe 2001b:173).
Secondly, the African subject is constructed as a monster. If 
what it means to exist as a rational, self-conscious human being 
is constituted by the Western metaphysical identity, or in 
Heidegger’s words, Dasein, then the African subject who is 
excluded and denied is regarded as less than a non-being, an 
empty figure, as nothing (Mbembe 2001b:173). Mbembe further 
suggests:
In the colonial principle of rationality, however, there is a clear 
difference between being and existing. Only the human exists, 
since the human alone can represent the self as existent, and have 
a consciousness of what is so represented. From the standpoint 
of colonialism, the colonised does not truly exist, as person or as 
subject. (p. 187)
108. Gods and Monsters are written here in capital letters to emphasise that their creation is 
a product of an ontotheological thought structure as discussed above.
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This denial of the existence of the African other as fully human is 
what defines the violence par excellence of colonisation (Mbembe 
2001b:182). Moreover, it is the role that language plays in 
constructing the African other as monstrous through a process 
of continuous repetition that enables the coloniser to deny the 
existence and subjectivity of the colonised (Mbembe 2001b:181).
To recapitulate: In unpacking the critique of Western 
metaphysics, the way in which the logic of the coloniser functions 
becomes clear in the repeated efforts of constructing 
essentialising onto-theological figurations, which serve as the 
ultimate reference point to understand the world, fill the ‘space 
of power’ and structure the khora around its centre. The 
consequence of constructing the figuration of the Western 
identity as a God in colonialisation is the exclusion and 
scapegoating of the African other, which is transformed into an 
African monster. Accordingly, injustice is understood as the 
denial of the other’s existence as fully human.
African gods and Western monsters? 
What a sense of decolonisation 
might not be
If the logic of the coloniser constructed Western gods and 
African monsters, that is, a logic that leads to violent exclusion 
and ultimate denial of the existence of the other as fully human, 
then a sense of decolonisation would not aim to reinforce the 
same logic. In other words, a sense of decolonisation would not 
aim to refigure an African worldview or identity as the highest 
reference point, that is, an African god with an accompanying 
master narrative that would, in turn, exclude the Western monster 
in a totalitarian fashion. Or, to rephrase Kearney (2003):
The attempt to build hermeneutic bridges [decolonisation] between us 
and ‘others’ (human, divine or whatever) should not, […] be denounced 
as [fall back into] ontology, onto-theology or logocentrism – that is 
to say, as some form of totalising reduction bordering on violence. 
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For such denunciation [falling back] ultimately denies any form of 
dialogical interbeing between self and other. (p. 9).
The centre would be fixed again, in Derridean terms, which would 
not allow for play within the structure or difference in the khora. 
Plainly put, a sense of decolonisation thought along these lines 
would paradoxically not be more just than that which it aims to 
replace. The cycle of injustice would be perpetuated.
Hence, in undertaking the task of decolonisation, one should 
be mindful of the temptation to construct a new onto-theological 
figuration. Moreover, even if the Western identity is replaced by 
its African counterpart as the highest and grounding reference 
point (as a new God), then, to follow Mbembe, the aim of 
decolonisation has still not been met, that is, addressing the 
question of what it means to be an African, the question that 
seeks to make sense of the everyday lived experience in Africa. 
Rather, such a practice of decolonisation falls back into what 
Mbembe (2001a) calls the metaphysics of difference, which is 
another way of formulating the logic of coloniser, by an 
overemphasis on alterity to the point of inaccessibility. Also, 
the cycle of violence sprouting from this logic of subjugation is 
not broken, but rather reappropriated in the postcolonial 
regimes after independence. This falling back is evident in the 
‘attempts of Africanism, Afrocentrism and most prevalently 
Pan-Africanism that seem to fall prey to the temptation of onto-
theological re-figuration’ (Gerber 2018:7). Patrice Nganang109 
(2007:45) echoes this sentiment when he writes on the Rwandan 
genocide, indicating that this kind of essentialist or ‘identitarian 
thinking’ grounded the rationale and motivation of the mass 
killing.
To reiterate the point on Afrocentrism, Mbembe holds that 
this position often manifests as the logic that it seeks to overcome 
and thereby it merely reverses or redirects the logic of the colony 
109. See also Syrotinski (2012, 2014) for a discussion of the relationship between Nganang 
literature and Mbembe’s philosophy.
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earlier described. ‘The tables are simply turned; everything 
African is seen as positive and Western as negative, which leads 
to a sense of decolonisation as destruction’ (Gerber 2018:2). The 
de- refers to an emptying out or exclusion of anything Western. 
Furthermore, no critique against this line of thought is considered; 
hence one is left with cultural relativism (Wiredu 2004:12). Thus, 
although terms like the ‘post-colony’, ‘post-apartheid’ or for that 
matter the ‘end of Western metaphysics’ have been proclaimed, 
it is no way evident that whatever is designated by these terms 
can represent a clean break with or end to these practices, both 
colonial and anticolonial, sharing the same logic.
Attempts, however, at thinking an alternative sense of 
decolonisation110 to that of destruction are to be found most 
notably by Kwasi Wiredu. These attempts seek to critique the 
negative aspects of the colonial heritage and at the same time 
try to engage with aspects of the colonial past and the rest of 
the world that may be beneficial to humankind. Wiredu (1998) 
hence defines ‘decolonisation’ as follows:
By decolonisation, I mean divesting African philosophical thinking 
of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past. The crucial 
word in this formulation is ‘undue’. Obviously, it would not be rational 
to try to reject everything of a colonial ancestry. Conceivably, a 
thought or a mode of enquiry spearheaded by our erstwhile colonisers 
may be valid or in some way beneficial to humankind. Are we called 
upon to reject or ignore it? That would be a madness having neither 
rhyme nor reason. (p. 17)
For Wiredu (1998:17), the ‘emptying out’ lies especially with the 
conceptual heritage of the colonial past with its binary categories, 
which are promoted by language, for instance, English. But there 
is also an element of self-critique. Or as Ramón Grosfoguel 
(2011:3) formulates it, the aim of decolonisation is not only an 
110. Other forms and themes within the decolonisation and broader African discourse include 
not only the conceptual decolonisation but also religion, politics, literature and gender. For 
an overview of the different themes, see Wiredu (2004). For a discussion of the link between 
decolonisation and feminism in South Africa, see Jennifer Wilkinson’s text ‘South African 
women and the ties that bind’ in The African Philosophy Reader (2005).
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essentialist and fundamentalist anti-European critique, but ‘it is a 
perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World 
fundamentalisms, colonialism and nationalism’ (Gerber 2018:3). 
The current chapter aims in a similar line of thought, to ask what 
decolonisation may be by engaging with an alternative in 
exploring Kearney’s notion of diacritical hermeneutics for the 
South African context. The challenge now, to quote Kearney 
(2013:9), ‘is to acknowledge a difference between self and other 
without separating them so schismatically that no relation at all 
is possible’.
Diacritical hermeneutics
Keeping with the schema from the introduction, that is, the 
attempt to avoid the overemphasising of the universal or that of 
the particular where no relation is possible, we may look at how 
Kearney defines diacritic hermeneutics. In the book Strangers, 
Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness, Kearney (2003:9) 
contrasts the diacritical hermeneutics approach to that of the 
‘dialectical conflations – or deconstructive inversions’ positions 
to interpret the other, as a third way.111 But, as Jack Caputo112 
rightfully notes, Kearney implements the approach in the book 
more than theoretically developing it. Accordingly, partly in 
111. Kearney (2003:18) describes diacritical hermeneutics in Strangers, Gods and Monsters: 
Interpreting Otherness in the following manner, ‘[t]he diacritical hermeneutics I propose, by 
contrast, is committed to a third way beyond these romantic and radical options. It is my 
contention that this middle way (metaxu) is in fact more radical and challenging than either. 
Obviating both the congenial communion of fused horizons and the apocalyptic rupture 
of non-communion, I will endeavour to explore possibilities of intercommunion between 
distinct but not incomparable selves. The diacritical approach holds that friendship begins 
by welcoming difference (dia-legein). It champions the practice of dialogue between self 
and other, while refusing to submit to the reductionist dialectics of egology governed by 
the logos of the Same. Between the logos of the One and the anti-logos of the Other, falls 
the dia-logos of oneself-as-another. The basic aim of diacritical hermeneutics is, I suggest, to 
make us more hospitable to strangers, gods and monsters without succumbing to mystique 
or madness’.
112. See Kearney (2011a:78).
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response to Jack Caputo’s charge, Kearney develops what is 
meant by diacritical hermeneutics further in additional 
publications113 by defining each term separately.
Hence, hermeneutics for Kearney (2011b:2) means the ‘art of 
deciphering multiple meanings’, or more accurately ‘it refers to 
the practice of discerning indirect, tacit or allusive meanings, of 
sensing another sense beyond or beneath apparent sense’. 
Sequentially, this special human activity, Kearney holds, may be 
translated into a second order reflective interpretation with the 
aim of disclosing concealed messages. The process of 
disclosement may take place in two ways:
a) [U ]nmasking covered-up meaning (hermeneutics of suspicion) 
or b) by disclosing surplus meaning (hermeneutics of affirmation). 
In short, I understand hermeneutics as the task of interpreting 
(hermeneuein) plural meaning in response to the polysemy of 
language and life. (p. 2)
What is important here for our purposes, keeping in mind the 
argument on what a sense of decolonisation might not be, is that 
for Kearney hermeneutics has an ethico-political element. 
Kearney shares this element with Derrida and deconstruction 
and accordingly identifies it in the hermeneutical tradition only 
after Paul Ricoeur, who coined the earlier-quoted notion of the 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, and Vattimo’s ‘hermeneutics of 
subversion’. It is this double vigilance or critique in interpretation 
that will be important for a sense of diacritical decolonisation, to 
which we return below.
Therefore, the hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey, Heidegger 
to Gadamer114 is regarded by Kearney as ‘romantic hermeneutics’ 
with an emphasis on the fusion of horizons or, as Schmiedel 
(2017:2) writes, the other and self become converged so that 
there is no distinction, which may be understood as an 
113. See Kearney (2011a, 2011b) on ‘Eros, diacritical hermeneutics, and the maybe’ and also 
‘What is diacritical hermeneutics?’ See also Dooley (2003).
114. See Gregor (2005), who holds that placing Gadamer in this category is contestable.
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overemphasis on the universal. Kearney as mentioned previously 
also contrasts his approach to that of ‘radical hermeneutics’ as 
formulated by Caputo via his reading of Derrida and originating 
with Levinas. Here, the problem for Kearney concerns the other 
becoming the absolute transcending Other (Levinas),115 meaning 
that the other is so radically different that no understanding of 
him or her may be accomplished that leads to undecidability in 
the call for absolute hospitality (Derrida).116 We find here an 
overemphasis of the particular.
Returning to the terminology explanation, Kearney defines 
diacritical in a fourfold manner. Firstly, the critical of diacritical 
links up again with the ethico-politico imperative in the definition 
of hermeneutics as (1) an inquiry into the conditions of possibility 
of meaning, and (2) a critical exposure of ‘masked’ power in 
the  name of liberation and justice. Secondly, in terms of a 
criteriological discernment between opposing or competing 
claims to meaning with a hermeneutical and narrative retrieval 
of future and past testimonies. Kearney, following Aristotle, has 
in mind here stories with persons who embody the virtue you 
aim to communicate, like Achilles for courage, Penelope for 
constancy, Tiresius for wisdom and so forth. These narratives 
provide practical judgement as ‘phronesis117 with exemplary 
paradigms by which to measure, judge, and act’ (Kearney 
2011b:2). Thirdly, in a more technical or grammatological118 sense 
where ‘diacritics denotes a way of reading differentially, across 
gaps and oppositions’ and in this regard ‘diacritics is all about 
micro-reading’ (Kearney 2011b:2). Finally, diacritical also refers 
back to an older diagnostic meaning of reading the body.119
115. For further elaborations on the critique of Levinas’s position; see Gerber and Van der 
Merwe (2017), Schrijvers (2011), and Sands (2017).
116. For the discussion on Derrida and hospitality, see Kearney (2003:68–72).
117. On a discussion of phronesis, see Kearney (2003:111–113). See also Caputo (2002:93).
118. See Kearney (2011b:2).
119. Kearney (2011b:3) shows how ‘diacritics’ is taken from the Greek terms dia-krinein and 
dia-krisis, which ‘[R]eferred to the medical or therapeutic practice of diagnosing symptoms of 
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Thus, diacritic hermeneutics aims not to fall into the trap of 
constructing an onto-theological figuration of the self, same or 
subject – nor of the other. For if you make the identity of the self 
as the ultimate reference point, the other gets excluded. But, if 
you make the identity of the other as the middle of the structure, 
the self gets excluded by the inability to make sense of the world. 
Rather, Kearney suggests a way of critically engaging one with 
an other. Engaging the other that again aims to avoid both 
extreme positions. Or as Kearney (2003) writes:
[W]e need to be able to critically discriminate between different 
kinds of otherness while remaining alert to the deconstructive 
resistance to black and white judgements of Us versus Them. We 
need, at crucial moments, to discern the other in the alien and the 
alien in the other. (p. 67)
Apart from the critique that Kearney underdevelops the notion 
of diacritical hermeneutics, at least in the book Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness (2003), Caputo also 
replies to Kearney’s critique of radical hermeneutics. Caputo 
(2002:58) argues that Kearney misconstrues undecidability with 
indecision.120 Instead, undecidability is the possibility for a 
decision, and the opposite of undecidability is not the decision 
of decisiveness but programmability, that is, a step-for-step 
method on deciding what to do in any situation. Undecidability, 
here, refers to the openness in the encounter with the other and 
(footnote 119 continues...)
bodily fevers, colorations, and secretions. In this sense, the word designated the hermeneutic 
art of discriminating between health and dis-ease’. Accordingly, Kearney (2011b:3) develops 
from his notion of diacritical hermeneutics the notion of carnal hermeneutics: ‘Here we are 
concerned with a hermeneutics that goes all the way down. It covers diacritical readings of 
different kinds of Others – human, animal or divine’. See also Pretorius (2016) on ‘Reading 
“blackface”: A (narrative) introduction to Richard Kearney’s notion of carnal hermeneutics’ 
for another interpretation of Kearney in the South African context, Manoussakis (2015), as 
well as Kearney (2015) on ‘The wager of carnal hermeneutics’.
120. For Caputo’s response to Kearney, see ‘Richard Kearney’s enthusiasm: A philosophical 
exploration on the God Who May Be’ and ‘God, perhaps: The diacritical hermeneutics of God 
in the work of Richard Kearney’, as well as Kosky (2003).
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there is no guarantee that things will work out. Anything can 
happen:
We rely upon promises in the face of a threat even as a threat can be 
posed only if something is promised, and ‘perhaps’ means there is no 
guarantee about how things will turn out. (p. 58)
In other words, you will not know whether the other is a friend or 
foe if you do not give them a chance. There is an element of risk. 
Moreover, this leads Caputo (2002:93) to suggest that Kearney 
wants to overcome or ‘extinguish’ the khora, or the open space 
that was previously filled with an onto-theological figuration, 
with constructing an onto-theological figuration in search of an 
‘original oneness’ himself.
Although I tend to agree with Caputo on his outline of the 
difference between undecidability and indecision, I do not think 
that Caputo’s accusation against Kearney in terms of onto-
theology holds water. Kearney’s response and reformulation121 of 
his position on khora is evident of this. The debate, however, is 
significant for our purposes because the theme of keeping the 
space, or khora, open is exactly what is at stake in the question 
of decolonisation. That is, how not to fill the space with another 
onto-theological figuration, not even an African Other or African 
god and links up with Lefort’s notion of ‘the empty space of 
power’, as described.
121. See Kearney (2011a: 78–83) for the full reply summarised as follows: ‘The God who-may-
be is not, as Jack critically suspects, a God who will ‘be’ as full self-identical presence at the 
eschaton. It is an ana-God who, after the last God, would continue forever in the mode of 
may-being, resisting always the lure of sovereign self-presence. Hence the fertile resonances 
of pericho-rsis: peri-cho-ra meaning a movement around, a circling about a centre which, as 
cho-ra, remains empty, a centreless centre, a free space for the three persons to move in and 
out, back and forth, up and down. In this spaceless space of ‘ana’ – as a movement ‘back, up, 
again, in time or space’ – each divine person remains in part a stranger to the other, re-fusing 
to collide, conflate or collapse into a fusion of totalizing identity. 
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Towards a sense of diacritical 
decolonisation
What then might a sense of decolonisation as diacritical 
decolonisation be? In what follows, I would like to make four 
suggestions:
Firstly, the schema of how to interpret Otherness presented 
by Kearney helps to address the problematic set out in the 
question for African identity. The challenge of rethinking what it 
means to exist in Africa is to rethink the relation between the so-
called Western identity and the African identity. And, if our 
analysis holds, this would not entail a re-figuration of African 
gods and Western monsters. Instead, the aim would be to break 
the cycle of the logic of the coloniser, with its violent practices of 
exclusion and the denial of the other’s existence as fully human. 
Kearney, therefore, suggests an important way of making this 
task of breaking the cycle. For if the relation of the Western and 
African is rethought to only focus on the universal aspects, or 
how their respective horizons may fuse as in a multicultural 
melting pot, then what is at risk is the denial of difference that 
does not fall in the new synthesised identity. Then again, if the 
African identity is so construed that anyone not ‘African’ may not 
be able to understand it, that it becomes inaccessible and 
separated from the rest of the world in its focus on absolute 
particularity, then it undergoes the same risk of the denial of the 
other. Restated, in the claim to particularity that exists in a kind of 
vacuum, the lived experience of existing in the world with others 
is suppressed. The existence of other identities within your lived 
experience has to be denied in order to construct such an 
absolute particular concept of identity. Furthermore, two 
unexpected scenarios occur when the particularity of the other is 
so radically different that it cannot be grasped:
1. One can argue that the ungraspable other should be kept 
apart, and not interfered with. This line of thought starts to 
resemble the ideology of apartheid. 
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2. This way of reasoning may be used to avoid responsibility. 
That is, you cannot hold me responsible because you cannot 
grasp my actions. I am so other that you cannot hold me 
accountable.
In sum, the overemphasis of the universal and the particular 
form two sides of the same coin that denies the existence 
of Otherness in some fashion. Hence, Kearney’s suggestion of 
a middle way may help to break the cycle and take seriously 
the responsibility to think the relation between the self and 
the other, that is to discern in our relation to others who 
may  rightfully be judged as the other and the alien, that is 
(Kearney 2003):
[B]etween (a) those aliens and strangers that need our care and 
hospitality, no matter how monstrous they might first appear, and 
(b) those others that really do seek to destroy and exterminate. 
(p. 10)
Kearney advocates that the universal and the particular, the self 
and the other, Western and African be thought in relation to each 
other. And he advocates that the tension between the two be 
kept and not sublated in a Hegelian way, even though this is one 
of the charges that Caputo raises against Kearney’s thought.122 
Or as Kearney (2013) formulates it:
This is less a question of Hegelian synthesis than of multiple traversals 
between seeming incompatibles. It does not signal recourse to 
122. For Caputo’s critique of Kearney, see Caputo (2011). In terms of the Hegelian charge, 
Caputo (2011:16) holds that he still worries that Hegel is in the closet of Kearney’s diacritical 
logic of the third: ‘I do not mean a strong Hegelianism, with the ab-solute Spirit and the 
Begriff and the teleology, but a certain Hegelian ‘structure’, which is why in Radical 
Hermeneutics, speaking of Gadamer, I spoke of a ‘closet’ Hegelianism. By ‘Hegelian’ I mean 
that everything culminates in a moment of the ‘third’, of a ‘between’ (metaxy) or a ‘middle’, 
of a reconciliation, of a deeper, richer, more mature concretion of two moments that, 
taken by themselves, are one-sided and abstract.’ Kearney (2011a:81), in turn, outlines how 
he avoids a total resolution and concludes: ‘So, far from collapsing horizons, ana-theism 
keeps them open and overlapping. Far from resolving conflicting interpretations, ana-
theism preserves the hermeneutic circles in motion. It renounces the romantic nostalgia 
for some original oneness (of being, meaning, intention, authorship), declining to end the 
story, happy or unhappy. And it does this out of fidelity to an endless interplay between 
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some speculative metaphysical system that would wrap opposites 
into some happy ending. Nor does it summon us to the call of a 
‘Last God’, as Heidegger might have us believe. Nor, finally, need 
such translation revert to a model of scholastic compromise, setting 
out middle-range rules and then settling for the median mark. It is 
more a matter of gracious affinities. Constellations. Interlacings of 
alterities. (p. 12)
Furthermore, the last sentence of the quotation formulates 
alterities in the plural, which means the moment of diacritical 
discernment is an endless task that takes place at each (of the 
plural) encounters between one and an other. Hence, the call is 
not for an overcoming of differences in one act of interpretation. 
Rather, the call is a continuous dialogue with others and hence 
for decolonisation to become a practice of constant diacritical 
interpretation over against a single sweep of destruction.
Secondly, in order to try and avoid these two extreme positions 
in rethinking identity by way of engaging and encountering the 
other in dialogue, I would like to emphasise the double critique 
Kearney formulates in his approach of diacritical for the task of 
decolonisation. In short, it is a double critique of namely the self 
and that of the other. Or in Kearney’s (2013) words: 
Not all ‘selves’ are evil and not all ‘others’ are angelic. That is why, 
I suggest, it is wise to supplement the critique of the self with an 
equally indispensable critique of the other. Without such a double 
critique – which exposes illusory categories of ego and alien – we 
can no longer speak of any real relation between humans, or indeed 
between humans and non-humans (animal or divine). (pp. 10–11)
The critique of the Western self, therefore, is to be supplemented 
by the critique of the African other. And the critique of the 
African self is to be supplemented by the critique of the Western 
other, which importantly will entail a critique of all the variations 
of identities that escape these formulations.
(footnote 122 continues...)
transcendence and immanence. As such, ana-theism holds that two is better than one – and 
that three (or four) is better still.’
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The double critique thus aims to address the challenge of 
keeping the tension between others and thereby avoid falling 
into one of two extreme positions (Kearney 2013):
This double critique requires a delicate balance. On one hand, if 
others become too transcendent, they disappear off our radar screen 
and we lose all contact. We then not only stop seeing them directly 
but even stop seeing them indirectly as this or that other. The 
possibility of imagining, narrating or interpreting alterity becomes 
impossible; and in the field of philosophy, we witness the demise of 
phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiry. […] On the other hand, 
if others become too immanent, they become equally exempt from 
ethical relation. In this instance, they become indistinguishable from 
our own totalising selves (conscious or unconscious). The trick is 
therefore, I suggest, not to let the foreign become too foreign or the 
familiar too familiar. (p. 11) 
It is this double critique that aims to ensure the engagement of 
one with an other and thereby overcomes the violent logic that 
denies the existence of the other as fully human.
Thirdly, the importance of keeping the tension between the 
extreme poles is of course found in the deconstructive impulse 
that underlines the tension. That is, firstly, to be aware of the 
ethico-politico implication when one of these poles becomes 
essentialised and totalised selves, as the previous quote phrases 
the problem, that is, when one of them is taken as an onto-
theological figuration. The tension is nothing but the ‘empty 
space of power’, or khora, that needs to be kept open. The cycle 
of the logic of the coloniser needs to be broken, decolonised in a 
diacritical manner. Moreover, the double critique implies that 
both the self and the other take part in conversation through 
mutual recognition of the existence of the other as fully human 
(Kearney 2003):
[O]ne of the best ways to de-alienate the other is to recognise (a) 
oneself as another and (b) the other as (in part) another self. For 
if ethics rightly requires me to respect the singularity of the other 
person, it equally requires me to recognise the other as another 
self bearing universal rights and responsibilities, that is, as someone 
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capable of recognising me in turn as a self capable of recognition 
and esteem (p. 80).
Hence, from within the space of diacritical decolonisation, others 
may encounter each other, one an other, and in taking up the 
responsibility of critical dialogue or struggle start to co-create a 
sense of what it may mean to live in the postcolonial and post-
apartheid world.
Fourthly, from the space of struggle and contestation of 
diacritical decolonisation, the question of meaning and identity 
may be taken up anew through narration. Kearney (2013:101), 
following Paul Ricoeur, describes the process in three parts. 
Firstly, the critical and practical judgement of phronesis through 
narratives as discussed earlier. Regarding evil, this critical 
judgement, although not absolute but always intermediate, 
would enable us to act against evil, that is, to act against new 
onto-theological figurations that want to reinstate the violent 
logic of the coloniser. Elaborating on the narrative account, the 
second part entails a working through: 
If practical understanding addresses the action response to evil, it 
sometimes neglects the suffering response. Evil is not just something 
we struggle against. It is also (as noted above) something we 
undergo. Something that ‘befalls’ us. To ignore this passivity of evil 
endured is to ignore the extent to which evil strikes us as shockingly 
strange and disempowering. (p.103)
As Kearney (2003) points out, acknowledging the traumatising 
effects of enduring evil and working through them is one of the 
wisest responses one can give. Hence, the importance of narrative 
testimonies that may lead to narrative catharsis:
What the catharsis of mourning narrative allows is the [realisation] 
that new actions are still possible in spite of evil suffered. Narrative 
catharsis detaches us from the [obsessional] repetitions of the past 
and frees us for a less repressed future. [And moreover] mourning is 
not a way of instituting a new sacrificial dialectic of us-versus-them. 
On the contrary, it is a way of learning to live with the monsters in 




Thus, a narrative working-through helps us to start breaking the 
cycle of the logic of the coloniser, of creating new gods and 
monsters, of enduring and inflicting evil, in order to open up new 
possible futures.
Sequentially, the third part of narrating identity, which follows 
the working-through and allows for the cycle to be broken, 
Kearney suggests is pardon. Although it may seem impossible or 
unpredictable, Kearney argues that in pardon phronetic 
understanding joins forces with the practice of patient working-
through. Their joint aim, as Kearney (2003) describes, is:
[T ]o ensure that past evils might be prevented from recurring. Such 
prevention often requires pardon as well as protest so that the cycles 
of repetition and revenge give way to future possibilities of non-evil. 
(p. 104)
Here, one must note that the issue of forgiveness is difficult but 
at the same time not completely idealistic as South Africa’s own 
history reflects: 
For narrative testimony can sometimes give us such a deep empathic 
connection with the suffering of others that not only is their past 
honoured in the present but our own present is enlarged by this 
past. This exchange of testimonial memories – between past and 
present, Jew and non-Jew, native and alien, us and them – holds 
out possibilities of reconciliation. And recent experiences of truth 
tribunals in South Africa and Northern Ireland suggest that such 
possibilities are not entirely utopian. (p.104)
Coming back to the question of identity, in breaking the cycle of 
reinstituting the logic of the coloniser, the Us versus Them 
conception of essentialised identities allows for an understanding 
of the self in relation to the other in dialogue. Thus, identity is 
created through the diacritical and narrative interpretation(s) of 
the lived experience in our relation to multiple others, instead 
of a substantialised isolated and non-accessible notion of the self 
or the other. In the words of Kearney (2003):
Resisting this option of self-ruin, a complex phenomenology of the 
self–other dyad prompts us to espouse a hermeneutic pluralism 
Strangers, Gods and Africa: In dialogue with Richard Kearney on Otherness
170
of otherness, a sort of ‘polysemy of alterity’ – ranging from our 
experiences of conscience and the body to those of other persons, 
living or dead (our ancestors), or to a divine Other, living or absent. 
(p. 81)
One may here bring Mbembe back into the conversation. With a 
similar aim of overcoming the logic of the coloniser, Mbembe 
(2001b) speaks of alternative identity as in his notion of the 
emerging subject:
[T ]he subject emerging, acting effectively, withdrawing, or being 
removed in the act and context of displacement refers to two 
things: first, to the forms of ‘living in the concrete world’, then 
to the subjective forms that make possible any validation of 
its contents – that objectify  it. In Africa today, the subject who 
accomplishes the age and validates it, who lives and espouses 
his/her contemporaneousness  – that is, what is ‘distinctive’ or 
‘particular’ to his/her present real world – is first a subject who has 
an experience of ‘living in the concrete world’. She/he is a subject of 
experience and a validating subject, not only in the sense that she/
he is a conscious existence or has a perceptive conscious-ness of 
things, but to the extent that his/her ‘living in the concrete world’ 
involves, and is evaluated by, his/her eyes, ears, mouth – in short, 
his/her flesh, his/her body.123 (p. 17)
One finds here Mbembe resonating the call for a diacritical 
decolonisation, of validating or critically interpreting the world 
including others around him or her. Moreover, this continuous 
critical interpretation of the world in order to understand yourself 
in relation to the other in dialogue re-emphasises the break with 
essentialised notions of identity. Identity is not to be rediscovered 
by looking to the past and removing the elements that obscure 
the purity of that identity so that it may be uplifted in all its glory 
to the highest reference point. Instead, identity is constantly 
123. The question of embodiment, introduced by Mbembe, cannot regretfully be addressed 
here. For an overview of the question of embodiment and its various interpretations in the 
contemporary phenomenological tradition, see Ramona, Jasper and Salazar-Ferrer (2014). 
See also Kearney (2015), Manoussakis (2015), Pretorius (2017) and Verhoef (2016:7).
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co-created in the interpretation of the lived world. Mbembe 
(2001b) reverberates this point when he writes:
There is no African identity that could be designated by a single term, 
or that could be named by a single word; or that could be subsumed 
under a single category […]. Neither the forms of this identity nor 
its idioms are always self-identical. And these forms and idioms are 
mobile, reversible, and unstable. Given this, they cannot be reduced 
to a purely biological order based on blood, race, or geography. 
Nor can they be reduced to custom, to the extent that the latter is 
constantly being reinvented. (p. 33)
The task of diacritical decolonisation, then, is not to rediscover a 
lost past by way of destruction but to make sense of the lived 
experience and co-create possible new futures by way of critical 
engagement.
What is to be done?
As a final word: We may consider the South African context as 
the experience of a kind of crisis after the deconstruction of the 
onto-theological figuration and master narrative of apartheid. 
We are in the midst of experiencing the crisis of democracy, with 
its ‘empty space of power’. This crisis, on the one side, has 
brought about and re-enforced fear, anger and disappointment 
towards our various monstrous others as well as the urge to 
replace the space of power with another figuration of an African 
god and the creation of a Western monster. On the other side, 
Kearney reminds us that the empty space opened up by the 
deconstruction is not one of silence resulting from inaccessibility 
to alterity or in this instance ‘African alterity’, or the inability to 
act against the perceived persistence of ‘Western domination’. 
The space opened up by the crisis of democracy is rather a space 
of contestation and struggle between conflicting interpretations 
(or one might say voices, translations, languages, etc.). And a 
space where the past may be worked through, pardoned 
and  made sense of anew towards possible new futures and 
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understandings of the self and other. It calls for the negotiation 
and co-creation of meaning within this space between co-existing, 
co-original others, one with an other. In other words, this is where 
Kearney’s diacritical hermeneutics enters as a possible guiding 
sense of what decolonisation might be, that is, a diacritical 
decolonisation. We need to start having more conversations, 
testimonies and critical dialogues where we may discern or 
‘judge’ the interpretations and the agendas of the other(s) who 
proclaim them, which is different from denying these 
interpretations from the start. For to love and hate presupposes 
a form of recognition. Thus, what happens on an ontological level 
in our understanding of ourselves in relation to others – which is 
the mutual recognition that Dasein is always Mitsein [being-in-
the-world with others] or Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu [‘a person 
is a person through other people’, as the Zulu saying on ubuntu 
goes] – opens and keeps open the space of contestation 
and thereby enables the diacritical hermeneutical event of 
decolonisation to take place.
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Approaching the threshold124
How does one learn of the other? Is it possible to become better 
at responding to the experience of strangeness? If the presence 
124. Doctoral candidate in a joint degree programme at Stellenbosch University, South 
Africa, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
How to cite: Pretorius, H., 2018, ‘Approaching the threshold: Hospitality as a  pedagogical 
wager in the work of Richard Kearney’, in D.P. Veldsman & Y. Steenkamp (eds.), Debating 
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of the stranger calls for hospitality, is that something one could 
cultivate in oneself or in others?
It is in grappling with these types of questions that I wish to 
set forth my conversation with Richard Kearney. Certainly, the 
question of the other would count as one of the most prevalent 
themes of our time. It has also been a persistent question at the 
heart of Kearney’s work over many years. I believe this publication 
also attests to the fact that many South African scholars, from 
different disciplines, have learnt a great deal from Richard 
Kearney about Otherness and what hospitality to the stranger 
might entail. Who knows, perhaps one could even say that many 
people, touched by Richard Kearney’s person, his writings, 
lectures and public initiatives, have grown in hospitality or that 
they have learnt something about creating more hospitable 
communities and institutions – perhaps.
But if that is so, what did they learn? And how did they learn 
it? Might they also become teachers of Otherness or help cultivate 
an ethos of hospitality? And if so, how?
In his most important work on alterity to date, Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness (2003), Richard Kearney 
refers to Julia Kristeva’s suggestion that there are three main 
ways of responding to our fundamental experience of 
estrangement: art, religion and psychoanalysis (Kearney 2003:6). 
Kearney draws resources from each of these in his own attempt 
to respond to the question of the other, but he also suggests that 
these approaches may be supplemented by a fourth way – 
philosophy (Kearney 2003):
For if art offers therapy in terms of images, religion in terms of 
faith, and psychoanalysis in terms of a ‘talking cure’, philosophy has 
something extra (though not necessarily better) to offer. And that 
something extra, which may usefully supplement the other three, is a 
certain kind of understanding. (pp. 6–7)
Before exploring what such understanding might entail, I would 
like to draw attention to the fact that each of these approaches 
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is carried and sustained by a certain pedagogy or paideia. 
In  art, religion, psychoanalysis and philosophy, at least a 
minimal form of learning or instruction, training or formation, 
apprenticeship or initiation are important, mediated by 
institutions involving curricula, habits, practices, teachers and 
the like. My premise is that without some type of formative 
process, these modes of responding to the other would hardly 
be conceivable.
As an example of what I have in mind, let us briefly consider 
the tradition of hermeneutic phenomenology in which Kearney 
primarily situates himself. Would it have been possible for this 
tradition to emerge as a response to the other, as Kearney 
suggests that it did, were it not for its roots in the humanistic 
heritage of viewing education as something more than the 
accumulation of knowledge (epistemē) and the acquiring of 
certain technical skills (technē) but also as the cultivation 
of  practical wisdom (phronēsis), the open-ended formation of 
values, virtues and habits of mind?
Hans-Georg Gadamer recognised the indebtedness of 
hermeneutics to this particular kind of formation when he gave a 
central place to the notion of Bildung in his influential work Truth 
and Method. Gadamer argues that Verstehen [understanding], 
philosophical or otherwise, is intimately related to a type of 
formation that cannot be reduced to a methodological procedure 
or technical result. To be sure, notions like Bildung have an 
ambivalent relationship to the other, something that Gadamer 
was well aware of when he distinguished Bildung from Kultur as 
the development of one’s own capacities and talents. Instead, for 
Gadamer, Bildung and the hermeneutic endeavour are both 
provoked by a common desire, which also determines its course, 
namely, ‘learning how to be open to the other, to come to respect 
the other on its own terms’ (Thiselton 2007:82) or, in Gadamer’s 
words, ‘learning to affirm what is different from oneself’, which 




Recognising the important connection between alterity, 
formation and understanding calls up a whole new set of 
questions. If understanding involves some type of formation or 
training, this might imply that something can be done to prepare 
for the other ‘as other’. Would that not, however, be implying too 
much? Can one really be prepared for what is absolutely ‘other’? 
Is it possible to be educated, trained or formed (Bildung) for an 
encounter or event that – by its very nature ‘as other’ – should 
transcend or disrupt the figures or images (Bilder) that make up 
the prevailing horizons of an educated person (Gebildete)? Or 
do notions like Bildung denote something that is too culturally 
familiar to do justice to what is radically other? Doesn’t Bildung, 
in the final instance, lead to a configuring of the stranger into our 
own image (Bild), thereby running the risk of disfiguring 
Otherness by imposing our own values, concerns, desires and 
fears onto the other?
It is here, at the intersection between formation, imagination 
and the other – with due respect to the complexities presented 
by each of these terms – that I believe Richard Kearney’s 
philosophical project has made an important pedagogical 
contribution. What I have found in Kearney’s work is a daring 
attempt to thoroughly engage the question of the other, yet 
without abandoning a commitment to a (broadly defined) 
humanist tradition of learning, oriented towards the cultivation 
of ‘practical wisdom which deliberates about actions and ends in 
a context where human selves discover an ethos binding them to 
others in a community, tradition, or polis’ (Kearney 1995:xii). 
Against this background, I ask how Kearney’s approach to alterity 
could be read as a pedagogical wager that risks preparing a 
place for the other by allowing the other to prepare a place for 
the self.
As we will see, such a wager harbours layers of complexity, 
with many risks to be negotiated and new pathways to be sought 
between what seems to be incontestable dichotomies. What is at 
stake is an adequate response to the many crosswinds currently 
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facing educational institutions, globally and in South Africa. In a 
culturally polyvalent South Africa struggling to work through 
persistent histories of violent forms of othering, there is a 
need for a ‘decolonised pedagogy’ and also confusion and 
misunderstanding about what that might mean. At the same 
time, as institutions of learning are put under increasing pressure 
to commercialise and instrumentalise their pedagogical offerings, 
spaces where the question of the other could even be posed with 
any integrity are rapidly shrinking.
Against this background, I will attempt to retrace Kearney’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology of ‘the stranger’ as it emerges from 
his dialogue with other phenomenological, deconstructive and 
psychoanalytical approaches. In each case, I will try to draw 
some preliminary pedagogical insights from Kearney’s 
engagement with various heterologies. The point is not to present 
prepackaged pedagogical solutions. The aim of this essay is 
simply to reach for new pedagogical vistas or starting points by 
uncovering language and imagery that could potentially evoke 
greater attentiveness to Otherness in a variety of pedagogical 
contexts, from the university classroom to a local congregation’s 
pulpit or communion table. In conclusion, I will suggest that 
Kearney’s description of the ‘anatheist wager’ as a fivefold 
movement of imagination, humour, commitment, discernment 
and hospitality could be seen as possible orientating markers of 
a pedagogy of hospitality (Kearney 2010:40–56).
Introducing the stranger
Who is the stranger? Where and how does the stranger appear?
Firstly, a few words on terminology. In the introduction to 
Phenomenologies of the Stranger (2011), a collection of essays 
co-edited by Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch, the 
editors make a distinction between the English terms ‘stranger’, 
‘other’ and ‘foreigner’ (Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:6). While 
often similar and always interrelated, the three terms, for them, 
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are not the same. Their study focuses primarily on the figure of 
the stranger, which in relation to the other and the foreigner 
occupies a type of middle ground:
The Stranger occupies the threshold between the Other and the 
Foreigner […]. Foreigner and Other are two faces of the Stranger, 
one turned towards us, the other turned away: the Foreigner is the 
Stranger we see; the Other is the Stranger we do not see. [...] Insofar 
as it comes towards us, the Stranger reveals its face as ‘Foreigner’, 
someone with a name and identity, someone with papers and 
fingerprints, an accent and place of origin, however far away […]. 
By contrast, what we term the Other as such, is precisely that which 
cannot appear according to any of our factical categories, political, 
psychological, or social. (p. 6)
By choosing to focus on the stranger as a threshold figure 
between the foreigner and the other, Kearney and Semonovitch 
intentionally draw our attention to the profound ambiguity or 
doubling nature of the phenomenon in question. The stranger, 
like a shape shifter, slips from being a transcendent other – 
without name or face – to a foreigner – who can be ‘tracked, 
classified and computed’ – and back again (Kearney & 
Semonovitch 2011:6). It is for this reason that the distinction 
between ‘foreigner’, ‘stranger’ and ‘other’ is helpful: not to 
indicate three different beings, but to touch on the ambiguities 
that arise when the same being presents itself in different guises 
(Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:6).125
There is, in other words, no stranger ‘as such’ but only different 
modes of strangeness, manifesting in different types of strangers 
and different types of threshold experiences. As Bernard 
Waldenfels (2007:8) says, ‘otherness has an occasional character’ 
and is always imbedded within particular socio-political and 
symbolic realities. ‘A placeless “alien in general” would resemble 
a “left side in general” – a monstrous idea’, says Waldenfels 
(2007:8). It is important to stress that in Kearney’s use of the 
125. In the rest of this chapter, I will attempt, as far as possible, to stick with Kearney’s use of 
these terms, using inverted commas to indicate their more technical use.
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stranger, there is no ‘monstrous’ or ‘sublime’ or ‘noumenal’ omni-
stranger lurking behind phenomena. Instead, by presenting 
the stranger as a liminal figure between the poles of the ‘foreigner-
for-me’ and the ‘other as other’ Kearney directs our attention to 
the threshold as ‘the mi-lieu between the non-lieu of the nameless 
and the lieu of the named’ (Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:5).
In making our way towards a pedagogy of hospitality, the 
following section will try to situate Kearney’s so-called diacritical 
hermeneutic of the stranger within his many dialogical detours 
with other thinkers. 126 Although the question of alterity recalls a 
story with ancient beginnings,127 we will restrict our discussion 
to Kearney’s reception of this question via the phenomenological 
tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl at the start of the 
20th century. Kearney’s hermeneutic philosophy of the other 
emerges from a critical dialogue with diverse thinkers from this 
tradition, starting with Husserl’s students, Heidegger, Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty, before being received and extended in 
different ways by the phenomenological hermeneutics of 
Ricoeur, the deconstruction of Derrida and the psychoanalytic 
philosophy of Kristeva.
The absolute Other: Levinas and Derrida
It is to the credit of the phenomenological tradition that it helped 
to effect an important shift in the question of alterity from a 
relative kind of Otherness to the possibility of more radical 
types of otherness. For centuries before, in Western thought, there 
was only room for a stranger that could be derived from the 
same; only an other for us, but not an other in itself or an other as 
other. Such a relative Otherness (comparable to Kearney’s notion 
of the foreigner) depended on constellations of thought and 
126. For ‘diacritical hermeneutics’ as an important term for Kearney’s self-understanding, see 
Kearney (2012).
127. For a more comprehensive account of alterity in Western history and culture, see Part 1 
of Kearney’s (2003) work Strangers, Gods and Monsters, as well as Kristeva (1991).
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practice that associated the own and familiar with what is rational 
or reasonable, while designating the irrational or incomprehensible 
as alien or strange. It was only in recent times, as the Modern 
ideals of universal Reason and the autonomous Subject became 
undermined, that notions of radical Otherness were able to 
emerge from the cracks – in other words, types of Otherness that 
reach to the core of the self without a foundation in some a priori 
order or subjectivity.
Husserl’s phenomenological work played an important role in 
facilitating this shift, for by revealing the intentional character of 
all phenomena (i.e. that things always appear to me as ‘this’ or 
‘that’) he helped to unveil the processes by which the other enters 
into the subject’s local standpoint and perspective. This is what 
enabled the ‘occasional character’ of Otherness to be conceived, 
implying that the other ‘as such’ always remains beyond the reach 
of the subject’s interpretive gaze. At best, the stranger ‘as other’ 
is apprehended as an ‘immanent transcendency’, a ‘becoming 
conscious’ of an Otherness that transcends my consciousness 
(Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:8).128 The stranger that becomes 
present to consciousness does so only as my experience of ‘an 
other’ that can at best be called ‘an other I’ or alter ego. Husserl 
ultimately remained bound to the strictures of transcendental 
idealism in his attempt to establish a foundation for a science of 
the human that could compete with the natural sciences. 
Nevertheless, by defining the limits of the subject’s capabilities, 
Husserl helped to prepare the way for the radical other to make 
itself felt from beyond the subject’s appropriating gaze.
The radical implications of Husserl’s discovery would however 
only become apparent in the work of his student Emmanuel 
Levinas. Levinas agreed with his teacher that the stranger eludes 
our attempts to mediate its otherness. However, unlike Husserl, 
whose concerns were strictly epistemological, Levinas did not 




consider the incapacity of the subject to be a failure. Instead, for 
Levinas, the stranger’s irreducible transcendence was seen as 
something laudable (Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:10). Levinas 
reimagined the self’s incapacity before the other as ‘an invitation 
to allow the Stranger to remain strange’ (2011:10). He thereby 
exchanged a relative Otherness that reduces the strange to the 
familiar for a radical Otherness that is not derived from a prior 
self or predetermined logos.
For Levinas, the epistemological inadequacy of my attempts 
to apprehend the other (by sign, image or analogy) clears the 
way for an even prior ethical responsibility for the irreducible 
face of the stranger to be recognised.129 In my experience of the 
stranger ‘as other’, I feel myself seen before I see him or her. 
Therefore, the face of the other demands that ethics is prior to 
epistemology. Kearney and Semonovitch (2011) summarise their 
discussion of Levinas’s epoch-changing shift as follows:
At the limit of my powers, I am compelled to confront a Stranger 
whose ‘face’ refuses to be reduced to what is ‘similar’ to me, to 
likeness or resemblance. In short, in Levinas’s hands phenomenology 
implodes to reveal an alter beyond all alter egos. This turning towards 
the face of the Other who looks at me before I look at it, contests 
all phenomenologies of subjectivity which prevailed from Hegel and 
Husserl to Heidegger and Sartre. It opens the possibility of radical 
welcome. (p. 11)
It was this ethical philosophy of radical welcome that inspired 
Jacques Derrida to direct his deconstructive energies towards 
various modes of resistance to the stranger ‘as other’, most 
notably through mechanisms of appropriation tied up with the 
Western metaphysical tradition. However (Kearney 1995):
While Derrida agrees with Levinas’s ethical language of radical 
responsibility to ‘the other’, he insists that the language of ethics 
cannot be so easily divorced from the language of ‘being’. (p. 151)
129. For a careful deliberation on ‘Levinas and the Ethics of Imagining’, see Chapter 8 of 




What is required – in service of the ethical horizon of ‘the other’ – 
is a re-evaluation of fundamental Western ethical categories 
(such as ‘the self’, ‘the other’ and ‘the good’). From this follows 
Derrida’s critique of various ‘-centrisms’, such as egocentrism 
(which reduces the other to the own) and logocentrism (which 
reduces the other to the common). By decentring the 
transcendental subject and disrupting conventional orders such 
as ‘pure reason’ or ‘moral dualism’, deconstruction sets out to do 
justice to the singularity of each event, the irreducibility of every 
other and the undecidability of every decision (1995:154–158).
Kearney’s distinction between the stranger ‘as other’ and the 
stranger ‘as foreigner’ gains particular significance in the light of 
Derrida’s celebrated work on hospitality (see Derrida 2000, 
2001). Absolute hospitality, as presented by Levinas’s hyperbolic 
language, says Derrida, is impossible. Because of the conditional 
nature of hospitality in practice (within the orders of ‘family’, 
‘society’ and ‘state’), the stranger ‘as other’ can only ever be 
awaited. Like the messiah, however, it never actually arrives. 
Instead of ‘the other’, the face that appears is always only ‘the 
foreigner’ (Kearney 2003:68–9). Because – in practice – hospitality 
is always conditioned by nomos (laws and conventions) and le 
nom (the demand for the stranger’s name), the stranger is not 
allowed to remain strange, but may only exist as a ‘foreigner-for-
me’ (2011:12).
In light of conventions of hospitality based on egocentric and 
logocentric regimes of thought and practice, Kearney views the 
radical other of Levinas and Derrida as a vital interruption and 
disruption in service of an ethics of justice (Kearney 2003):
The most important lesson, I believe, that we can draw from Derrida’s 
analysis is that the exclusivist binary oppositions of ‘us’ (sameness) 
and ‘them’ (otherness) need to be challenged so that the ‘Foreigner 
Question’ becomes not only ‘Who is this foreigner?’ but ‘Who am I 
for this foreigner?’ And by extension ‘Whose home is this anyway?’ 
(p. 243)
To return to our pedagogical question, two important shifts 
stand out as important. Firstly, there is the shift from relative to 
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radical otherness. Levinas especially asks us to consider a 
pedagogy that takes ‘the other’, rather than ‘the subject’ as its 
starting point. Unlike conventional pedagogical models aimed at 
overcoming, appropriating or containing strangeness, this would 
involve the recognition that the stranger ‘as other’ is not only a 
puzzle I have not yet solved but also someone who maintains 
their mystery and strangeness even as they enter my home.
Secondly, there is the shift from an epistemological to an 
ethical point of departure. As educational philosopher Sharon 
Todd (2001:67) has argued, this means that the operative 
question shifts from ‘[w]hat do we need to know in order to live 
well together?’ to ‘[w]hat relation with ‘the other’ is necessary in 
order for knowledge to be possible?’ (Ben-Ari & Strier 2010). In 
other words, a pedagogy that takes the ethical relation to the 
other as its starting point would be oriented more towards the 
formation of a type of disposition than the passing on of 
information.
With these two shifts in mind, it might be helpful to reimagine 
formation, not as a process becoming more informed about 
those who have been othered (although this certainly has its 
place) but as a type of initiation process into a different ethical 
relation to the other, namely, of becoming susceptible to 
otherness. To prepare for the stranger is to be ‘initiated’ into an 
ethos – understood in the original Greek sense of ‘dwelling’ or 
‘habitation’. This means that learning and teaching spring forth, 
not from subjectivity, but from an even prior disposition of 
passivity. After all, the dwelling, as Levinas reminds us, is always 
the first to show hospitality, for it offers its proprietor a primordial 
welcome.130 Does the same not also apply to our ‘houses of 
learning’? Are we not, as teachers and students, first of all 
strangers who have been and continue to be welcomed as 
guests?
130. The home that founds possession is not a possession in the same sense as the movable 
goods it can collect and keep. It is possessed because it already and henceforth is hospitable 
for its proprietor (Levinas 1969:157).
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Derrida also sees hospitality as the absolute ethical horizon 
within which our encounter with the stranger takes place. In a 
remarkable passage from On Cosmopolitanism, Derrida (2001) 
might even be challenging us to think of hospitality as Bildung 
itself:
‘To cultivate an ethic of hospitality’ – is such an expression not 
tautologous? Despite all the tensions or contradictions which 
distinguish it, and despite all the perversions that can befall it, one 
cannot speak of cultivating an ethic of hospitality. Hospitality is 
culture itself and not simply one ethic among others. Insofar as it has 
to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar 
place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the 
manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as 
our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly 
coextensive with the experience of hospitality. (pp. 16–17)
This passage affirms an ethos of hospitality to the extent that it 
also calls into question the very quest for a pedagogy that aims 
at cultivating such an ethic. What, may we ask, remains to be 
done?
Because ‘there is a history of hospitality, an always possible 
perversion of the law of hospitality’, there is also a call for the 
deconstruction of ‘different modalities of violence’ by which ‘one 
seeks to appropriate, control and master’ the stranger ‘as 
foreigner’ (Derrida 2001:17). Therefore, Derrida could be nudging 
us, initiands of the ethos of hospitality, towards a process of 
decentring and unlearning – of deconstructing the house built on 
egocentrism (which reduces the other to the own) and 
logocentrism (which reduces the other to common goals and 
rules). Importantly, because one never stops awaiting ‘the 
other’  – even after ‘the foreigner’ has arrived – the initiation 
process is endless. One never graduates. Yet – and this may be 
Derrida’s point – as long as hospitality remains the ultimate 
horizon, the hope remains of being ever readmitted as an initiand, 
a disciple awaiting the other’s arrival.
In South Africa, hospitality also has ‘a history’. It is, in part, a 
history of colonial violence, of apartheid instituted by ‘passes’ and 
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‘homelands’, of mob violence against scapegoated makwerekwere. 
From this (ongoing) history leaps forth a call to decentre various 
‘ethnocentrisms’ (egocentrism on a social scale) that revolve 
around one’s own group, tribe, culture and nation. More specifically, 
there is an urgency to decolonise pedagogies built on a very 
particular form of ethnocentrism called Eurocentrism: not one 
culture among others, but the elevation of a particular cultural and 
ethnic matrix that Bernard Waldenfels has defined as a ‘mixture 
between ego and logocentrism’, quietly assumed to be ‘the 
incarnation and vanguard of mankind’ (Waldenfels 2007:14–15). 
However, if a pedagogy that decolonises the foreigner and fosters 
openness to ‘the other’ is required, is it sufficient?
Strangers to ourselves: Kristeva and 
Waldenfels
While the influence of Levinas and Derrida on Kearney’s 
understanding of the stranger is undisputed, this is only one 
part of the story.131 According to Kearney, one should also 
explore the actual ways that strangers register in our individual 
and social psyches. In other words, how are strangers imagined 
as this or that type of ‘foreigner’ – as guest, neighbour, alien or 
enemy? How do we account for the age-old tendency within 
Western discourses to predicate claims to identity ‘upon some 
unconscious projection of an Other who is not “us”’ (Kearney 
2003:72–73)?132
To help account for these processes of projection, Kearney 
draws on Kristeva’s psychoanalytic approach to alterity in her 
131. For the sake of brevity, I have not dwelled here at any length on Kearney’s important 
critiques of Levinas and Derrida with regard to alterity. See Kearney’s critical discussions in 
Strangers, Gods and Monsters (2003:65–72, 102–108).
132. Kearney provides countless examples and incisive readings of ethnic, cultural and 
national groups identifying themselves in opposition to the stranger. See Part 1 of Strangers, 
Gods and Monsters (Kearney 2003:23–139) and Part 3 of On Stories (2002:77–122), 
where Kearney’s critical philosophical analyses are enriched with textured examples from 
anthropology, political history, literature and cinema.
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Strangers to Ourselves (1991). Kristeva (cited in Kearney 2003) 
relates this recurring xenophobic drive:
[T]o a basic unconscious process whereby we externalise that which 
is ‘strange’ within us unto an external ‘stranger’. The result is a denial 
of the fact that we are strangers to ourselves, a denial which takes the 
form of negating aliens. To the extent that we exclude the outsider 
we deceive ourselves into thinking that we have exempted ourselves 
from estrangement. (p. 73)
Her analysis of this recurring phenomenon rests upon Freud’s 
notion of ‘the uncanny’ (das Unheimliche) (2003:73). Freud 
ironically pointed out that the Unheimliche ‘is that phenomenon 
of strangeness which curiously re-evokes what is “known of old 
and familiar”’ (2003:73). In other words, the uncanny is situated 
not outside oneself, but in the unconscious of ‘the self’, ‘the own’, 
‘the known’ and ‘the same’:
[D]as Unheimliche is the obverse of das Heimlich, arising when 
the latter becomes so privy or surreptitious that it disappears 
from consciousness altogether, slipping beneath the bar of the 
unconscious. The intimate becomes so intimate that it becomes 
strange. The ‘uncanny’ comes to mean, then, something ‘secret 
or untrustworthy’, finding its equivalents in the Latin occultus or 
mysticus. (p. 73)
As a hidden part of ourselves, the ‘alien’ or ‘uncanny’ is experienced 
as something unexpected, fearful and unspeakable, provoking us 
to find a means of externalising it – often, by projecting it onto 
strangers. In such cases, says Kearney (2003), the:
[M]ore foreign someone is the more eligible to carry the shadow cast 
by our unconscious. Strangers become perfect foils since we can act out 
on them the hostility we feel towards our own strangers within. (p. 74)
What the psychoanalytic hermeneutic discloses is that the 
scapegoated strangers, however threatening and terrifying they 
may appear, are sometimes ‘nothing other than our own 
estranged self coming back to ghost us’ (2003:74). Kearney 
(2003) concludes his discussion of Freud’s Unheimliche thus:
The prefix un- in Unheimlich is, in short, to be understood less as a 
logical opposition than as a dialectical reversal. The adversary I love 
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to hate is often nothing less than myself in disguise. Taking our cue 
from Freud we might conclude, accordingly, that dreaded aliens are 
most dreaded not because they are other than us but because they 
are more like us than our own selves. (p. 74)
Kristeva continues to develop this Freudian insight politically, 
viewing the realisation that we are ‘strangers to ourselves’ as the 
‘very basis’ upon which ‘we can try to exist with others’ (Kristeva 
cited in 2003:75).133 Aware of the strangeness within, a ‘tolerant 
moral cosmopolitanism’ becomes ‘the secular equivalent’, says 
Kearney (2003:74) ‘of the old religious vision [...] so vigorously 
promoted by the Prophets and Saint Paul, of a community 
of  peoples and tongues’. Kearney (2003:74) sees Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytic exposé of the uncanny as ‘the stranger within’ as 
a ‘useful means of depathologising the alien’. Because a ‘gap is 
now located within the presumed homogeneity of human 
consciousness’, the other is ‘at long last being admitted as an 
integral inhabitant of the self’ (2003:74). Or as Kristeva puts it: 
‘the stranger is neither a race nor a nation […] we are our own 
strangers – we are divided selves’ (cited in Kearney 2003:75).134
While Kearney endorses Kristeva’s therapeutic response to 
pathological forms of alienisation, he is inclined to ask, in light of 
the radical alterity of Levinas and Derrida, whether Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytic approach is not perhaps ‘too quick in its tendency 
to reduce alterity to a dialectic of the unconscious psyche?’. 
Kearney (2003) suggests:
To put it in another way, if deconstruction too rapidly subordinates 
the Same to the Other, psychoanalysis may too rapidly subordinate 
the Other to the Same. And so doing, it risks subsuming the exteriority 
of transcendence into the language games of psychic immanence. 
(p. 77)
While psychoanalysis sheds light on an aspect of the experience 
of alterity that is lost from view when Otherness is only situated 
133. Original quote from Kristeva (1988) (Kearney’s translation).
134. Original quote from Kristeva (1988:268) (Kearney’s translation).
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outside of the self, Kearney’s critique is that Kristeva ‘does not 
sufficiently emphasise how there are also strangers who are not 
ourselves – and never will be’ (2011:21).
At this point, it may be helpful to introduce Bernard Waldenfels 
to the discussion.135 Waldenfels has also argued (from a 
phenomenological perspective) that the other does not merely 
reside outside of ourselves, in strangers, but sometimes also 
emerges from within, as an ‘intra-subjective and intra-cultural 
otherness’ (2007:9–11). According to Waldenfels, for whom the 
experience of ‘the other’ is a ‘lived and incarnate absence’ 
[leibhaftige Abwesenheit], Otherness ‘originates in ourselves; it 
comes upon us at home’ (2007:10). Like the event of my own 
birth – the incarnate absence per excellence – even the genesis 
of my self is hardly my own; I have my beginning outside myself 
and I am never entirely at home in myself.
The same applies to the cultural realm. According to 
Waldenfels (2007:18) there always remains a ‘wild region’ 
(Merleau-Ponty) of ourselves that is not invested in our own 
culture. Furthermore, it is this alien region within ourselves, more 
than anything else, that makes intercourse with the stranger ‘as 
other’ a possibility:
If we were completely at home in our own culture, the other would 
remain completely outside of it; there would not be any threshold 
between our own world and the alien world. A threshold, that is, as a 
place of passage or transition that we cross but do not surpass in a 
definitive way. (p. 18)
Kearney and Waldenfels both emphasise more strongly than 
Kristeva that the ‘other within’ could be no less other than the 
stranger who is outside of the self. In other words, recognising 
the other within does not make it any less radical. Rather, it 
135. Bernhard Waldenfels is someone who rarely features in Kearney’s own discourse 
but nevertheless shares some important characteristics with Kearney’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology of the stranger. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Wabel from Universität 
Bamberg for recommending his work to me.
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acknowledges that ‘strangeness is not something added to 
selfhood from without but inhabits the very tenor of its lived 
experience’ (2011:17). As Waldenfels (2007) says:
We have never been and will never be completely at home in the 
world, and this applies in clear opposition to traditional concentric 
orders, widening from the narrowness of a home-world to a 
world home [for] e.g. from the oikos through the polis to a sort of 
cosmopolis […] the life-world itself splits into home-world and alien 
world (Heimwelt / Fremdwelt). Such a splitting is not fatal. On the 
contrary it asks for hospitality and allows it, preparing the ground for 
an ethics of dwelling with others in the world. (p. 126)
In spite of their important differences, Waldenfels and Kristeva 
share the view that such an acknowledgement is the opening of 
a threshold towards a hospitable ethics and politics in a globalised 
world. So does Kearney (2003):
It may well be that we find more of ourselves than we lose in 
befriending those monsters that are ultimately neither fremd nor 
foe, embracing the strangers in ourselves and others. For such 
mindfulness brings peace and transfigures fear. (p. 232)
How might a pedagogy of hospitality help to cultivate such 
‘mindfulness’? For a start, we might simply recognise that it may 
not be enough to imagine Otherness as that which is ‘still to 
come’. The other needs to be welcomed into the heart of the 
pedagogical process itself by exploring ways of becoming more 
attuned to the alien that resides within what we presume to be 
‘our own’ family, tribe, culture, language and tradition.
Thinking with Waldenfels, this might mean that the 
‘astonishment and wonder’ evoked by an experience of the alien 
(and we could add other ‘moods’ such as attraction, repulsion, 
anxiety, nostalgia etc.) is ‘not merely […] the first step towards 
wisdom and knowledge, but […] the initiation into “another state” 
[…] that we will never leave behind’ (Waldenfels 2007:6). The 
other, in this light, is not only the source and goal of a pedagogy 
of hospitality but also (like Socrates’ daemon) its constant 
companion and even ‘the way’, ‘The alienness in the midst of 
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myself opens paths to the alienness of the other’ (Waldenfels 
2007:81). This stands in sharp contrast to conventional pedagogies 
based on appropriating, domesticating and colonising otherness. 
We find ourselves, not only before the other, as a territory to be 
exploited, but beside the other, as if learning means something 
akin to cooking with strangers.136
Kristeva, on the other hand, would add that our pedagogies 
should include a therapeutic aspect that aspires towards healing 
and wholeness. We need to be equipped with the diagnostic 
skills of identifying various ways in which the stranger is 
‘alienised’.137 To be sure, this should not be misunderstood as a 
way of expelling the alien from our lives as if Otherness were a 
pathology to be cured. On the contrary, the aim is to depathologise 
the stranger by way of a painful process of healing wounds that 
may never be cured – for unattended wounds create new victims. 
Part of the pedagogical task might therefore include ways of 
working through painful memories, of loosening bonds of 
resistance, of exposing strategies of mystification and of raising 
the lid on repressive distractions. 
To assist in these tasks, Kearney has often insisted on the 
need to cultivate what he has called a ‘diacritical hermeneutic’ of 
the self capable of discerning – case for case – between damaging 
alienating mechanisms (of discrimination, suspicion and 
scapegoating) and experiences of Otherness that can become a 
threshold to a deeper intimacy with others and ourselves.138 With 
this in mind, we turn to Kearney’s engagement with Ricoeur and 
Merleau-Ponty.
136. One is reminded of Roland Barthes’ definition (recipe?) of Sapientia: ‘no power, a bit 
of knowledge, a bit of wisdom, and the most of savor possible […]’ (cited in Alves 1990:19).
137. Here ‘alienised’ refers to harmful forms of alienation and othering by which the stranger 
is discriminated against, paternalised, ostracised, scapegoated etc.




At the threshold: Ricoeur and 
Merleau-Ponty
While openness to the absolute Otherness of the stranger is 
pivotal, the danger of Levinas’s hyperbolic passivity and Derrida’s 
deconstructive self-critique is that we could become paralysed 
before absolute otherness. On the other hand, as we have noted 
with regard to Kristeva’s analysis, reducing Otherness to the 
immanent play of the unconscious endangers the transcendence, 
contingency and particularities of our multifaceted identities.
Against this background, Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, in their 
respective ways, have tried to shift the focus of the conversation 
towards ‘the gap between’ self and other, familiar and strange, 
and immanence and transcendence. Embodied existence in time 
and space, in which every day social, moral and political forces 
need to be negotiated in the name of justice, not only to 
‘otherness’ or ‘the uncanny’ but also to flesh and blood ‘strangers’ 
who ‘as others’ are also ‘selves’, requires ways of traversing the 
‘gap between’ without collapsing it. As the opening discussion 
may already have made clear, this is mostly where Kearney 
situates his own approach to alterity. I will first discuss Ricoeur’s 
contribution with reference to the notion of ‘translation’ and then 
turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘intercorporeal’ perspective, before 
drawing further pedagogical implications from their ideas.
As I have just suggested, Paul Ricoeur’s approach to alterity 
seeks to shift the focus of the conversation to the hyphens 
between ‘self’ and ‘self’, between ‘self’ and ‘stranger’ and between 
‘foreigner’ and ‘other’. He does this by replacing the hyperbolic 
paradigm of Levinas and Derrida with the paradigmatic event of 
translation (Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:13–16). However, this 
does not imply the return to relative otherness, for the very 
notion of translation is dependent on the other; it presupposes a 
multiplicity of languages, in contrast to the ‘platonic ideal of one 
language’. In spite of the allure of a universal language that 
‘would try to fill the interlinguistic space of communication’, 
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Ricoeur sees the post-Babel human condition as a happy 
opportunity for linguistic hospitality (Ricoeur 2006:9–10). 
Accordingly, the inter-linguistic event of translation 
between different natural languages becomes a symbol for the 
intra-linguistic ‘capacity to communicate between distinct 
human beings’ (Kearney & Semonovitch 2011:14). The latter is 
what Ricoeur calls the ‘ontological paradigm’ of translation 
(Kearney 2006:xii). Echoing Waldenfels above, this symbol 
teaches us that even the most intimate and familiar relationships, 
such as those shared by friends or lovers, include elements of the 
strange. Translation, therefore, is always required, even within 
the mother tongue (2011:14).
A good translation requires an openness to the other and a 
willingness ‘to forfeit our native language’s claim to self-
sufficiency […] in order to “host” […] the “foreign”’ (Kearney 
2006:xvi). Ricoeur calls this condition of openness linguistic 
hospitality. While translation celebrates the possibility of 
communication between self and other, ‘linguistic hospitality 
calls us to forego the lure of omnipotence: the illusion of a total 
translation which would provide a perfect replica of the original’ 
(2006:xvii). Or, as Ricoeur (cited in Kearney 2006) says, linguistic 
hospitality:
[I ]s the act of inhabiting the word of the Other paralleled by the act 
of receiving the word of the Other into one’s own home, one’s own 
dwelling. (p. xvi)
This makes translation ‘a wager, easier said than done and 
occasionally impossible to take up’ (Ricoeur 2006:3), a difficult 
task in which the translator, who serves ‘two masters’ (an author 
and a reader, a self and another), fulfils the vow of fidelity while 
always being suspected of betrayal (Ricoeur 2006:4). Thus, the 
translator has a double fidelity: ‘the first to the possibility of 
receiving the Foreigner into one’s home, the second to the 
impossibility of ever doing so completely’ (Kearney 2006:xvi). 
As with any translation, something is always lost in an encounter 
with the other, making the good host like the good translator: 
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someone who respects the ‘untranslatable kernel’ and gives up 
the ideal of the perfect translation, ‘the temptation of a final 
account, the mirage of a total language’ (Kearney & Semonovitch 
2011:13).
The threshold that enables communication between ‘self’ and 
‘other’, therefore, is not a given but an invitation and task that 
always remains to be taken up. It is important to note that the 
‘self’ spoken of here is no longer the self-founding, self-knowing 
‘I’, but a narrative self that ‘takes on board the postmodern 
assaults on the sovereign cogito’ (Kearney 2003:189).139 As a 
narrative identity, it is also not a fait accompli but an open-ended 
task of imagination, of being ‘woven from its own histories and 
those of others’ (2003:188). Thus, Kearney reads Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic approach of ‘oneself-as-another’ as an attempt ‘to 
acknowledge a difference between self and other without 
separating them so schismatically that no relation at all is 
possible’ – or, stated differently, ‘to discover the other in our self 
and our self in the other – without abjuring either’ (Kearney 
2003:9, 10). This recovery of a nuanced and complex notion of 
the self has important implications for our search for a type of 
ethical pedagogy. As Kearney has often argued, a ‘minimal 
quotient of self-esteem’ is required to remain true to the ethical 
relationship between ‘selves as others’ and ‘others as selves’, 
capable of making and keeping promises, acting for the sake of 
139. In his introduction to The Owl of Minerva (2004), Kearney poignantly summarises 
Ricoeur’s notion of the self: Ricoeur explodes the pretensions of the cogito to be self-
founding and self-knowing. He insists that the shortest route from self to self is through the 
other. Or to put it in Ricoeur’s felicitous formula: ‘to say self is not to say I’. Why? Because 
the hermeneutic self is much more than an autonomous subject. Challenging the reign of 
the transcendental ego, Ricoeur proposes the notion of self-as-another – a soi that passes 
beyond the illusory confines of the moi and discovers its meaning in and through the linguistic 
mediations of signs and symbols, stories and ideologies, metaphors and myths. In the most 
positive hermeneutic scenario, the self returns to itself after numerous hermeneutic detours 
through the language of others, to find itself enlarged and enriched by the journey. The 




love and justice, listening to the legitimate claims and rights of 
strangers, and bearing testimony to past crimes.140
If Ricoeur emphasises the interlinguistic character of human 
existence to reimagine the gap between self and other, Merleau-
Ponty’s contribution consists primarily in a shift from an inter-
subjective to an inter-corporeal paradigm. The implications of 
this alteration should not be underestimated, for it wholly 
transforms the threshold itself. As Waldenfels says, ‘the 
exchange of the leading figure [from “subject” to “body”] 
changes the inter of the inter-change and inter-course which 
takes place between us’ (2007:82).141 With regard to our 
question of the stranger, two important consequences are 
worth mentioning here.
Firstly, it means that my experience of the stranger in the flesh 
precedes my grasp of the other as an active subject, for it ‘first 
opens me to a radical passivity and passion’ (Kearney 2015:27). 
Before the stranger even appears on my radar, my existence as 
flesh is already a ‘naked exposition to the other-than-me, 
receptive to whomever and whatever exceeds and calls and 
gives itself to me’ (Kearney 2015:27). According to Waldenfels, 
this means that ‘we are touched by others before being able to 
ask who they are and what their behaviour or their utterances 
mean’ (Waldenfels 2007:82). In the flesh, one’s creative capacity 
of making sense is dependent on a prior reception of sense from 
the other as an ‘incarnate absence’. In other words, ‘one’s agency 
(the capacity to touch) and one’s passivity (the possibility of 
being touched), one’s action and one’s passion, are radically 
intertwined’ (Kearney 2015:27–28). ‘Here our sense of touch, not 
sight, is the operative sense [and] the [paradigm] of all other 
senses’ (Kearney 2015:27–28).
140. For a helpful discussion on the complexities involved in historical testimony 
and rememoration, see Chapter 5 of On Stories, entitled ‘The Paradox of Testimony’ 
(Kearney 2002).
141. Kearney works out the implications of this shift with his notion of carnal hermeneutics.
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Secondly, the stranger ‘as other’ is not only experienced as 
someone different from me, but – crucially – as my living ‘similar’ 
(mon semblable). Thus, quoting an example of Merleau-Ponty, 
Kearney and Semonovitch (2011) say:
The very fact that we are oriented to display for others affirms the 
otherness of others. When I am talking with someone else, ‘should 
the voice alter, should the unwonted appear in the score of the 
dialogue’ – in short, if the person with whom I am speaking does 
anything that shows her to be alive and not a robot – then, ‘suddenly 
there breaks forth the evidence that yonder also, minute by minute, 
life is being lived’. (p. 16)
Importantly, this is ‘an identification not of identical beings, but 
of similar beings despite an infinite multiplicity of variation in 
corporeal form and of conduct across time’ (Kearney & 
Semonovitch 2011:16). By showing that self and other share the 
condition of ‘being seen’ before ‘seeing’, Merleau-Ponty enables 
a shift from the extremes of radical alterity and psychic 
immanence to a similarity in plurality and otherness.
Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty together help Kearney to shift the 
focus of the conversation to the hyphen between the extremes 
of hyperbolic transcendence and psychic immanence to situate 
our pedagogical wager of the stranger within the symbolic and 
embodied world of social and political realities. Both show that 
justice towards the stranger ‘as other’ is not possible unless one 
is able to recognise the other, not only as different but also as 
one that is similar. Similar but not the same, the stranger is the 
one who ‘is recognisable enough to appear but who nonetheless 
retains a distance’ (Kearney 2003:17). Even at the threshold 
between self and other, an untranslatable kernel always remains, 
making any pedagogical wager, like translation, a trial and a 
drama, a fragile task always to be taken up anew.
As Kearney says of his own diacritical hermeneutic approach, 
such a pedagogy of the threshold ‘does not propose speculative 
fly-overs or viaducts but tentative foot-bridges and rope-ladders 
reaching across the chasms separating old ontologies and new 
heterologies’ (Kearney 2003:17). This implies that the delicate 
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gap between ‘oneself as another’ and ‘the other as another self’ 
should be safeguarded as a playful and tentative space of 
learning where ‘a variety of crossings between same and other’ 
can be tried out (Kearney 2010:40). Classrooms should be 
allowed to become more like thresholds of encounter and 
transgression, while thresholds encountered at the margins of life 
(for e.g. death, [re]birth) should be recognised as spaces 
of  learning and (trans)formation. Teachers, in a paradigm of 
linguistic hospitality, may be seen as boundary dwellers who, like 
interpreters, mediate crossings by allowing initiands to try out, in 
playful ways, different personas (guest, host, foreigner, friend 
[…]) and different ways of responding to threshold experiences.
With such a pedagogy in mind, Ricoeur might also emphasise 
dialogue and the mutual exchange of narratives (fictional and 
testimonial), as well as the importance of just institutions capable 
of transcending the fleeting present moment to amplify the 
voices of strangers we may never see or encounter face-to-face. 
In addition, in an age of excarnation and online distance learning, 
a carnal hermeneutics informed by Merleau-Ponty might require 
that established pedagogies based on ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ be 
embedded in paradigm of ‘touch’ to ensure the cultivation of 
that tactile wisdom necessary for a hospitable response to the 
stranger as my living similar.
Training for contact: Kearney’s 
fivefold wager
When Kearney speaks of the stranger in Anatheism, he speaks of 
an encounter that solicits an existential and ethical, and I would 
add, pedagogical wager, involving both risk and promise. 
Drawing on founding narratives from the three Abrahamic faiths, 
Kearney argues that the encounter with the stranger is one of 
the ‘primary scenes of religion’, something shared by various 
religious traditions. He suggests that there is (potentially) 
something sacred at the heart of such encounters, that these 
Chapter 8
197
traditions mediate an understanding of a God who meets us in 
strange guises and also in the guise of the stranger (Kearney 
2010:17–39). In Chapter 2 of Anatheism, Kearney explicates his 
use of the term ‘wager’ by speaking of five components (also 
‘movements’ or ‘moments’) that together make up the anatheist 
wager: imagination, humour, commitment, discernment and 
hospitality.
Thus far, I have tried to show how Kearney searches for a 
nuanced way of speaking of the stranger, suggesting that the 
encounter with the stranger, while remaining a wager, is more 
than a blind leap in the dark but a call to cultivate openness and 
responsibility, mindfulness and attentiveness, thoughtful 
discernment and tactile sensitivity. Even if ‘wagers occur in an 
instant, all at once’, Kearney reminds us that ‘they are complex, 
shrouded in a halo of multi-layered motions. And there is much 
[…] that precedes and follows them’ (Kearney 2010:40). I have 
suggested that it is in this ‘halo of multi-layered motions’ that a 
space can be found for a type of formation that, without nullifying 
the risks involved in the wager, nevertheless makes all the 
difference when it comes to the wager itself.
In a similar context, Anthony Thiselton recalls ‘the Duke of 
Wellington’s remark that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the 
playing fields of Eton’. According to Thiselton, ‘Wellington’s 
point was that Eton had provided the character formation, 
training, and habits of thought and action that proved decisive 
for the later moment of decision and action in battle’.142 Wagers 
are indeed open to a time before and after, and while each wager 
is a new instance, calling for improvisation and openness to the 
142. In his seminal work on The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (2007), Anthony Thiselton helpfully 
shows how the hermeneutic tradition is fundamentally interested in the educational, 
formative and transformative role played by the hermeneutic experience generally (coming 
to understand another) and, more specifically, by the hermeneutic encounter with the shared 
communal practices, customs, norms, doctrines and institutions of Christian faith traditions. 
In this regard, see Chapter 5 (‘Formation, Education and Training in Hermeneutics and 
Doctrine’) and Chapter 6 (‘Formation through a Hermeneutic of Alterity and Provocation’).
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not-yet, without the cantus firmus offered by traditions, 
institutions and practices, what will prevent the polyphony of life 
from collapsing into a cacophony under the tyranny of the 
present moment?
By way of conclusion, therefore, I want to suggest that the 
five components or movements of Kearney’s wager could be 
further explored as five tenets or guideposts for a pedagogy that 
aims at cultivating hospitality to the stranger, understood in the 
multilayered richness explored by our discussion. While the five 
moments – imagination, humour, commitment, discernment, 
hospitality – do not necessarily follow a chronological or logical 
order, one could nevertheless say that the first and the last – 
imagination and hospitality – are what invigorates and orientates 
the pedagogical process.
It is impossible to do justice here to Kearney’s immense 
contribution to our understanding of imagination, which he 
problematised, deepened and enriched, not only through his 
many writings dedicated to the topic but also by displaying, 
throughout his many philosophical and literary writings, his own 
poetic sensibilities and his acute sensitivity to the imagination’s 
(often hidden and elusive) workings. Kearney’s work on 
imagination will remain an indispensable resource for anyone 
interested in exploring the role of imagination in the formation 
and transformation of persons and society (cf. Kearney 1988, 
1995, 1998).
The first step to being initiated into an ethos of hospitality is 
stimulating the imagination, which plays two crucial roles in the 
encounter with the stranger. Firstly, the imagination serves as a 
condition for the very possibility of a wager in as far as it provides 
one with ‘the freedom to choose’ (Kearney 2010:40). The 
possibility of choice, Kearney (2010:40) reminds us, ‘presupposes 
our ability to imagine different possibilities in the same person, 
to see the Other before us as a stranger to be welcomed or 
rejected’. Before any decision is made, our very perception of the 
other ‘is already a hermeneutic seeing as’ (Kearney 2010:40). 
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Secondly, imagination makes empathy ‘between self and other’ 
possible. The only way for the self to become host to the stranger 
is by ‘imagining the other as other’ (Kearney 2010:41). Because 
the other always remains foreign and transcendent, imagination 
cannot ever eradicate the gap between self and other. Yet, it is 
within this gap that imagination operates, ‘imagining the Other 
“as” Other (metaphorically) or “as if” the Other were like me 
(fictively)’ (Kearney 2010:42).
One of Kearney’s most significant contributions has been to 
illustrate the ineluctable relationship between poetics and ethics, 
between the free play of the imagination’s creative capacities 
and the ethics of imagination that recognises its limits before the 
irreducible face of the other. To recall a passage from the 
conclusion of The Wake of Imagination (1988):
Otherness is as essential to the life of poiesis as it is to that of ethos. 
In both cases it signals a call to abandon the priority of egological 
existence for the sake of alternative modes of experience hitherto 
repressed or simply unimagined. Indeed without the poetical openness 
to the pluri-dimensionality of meaning, the ethical imagination might 
well shrink into a cheerless moralising, and authoritarian and fearful 
censorship. And, likewise, a poetical imagination entirely lacking in 
ethical sensibility all too easily slides into an irresponsible […] attitude 
where anything goes and everything is everything else because it is, 
in the final analysis, nothing at all. (p. 369)
Cultivating the relation between ethos and poiesis is a crucial 
prerequisite for the institution of each of the ‘pedagogical 
lessons’ gleaned from Kearney’s multiple conversation partners 
above: from passively assuming the stranger’s summons and 
sufferings ‘as if’ they were my own (Levinas) to decentring and 
unlearning for the sake of a strange hospitality still to come 
(Derrida); from healing incurable wounds through cathartic 
participation in narrative (Kristeva) to embracing the experience 
of the alien as a passage to intimacy, wisdom and rebirth 
(Waldenfels); from inhabiting the words of the strangers and 
welcoming the other into one’s home (Ricoeur) to being touched 
by the other (Merleau-Ponty) – each of these pedagogical 
exchanges depends on the delicate balance between ‘the ethical 
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demand to imagine otherwise’ and the poetic playfulness that 
dares to ‘transgress the security fences of self-centredness’ 
(Kearney 1988:364, 369).
This brings us to the second movement, humour, which, as 
‘the ability to encounter and compose opposites’, is also a faculty 
of the imagination. Humour is often considered to be unteachable 
and certainly would not be a commonplace in the average 
university curriculum. However, when Kearney uses humour in 
Bergson’s sense, ‘as a creative response to enigma, contradiction, 
and paradox’ (Kearney 2010:42), we might be inclined to ask if 
anything is more urgently needed in our curricula. Could it be 
that we have simply stopped trying to teach creative responses 
to enigma, contradiction and paradox – not because that is 
impossible per se – but because it is impossible to quantify such 
results in annual evaluation reports?
Perhaps it is a related folly that believes humour to be a matter 
beyond critique. Ola Sigurdson’s recent work on humour reminds 
us that laughter may also happen at the expense of the other, as 
when it is used as a tool of power ‘to establish one’s superiority 
over the person one is laughing at’ (Sigurdson 2015:147). It is 
important, therefore, that Kearney situates humour within what 
Sigurdson identifies as an ‘incarnational comedy’ when he 
recognises the intimate link between humour and humility 
(Kearney 2010):
As the Latin root humus reminds us, humour, humility, and humanity 
share a common source. […] Humour reminds us that we are deeply 
and invariably creatures of the earth (humus). Finite, mortal, natal. 
We laugh, like Sarah, when we see God because we are temporal 
beings facing divine surplus. (pp. 42–43)
A pedagogy of hospitality might therefore wager on cultivating 
humour not only as an ethos of humble solidarity with the other 
and with the earth but also as a critique of power that takes 




The playfulness of humour, therefore, proceeds from a 
fundamental commitment to the other, the third component of 
the anatheist wager. As the initiation into an ethos of hospitality 
as the ultimate cultural horizon, the goal of paideia goes beyond 
‘understanding the other’ to responding to actual strangers with 
hospitality. The Latin spondere means ‘to make a solemn pledge 
or promise’, and it is in this sense that every encounter with the 
stranger is a moment of truth (Kearney 2010):
We are speaking here, in sum, of a moment of truth – as troth – 
where we do not know the truth but do the truth. Facere veritatem, 
as Augustine put it. Orthopraxis precedes orthodoxy. Trust precedes 
theory. Action precedes abstraction. Commitment, in this sense of 
betrothal, is the movement of the wager that makes truth primarily, 
though not exclusively, a matter of existential transformation 
(metanoia). (p. 44)
As our discussion of Derrida’s absolute hospitality suggested, 
commitment to the stranger ‘as other’ is not the same as 
commitment to the stranger ‘as foreigner’ – that is, the stranger 
as we have become determined to frame him or her. Commitment 
in the former sense might mean that we betray our prior 
‘commitments’ to the stranger ‘as foreigner’. Seen in the light of 
the ever-increasing professionalisation of learning, a pedagogy 
of the stranger is not a success story. As metanoia, the desired 
result might even be seen as a failure, such as setting out for 
Damascus, but – by the grace of God – never make it there.
If the anatheist wager involves a sacred commitment to the 
stranger, it also acknowledges that not every stranger is sacred. 
Therefore, welcoming the stranger always includes the need for 
discernment. Responding to the stranger is a ‘multilayered 
hermeneutic drama – extending from embodied prereflection to 
critical reflection’ (Kearney 2010:47). While discernment already 
begins ‘in the moment’, starting ‘at the most basic carnal level’ 
where ‘the body already ‘ponders’ in dia-logue with the stranger’, 
it is not isolated in the fleeting present moment but is always 
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accompanied by the movements of imagination, commitment 
and humility. Therefore, discernment is open-ended and ‘includes 
the wisdom to learn from initial mistakes and misreadings’ 
(Kearney 2010:47).
Therefore, a pedagogy of hospitality aims at cultivating 
phronesis that finds practical understanding and ethical 
orientation in the retrieval of ‘memories and testimonies as well 
as future oriented projects – utopian, messianic, eschatological’ 
(Kearney 2012:178). Rather than abstract criteria applied 
indiscriminately across contexts, phronesis employs the powers 
of narrative (fictional and testimonial), dialogue and the tactile 
sense of touch. Also spiritual and academic disciplines that 
cultivate vigilance and attentiveness as habits of mind have an 
important role to play in upholding ‘Jesus’s admonition to Peter 
to be “watchful and prayerful”: where watchfulness means being 
“vigilant and alert,” and “prayer is attention to otherness”’ 
(Kearney 2010:45).
Finally, the last word goes to hospitality, which as we have 
said, is not the conclusion ‘after all facts are in, but “there from 
the beginning and coterminous with the other four [movements]”’ 
(2010:47). ‘At best’, says Kearney (2010:47), ‘love of the stranger 
is a form of faith seeking knowledge’, knowing that absolute 
knowledge of the other is impossible and that we always run the 
risk of getting it wrong. Hospitality that precedes and ‘exceeds 
discernment implies, furthermore, that the “ability to serve as 
gracious host is not […] only a matter of discerning between 
strangers; it is also a matter of discerning between selves”’ 
(2010:48). In a sense, Derrida may have been right to question 
the possibility of cultivating hospitality. It is rather hospitality 
that cultivates human beings by extending a strange welcome in 
which we may be transfigured by the stranger.
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‘How could one authentically choose theism if one was not familiar 
with the alternative of atheism?’ (Richard Kearney)
Introduction
To say YHWH (יהוה), to say Elohim (אלהים), to say Ehyeh (אהיה [I Am]), 
to say Adonai [Lord, master] in prayer or Hashem (השם [the Name]) 
in conversation, to say Theos (Θεός) or Kurios (Κύριος) is to 
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create space.143 It is to verbally create space here and now for 
(religious) stories. Stories from there, from other peoples’ contextual 
experiences of transcendence, intersect re-figuratively with my and 
our stories as contextual witnesses to transcendence. Put differently, 
concrete embodied existence before transcendence is given 
narrative content and mythological identity (as sense making) from 
specific historical contexts, provided that content from specific 
socio-psychological understandings is embedded within deep-
seated life and world views, presenting itself here and now as 
archaeologically layered humaneness. Humaneness lived and 
witnessed before transcendence and captured in narrative identities. 
Or in short: It is to make (theological) sense of (existential) life in the 
space that has been created by religious stories.
Much traditional Western-orientated dogmatic reflection over 
the last two centuries, specifically in reference to the doctrine of 
God, has mostly been stripped off the lived experiences of the 
group or the individual from their particular contextual 
embeddedness. God-talk, stripped from its experiential marks, is 
then often reduced to a systematic list of static, lifeless, 
relationless descriptions and/or characteristics. However, for 
various good reasons, this has changed dramatically over the 
last 40 to 50 years.144 Theological reflection on God has been 
seriously urged to move – with exciting and lively sense-making 
and hermeneutical results – beyond detached objectivity!145 
143. To ‘create space’ follows implicitly from the ‘possible’ etymological background of 
the Indo-Germanic word ‘God’ from a 5th-century Sanskrit text. Given the morphological 
unknown history but the suggested possibilities, I work with the etymological suggestions of 
the root form of ‘to call upon’, to call ‘in’ to make light, to make sense. I interpretatively work 
with these possibilities.
144. These good reasons are indeed multivarious, ranging from theological movements 
(such as liberation theologies) to exciting new hermeneutical endeavours (such as the role 
of the reader and contexts) to philosophical–anthropological insights (such as embodied 
personhood) to social–cognitive developments.
145. In my unpublished inaugural lecture at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, in August 
2014, I called it: post-dogmatic dogmatical reflection, that is, systematic reflection that has 
moved far beyond the confines of dogmatistic reflection.
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In most contemporary discourses, the contextual embeddedness 
is hermeneutically acknowledged, emphasising that we are all 
‘speaking from’ very particular contexts and from very specific 
perspectives. And combined or integrated with this God-talk, we 
find increasingly experiential and narrative elements, bringing 
the God-talk of humans as people of flesh and blood to life! Our 
God-talk and God-stories are now being reconceptualised and 
rewritten in a lively manner, depicting and exploring the dynamics, 
complexities, diversities, multidimensionality, the unexpected, 
the not-so-normal, the cracks, the deep and unsayable in a new 
life-breathing and relational embodied manner.
In this chapter, I would like firstly to give a very general and 
broad overview of snippets of the prophets’ God-stories (as lively 
products of various historical research endeavours) in which so 
much are presented as spaces for stories of God. I engage very 
strongly with the interesting and lively approach to prophetic 
literature by Stulman and Kim (2010), which values prophetic 
literature as disaster and survival literature, that is, in sweeping 
terms, an approach that understands written prophecy as 
attempts to find meaning in radical suffering and quests for 
meaning and hope (cf. Stulman & Kim 2010:2ff.). In their own 
explanatory words on the nature of prophetic literature as 
disaster and survival literature (Stulman & Kim 2010):
It functions simultaneously as a disturbing cultural expression of 
lament and as a complex theological response to massive human 
wreckage. It pulsates with the pain of war while it fosters hope for 
survival in those living crisis – often during or after the collapse of 
long-standing symbolic, cultural and geopolitical structures. The 
cumulative result is a thick meaning-making map – a tapestry of 
hope – for exiles living on the edge of time. (p. 8)
From this approach to prophetic literature, I secondly would like 
to read the prophetic God-talk together with the contemporary 
philosophical–theological contribution on God-talk by Richard 
Kearney in his The God Who May Be (2001) and Anatheism 
(2010). What I employ as creative interpretative connection is 
Kearney’s (2010:85) indication of the three basic elements to his 
God-talk, the biblical prophets and Richard Kearney
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approach that he labels with the descriptive term ‘anatheism’. 
The three basic elements of anatheism are protest, prophecy and 
sacrament in ‘telling a philosophical story of the God question’ 
(Kearney 2010:xvii). Finally, possible connections between 
prophetic and Kearney’s God-talk are pursued in an intuitive and 
artistic interpretative manner.
The prophets’ God-stories
The God-talk of the prophets146 – as YHWH partners, as community 
advocates, as ambassadors, as social reformers or moral teachers 
(cf. Stulman & Kim 2010:2), or as the messengers of Yahweh who 
brought a word relevant to a particular hour in history, deeply 
embedded in their specific historical-sociological contexts – 
represents a definite break with the preceding earlier ideas held 
within Jahwism (cf. Von Rad 1965:3). The ‘definite break’ is 
formulated poignantly and given content by Stulman and Kim 
(2010) in saying:
Biblical prophets map out paths that lead to survival and healing for 
war-torn and colonised communities, as well for those of us living 
in a world on the brink of extinction. These meaning-making figures 
and their enduring literary legacy helps us entertain the possibility of 
hope in the face of a ruptured and chaotic world. (p. 4)
The mapped paths find expression in a plurality of theologies 
and multiple voices of written prophecy.147 At the very same time, 
146. I am aware that there are a host of historical problems attached to my uncritical use of 
the words ‘God-stories’ as well as with the phenomenon ‘prophets’. However, for the sake of 
the argument in this context, I will be sensitive to the problematic history of different kind 
of prophets and different kinds of prophecy but will not discuss the background and nature 
thereof in any conclusive manner. Stulman and Kim (2010:15) make the point very clear, 
stating, ‘[p]rophets are emissaries, poets, cynic, performers, intercessors, social reformers, 
covenant mediators, harbingers of violence, harbingers of hope – to name only but a few of 
their roles and functions’.
147. I accept the very important distinction and understanding of prophecy as oral 
phenomenon and our access to this oral phenomenon only through written sources. Stulman 
and Kim (2010:9ff.) discuss in a very insightful and convincing manner the importance of this 
observation and state: ‘Contemporary studies of language have made us well aware that 
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they are also present in the rich array of divine images, as Stulman 
and Kim (2010:9, 10, 15) insightfully explain, ‘YHWH is warrior and 
peacemaker, judge and saviour, inscrutable and accessible, 
confident and deceiver, hidden and present, approachable and 
elusive, healer and destroyer.’
We can start our mapped paths of God-stories of the biblical 
prophets of disaster and survival with the 9th-century figure from 
Gilead, namely Elijah. We hear a strong emphasis on ‘belonging to 
Yahweh and to Him alone’ and also a very new, scary emphasis 
on a God who is to rise against them because of the apostasy of 
his  people. From another socio-economic context came the 
contemporary voice of the miracle worker and political figure of 
Elisha, who confirmed God’s presence with his people, but especially 
a message that carried the strong emphasis that their help lay not 
in chariots and horses, but solely in Yahweh. For the 8th-century 
visionary prophet Amos in the Northern Kingdom, there was a crack 
in society. Israel had to deal directly with (an unknown) Yahweh 
that would no longer forgive his people. The Day of the Lord was 
imminent because wrongdoing in the society – seen from the 
perspective of the Mosaic covenant – was rife. To say ‘God’ was to 
say that he was God of all the nations but that he had an eye for 
what you were doing. His contemporary Hosea looked through his 
writings into the heart of God. It was a God who had turned against 
them. For Hosea to say ‘God’ was an invitation to love him again. An 
invitation that he passionately and with great feeling proclaimed 
metaphorically. For the 8th century prophet in the Southern 
(footnote 147 continues...)
the transition from spoken to written prophecy involves more than mimetic transposition. 
Writing does not preserve meaning with externalized precision: rather, it reconstructs and 
reconfigures thought.’
In the discussion that follows, many important characteristics of the distinctions between 
oral prophecy and written prophecy are identified and elaborated on. One of the most 
descriptive formulations for me that captures their discussion reads: ‘[…] Prophetic texts can 
do what prophets cannot; and they can go where prophets are forbidden’ (Stulman & Kim 
2010:10). Written prophecy – and I take their point – that takes shape after frightful events 
engages in artful reinterpretation and re-enactment.
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Kingdom, the townsman Isaiah’s148 disappointment was the order of 
the day. To say ‘God’ was to say that he was the Holy One of Israel. 
To say ‘God’ was to say destruction was to hear the unsympathetic 
judgement that their prayers would go unanswered. Would go 
unanswered because of their hardened hearts, because of their lack 
of obedience to divine law. At the same time, God was present with 
them and invited them to clear the waters with him. For Isaiah’s 
contemporary Micah, to say ‘God’ was to say that he was the Lord 
of the world and of all nations. To say ‘God’ was to say that Yahweh 
was once more taking up his Messianic work from the beginning. 
But it was a new beginning that was bound up with the total 
obliteration of Jerusalem from the pages of history.
For the minor prophets from 701 BCE to 586 BCE, to say ‘God’ 
was to bring a loud and strong message of punishment. But at the 
same time, to mutter God was to proclaim grace. To paradoxically 
proclaim God’s amazing grace. For Nahum, to say ‘God’ was to 
name and to put your trust in the One who was more powerful than 
any world force! To say ‘God’ was to be aware of the hour of feasting 
before him. Yahweh manifested himself in the world as the avenger 
of wrong. For Habakkuk, to say ‘God’ was to complain that 
everything was going terribly wrong and what was even more 
disconcerting was that God did not intervene. However, those who 
held fast to Yahweh – the King – would be saved. For Zephaniah, 
saying ‘God’ meant very much the same as for Habakkuk but with 
the stronger emphasis on the resulting judgement of Jerusalem, the 
advent of the Day of the Lord and threats against those who were 
complacent in the face of injustice and apostasy.
The pervasive collapse of ideological, institutional, political 
and religious structures during the time of the prophets provided 
the context in which their lament and protest sounded forth. 
During this period (neo-Babylonian and early Persian), three 
prophets arose, sharing and struggling in their own specific ways 
with the deep question of whether Yahweh was still in control. 
148. Von Rad (1965:147) describes Isaiah’s preaching as the theological high-water mark of 
the whole Old Testament.
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With Jeremiah, a completely new dispensation and personal 
style of prophecy took shape.149 To say ‘God’ was to say Creator. 
Creator of the world and its nations. To continue to say ‘God’ was 
for Jeremiah to launch forth long complaints, was also to engage 
in individual laments. It was to drive home the reality of a 
dismantled world and the end of a culture. In the words of 
Stulman and Kim (2010:7): ‘The wounded prophet reads the 
abyss as chaos and cosmic crumbling’. Yahweh became a God 
who at once stood ‘far off’ but at the same time yearned for his 
lost people. They had forsaken him. Their apostasy was 
incomprehensible. Not only his own nation but also some other 
nations would endure Yahweh’s wrath as he directed history. But 
God’s whole way with Israel threatened to end in some kind of 
metaphysical abyss. A darkness. Only much later in Jeremiah’s 
prophetic message does a tone of eschatological hope break 
through for the future when he soberly proclaims that Yahweh 
will give his people a heart to know him.150 A call to return to God. 
How different, however, the temperament and style of (sacral) 
thinking, speaking and writing of Jeremiah’s contemporary, the 
intellectual prophet but also theologian Ezekiel. To say ‘God’ for 
Ezekiel was to say ‘Otherness’. Otherness with regard to holiness 
and cosmic powers. He was addressing a colonised community 
in jeopardy of losing its core identity, and according to Stulman 
and Kim (2010:7), he reads as prisoner of war ‘the abyss as 
absence and alienation’. To say ‘God’ in exile in Babylon was to 
say that he as prophet was on God’s side, on God’s side for the 
honour of his name among the nations. Israel’s history with 
Yahweh was characterised by a constant failure to comply with 
his divine will. For Ezekiel as watcher for the house of Israel to 
now say ‘God’ was to deliver a message of doom, namely 
that  Yahweh’s manifestation was to leave the temple, and 
149. Von Rad (1965:196) remarks, ‘[i]n Jeremiah we are cautious of a prophet’s feeling of 
solidarity with his people in their danger, and even with the land itself in hers, such as we 
shall never meet with again.’
150. Stulman and Kim (2010:7) formulate it as follows: ‘Jeremiah proclaims that God will 
sculpt new beginnings out of the wreckage of a war-torn community.’
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also  –  almost contradictory – to deliver a pastoral message of 
giving Israel and the individual a chance to turn. To rebuild their 
temple and lives. To take out the heart of stone and to give them 
a heart of flesh. To be God’s people and Yahweh to be their God.151
But over against the ‘re-builders’ stood another group of 
‘theological innovators’. For the unknown prophet completely 
hidden behind the very emotional message, namely Deutero-
Isaiah, to say ‘God’ was to call him Israel’s creator, the One who 
called this people in its whole physical existence into being. 
He chose Israel and redeemed her. He was the Lord of history 
because he – and he alone – could allow the future to be told in 
advance. His advent was imminent. A final theophany for the 
whole world and not only for Israel: He was to reveal his glory in 
the eyes of all the nations. Israel as sign (‘witness’) to the nations 
that Yahweh was undertaking a new task, a new exodus, so 
marvellous it would completely eclipse his previous ones! 
A prophetic psalm of trust (Von Rad 1965).
The prophets of the later Persian period brought their 
respective messages after the return to their homeland. A period 
that was neither great nor clear in saying ‘God’! For Trito-Isaiah to 
say ‘God’ to people with little faith, and who felt that fulfilment of 
the divine promise was long overdue, was to say, I do not need 
the temple. I live in heaven and have a new vision for my people. 
In stark contrast, for Haggai and Zechariah to say ‘God’ was 
to  stutteringly say ‘rebuild – rebuild’ – in spite of economic 
hardships – the temple as sacral centre. Otherwise, Yahweh would 
not be with them, speak with them nor forgive their sins. The day 
of Yahweh and the coming of an anointed one was imminent. 
Now was the time of salvation. Now? That was not the message 
of the anonymous prophet Malachi after the temple was rebuilt. 
For him to say ‘God’ in a community that on the one hand wanted 
to know where the promised salvation was but was at the same 
151. In a very gripping formulation, Stulman and Kim (2010: 7–8) write in this regard, ‘Ezekiel 
envisions God’s own exile from the temple in Jerusalem, which ironically leads to solidarity 
with the banished people of ‘God and the re-creation of the world. When God becomes an 
outcast, God takes up residence in the borderlands with other displaced persons’. 
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time a community in which abuses were the order of the day, to 
say ‘God’ was to say that Yahweh would come unexpectedly and 
would bring judgement upon the godless. However, for those 
who feared God, the ‘sun of salvation’ would shine forth.
Perhaps the last words as God-talk of the prophets as messengers 
were not from the prophets themselves. It was God-talk from the 
group of pseudepigraphical apocalypses from Daniel to IV Ezra 
that represent a complete break in the understanding of history, 
namely from a view of the unity of world history. This view – in 
which growing evil was a result of the nature of humanity and the 
empires founded by them – was pessimistic in the extreme. God-
talk in this context was semantically clothed in esoteric and gnostic 
terms and characterised in an a-confessional manner by 
eschatological dualism and sheer transcendentalism. To say ‘God’ 
was to take on the responsibility of interpretation and actualisation 
of earlier cosmological schemata found in myth. It was also to 
accept that loyalty to Yahweh would lead to suffering (martyrdom). 
But the suffering was not a sign that there was an end to their 
fellowship with God.
From these apocalyptic last words on God and history, I now 
turn to contemporary philosophical discourses on God-talk and 
specifically to the Irish philosopher Richard Kearney. I take Kearney 
as an influential representative of current philosophical God-talk.
Kearney’s God-story152
What does ‘to say “God”’ entail for Kearney? The basic question 
as vantage point that the Irish philosopher addresses in telling a 
philosophical story of the God question is, how do I return to 
152. Richard Kearney is currently the Charles Seelig Professor in Philosophy at Boston College, 
USA. He studied at Glenstal Abbey under the Benedictines until 1972. He completed an MA 
at McGill University with Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and a PhD with Paul Ricoeur 
at the University of Paris, Nanterre. His work focuses on the philosophy of the narrative 
imagination, hermeneutics and phenomenology. Among his best-known written works are 
The Wake of the Imagination, On Stories, Poetics of Imagining and Debates in Continental 
Philosophy (globalcenterforadvancedstudies.org).
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God, having ‘lost God’? How and where do I today find the 
acoustic space to hear anew God’s call and to decide for God?
Kearney’s answer ‘to say “God”’ finds expression in his formulation 
of a third way. A third way from a hermeneutical narrative approach 
with its interpretative focus on Otherness and the welcoming of the 
(S)tranger. A third way in which he explores the deep probing 
interpretative possibilities of a ‘return’ to God and to reimagine God 
after the death of God as reaction to the polar opposites of certainty 
‘that have maimed so many minds and souls in our history’ (Kearney 
2010:2). A third way between contemporary dogmatic theism and 
militant atheism. A way between naïve faith and the hermeneutics 
of suspicion. It is a possibility he calls anatheism that contains a 
moment of atheism as well as theism within itself. A possibility as 
hermeneutical wager153 in a double sense: philosophically and 
existentially.154 However, before I turn to his exposition of anatheism 
as the third way, it is necessary to ask how Kearney explains his 
understanding of God in his The God Who May Be (2001).
The God who may be
For Kearney,155 the divine is in some way present in its absence 
and able to disclose itself. All expressions of otherness, including 
that which envisages a transcendent deity, must be somehow 
accessible to human consciousness. It immediately raises the 
question of what this might somehow mean. When it is associated 
with the claim that in a ‘post-metaphysical age there are no 
longer clear maps as to who or what lies beyond the reaches of 
human finitude’ (Kearney) and with insistence upon ‘the 
153. Wager simply in the sense that it can go all wrong! It is a dangerous drama that can go 
either way.
154. It is a philosophical wager regarding the interpretation of diverse voices, texts and 
theories about the sacred in our times. Furthermore, for Kearney an existential wager is 
central to everyday movements of belief and unbelief, of uncertainty and wonder (cf. Kearney 
2010:xvii).




indispensable role of a post-metaphysical self in our post-modern 
culture’ (Kearney), the stage is set for this somehow to be played 
out post-metaphysically in his The God Who May Be.
Written from a hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective, 
Kearney ‘seeks to delineate the somehow whereby a transcendent 
deity is accessible to human consciousness’. To do so, it 
invokes  the priority of the possible over the actual and the 
correlative priority of the imagination over speculative reason. 
The possibility that he explores is that of a deity envisaged not 
as  a ‘vertically’ transcendent actual supreme being but as a 
‘horizontally’ beckoning possibility of ethical achievement.
He (Kearney 2001) writes:
God neither is nor is not but may be […] What I mean by this is that 
God, who is traditionally thought of as act or actuality, might be 
better rethought as possibility. To this end I am proposing here a new 
hermeneutics of religion which explores and evaluates two rival ways 
of interpreting the divine – the eschatological and the onto-theological. 
The former, which I endorse, privileges a God who possibilises our 
world from out of the future, from the hoped-for eschaton which 
several religious traditions have promised will one day come […] 
Instead of seeing possibility as some want or lack to be eradicated 
from the divine so that it can be recognised as the perfectly fulfilled 
act it supposedly is, I proffer the alternative view that it is divinity’s 
very potentiality-to-be that is the most divine thing about it [...] God 
can be God only if we enable this to happen. (pp. 1–2)
This commitment in considering God in terms of possibility rather 
than actuality is motivated in part by a rejection of a metaphysical 
conception of God – a rejection of what has been called ‘onto-
theology’, that is, the tendency ‘to reify God by reducing Him to a 
being – albeit the highest, first and most indeterminate of all 
beings’ (Kearney 2001:24). In his The God Who May Be, Kearney 
devotes much of the book to subtle and illuminating interpretations 
of key biblical events156 in terms of a post-metaphysical view of 
God as divine transforming possibility. One significant feature of 
this view is the insistence that God conceived as possibility is not 
156. Events such as the burning bush, the Shulamite women and the transfiguration of Christ.
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to be understood simply as an intrinsic possibility of the historically 
evolving world. God has indeed a relationship to the historical 
world, but as a transfiguring possibility beyond its own intrinsic 
possibilities. Here we are in the domain of eschatology, not 
teleology, of ethical invocation, not latent purpose. We are ‘[…] 
where the infinite eschaton intersects with the finite order of 
being’ (Kearney 2001:8).
Or (Kearney 2001) again:
[F ]rom an eschatological perspective, divinity is reconceived as that 
posse or possest which calls and invites us to actualise its proffered 
possibilities by our poetical and ethical actions. (p. 105)
A striking feature of this conception of God as possibility is the 
claim that although God has a bearing on human history, human 
history has a comparable bearing upon God. Kearney (2001) 
provocatively claims:
God will be God at the eschaton. That is what is promised […] the 
promise remains powerless until and unless we respond to it […] God 
depends on us to be. (p. 4)
Henceforth, God may be recognised as someone who becomes 
with us, someone as dependent on us as we are on him. Is such a 
thing possible? Not for us alone. But it is not impossible to God – 
if we help God to become God. How? By opening ourselves to 
the ‘loving possibility’ by acting each moment to make the 
impossible that bit more possible.
This is for Kearney how the somehow can be unravelled whereby 
the other and the same, God and humankind, transcendence and 
immanence can be related together in ethical terms. But how are 
we then to reimagine the possibility of God in our everyday lives? 
How are we to experience God after the death of God? Through 
sacramental imagination (SI).157 To come to such an SI, we have to 
take the third way.
157. Kearney uses two concepts with similar meaning in this regard, namely, ‘sacramental 
imagination’ or ‘sacred imagination’.
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Anatheism as third way
If the word was in the beginning, so was hermeneutics is the first 
and foremost remark by Kearney (2010:xi) on his Anatheism: 
Returning to God after God which raises the importance of the 
question: ‘Where do I speak from?’ As a philosopher who grew 
up in Ireland, he sees himself intellectually as a Protestant and 
emotionally as a Catholic.
We live today – according to Kearney – in a context in which 
the God question is returning with a new sense of urgency. What, 
however, do we mean when we speak of God? It is a question of 
religious, political and philosophical importance. Kearney 
believes it is ‘an increasingly pressing inquiry for our “postmodern” 
age where the adversarial dogmas of secularism and absolutism 
threaten the option of considered dialogue’ (Kearney 2010:xiii).
His ‘pressing inquiry’ is formulated in the following ways: How 
do we speak of the sacred after the disappearance of God? What 
comes after God (‘ana’)? What follows in the wake of our letting 
go of God? What emerges out of the night of not-knowing, that 
moment of abandoning and abandonment?158 Especially for 
those who – after ridding themselves of ‘God’ – still seek God 
(Kearney 2010:3)? All these questions are bound together in the 
coined word ‘anatheism’. Anatheism is for him ‘an invitation to 
revisit’ what might be termed a primary scene of religion: the 
‘encounter with [a] radical Stranger [whom] we choose, or don’t 
choose, to call God’ (Kearney 2010:7). Three elements characterise 
the Anatheistic Project, namely protest, prophecy and sacrament.
For Kearney, the starting point of the element of protest is 
firstly to concede: I know nothing of God because then ‘one can 
begin to recover the presence of holiness in the flesh of ordinary 
158. Kearney (2010:235) qualifies and explains the experience that he calls the ‘dark night of 
the soul’ as follows: ‘This private moment – the first “a” – is an indispensable to anatheism. 
But in “a-n-a” we have two A’s. And if the first “a” is the “a” of atheism, the second “a” is the 
“not” of the “not”. The negation of the negation. The double A-A of anatheism. A reopening 
to something new. After all.’ 
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existence’ (Kearney 2010:86). It is not an elite question but a 
question for anyone that has experienced instants of deep 
disorientation, doubt and dread.159 Kearney turns in his hermeneutic 
narrative to the three confessional responses to biblical revelation, 
namely Judaism (Abraham, Gn 18), Christianity (Mary and Gabriel) 
and Islam (Muhammad), to give content to his Anatheistic 
Project.160 In these responses, he specifically focuses on the 
possible reactions of either hostility or hospitality. Why? For him 
religion is capable of the best and worst (the great stories of Israel 
are testaments to the paradoxical origins of religion in both violent 
conflict and peaceful embrace). You either welcome or refuse the 
stranger. Monotheism is the history of this wager (Kearney 
2010:22). God is revealed après-coup, in the wake of the encounter 
in the trace of his passing (‘afterwardsness’). If divinity moves 
159. Elsewhere he states: ‘The shortest route from wonder to wonder is loss’ (Kearney 2010:13).
160. For Kearney, the anatheist wager has five main components, namely imagination, 
humour, commitment, discernment and hospitality. In brief, a few comments on these 
components (Kearney 2010:40ff.): (1) Imagination. One cannot wager unless one has 
freedom to choose. Such choice presupposes our ability to imagine different possibilities 
in the same person, to see the other before us as a stranger to be welcomed or rejected. 
Our perception is already a hermeneutic ‘seeing’ as. For Kearney, the act of faith is the 
belief in the possibility of the impossible, of a possibility beyond the impossible. And it all 
starts with a divine call and human response. In short: Revelation begins with imagination. 
(2) Humour. The ability to encounter and compose opposites: what I see as impossible and 
possible at one and the same time. It is the creative response to enigma, contradiction and 
paradox. Kearney points us towards the Latin root: humus. Humus reminds us: humour, 
humility and humanity share a common source (e.g. Jesus asking his disciples: Who 
do you think I  am?). Humour as deep humility before the excess of meaning the divine 
stranger carries. (3) Commitment. Our response to the stranger is already a decision. 
Commitment – in the sense of betrothal – is the movement of the wager that makes truth 
primarily a matter of existential transformation (cf. Kearney 2010:44). (4) Discernment. 
Simultaneous with other aspects. Occurs at the most basic affective and preconceptual 
levels. Distinguishes between a blind leap of faith and wise one (cf. Kearney 2010:44). Not 
irrational. Seeing as – a reading of the stranger as this or that. Receive him or her with our 
eyes wide open. Discernment is a matter of prereflective carnal response to the advent 
of the other before it becomes a matter of reflective cognitive evaluation (cf. Kearney 
2010:46). (5) Hospitality. Is there from the beginning and coterminous with the other four. 
For Kearney, love of the stranger is a form of faith seeking understanding. We always run 
the risk of being mistaken, of getting it wrong. Love – as compassion and justice – is the 
watermark. Kearney (2010:47) gives a simple but clear explanation: ‘There is a discernible 
difference between one that gives water to the thirsty and one who does not.’
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towards us cataphatically in the face of the foreigner, it also 
absolves itself apophatically from the immediate group.
The afterwardsness is the afterwardsness that springs from 
the notion of incarnation as kenosis, of the self-emptying of the 
omnipotent God. In this context, to say ‘God’ is for Kearney 
(2010) the question to ask what the more is:
Something beyond childish superstition and fetishism? Something 
that gestures towards a divinity that may be in flesh and blood, here 
and now, if we allow it, responding to the name that calls by creating 
a place where the one who comes can arrive in our midst? (p. 57)
Answering this question leads from the sovereign to the servant, 
to the power of the powerless. In this sense: anatheism is a form 
of post-theism that allows us to revisit the sacred in the midst of 
the secular. It is a revisitation that confirms specific no’s. The no’s 
of Omni-God of celestial might; the no’s of the idea that God 
orchestrates good and evil alike. If anything is dead, it is the 
traditional thought of God, that is, a God as deus ex machina 
in  times of need. Also – if anything is dead – it is the modern 
individualist conception of private salvation.
It is ‘after the death of this God’, speaking God without religion 
(Bonhoeffer), that is, after the protest and the prophecy (in short: 
the challenge to the God of otherworldly omnipotence), that we 
can ‘return’, find, discover, disclose an SI. For Kearney, the SI 
entails the sacramental return to the holiness of the everyday. 
Kearney is adamant that Christianity professes both a pilgrim 
(quest: a kingdom to come) and sacramental vocation (the 
kingdom has already come). It is the hosting of the transcendent 
in the immanence of the presence. Anatheism draws from these 
two vocations, seeking to combine the pilgrim commitment to 
protest and prophecy with a sacramental return to epiphanies of 
the everyday. Sacramental return is a retrieval of the extraordinary 
in the ordinary. Stronger – more positively formulated: the 
sacramental invokes the power of yes in the wake of no:
 • Marks an opening towards a God whose descent into flesh 
depends on our response to the sacred summons of 
God-talk, the biblical prophets and Richard Kearney
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the moment. (This calls for a special attentiveness to infinity 
embodying itself in daily acts of Eucharistic love and sharing; 
it is a retrieval of the sacramental in sensible.)
• The ghost of metaphysical idealism is laid to rest. We return to 
the body in its unfathomable thisness.
• We have to move beyond religious forms disfigured by 
otherworldly metaphysics to a faith in the divine potential 
inherent in the everyday life of action and suffering, of 
attention and service to others (Kearney 2010:93–94).
• Preparatory moment for sacramental vision: Cloud of 
unknowing (docta ignorantia) experiences that pave the way 
for the deepest wisdom of reality (Kearney 2010:96).
But how is the power of the yes to be realised? What are we to 
do? Differently put: How are we to move from sacred imagination 
to sacred praxis, to translate epiphanies of transcendence into 
the immanence of everyday action?
Negatively, what we are not to do is to use religion to dominate 
politics (religious wars, crusades or inquisitions – fuelled by 
pathological religious passions). Positively, what we are to do is 
the sacralising of the secular, and secularising of the sacred!161 
This is the third moment of the Anatheistic Project in concretely 
answering the questions if formulated in terms of the other or in 
161. Kearney (2010:139ff.) gives a very insightful discussion of his understanding of the 
relationship of the secular and the sacral. In this regard, he argues that it is from the task of the 
re-envision of the relationship between the holy and profane as such that we can pass from 
theophany to praxis while avoiding the traps of theocracy and theodicy (Kearney 2010:139). 
The former, namely secular, is seen as the dominant scientific worldview that is driven by 
an attitude of disenchantment! A disenchantment that is religion-unfriendly! Religion – as 
institutionalised wishwill thinking – is seen as a primitive rest of earlier civilisations. All we 
have left after the sacral has left us is exclusive humanism. Kearney (2010:140ff.) strongly 
rejects this understanding and explores a privative and affirmative perspective on secularism 
from the Latin term saeculum [of what turns towards the world], as indication of a specific 
period of time, that is, to direct our attention to a particular time. A secular attitude as such 
does not exclude the possibility of faith that is attentive for the realm of action and suffering, 
thus for lived experience. It is indeed directed toward a faith that is detached, apart from 
lived experience, and finds expression in private interiority or otherworldly abstractions. The 




terms of the stranger. How is the stranger something more; how 
is the everyday something more?
The third moment of SI complements a prophecy of promise 
with concrete attention to embodied divinity. It combines a 
messianicity of waiting with an engagement with the incarnate 
stranger before us. In short: kenotic hospitality in which we open 
ourselves to receiving our own God back again, a gift from the 
other. It finds expression among others of the transformation of 
injustice into justice, in the passion to serve others in need.
God-talk: The prophets and Kearney
Are there comparative elements of continuity and of discontinuity 
between the prophets and Kearney’s God-talk? Given the sheer 
quantity and very diverse socio-historical background of 
prophetic writings, any remarks here must necessarily be of a 
cursory and preliminary nature. Studies that focus more on 
specific lines of prophetic tradition162 will be able to fill these with 
much greater content than the constraints of this chapter allow. 
The following paragraphs are therefore to be understood as 
nodes of meaning that I tentatively formulate to invite further 
and deeper reflection on their respective contextual meaning-
making mapping.
Firstly, the very different historical-sociological contexts of 
the God-talk of both the prophets (understood as written 
prophetic literature) and Kearney can most surely be best 
described in terms – on the one experiential hand – of pain, 
trauma, disillusionment and disorientation, violence and 
cruelties.163 On the other relational hand, they represent historical 
162. George Fisher in his Theologien des Alten Testaments that was published in 2012.
163. Stulman and Kim (2010:4–5) refer to an earlier remark by the Dutch Catholic priest Henri 
Nouwen in which he captures the contemporary contextual experience of many, whether in 
Europe, Asia, America or Africa, when he writes: ‘History is filled with violence, cruelties and 
atrocities committed by people against people […]. But never before has it been possible 
for humanity to commit collective suicide, to destroy the whole planet and put an end to all
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periods of deep transcendental loss, fractured hope, brokenness, 
darkness and displacement. Both find themselves in places 
(as  interpretative communities) – Stulman and Kim (2010:12) 
describe them as ‘communities that are living with an acute sense 
of liminality’ – where they in their meaning-making mapping 
have to create space for re-newed or re-vised, re-orientated or 
re-established religious stories, that is, for attending, coming 
to  terms, coping, looking after their severed experiences and 
witnesses to transcendence.
Secondly, both want to find, capture and express a relevant 
‘message’ or discourse for their respective contexts and times in 
their God-talk – messages in which God is in multivarious manners 
the focus; at the same time, it is messages in which our faith 
relationships are intensely scrutinised as life before and with 
God. It is God-talk in which very specific historical circumstances 
are addressed and are addressed critically (e.g. to expose 
communal acts of injustice). Both are relentlessly honest about 
the experienced deep ruptures of life (to name but two examples: 
the atrocities of the European Holocaust and the Irish revolution 
and freedom battles). It is God-talk in which specific unacceptable 
convictions, attitudes and perspectives are called to be left 
behind and ‘new’ hearts (convictions, obedience and perspectives) 
to be pursued and realised – all for the sake of the holy God who 
is confessed and worshipped. Both radically refuse in facing life 
to be silenced by their respective eventual, spiritual and political 
adversaries!
Thirdly, in over-generalised terms, specific differences can 
also be noted. The prophets in saying ‘God’ – with all their specific 
(footnote 163 continues...)
history.’ On his remark, they elaborate as follows Stulman and Kim (2010:4–5): ‘The potential 
for global devastation has shattered conventional renderings of hope, beauty, and meaning. 
It has violated our sense of self and morality, and it has created a chasm deep enough to 
engulf political and civic discourse, as well as art, literature and music. But what is perhaps 
even more disturbing is that the surplus of violence exceeds our capacity to imagine. It shuts 
down our ability to feel, exacerbates our loss of control, and it results in debilitating fear – 
fear that we are less human than intended.’
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variances – direct their words from a deep awareness of 
the  holiness of their creator God, the God of history and of 
all nations, towards the people’s apostasy, wrongdoing (thus: 
hamartiological focus) and subsequent consequential destruction. 
The destruction is proclaimed paradoxically – God cannot endure 
Israel’s (covenantal) disobedience any longer, and at the same 
time, God cannot stop loving his people! SI finds its deepest 
expression in obedience before God. Kearney in saying ‘God’ 
from a perspective of a God who may possibly be directs his 
words from a deep awareness of God’s holy Otherness that 
strangely finds concrete expressions as the kenotic love of God 
in our embodied, that is, in the welcoming of the Other, in the 
hospitality towards the stranger, the sacral in the secular, in 
the SI of the everyday (thus: existentially). The latter expressions 
are highly critical of traditional thought of God, of an Omni-God 
of celestial might, of a God as deus ex machine in times of 
neediness. Are also deeply critical of ‘sayings about our relations 
to God’ in which faith is reduced to interiority, to a modern 
individualistic conception of private salvation. For Kearney, SI 
finds its deepest expression in welcoming otherness. The strong 
hamartiological focus for the sake of God’s holiness is re-directed 
to an existential focus of God’s kenotic presence in the everyday 
in taking care of God’s creation and creatures.
To conclude, both Kearney and the prophets represent 
powerful meaning-making mapping discourses for their specific 
historical contexts of embodied personhood before and with 
God. Both open up spaces for new, re-established, revised God-
stories that refuse to be silenced in spite of brokenness, 
disorientation, trauma, radical suffering in their quest for meaning 
and hope. Both explore in their own respective manners the 
creative poetic possibilities of the moments where ordinary and 
everyday aesthetics expressions have been ruptured by moments 
of unspeakable pain. Whereas the prophets are deeply engaging 
in their interpretative communities with the question of a 
templeless faith and the possibilities of welcoming their God in a 
strange land, Kearney is asking in his own characteristic manner 
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about faith in God after having lost one’s faith in God. Both are 
after all about a return to (or off) God. Only the former sometimes 
couples the land question to the return. Otherwise, it seeks to 
return to God in a new land. The latter explores a return to God 
in the acoustic space (as a third way between militant atheism 
and dogmatistic onto-theology) where God’s call to faith can be 
heard anew in the discovery of an SI, that is, finding and 
welcoming the sacred in the ordinary there wherever one is. 
Formulated in a pastoral manner as last word: Both discourses 
are deep engagements with interpretative communities to 
empower them to take back their lives and carve out a future 
when none seems possible (cf. Stulman & Kim 2010:17).
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Introduction164
The year 2017 celebrates the 500-year anniversary of the 
Reformation. In its time and context, the Reformation aimed to 
redress a God-talk that tended to show favour to those who 
adhered to the theology of the then Roman Catholic Church. At 
times, the church’s doctrine was characterised by exclusivism 
and was determined in distinguishing between those who 
belonged to the faith and those who did not. The church was not 
164. This chapter was first presented as a paper at the 2017 conference of the Theological 
Society of South Africa, hosted by Stellenbosch University.
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always a welcoming place to be, and Christianity was seldom a 
religion that allowed for a diversity of opinions. Then again, this 
may be a criticism levelled against the church and the Christian 
religion irrespective of time and space. Considering the modern 
context, it appears as if Christianity is once again faced with a 
very particular narrative of exclusion and self-isolation. This time 
it is not a self-isolation borne out of a need to protect the Christian 
religion or the church. Instead, it is a self-isolation that focuses on 
the perpetuation of particular social and political identities, 
worldviews and belief systems (not necessarily religious).
Let me illustrate: It can be safely assumed that the September 11 
(2001) attacks in the USA changed the course of history 
(Du Toit & Lubbe 2002). These events impacted on the traditional 
West’s notions of diversity, inclusivity and hospitality. For 
decades, the idea of ‘the American dream’ espoused images of 
the West being a haven for diversity – that everyone was 
welcome. Such hospitality hinged on the premise that everyone 
who took advantage of this invitation could make a contribution 
towards the well-being of American society (and its democracy).
Following the attacks of 2001, the USA (and other Western 
countries) questioned their own levels of ‘hospitality’. What 
followed was an increase in security, growing caution and 
scrutiny of those who entered these countries and a cycle of 
retributive acts of violence. The persistent to-and-fro of this 
violence between the West and groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) must have had a psychological 
impact on all sides; it escalated social suspicion of the ‘other’, 
expressed apprehension when the ‘different’ were encountered 
and increased a sense of having to create a safe space for their 
respective socio-ideological ‘in-groups’.
If the recent political history of the West is anything to go by, 
the rise of the Trump administration and Brexit are indicative of 
societies that have become critical of the levels of hospitality once 
proclaimed by their liberal worldviews. Instead, these momentous 
events speak of social fear, anxiety, self-isolation and effectively a 
political redelineation of the conditions of their  hospitality. 
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Fear, anxiety and self-isolation are ingredients for the building of 
walls, whether these walls are literal or metaphorical. The higher 
and stronger the ‘walls’, the more effectively society is able to 
differentiate between the self and the other, distinguishing 
between the in-group and the out-group, and the easier it is to fall 
into the trap of adhering to social generalisations.
It is then no wonder that events take place like the attacks on 
Muslim worshippers at Finsbury Park, clearly motivated by social 
generalisations and prejudice stemming from maladaptive 
schemas and fuelled by fear, anxiety, anger and isolation. Before 
Darren Osborne drove a van into a crowd of worshippers, he is 
quoted as having shouted ‘I want to kill all Muslims’ (Booth, 
Cobain & Morris 2017). This utterance carries all the traits of a 
self-isolating, maladaptive worldview. Of course, it would be 
unfair to typify Osborne’s approach as the general view held by 
society. On the contrary, his acts are viewed as extremist and 
carried widespread condemnation. Nonetheless, his radical views 
must be noted, and subsequently, one should take heed that the 
rise of radical religious orientations is leading to increased 
incidences of violence and subsequently also isolating 
nationalisms, patriotisms and overall intolerance. The voices of 
integration, social cohesion of diverse population groups and 
multidimensional civil society are being challenged by voices 
that call for the reestablishment of primary identities of origin, 
culture, language and, perhaps subliminally, religion.
The world has changed; this is beyond dispute. Further, the 
world is changing, and hence, theologians have to ask what we 
are to make of God-talk in this changing global landscape. Is 
there a theological approach that can inform a Christian response 
to the overt polarisation of people, religions and worldviews?
It is my view that the contribution made by Richard Kearney, 
an Irish philosopher who has ventured into the discussion on 
religion and social cohesion, is a promising approach. Advocating 
non-violence, Kearney argues for a God-talk that takes the risk of 
making the self vulnerable to the other, with the hope of not only 
finding in the ‘stranger’ a friend but also finding God.
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The status quo in encountering 
the Other
As a student of Ricoeur, it is only fitting for Kearney to begin his 
wandering into a ‘strange’ God-talk by asking the question: 
‘Where do I speak from?’ (Kearney 2010:i). He answers this 
question by describing his journey as one where his life was 
shaped by different forms of conflict, conflict that ultimately 
aimed to polarise people, whether American and Middle-Eastern, 
Catholic and Protestant in Ireland or black and white in South 
Africa. He speaks as a person who was raised in Western religion, 
politics and worldviews. This does not make him apologetic with 
regard to Western thoughts and actions. On the contrary, 
Kearney engages critically with his own world, his own beliefs 
and his own understanding of God.
Off the bat, Kearney offers his first critique of Western thinking, 
namely that in the West, notions of self-identity are measured as 
the good while the other is dealt with from the perspective of 
suspicion (Kearney 2002:7–8). I do not think that this hermeneutic 
of suspicion is necessarily a Western-specific notion. Our 
biological make-up informs us that the threat comes from the 
‘outside’, and any perceived threat engages our primal defence–
attack mechanisms (LeDoux 1998:138–178). Nonetheless, Western 
worldviews with their individual-centred approaches seem to 
emphasise suspicious and cautious engaging with the other. 
Describing this (almost) natural form of prejudice, Kearney falls 
back on Levinas’s notion of ‘ontology of sameness’ and Derrida’s 
‘logocentrism’ (Kearney 2002:9) as philosophical foundations for 
dealing with this suspicious way of life.
In Levinas’s ‘ontology of sameness’, the other is first 
encountered as an entity outside the self. The other is primarily 
perceived as a threat who enters into an unspoken dialogue with 
the self (Cohen 1986):
The unspoken message which appears in the face of the other is: do 
not kill me; or, since the message has no ontological force, but is the 
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very force of morality: you ought not kill me; or, since the alterity of 
the other’s face is alterity itself: thou shalt not kill. (p. 7)
When self encounters the other, the self and the other’s self are 
moved to ethical and moral reflections, determining what unfolds 
in the meeting event (Levinas & Kearney 1986). The ‘ontology of 
sameness’ then suggests that this move to personalised ethical 
responses, where the focus is on my response and on the other’s 
my response – the identification of the self in the other and the 
other in self – creates the option to forego defence mechanisms 
and to ‘become incarnate selves in the face of incarnate others’ 
(Kearney 2010:160).
Derrida’s ‘logocentrism’, according to Kearney, follows similar 
lines. The unspoken word of law, rights, justice, contracts, duties 
and pacts set the conditions for hospitality in any given context 
(Kearney 2002:11). It is up to the host to choose an approach of 
radical hospitality, as the host has no way to guarantee that the 
guest will naturally comply with the expectations set out by the 
unspoken word. In both Levinas’s and Derrida’s approaches, 
the  hermeneutic of suspicion is acknowledged, but the move 
towards a positive encounter between the self and the other 
rests squarely on the decision of the self to risk hospitality.
Perhaps this hermeneutic of suspicion, the over-cautious 
response of considering the other as a threat (and acting on the 
premise that the other is a threat) lies at the heart of the 
perpetuating cycles of violence and self-isolation that we witness 
in the world today. Kearney then responds with a call to actively 
and deliberately take the risk of making oneself vulnerable to 
the other by offering the gift of hospitality. This requires a shift in 
thinking, a move that Kearney calls the transition from optocentrism 
(emphasis on sight) to carnal hermeneutics (emphasis on touch). 
As beings who are embodied in the context of a particular time and 
space, reality is mediated through the senses (Kearney & Treanor 
2015:2). The reason we are able to perceive threat is as a result of 
information passing through the senses, informing the self that 
something or someone exists beyond the parameters of the self.
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Our first encounter with the other is usually visual – we see the 
other. The optocentric response prefers to keep a distance 
between the self and the other, where the other is viewed as an 
object and distinct from the self (Kearney 2015:30). To see a 
person allows the subject (self) to operate with the knowledge 
that safety is found in the distance between the self and the 
other. Carnal hermeneutics, on the other hand, engages the other 
senses, of which touch is the most profound. Whether it be in the 
shaking of hands, the sharing of a meal or ultimately in intimate 
contact, the distance between the self and the other is removed, 
leaving the self in a place of vulnerability, taking a chance that 
hospitality shown will result in a life-giving experience and not 
unfold in the most negative imaginings that suspicion can conjure 
up (Kearney 2015:89–98, 199–215).
Kearney develops these ideas in his book Anatheism: Returning 
to God after God, emphasising the point that not only does 
hospitality facilitate community and reconciliation between 
people but also the mystery of God is encountered in the process.
A ‘strange’ response
Kearney’s thesis in Anatheism: Returning to God after God is that 
God meets people (us) through the stranger (them). He deduces 
this point by citing all three Abrahamic religions, identifying the 
common theme of how the religious pundits miss the revelation 
of God, while those on the margins, who have nothing to lose by 
displaying hospitality, are able to meet God. Whether it be 
Abraham under the Mamre tree (Kearney 2010:3–20), Jesus 
feasting with sinners and tax collectors (Kearney 2010:136) or 
the Prophet meeting God in the cave (Kearney 2010:30–46), 
these God-encounters break the rigid framework of religious 
fundamentalisms, as if God refuses to be defined by them. It is in 
the God-talk of a well-defined god that theists build a wall 
between the self and the other, where the in-group hold fast to 
the basic fundamentals of the faith, while those who form part of 
the out-group are often marginalised and labelled. They are then 
Chapter 10
229
encouraged to relinquish these labels before they can be 
welcomed back into the ‘community of faith’.
By the same token, atheism, which may serve as a disillusioned 
response to theism, builds a wall between those who seek 
freedom outside the strict fundamentals of religion and those 
who continue to subscribe to a theistic god. Both theism and 
atheism have very distinct forms of God-talk. It may seem to be 
a contradiction to describe atheism as having a God-talk, but 
without a God-talk, atheism has little or nothing to protest 
against. Richard Dawkins is a prime example of an atheist with a 
very particular kind of God-talk. The God-talk he employs in The 
God Delusion, for instance, is one that protests against the very 
God-talk propagated by the theists, who remain unmoved when 
it comes to critiquing their faith claims (Dawkins 2006). So, here 
we have two polarised groups, all because of God-talk, and the 
wall between them consists of the rigid adherence to their 
respective beliefs … and in the end neither has much to show in 
terms of a providing a life-giving God-encounter.
It is here that Kearney introduces a third way, a way he calls 
‘anatheism’. The prefix ‘ana-’ does not mean ‘another’, as if 
another theism would solve the problem of polarisation, or as if 
another theism would be the real theism – the real encounter 
with God. If it were, then such a new form of theism would do 
nothing more but add another wall, one between the old theism 
and the new. No, ‘ana-’ is used as a process of stepping-back and 
returning to God after the god of theism became the irrelevant 
god of atheism. He (Kearney 2014) describes it as follows:
But in a-n-a we have two A’s. And if the first ‘a’ is the ‘a’ of a-theism, 
the second ‘a’ is the ‘not’ of the ‘not’. The negation of the negation. 
The double A-A of anatheism. A reopening to something new. After 
all. (p. 235)
The re-meeting with God, a fresh divine revelation in an authentic 
life experience, is what Kearney refers to when he notes that ‘[…] 
certain deep experiences can undergo disenchantment after 
which we may return again to them again in a new light, over and 
over’ (Kearney 2014:234).
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In anatheism, God is not encountered as God, or at first 
recognised as God, for the defined god is nothing but the 
domesticated image of our understanding – God created in our 
own image. God meets Abraham through the wandering 
strangers who seek food, drink and shelter; the shepherds meet 
God through the stranded strangers in the stable; Muhammad 
meets God through the strange presence in the cave; the theme 
repeats itself in the Abrahamic religions over and over again. The 
key to the encounter is not through God forcing a divine meeting 
with the self, but through and when the self ventures to show the 
gift of hospitality instead of the act of hostility towards the other 
(Kearney 2014:238). The repetitive nature of this form of God-
encounter makes the Divine dynamic and, in a Levinasian manner, 
requires of us to recognise the dynamism of our own self in the 
Being of God. Anatheism therefore is not only a fresh way in 
which we encounter God but a dynamically refreshing way in 
which we encounter the other and discover new life in the self – 
returning in a fresh way in order to move forward (Kearney 
2014:234).
To open oneself to this form of encounter entails risk. Kearney 
recognises this risk and proposes that with every act of meeting 
with the other, the self has to make a wager. The self needs to 
discern whether the other acts as a guest or as an enemy (Kearney 
2015:17). Interestingly, the Latin word that forms the basis of 
English words like ‘hospitality’ and ‘hostility’ is the word hostis, 
which can be translated as either ‘guest’ or ‘enemy’ (Kearney 
2010:38). Irrespective of whether the other acts as guest or 
enemy, the self in the gift of hospitality will also encounter God; 
whether it be God joining us in new life or God meeting us in our 
suffering in the event that our hospitality has been abused.
Some reflections
Now, what are we to make of anatheism? Of course, questions 
are posed of Kearney’s approach. Sands, for instance, argues 
that Kearney merely reinterprets God alongside others who 
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already have had a God-experience but does so from the 
limitations of his own biases and suspicion which is in fact the 
writing of a new dogmatic line in theology (Sands 2016:10). 
A further question would be: What are we to do with religious 
tradition? Is it merely to be appreciated as the story of the 
development of our response to God through the means of 
religion? Or what about the more detailed aspects of religious 
traditions such as the sacraments – are we, by being suspicious 
of traditions in religion, to throw out the baby with the bathwater 
in order to reinvent a religion that is aesthetically more palatable 
for today’s context? Are we creating God in our own image, our 
own hopes, our own projected eschatons, especially if we want 
these eschatons to build bridges and destroy the dividing walls? 
Is this truly a new kind of God-encounter, an anatheism, or is it a 
kind of theism that we want and are thus subsequently inventing?
As valid as these questions are, two points need to be noted. 
Firstly, the hermeneutic of anatheism is nothing new in the 
Abrahamic religions; Kearney merely identified the recurring theme 
and named it. Along with it, there are some truths to be learnt, one 
of which is that we should guard against religious Empire building, 
for even when we have an authentic God-experience and ask 
whether we should ‘build huts’ to commemorate this experience, 
God will surprise again by manifesting in a different stranger. 
Secondly, Kearney does not demonise religious tradition or describe 
it as a lesser-preferred option. No, anatheism recognises the 
dynamic movement of sacred encounters, which sometimes 
manifest significantly through religious traditions and rituals, while 
at other times meet the self in a religious spaces. The point is that 
the culmination of encounter, wager and hospitality is the creation 
of sacred spaces and sacred moments. Hostility achieves the exact 
opposite. The sacred is not confined to religion and neither does 
spirituality have a monopoly on the sacred. Kearney (2014) suggests: 
The ‘sacred’ is somewhere between the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘religious’ 
[…]. The spiritual involves a seeking that does not necessarily involve 
religion; if by religion we understand a specific set of creedal truth 
claims, shared ritual traditions and institutional behavioural codes. 
(pp. 244–245)
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The sacred is what unfolds when the unifying presence of God 
enables the self and the other to transcend the boundaries that 
keep them apart, the walls that are determined to convince them 
that the other is always an enemy.
A ‘strange’ communion
‘Where do I speak from?’ I speak as a white, male, South African 
Methodist. Like Kearney, my life too has been shaped by historically 
based wall-building. Using Kearney’s understanding of anatheism 
as a backdrop, I can identify the bridge-building nature of sacred 
moments, especially in events such as the sacrament of Holy 
Communion. I have already in other papers reflected on Holy 
Communion as unifying sacrament (Bentley 2011, 2012, 2014, 2017), 
but I wish to return anew to the mystery of the sacrament and God’s 
ability to use this space as a practical instrument of reconciliation.
Indulge me for a moment as I imagine the unfolding of events 
during Holy Communion: Here, in front of me is a congregation, 
a group of people from different backgrounds, different cultures, 
speaking a variety of languages. If we were to take the time to 
speak to each one of them, we would find that they hold divergent 
political beliefs, identify across the spectrum of sexuality and carry 
with them a myriad of complex histories, successes and problems. 
Each one is present as a self, standing in the midst of the other. 
The self is already vulnerable, for the self looks at the other and 
admires some, is intimidated by others, perhaps even feels either 
superior to them or inadequate compared to them. Optocentrism 
dictates this space. One thing is certain: the self can definitely 
identify those with whom they would rather not share this 
space. This is exacerbated when the presiding minister asks the 
congregants to look around and to take note of who is present in 
this moment. Now the congregation is asked to take note of who 
is absent from this space. Do those absent not feel welcome? Is 
there any reason why they would consider it better to be absent 
than to be part of this moment? Has the church neglected its gift 
of hospitality? Has it instead been hostile towards the stranger?
Chapter 10
233
The minister shares the peace and asks the congregation to 
share the peace among each other. People turn towards each 
other, shaking hands or giving a hug, blessing each other with 
‘The peace of the Lord be with you’, responding with ‘And also 
with you’ (Methodist Conference Office 1975:B10). Some engage 
heartily, while the apprehension is tangible in others. It is obvious 
that some handshakes and hugs are forced, reluctantly making 
the self vulnerable to transcend the space of optocentrism so as 
to dare to touch.
It does not end there. Now everyone is invited to a common 
Table. It is not the church’s Table, neither is it the minister’s Table. 
It is the Lord’s Table and everybody is invited. As the elements 
are consecrated, the congregation sings Charles Wesley’s hymn 
(Wesley n.d.):
1. Come, sinners, to the gospel feast;
let every soul be Jesus’ guest.
Ye need not one be left behind,
for God hath bid all humankind.
2. Sent by my Lord, on you I call;
the invitation is to all.
Come, all the world! Come, sinner, thou!
All things in Christ are ready now.
3. Come, all ye souls by sin oppressed,
ye restless wanderers after rest;
ye poor, and maimed, and halt, and blind,
in Christ a hearty welcome find.
4. My message as from God receive;
ye all may come to Christ and live.
O let his love your hearts constrain,
nor suffer him to die in vain.
5. This is the time, no more delay!
This is the Lord’s accepted day.
Come thou, this moment, at his call,
and live for him who died for all. (n.p.)
The congregation makes their way to the Communion rail. As 
they kneel, they gather as a diverse community, a people who 
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would not usually spend time around each other’s tables. Here 
they are: black, white, rich, poor, the healthy, those who suffer 
ill-health, the disenfranchised, those who benefit from others’ 
hard labour … they are all here.
As they receive the Bread, they hear, ‘[t]his is the Body of 
Christ, take and eat’. The Body of the Divine touches my hand in 
the same way as it touches the hand of the other. The self 
becomes vulnerable to being touched (cf. Kearney 2015:27). 
I taste and eat. ‘The Blood of Christ shed for you. Take and drink.’ 
I taste and drink (cf. Kearney 2015:18). There is something sacred 
in this vulnerable moment where I am welcomed by the hospitality 
of the Table. Those who I considered as the other a moment ago 
become fellow sojourners as they too experience this sacred 
hospitality.
We leave the Table with the blessing (Methodist Conference 
Office 1975):
The blessing of God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, remain with you 
always. Amen. Go in peace in the power of the Spirit to live and work 
to God’s praise and glory. Thanks be to God. (p. B17)
This means that I am now required to extend the hospitality 
shown to me in turn to those whom I may encounter during the 
course of the week.
And so, the sacred moment moves beyond the religious into 
the secular, an open invitation to take the risk of encountering 
‘the other’.
Conclusion
Not everyone will share my view or experience of the Lord’s 
Table. Neither should they. This is where I experienced a sacred 
moment. It is not a moment to be prescribed or duplicated for 
others. To do so would be to ‘build huts’, to construct a theism 
through which we believe God should and must encounter all 
people. For me, this was one of Kearney’s anatheistic moments, 
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a returning to God after God, experiencing the transforming 
potential held concentrated in the gift of hospitality. Here, God, 
who for all means and purposes should see me as the other, took 
the wager of showing hospitality. In turn, as I become the guest, 
one request was made: ‘I have set you an example that you 
should do as I have done for you’ (Jn 13:15 NIV).
The Christian response to the increasing polarising of people 
in our communities is that the gospel was never intended to 
perpetuate the divisive action of building walls between people. 
There should therefore not be a Christian rationale for turning 
away the stranger, whether the stranger be a bearded Middle-
Eastern man wishing to travel to the West or refugees fleeing the 
atrocities in their home countries in order to find refuge elsewhere. 
The building of walls to keep out ‘the vulnerable’ could perhaps 
just be the most inhumane response we could offer.
Instead, religion by its own rich history of learning that there 
is something sacred in opening the door for the other must act in 
both faith and hope. It should act in faith as it reflects on its past, 
knowing the value that emerges from the gift of hospitality. 
Furthermore, it should act in the hope that the world its hospitality 
is contributing to is one that experiences healing through the 
sharing of this gift. In the present, the gift of hospitality is manifest 
in the gift of love … and perhaps right here the formulation of 
sacred hospitality is to be found in: ‘Love the Lord your God with 
your entire being, and love your neighbour as you love yourself’.165
Kearney’s anatheism calls for a re-encounter, a fresh God-
experience that unfolds in the existential expression of hospitality.
165. My own paraphrase of the twofold law of love.
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Appreciation and introduction
Looking at the books by Richard Kearney on my desk, I can still 
recall how they have touched me in various ways. Years 
ago Modern Movements in European Philosophy helped me to 
navigate the labyrinth of philosophy while writing a doctoral 
thesis, and The Wake of Imagination assisted me when thinking 
about doing Systematic Theology in South Africa (Venter 2004). 
More recently, The God Who May Be and Anatheism found 
their way into my whispering of the notion of a theo-episteme 
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(Venter 2012). And some, apart from their fascinating ideas, like 
Reimagining the Sacred, I love to feel and look at. I cannot but be 
deeply appreciative of these books by Richard Kearney.
But the touch reaches deeper: a world is constructed in these 
texts that are intellectually unsettling, challenging and undeniably 
enchanting. It is a world of poetics, a world of imagination, of 
stories and of conversation. It is a world where the sacred and 
the body count, a world of God and of dogs. The grammar 
employed in this world is one of reimagination, of possibility, of 
small things, a world of micro- and onto-eschatology. But it is 
also a world where hospitality is valued, of humans, of Otherness 
and of responsibility. And it is a world of discernment, where 
navigation is required. To switch metaphors, this house is 
beautiful – the design and the textures. Do I want to inhabit this 
carefully manicured house? Maybe, but.
I am a systematic theologian, more dilettante than conductor,166 
who thinks of dogmatics as constructive theology. I caught only 
seven fish, had three dogs and remain intrigued by the return of 
God in theology, and the Trinitarian Renaissance.167 And I am 
committed to the epistemological transformation of theology in 
a (post)apartheid condition. My academic questions centre on 
the possibility of an interdisciplinary discourse on God and the 
social possibilities of a re-envisioned Trinitarian theology. Hence, 
I am interested in the conversation between systematic theology 
and philosophy of religion168 and whether one could do anatheistic 
Trinitarian theology.169
166. See the Dutch scholar Miskotte’s famous reference to the dogmatician as ‘dilettante’ and 
‘conductor’ (1990).
167. Says Kearney (2016a:241), ‘I speak as a man from Cork, in his middle ages, who loves 
fishing, philosophy, dogs, and God […]’.
168. Kearney (2007:62) refers to ‘a fruitful dialogue’ between hermeneutical poetics and 
theological dogma, speculative metaphysics and empirical physics. See also the explicit 
reference to an ‘interdisciplinary approach’ (2016a:245).
169. Kearney is clearly informed about Trinitarian theology; see his suggestive comments 




A number of brief remarks may be necessary to situate the 
conversation. One should at least refer to Janicaud and to 
Heidegger. In a report on the status of contemporary French 
philosophy Janicaud voiced his concern that phenomenology 
had been hijacked by theology. The culprits he identified were 
Lévinas, Marion and Henry. ‘Theological turn’ became a short-
hand description of a vibrant discourse in philosophy. Janicaud 
himself was of the opinion that phenomenology should be 
radically atheistic (for the debate, cf. Janicaud et al. 2001). In 
other contexts, like for example the USA, the same sentiment 
was to be found. According to Caputo (2012:11), there was 
a  certain inevitability to Continental Philosophy of Religion 
taking a ‘theological turn’. The subdiscipline of Philosophy of 
Religion started to display a marked mutation from the 
conventional approach to this field of study. Increasingly the 
focus became the overcoming of metaphysics and the critique of 
onto-theology.
The looming figure behind all of this is obviously Heidegger. 
In his discussion of Western metaphysics, starting already with 
Aristotle, he sees an intimate link between ontology and theology. 
God functions as the highest being, the causa prima, the ground 
of all causality. He raises the question of a ‘post-metaphysical 
God’, a god outside this great chain of being, a more divine god 
to whom one can pray.170 The critique of onto-theology implies 
the attractive imperatives of unmasking idols in our construction 
of the divine and of rethinking transcendence beyond human 
mastering (see Schrijvers 2006:303, 313). Various thinkers 
accepted this challenge of radically construing the human 
god-talk beyond being. Some of the most prominent are 
Marion,  Caputo and Kearney (for an excellent treatment, see 
Gschwandtner 2013).
170. For a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of religion, cf. Vedder (2007).
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The question that concerns me here is the relationship 
between contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion and 
Systematic Theology. My impression is that, apart from a few 
exceptions,171 the various attempts to overcome onto-theology 
and think post-metaphysically about God have not been taken 
seriously by systematic theologians. The relationship and 
conversation between Philosophy of Religion and Systematic 
Theology should be reconceived, beyond what Gunton (1996) 
called ‘indispensable opposition’. Conversation has multilayered 
dynamics. It is obviously non-colonising; it informs, it challenges, 
it stimulates, it entertains, and it encourages self-reflection and 
possible self-transformation.
Anatheistic imagination
The questions Kearney raises help to focus the direction of his 
own creative reimagining. He is interested in ‘what kind of divinity 
comes after metaphysics’ (Kearney 2001a:2), ‘what kind of God 
comes again after the death of the Alpha God’ (2016a:256), ‘what 
do we mean when we speak of God’ (Kearney 2010:xi) and ‘how 
one (might) speak of the sacred after the disappearance of God’ 
(Kearney 2010:xvi). His notions of ‘anatheism’, ‘theopoetics’ and 
the ‘possible’ are crucial to understand how he thinks these 
questions may be addressed.
Anatheism conveys a double sense: abandonment and 
retrieval. Kearney emphatically wants to move beyond a specific 
understanding of God in the Christian tradition, one trapped 
in  metaphysics and in theodicy thinking, one which prioritises 
onto-theological categories of omnipotence, sovereignty and 
all  causality. His shorthand designation is the ‘Omni-God’, the 
171. One can mention here Grenz (2005). Sadly, his engagement with thinkers like Marion, 
Caputo and Kearney is cursory. In a recent article, Benjamins (2015), also discussing Kearney, 
views the potential contribution of post-secular thought as opening new perspectives 
on  transcendence for Systematic Theology, which weakens the opposition between the 
religious and the secular.
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‘Alpha God’ (cf. Kearney 2001b:161, 2009:167-174, 2016b:17, 
2016a:249). What this refers to is clear (Kearney 2006:11), ‘For 
too long theology and metaphysics have identified the divine 
with the most all-powerful of Beings. Sovereign, Self-sufficient 
substances. Transcendental Forms. First and Final Causes. 
Immutable essences.’ 
His rejection is, however, twofold; he distances himself at the 
same time from postmodern extremes where the alterity is so 
‘other’ that it is indistinguishable from monstrosity (Kearney 
2001b:164, 167). In a magnificent discussion of khora, he articulates 
his unease when deconstruction makes a preferential option for 
khora, which is more ‘archi-ultimate than God’ (Kearney 2003:203, 
205). Kearney is looking for a third option between khora and 
hyperousia (Kearney 2003:208).
The grammar of ‘ana’ in anatheism speaks of before and after, 
but is not a dialectical third term that supersedes atheism and 
theism. This ‘returning to God after God’ opens a space for the 
questioning of God where theists and atheists may converse 
(Kearney 2010:xvii, 2017:35), and it emphatically resists 
absolutists’ positions against or for the divine (Kearney 2010:16). 
For Kearney, this entails ‘an act of reimagining’ (Kearney 
2016b:10); it is a disposition vis-à-vis different positions (Kearney 
2016a:246).
His constructive and creative contribution is to be found in a 
new category of the ‘possible’. This as third option moves beyond 
being and non-being, and beyond the traditional opposition 
between the possible and the impossible (Kearney 2007:54). 
Referring to Nicholas of Cusa and his construct of possest (esse 
revealed as posse), Kearney proposes a notion of God ‘that 
neither is nor is not but may be’ (Kearney 2001b:170). What 
emerges here are connotations of promise, becoming and futurity 
(2009:180), says Kearney (2009:182): ‘God’ becomes ‘another 
name for the “more,” the “surplus,” the “surprise” that humans 
seek’. For Kearney (2016a:241), God is not a thing out there that 
can be described in an essentialist manner. This ‘enabling God’ is 
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Kearney’s proposal for a post-God, a God thought onto-
eschatologically; it is a re-imagining ‘in terms of both ontological 
being and eschatological becoming’ (2016a:249).
Crucial for Kearney is the switch from macro- to micro-
eschatology, to revisit the sacred in the midst of the secular, 
to turn to the ‘least of these’ (Mt 25:40), to imagine a ‘God of 
small things’ (Kearney 2007:52f., 2017:35), the ‘possibilising 
power’. His reimagination is clear: ‘We are talking here of a 
radically fragile, vulnerable, humble, appealing, loving divinity’ 
(Kearney 2016a:256). After three previous reductions – Hussel’s 
transcendental, Heidegger’s ontological and Marion’s donological – 
Kearney submits a fourth, an eschatological reduction (2006:5). 
His focus is on the ‘possibilising of essence, being, and gift’ 
(Kearney 2006:8).
Anatheism needs theopoetics, according to Kearney. This 
seemingly simple notion becomes quite multilayered and 
complex in his philosophy. Basically, it refers to the mutual 
recreation between the human and the divine, the relation 
between divine poiesis and human praxis (Kearney 2017:32, 34). 
This synergy, however, has much more radical implication for 
Kearney and involves a crucial ‘if’: ‘God can only be God if we 
enable this to happen’ (Kearney 2001a:2); ‘we […] must help God 
to be God’ (Kearney 2007:55, [author’s added emphasis]); ‘God 
is up to us, in the end’ (Kearney 2016a:250). Theopoetics involves 
more than ethics: it is hermeneutical, it is multidisciplinary and 
requires the arts. In this way it differs drastically from dogmatic 
theology. The fourth reduction ‘signals a return to poetry’ 
(Kearney 2006:12). Kearney’s constructive reimagining of God in 
terms of the possible cannot be mapped without these dynamics 
of imagination, interpretation and openness to various religious 
traditions and to artistic expressions. The superabundance of 
meaning requires a certain liberty that could be wrought only in 
this manner.
Kearney discusses the icon of Andrei Rublev of the Trinity as 
an example of hospitality, and this conveys also his conviction 
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that images are stronger than ideas and that art goes deeper 
than any theoretical theology. What is invited is nothing but 
carnal hermeneutics. The visit of the three strangers to Abraham 
was for Rublev a perfect icon for the three divine persons of the 
Christian deity. The relationship between the three is described 
by Kearney as an open-ended dance by equal partners, expressed 
by the Patristic term ‘perichoresis’. What is, however, central in 
Kearney’s interpretation is the chalice in the icon. This open 
space signifies chora, a fourth person, and ultimately ‘a space of 
endless possibility’, ‘a divine possibility [dunamis] beyond 
the  impossible [adunaton] of the human possible’ (Kearney 
2017:39, 41). The chalice is the gap ‘where the radically Other 
may arrive’ (Kearney 2010:25). Rublev’s icon finally ‘exemplifies 
the Trinity as a drama of lived hospitality’ (Kearney 2017:39).
Trinitarian imagination
Some brief clarifying remarks on Trinitarian theology may assist a 
conversation. What is at stake here and how does this allow for a 
possible dialogue with contemporary Philosophy of Religion and 
with Richard Kearney? The following comments are fragmentary, 
brief and aim at the present conversation.
The Trinitarian confession is the specific Christian identification 
of the divine. Often, Christianity is uncritically associated with 
a  generic divine being, the so-called classical theism, or the 
omni-monster. This is a far cry from liturgical practice with its 
identification of God as Father, Son and Spirit and from all major 
Christian thinkers throughout history who uphold a Trinitarian 
understanding of the divine. Claiming this does not imply that the 
church and theologians maintain stable or similar interpretations, 
but a fundamental conviction of the simultaneous unity and 
differentiation of the divine character functions as centripetal 
force in this religion. The differences between churches of the 
East and the West should not be minimised, but still they share 
the same basic conviction.
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This confession and eventual conceptual articulation with 
the  available intellectual tools emerged as the culmination of 
experiences (i.e. the resurrection and Pentecost),172 of scriptural 
interpretation and of interaction with empire.173 The experience 
of the dawn of the eschaton, of something drastically new 
prompted the early followers of Jesus of Galilea to start rethinking 
their inherited monotheistic Jewish faith.
The expression of a Trinitarian confession did not come easily, 
and the intense intellectual debate should be carefully taken note 
of. Seldom do the notions of imagination, courage and novelty 
receive their due in historical reconstructions. The revolutionary 
quality of patristic reconstructions should be understood. The 
homo-ousios ascription (i.e. Jesus having the same nature as the 
Father) of the Council of Nicea was a rejection of the conservatism 
of Arius, who could not imagine complexity and differentiation in 
the eternal ‘substance’ of the divine.174 At the same time, this 
formulation constituted a challenge to the Roman Empire, which 
valued order and not difference in the life of the divine (Rieger 
2007:91–100). The Cappadocians re-envisioned being and 
relations; the ‘essence’ of God is relational. Personhood and 
relationship are co-fundamental with being, nature and essence.175 
The classical thesis of Von Harnack that dogma amounted to 
the  Hellenisation of Christianity is widely questioned today 
(cf.  Markschies 2012). The early fathers used the available 
conceptual tools from their environment but drastically redefined 
172. Few studies have explored the Trinitarian confession from a phenomenological 
perspective; for one recent work, cf. Hart (2012). Coakley (2013:100–151) raised the question: 
Can the Trinity be experienced?
173. Cf. Rieger (2007:69–117) for an excellent discussion of Nicea and Chalcedon in the 
context of empire.
174. For a thorough discussion of homoousios, see Wiles (1965), and for one on the logic of 
Arianism and the problems their specific metaphysics caused for reconstruction of God in 
light of the Jesus event, cf. Williams (1983).




them; Schwöbel (2009) is of the opinion that Greek metaphysics 
was used to express the universal significance of the Christian 
gospel. Their metaphysics was revolutionary: it brought change 
within the divine, established relation as a key category and 
subtly disrupted colonial power.
What is seldom fully grasped is that the early church with the 
councils and their confessional articulation, by implication, 
contracts a great variety of traditions of both the Old and New 
Testament. The patristic rhetoric was thoroughly informed by 
scriptural testimonies and exegesis. A complex deity emerged, a 
deity who could not, for example, be sanitised from the ‘texts of 
terror’ or of a ‘dark side’. The unity of the Old and New Testaments 
was consistently maintained by orthodox theologians. Any 
attempt at selectivity or truncation was rejected.
The attribute tradition in Christian dogmatics, especially under 
the influence of the Reformed Scholastics, inhibited the 
crystallisation of this theo-revolution and kept the Christian God 
subservient to Greek metaphysics. Often, the metaphysical 
reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas is discredited for the captivity 
of the Christian divinity, and the influential role of post-
Reformational thinking is ignored. Only in the 20th century 
were  serious attempts made to redress this: to rethink God’s 
character Trinitarianly (cf. Gunton 2002). In theological discourse, 
this is  arguably one of the most productive developments of 
the  20th century. For example, this opened possibilities to 
associate God with suffering, with space, with beauty and with 
justice. Kearney’s suggestion (2001b:161) that ‘the orthodox 
onto-theological categories of omnipotence, omniscience and 
self-causality […] could do with a radical rethink sub specie 
historiae’ has been taken up in Christian Systematic Theology.
The so-called Trinitarian Renaissance of the 20th century, 
with roots going far back, arguably to the German Idealists and 
Romantics, is an attempt to embrace the full implications and 
potential of this confession, to ‘re-baptise God’, the ‘God after 
God’ (R Jenson), to ‘let the symbol sing again’ (E Johnson). 
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In distinction from earlier theology, which focused on the unity of 
God, this development has taken divine relationality with utmost 
seriousness. A deliberate attempt was made to move beyond 
thinking in terms of ‘being’. The major Protestant theologian of 
the 20th century, K. Barth, is an excellent proponent of this. He is 
explicitly resistant to an absorption of the doctrine of God into 
a  doctrine of being and states clearly his alternative (Barth 
1957:260, 263): ‘To its very deepest depths God’s Godhead 
consists in the fact that it is an event’. The intimate link between 
Trinity, life, act and event is the focus in Barth’s understanding of 
God. Jenson (1997:221) puts it succinctly: ‘God is what happens 
between Jesus and his Father in their Spirit’.176 Trinitarian theology 
can hardly be labelled onto-theology and should not be equated 
with classical theism (cf. Vanhoozer 2010:82–105). The social 
doctrine of the Trinity of the German theologian Moltmann is 
a  typical example of a post-metaphysical approach to an 
understanding of the triune mystery (cf. Rossi-Keen 2008).
I want to suggest that this development of Trinitarian 
rediscovery, which has been mentioned briefly, may amount to 
an anatheistic move, albeit not with adequate ‘negative capability’. 
There is a deliberate attempt to think in a new register, a relational 
one, and to take seriously LaCugna’s (1973:1) comment that 
‘[t]he doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine 
with radical consequences’. Earlier insights, especially those of 
the Cappadocians, have been retrieved and reimagined. Kearney’s 
(2003:207) gracious comment, ‘Not every notion of the Trinitarian 
God […] is a fetish of presence or hyperessence’, is  especially 
applicable here. This is true of a large number of relational 
Trinitarian theologies developed in our time. A vision of God and 
a way of life have been integrated. For a significant spectrum of 
theologians, the Trinity has become ‘our social programme’, 
motivating specific Christian speaking about politics, economics, 
aesthetics, evolution, disability and an alternative praxis.
176. The entirety of Chapter 13 in Jenson’s Systematic Theology is exceptionally important. 
In an attempt to rethink ‘being’ trinitarianly, he states (1997:218): ‘The life of God is constituted 
in a structure of relations, whose own referents are narrative’.
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The critical contribution has been to rethink divine action and 
agency in a post-theistic, richly pluralistic and nuanced manner. 
Motifs like the silence and the hiddenness177 of YHWH, kenosis of 
Jesus Christ, and – this is crucial – the freedom of the Spirit and 
newness, beauty and even chaos178 – all come into play, but with 
an explicit extra nos character.
In short, a Trinitarian imagination allows for a conversation 
with most of the postmodern concerns. The Trinitarian 
identification of the divine, in contemporary Systematic Theology, 
is a far cry from a typical theistic, metaphysical, theodicean 
monarch. An entire constellation of factors in the historical 
emergence of Trinitarian theology opens the potential for 
subversion of a typical metaphysical distortion of the divine. 
If the following dynamics are taken serious in a theo-reimagining – 
the redefinition of monotheism, the contribution of the 
Cappadocian fathers, the subtle challenge to Roman empire, 
the crucifixion of the man of Galilee, the Spirit as hypostatised 
love, the turn to relationality and the ‘practical significance’ – 
a  ‘new space’ (cf. Verhoef 2017:182f.) could be opened for 
Trinitarian theology to contribute to the post-metaphysical 
conversation. The life of the Triune God is an event traditionised 
as a narrative of a divine who gives Godself with gracious 
hospitality, a God who is free in love, who can never be 
domesticated as idol in any manner.179
Anxieties
I am sensitive not to give the impression that theopoetics must 
be refashioned in the image of Trinitarian theology. Too much 
177. This does not necessarily amount to what Kearney (2009:169) calls ‘subtle apologetics 
for apophatic theology’.
178. Cf. the Dutch scholar Van de Beek (1987:210–214) on the ‘Chaotiserende Gees’ based on 
the provocative work by his compatriot Van Ruler on ‘God and chaos’.
179. Cf. a discussion by Schüssler Fiorenza (2001) on the three idols of being, subjectivity 
and otherness.
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could be learned from this stranger to enrich the identity of 
the confession. Despite a genuine appreciation of the Kearney 
construct, I have a Trinitarian anxiety about a number of features 
of his poetic profile which I will discuss in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, too much of the multilayered traditions underlying 
Christianity seems to me truncated, or dismissed or ignored as 
representing the omni-God of metaphysics. Kearney’s reference 
to and use of scripture, which is impressive and admirable, is in 
the final instance, quite understandably, eclectic. Theopoetics 
operates selectively and creates an image that has been sanitised 
of offensive features. One often gets the impression that Kearney 
associates theology with a certain ‘inhibitedness’ and that 
philosophy enjoys a far greater freedom (see, e.g., 2007:62 – 
‘strictures’). A certain irony could be at play here. Kearney 
(2010:xvii) refers to philosophy as opening ‘a space for the 
questioning of God’. Theology is indebted to a scope of traditions 
that cannot be easily dismissed, and it does not have this eclectic 
freedom. Recent systematic projects, for example, by Coakley 
[théologie totale] and Kärkkäinen (Constructive Theology for a 
Pluralistic World) evidence the multidimensional and radical 
open nature of theology. The particular difficulty for Systematic 
Theology is to argue for coherence amidst divergent traditions 
and to integrate also the ‘texts of terror’ (Trible) into its 
representation of the divine profile.
Secondly, the ‘if’ is problematic in ‘God’s kingdom can only 
come if […]’ (see the emphatic statements in Kearney 2011:222, 
227). This ‘if’ could render the two theo-imaginings – the enabling 
God of Kearney and the Trinitarian God – ultimately incompatible. 
Does the ‘if’ hide a pervasive disillusionment in God’s faithfulness? 
Does ‘[t]he God of little things’ come after ‘[n]ight’, after the 
‘[w]aiting for Godot’? The genealogy of the primacy of the 
ethical can be traced, and the deep disillusionment in any 
theodicy is understandable, but should the belief in divine agency 
be abandoned? Among contemporary theologians, there is 
considerable reflection on the silence of God (cf. The Silent God 
by Korpel & De Moor 2011) and on the nature of divine action in 
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dialogue with science. But dependence becomes immensely 
problematic. The Kearney interplay between divine venture and 
human adventure is potentially frightening for those who suffer, 
who are weak and who yearn for justice. The Trinitarian dialectic 
between cross and resurrection via the interval of dark Saturday 
may open possibilities to reconceive divine impotence and divine 
initiative.
Thirdly, the central question in an engagement with Kearney 
and the anxieties a Trinitarian theologian experiences contract in 
the neglect of the notion of S/spirit in the theopoetics. For the 
Christian religion, sociologically speaking, the 20th century has 
been the century of the Spirit with the unexpected growth of 
Charismatic churches in the most unexpected places.180 Trinitarian 
theology has sensitised theologians not only to the prominence 
of the Spirit but also to the surplus of meaning of ‘ruach’ or 
‘pneuma’ in the various biblical traditions. Christian theologians, 
or at least some of them, have started to imagine the separation 
between the Father and Son at the cross, the beauty of the 
tabernacle, the novum of the resurrection, the unity between 
Jew and Gentile, the emergence of cosmic emergence and even 
cosmic chaos pneumatologically. Many of the central motifs in 
Kearney’s theopoetics – like imagination, discernment, art, the 
little ones, possibility – belong in a Trinitarian theology to 
the  domain of the Spirit. The ontological implications of the 
Pauline notions of the Spirit as arrabōn [guarantee, first 
instalment] or as aparchē [first fruits] for an eschatology are 
immense. The Spirit is the eschatological gift, whom we can 
grieve and even quench. The Spirit is the possibilising person in 
the Christian tradition. It is a question whether perichoresis 
allows, in a fairly strict Christian theological sense, for a fourth 
dimension: ‘the triadic model of epiphany implies a fourth 
dimension – the vacant space of advent for the new […]’ (Kearney 
2010:109; also 2006:10). Is there a fourth feminine space, or is the 
180. Kearney (2007:57) makes this suggestive aside, ‘The pneumatological call to speak in 
tongues commits itself here to a poetics of the poor and unremembered’.
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Spirit the very (personal) relation of love between Father and 
Son? This was the particular contribution of St Augustine to 
Trinitarian and pneumatological reflection to conceive of the 
Spirit as the bond of love (cf. Kotsko 2011). The Spirit is the space 
of possibility and of hospitality. This space is not a khora but is 
a Person.
Fourthly, what has happened to salvation? Are the small 
instantiations of justice salvation?181 Is this being addressed 
by the fourth (micro-)eschatological reduction? What more does 
Kearney’s God offer than – ‘[e]schatology is realised in the 
presence of the alien in our midst’ (2010:29)? The notion of 
‘eschatology’ in Kearney’s project warrants a study on its own, 
which cannot be done here. Religions have ultimately to do with 
salvation, and this is why they also persist (cf. Riesebrodt 2010). 
The Christian faith has a rich legacy of soteriological traditions, 
which is being explored in ever new historical contexts by 
theologians. The challenge is to rethink, after so many ‘turns’, 
what salvus may imply pluralistically. There is clearly an antenna 
for antimetaphysical, holistic, social and ecological approaches 
to human and planetary flourishing. A Trinitarian imagination is 
looking for a clearer referent to what is possible.
Promise
Kearney is emphatic about a gap ‘between the philosopher’s 
endless exploration of new beginnings and the practitioner’s 
proclamation of a return to the word of God’ (2010:75; 
cf. 2009:177, 179). The gap between Philosophy of Religion and 
Systematic Theology will and should remain, but the conversation 
between Trinitarian theology and Kearney’s theopoetics could, 
arguably, be most fruitful. Trinitarian theology could be enriched 
by a greater attention to imagination, possibility, everyday life, 
181. One wonders whether Kearney supports Ricoeur, who ‘abandons the notion of personal 
salvation in favour of service to others’ (Kearney 2011:223).
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alterity, human agency and space. The Kearney reimagining of 
the divine remains deeply touching, intellectually challenging 
and theologically disturbing. The task for a post-metaphysical 
Trinitarian theology would be to explore its considerable 
intellectual resources, already started in the 20th century with 
the so-called relational turn, to express clearer sentiments 
articulated by philosophy of religion, and specifically by Kearney, 
and articulate more coherently its own distinctive integrity. This 
could renew speaking the divine and contribute to human 
flourishing. This is the promise of an engagement.
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Introduction
Since the year 2011, a television production company and 
two broadcasting companies in the Netherlands have annually 
organised The Passion, a popular musical representation of the 
suffering, death and resurrection of Christ.182 The ritual has grown 
into a large, open-air media event that takes place once a year 
on a square in one of the country’s larger cities: Gouda (2011), 
Rotterdam (2012), Den Haag (2013), Groningen (2014), Enschede 
(2015) and Amersfoort (2016). The Passion airs live on Dutch 
national television on Maundy Thursday, draws a large audience 
on the square, scores very high television viewing figures and 
gets a lot of attention in the national media. It was created and is 
organised by the TV production company Eye2EyeMedia, who 
initiated and further developed the event with the Evangelical 
Broadcasting Company EO and the broadcasting company KRO-
NCRV (which has Roman Catholic and Protestant origins), in 
cooperation with several other parties, such as the municipalities 
of the cities where it takes place. The Passion has become 
increasingly popular over the last six years: the fifth edition in the 
city of Enschede culminated in a TV-viewing share of 45.7%, with 
over 20 000 people attending the event on the square.183 The 
format of the show heavily leans on covers of well-known Dutch 
hit songs: secular songs are performed within the framework of 
a passion narrative based on the gospels. As a result of clever 
press strategies and marketing techniques, The Passion has 
182. The broadcasts of all editions so far are available online via http://www.npo.nl/the-
passion/POMS_S_EO_113985, viewed 30 June 2016.
183. Absolute viewing figures and share of viewing (percentage of the total viewing audience 
watching over a given period of time) per year, respectively, were 1.0 million and 17.6% 
(2011); 1.9 million and 25.9% (2012); 2.5 million and 32.4% (2013); 3.6 million and 44.9% 
(2014); 3.8 million and 45.7% (2015); 3.4 million and 44.2% (2016). N.B.: The Netherlands has 
a population of some 17 million people. Source: PDF document created by Petra Moonen, 
market researcher at broadcasting company KRO-NCRV (obtained by the first author on 
30 May 2016). The decrease in 2016 may be explained by a competing intercalary broadcast 
on the other national channel on the same evening, because of the death of world-famous 
Dutch soccer player Johan Cruijff earlier that day.
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popped up as a vibrant large performance that uses pop music, 
social and other media, and celebrities to tell the story of 
The  Passion and Easter. The performers are mainly famous 
Dutch actors and singers who not seldom emphatically define 
themselves as non-believers. Part of the 90-min show is a 
procession with a cross that over the years has come to take on 
three different but interrelated shapes: a physical, offline shape, 
and two online, virtual shapes. Because we will particularly focus 
on the procession in this article, these shapes are described more 
elaborately below.
Annual performances of The Passion narrative and processions 
with a cross are of course nothing new, certainly not in the week 
before Easter. What is new in this case is the secularised context 
in which The Passion is being performed: The Netherlands is 
often said to be among the most secularised countries in the 
world. Christianity permeated the culture for centuries, yet 
traditional Christian belief in the 1960s started to rapidly 
disappear from Dutch society (Bernts & Berghuijs 2016). To the 
majority of people today in the Netherlands, Christian liturgy, or 
even the God of the Christian tradition, does not appear to be 
(any longer) a topic of interest. The paradox – that watching a 
TV show on the suffering and death of Jesus Christ and walking 
along in a procession with a cross is highly popular, whereas the 
country has shown an ongoing decrease in church attendance as 
well as a significant shrinking of institutional churches – is as 
remarkable as it is fascinating, particularly because The Passion’s 
popularity by no means indicates a massive return to Christianity. 
On the contrary, the decennial quantitative study ‘God in 
Nederland’, first executed in 1966, showed in 2016 that 60% of 
the respondents appreciated The Passion, while 34% found it 
kitschy, 30% said that it did not at all strengthen their faith and 
58% indicated that it did not or not at all make them more curious 
about the Christian faith (Bernts & Berghuijs 2016:219). So, The 
Passion cannot simply be defined as a (Christian) religious ritual. 
To consequently define The Passion as a secular show would do 
no justice to the phenomenon either, even though a number 
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of  its success factors invite such a definition.184 Longitudinal 
empirical research has shown that many people attribute 
meaning to various elements of The Passion.185 The ritual appears 
to open a space that may be described as a nursery for religious 
experiences: a space where people’s hermeneutic ability to 
deal  with the sacred is being activated (Klomp & Van der 
Meulen 2017). Although many people do not or no longer have 
the language that we recognise as referring to God, this does not 
mean that God is absent in this passion ritual.
As theologians, we identify the issue at stake as the sacramental 
quality of the procession: the encounter with God through, with 
and in the ritual. This directly leads us to the central question in 
this article: in a 21st-century secularised society, how do participants 
in the processional shapes of The Passion encounter God? With 
this chapter, we aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of 
public liturgical ritual after the demolishing impact of secularisation 
on religious institutions in contemporary late modern Western 
Europe. We also hope to add to the further development of 
‘theology after the death of God’ (the latter referring to the 
experience that Christian religion had become unbelievable) in a 
21st-century Western European society where scholars have come 
to turn down secularisation theories, stating that modernity has 
not led to less religion, but rather to a shift in religion.186
184. Brief summary of The Passion’s success factors, (1) the meaning of the event is open 
(i.e.  it does not contain dogmatic proclamations that steer the meaning of the narrative: 
what people make of it is up to them), (2) it has a strong format consisting of famous Dutch 
hit songs inserted into the framework of the narrative, (3) performers are actors and singers 
who are famous in popular culture (role models) (4) the event is accessible (no entrance fee, 
open air, people can come and go, but also watch the show on TV or the Internet) and (5) it 
is a high-quality show (in terms of sound, light effects and spectacular images).
185. This research was conducted by the first author, who engaged in ethnographic fieldwork 
on The Passion between 2011 and 2016.
186. Numerous incidents within the last decade have raised questions regarding the validity 
of Europe’s assumed secularisation. The rise of the frequently used concept ‘post-secular’, 
however not unproblematic, points to the contested nature of both religion and secularity in 
Europe. For a discussion of the alleged secularity of Europe, see, for example, Lori Beaman 
(2013:141–157) and Jean-Paul Willaime (2009:23–35).
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We will first describe the three processional shapes of 
The Passion and briefly elaborate on the Dutch context in which 
this  procession practice takes place. We then explain the 
concept  of  ‘anatheism’ as developed by Richard Kearney and 
elaborate why his theory seems promising for the interpretation 
of liturgical ritual in late modern society. Leaning on Kearney 
and the possibility of a sacramental encounter with God in this 
contemporary procession, we will then offer an interpretation of 
the ritual and conclude the article by answering the fundamental 
research question.
The procession
The procession in The Passion
We understand a procession as ‘a communal ritualised act, a 
social action that can – mainly but not exclusively – be identified 
as religious’ (Gerhards 1997:593). This ritualised act in The Passion 
takes on three shapes: a physical procession with a cross through 
the city, a virtual procession behind the cross enabled by a 
second screen application and a virtual Twitter procession.
Since the first edition of The Passion in 2011, every year some 
1000 people187 have followed a large neon-lit cross that is carried 
through the streets by 16 so-called crossbearers. The procession 
always heads to the square where the main stage is set up in order 
to arrive there at that point in the narrative where Jesus, after his 
condemnation, is taken away by soldiers. During the live performance 
of the show on the city square, where a narrator on stage hosts the 
performance, cameras switch over occasionally to the procession. 
At these moments, a TV personality in the role of a journalist 
interviews several participants (coming from various religious and 
non-religious backgrounds) of the procession, who openly share 
with the millions their personal motives for following the cross.
187. The organisation set the limit at 1000 participants in order to be able to ensure their 
safety.
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By 2014, this physical procession had become so popular that 
the online registration for participation, which opened 6 months 
before the event, filled up in a couple of hours. The organisers, 
therefore, initiated an additional virtual procession by launching 
a second screen application, which enabled people to follow the 
procession online and to share their personal motivation to 
do so.188 This virtual procession became so popular, as well, that 
subsequent iterations of The Passion all had this second screen 
application (2015 showed a fivefold increase in participants). 
During the broadcast of The Passion, people were encouraged to 
join the virtual procession: the text live.thepassion.nl appeared 
as a subtitle on the screen. This website showed a pop-up screen 
with an ‘I walk along’ button along with an optional textbox 
where people could write in their motivation. Once enrolled in 
this virtual procession, participants saw the cross and crossbearers 
in front of them and could follow the procession through the 
streets of the city just by scrolling their mouse or swiping the 
touchscreen of their devices. Each participant could virtually 
walk the procession at their own pace upon arrival at the 
main square.189
In addition to the physical and virtual processions, people 
could also join the online Twitter procession by using 
#ikloopmee [#iwalkalong], a hashtag created and promoted by 
the broadcasting companies. They meant to relate this to the 
second screen application190, but the hashtag was also used more 
independently, as a way to relate to The Passion in general.
188. Definition of ‘second screen’: ‘a mobile device used while watching television, especially 
to access supplementary content or applications’. It is used to enhance the TV viewing 
experience and often generates online conversations around the content. From http://www.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/second-screen, viewed 30 August 2016.
189. Participants actually followed the procession rehearsal, which was recorded the evening 
before the event, which is why they could reach the main stage before the procession did 
so in real time.
190. So that people could not only share their motivations for following the cross by using 
the open textbox, but also share them on Twitter.
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Historical background and cultural context
Processions with the cross, from which the processional shapes 
in The Passion are directly derived, have an age-old history and 
have been the object of many liturgical studies.191 Here, we will 
especially and briefly focus on the history of outdoor processions 
in the Dutch context. After the Reformation got a foothold in 
what is now called the Netherlands, public expression of 
Roman Catholic faith within the territory of the Republic of the 
Seven United Netherlands (1561–1795) was prohibited.192 Although 
freedom of religion was legally established in 1795, processions 
were again officially banned by Dutch law in 1848 because the 
revival of processions and communal pilgrimages had stirred up 
too much turmoil in the predominantly Protestant country. This 
law prohibited processions in those parts of the country where 
they had not been a common phenomenon until 1848 (effectively 
this meant the predominantly Protestant part north of the rivers 
Rhine, Meuse and Walloon, which makes up two-thirds of the 
Dutch land area). The ban on processions was finally dispensed 
with in 1983. So, in general, liturgical procession in the Netherlands 
had long been a phenomenon that was tolerated and not 
practised by the majority of the Dutch inhabitants.
Since the 1990s, another ritual has arisen and developed in 
Dutch culture: the (compassionate or) silent procession.193 Today, 
such processions occur in various forms on various occasions: 
after disasters, after fatalities arising from what is termed 
‘senseless violence’ (e.g. street violence), after sudden deaths of 
prominent persons, in the context of national remembrance of 
191. For historical overviews and extensive lists of bibliographic references, see Jan Christian 
Gertz (1997:591–593). Regarding the relation between indoor and outdoor liturgy, particularly 
relevant is Paul Post et al. (1998:281–320).
192. An elaborate study of Dutch processional culture, on which this paragraph relies, can be 
found in Peter Jan Margry (2000).
193. For an overview of the development of this kind of procession, see Paul Post (2003: 
156–186).
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the dead of Second World War and all sorts of memorial and 
protest ritual (Post 2003:166–172). Where liturgical processions 
are rather absent, silent processions like these are a prominent 
public ritual in the Netherlands.
The procession that we focus on in this article illustrates the 
broader trend of Christian forms and ritual repertoires moving to 
‘outer-ecclesial’ domains. In his exploration of outdoor ritual, 
Paul Post in 1998 typified rituals similar to the procession in 
The Passion as ‘folklorised liturgy’. Acknowledging that the term 
is somewhat problematic, Post rightly pointed to ‘a fundamental 
change in the context of ritual and the way it is experienced’ 
(Post 2003:294–295). He signalled a change in liturgical shape, 
context and meaning: it moves to the public realm, where the 
ritual becomes a performance for an audience and becomes 
a  spectacle with rehearsals, scripts and sponsors. All this is 
applicable to The Passion.
Changes in the religious landscape
In Dutch culture, over the last century, religious language and 
religious practices have increasingly left the enclosed domain 
of  the institutional churches and have migrated to other 
realms,  such as the wider public domain – a shift that can be 
typified as a transfer and a transformation of religion and/or 
the  sacred.194 This transfer and transformation occur(red) 
in a society where institutional Christianity is marked by 
reduction and concentration.195 Yet, the Dutch have not become 
194. On the transfer and transformation of religion and the sacred, see Joep de Hart (2014); 
Erik Sengers (2005); Paul Post (2010); Erik Borgman (2006); Wim van de Donk et al. (2006); 
and Willem Frijhoff (1998).
195. Church attendance in the Netherlands decreased by 40% in the last 10 years (42% for the 
Roman Catholic Church; an estimated 25% for the Protestant Church). Unaffiliated and Other 




completely irreligious: it is not that they all became atheists, but, as 
historian Peter van Rooden (2004:547ff.) stated in 2004, Christianity 
simply became irrelevant because of the rise of the expressive and 
reflexive self. What remains are apparently a ‘basal sacral’ attitude 
and behaviour (cf. Juchtmans 2008:306–316), whereas a new 
group of unaffiliated ‘floating believers’ (seekers) arose (De Hart 
2015:53–79). Christianity ‘collapsed’ in the Netherlands (Van 
Rooden 2004:524). Religion, even Christian religion, remained, yet 
it took an entirely different shape: ecclesial ritual practices were 
transformed into less specific religious practices with Christian 
elements and roots. Religion has become fluid. Dutch society in 
general has become a society beyond the church.
The processional practices in The Passion are an example 
of  this transfer and transformation of religion. The procession 
turned into a public ritual event that is broadcast live and has 
acquired additional digitalised shapes that are strongly connected 
with technological developments (cf. Klomp & Van der Meulen 
2017). This is striking, considering that the majority of the Dutch 
have a relative unfamiliarity with the procession phenomenon: 
most people had never heard of or participated in this practice. 
Since the increase of media attention The Passion has got over 
the years, the word ‘procession’ in the public sphere (e.g. in 
newspapers and TV and radio talk shows) is now used as if it has 
always been a customary phenomenon.
Considering the complexity of the historical background and 
the context of the religious landscape of this procession practice, 
how does the encounter between God and the participants in the 
procession ritual take place? In working towards an answer to 
the question, the philosophical–theological reflection of the Irish 
philosopher Richard Kearney (now from Boston College, USA) 
on a return to God after having lost God may point us towards 
a  creative hermeneutic of the opened space ‘where people’s 
hermeneutic ability to deal with the sacred is being activated’. 
We turn to Kearney’s proposal of an SI that entails the sacramental 
return to the holiness of the everyday.
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Theory: Kearney’s anatheism
In the Western late modern context of today, the God question 
according to Kearney is returning with a new sense of urgency. 
He believes it is ‘an increasingly pressing inquiry for our 
“postmodern” age where the adversarial dogmas of secularism 
and absolutism threaten the option of considered dialogue’ 
(Kearney 2010:xiii). In his book Anatheism (Kearney 2010), he 
poses the deep penetrating question of how we can speak of 
God after having ‘left God behind’:
What comes after God? What follows in the wake of our letting go of 
God? What emerges out of the night of not-knowing, that moment 
of abandoning and abandonment? Especially for those who – after 
ridding themselves of ‘God’ – still seek God? (p. 3)
Kearney’s answer finds expression in his formulation of a way 
between contemporary dogmatic theism and militant atheism, 
which offers a hermeneutical narrative approach with its 
interpretative focus on ‘otherness’ and the welcoming of the 
S/stranger. Anatheism is ‘an invitation to revisit what might be 
termed a primary scene of religion: the encounter with a radical 
Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God’ (Kearney 
2010:7). It is a third way in which Kearney explores the exciting 
interpretative possibilities of a ‘return’ to God and a reimagining 
of God after the death of God as a reaction to the polar opposites 
of certainty ‘that have maimed so many minds and souls in our 
history’ (Kearney 2010:2). Crucial to this third way is that it 
contains a moment of both atheism and theism: it is a return to 
God after the disappearance of God (ana-theos), a way between 
naïve faith and the hermeneutic of suspicion. Ana-theism is 
‘another word for another way of seeking and sounding the 
things we consider sacred but can never fully fathom or prove’ 
(Kearney 2010:3). For Kearney, anatheism is not a state but 
rather a wager of faith beyond faith that occurs again and again; 
a wager that ‘marks a reopening of that space where we are free 
to choose between faith or nonfaith’ (Kearney 2010:7); a wager 
moment of creative ‘not-knowing’ that signifies a break with 
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former sureties and invites people to forge new meanings; 
a  movement that refuses all absolute talk about the absolute. 
Such moments by no means occur only to intellectuals: the 
anatheist moment can come to anyone who experiences anxiety, 
doubt or disorientation in life. These instants are ‘experienced in 
our bones – moods, affects, senses, emotions – before they are 
theoretically interrogated by our minds. And they are […] as 
familiar to believers as to non-believers’ (Kearney 2010:5).
An important element of Kearney’s theory is SI. For him, this 
entails the sacramental return to the holiness of the everyday. 
This sacramental return is taken as a retrieval of the extraordinary 
in the ordinary: ‘It marks and opening towards a God whose 
descent into flesh depends on our response to the sacred 
summons of the moment’ (Kearney 2010:86–7). In this sense, 
anatheism is a form of post-theism that allows us to revisit the 
sacred in the midst of the secular. A revisitation that confirms 
specific noes: the noes of the Omni-God of celestial might; 
the noes of the idea that God orchestrates good and evil alike. 
If anything is dead, it is the traditional thought of God, that is, a 
God as deus ex machina in times of neediness. Also, if anything 
is  dead, it is the modern individualist conception of private 
salvation. The sacramental return ‘is the possibility of a God after 
God (ana-theos) that signals the return of the sacred after its 
setting aside (ana-thema)’ (Kearney 2010:86).
In our opinion, Kearney’s theory can be extremely fruitful for 
the interpretation of the procession ritual in The Passion in 
particular as well as the wider interpretation of contemporary 
(Christian) ritual as such.196 By analogy with his ‘return to God 
after God’, the procession in The Passion may be described as ‘a 
return to liturgy after the liturgy’. In any one of the three shapes, 
the procession in The Passion is an ana-liturgical ritual. To many 
196. Strikingly, despite many opportunities in his philosophy that allow for an anatheistic 
interpretation of ritual, Kearney mainly focuses on texts, sacred stories and narratives, poetry 
and art.
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inhabitants of the Netherlands, a procession with a cross is like 
a  complete stranger. In a society where Christianity in the 
20th century was increasingly met with hostility but today has 
become mostly irrelevant to many people, this procession – still 
unequivocally related to the cross of Jesus Christ – is somehow 
embraced (we will later demonstrate how this works). Wherever 
the procession goes around, people are in the wager. The result 
of this anatheistic wager is by no means fixed or final: they either 
choose to follow the cross or they do not. If and when they 
actually follow the cross, they receive the stranger as a guest. 
It is their response to the sacred summon of the moment.
This does not mean that all those engaging in the offline and 
online procession consciously experience anatheistic moments 
or that they are aware of being in ‘a middle section’ where they 
can either choose belief or disbelief. Kearney approaches the 
anatheistic wager as a rather individual and rational affair, yet we 
claim some more space for communality and unintentionality. 
Although Kearney writes that the wager of discernment may 
occur at the most basic affective and preconceptual levels, the 
wager of response in his view is not irrational: ‘[…] every seeing is 
a seeing as, a reading of the Stranger as this or that other, as love 
or hate, life or death’ (Kearney 2010:44–45). The difficulty here is 
that in the end, what comes out of the wager for Kearney often 
seems very much linked to a verbal act (cf. Kearney 2010:7, where 
he writes: ‘the radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, 
to call God’).197 His theory therefore runs the risk of being limited 
to the mind, to convictions, thoughts and ideas. We emphasise, 
however, particularly in a 21st-century emotion and experience 
culture, that a return to God may also occur in the acting itself. 
Even without words, it is possible to welcome the stranger: in 
the ritual – a ritual that is often performed together with other 
people. No matter how small the act of clicking a virtual button, 
irrespective of the ambivalence that some participants feel, who 
197. Kearney seems to be ‘in the word’ rather than ‘in the flesh’, to refer to the title of his 
chapter on sacramentality and the body.
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physically follow the cross through the streets of the city, 
regardless of the impermanence of their engagement: they act 
and by acting welcome the stranger at their gates. Experiencing 
rituals as unfolding meaning within the inviting opened spaces 
does not necessarily have intellectual consent or theoretical 
interrogation as prerequisite. The procession of The Passion is a 
stranger walking up to contemporary Dutch people. They turn on 
the television and the web link to the virtual procession pops up – 
the stranger is knocking at their doors, and they engage or do 
not engage in this collective procession ritual.
In embracing The Passion, part of Dutch society embraces the 
procession with the cross anew. Protestants who would never 
engage in ‘such a Roman-Catholic thing’, ‘nones’ (the religiously 
unaffiliated) and atheists to whom following a cross is something 
new, Roman Catholics attracted by the virtuality of this ritual 
of  old – people from different backgrounds engage in these 
processional shapes. They allow the stranger to come closer. 
It might bring them something new.
Encountering God in the  
ana-liturgical ritual
If indeed in the ana-liturgical ritual, people encounter the radical 
stranger – whom they may or may not call God – then how exactly 
does this work? We discuss three examples of participants in the 
procession in 2014 and 2015. From a large set of empirical data 
collected between 2011 and 2016, we chose these examples 
because they show diverse ways of how the procession is an 
ana-liturgical ritual.
Empowering powerlessness: Firemen in 
the physical procession
In 2015, The Passion in Enschede took place shortly before the 
15th remembrance day of a catastrophic fireworks explosion that 
After God but behind the Cross
266
had destroyed the residential area Roombeek. In 2000, the 
storehouse of a trader in fireworks went up in flames, 23 people 
(four of whom were firemen) died, around 950 persons 
were injured and 200 houses were destroyed. The calamity had 
a great impact on the community. Six days after the accident, a 
silent procession was organised, in which over 100 000 people 
participated.198 In The Passion in 2015, the physical procession 
with the cross started in the heart of the (rebuilt) residential area 
of Roombeek and from there headed to the city centre. At the 
request of the local fire brigade, several firemen were crossbearers 
in this procession. In a preparatory interview that the organising 
team held with the firemen, they appeared to have concrete 
motivations to join the procession. One man made clear that by 
walking along he meant to honour the colleagues who had died 
in the accident:
At that time, I had only just begun to work at the fire brigade and was 
only on the sidelines […], but after 15 years I notice that the accident 
still greatly influences the work of the fire department.199
Another fireman in that pre-interview had been involved more 
directly:
I was on one of the first five fire trucks that rode out and ended 
up in the middle of the explosions. I lost consciousness on site, but 
I continued working in the days after the fire. It was much later that 
I got health problems. I had a serious whiplash and got disqualified 
for work for 60%. The catastrophe literally and figuratively left its 
scars.200 (n.p.)
These men did not speak about God; they were living their lives 
in their social circles, and in that context on a particular evening 
would join a ritual with a cross: they acted (as we said: a ritual is 
not always that verbal, and they may not even have experienced 
God). As theologians, we do interpret their ritual acting as an 
198. http://www.regiocanons.nl/overijssel/twente/enschede-in-de-klas/vuurwerkramp- 
(viewed 04 August 2016).
199. Source: Line-up of The Passion 2015, acquired via KRO-NCRV.
200. Source: Line-up of The Passion 2015, acquired via KRO-NCRV.
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encounter with the divine. In that very moment and place and 
setting where they picked up the cross, God became present just 
like that. Theologically speaking, by picking up the cross they 
connected their human suffering – of the fire department, of 
them as individuals, of the broader community of the inhabitants 
of Enschede – to the suffering of Jesus, who carried the cross 
to which he would later be nailed and on which he would die. 
They may have participated in the silent march in 2000, but this 
time during the procession they were carrying a cross, which has 
very explicit theological connotations. They walked with the 
suffering Christ, and the suffering Christ walked with them, 
almost like a re-enactment of the Emmaus journey. Participation 
in the ritual creates a space where the encounter of the firemen, 
the  commemorating community and the weak God can 
happen.  The anatheist moment involves ‘a hope in spite of 
hopelessness that the estranged God may return in its empowering 
powerlessness’, Kearney (2010:68) states (in line with Bonhoeffer). 
When commemorating in situ, the hope that comes with rebuilt 
houses, streets, parks and playgrounds stands next to the hopeless, 
utter darkness of the catastrophe and its scars still visible. In this 
ritual, the God of the past, who is the God still to come, descends. 
In the ordinary residential area, in a procession with a Plexiglas 
cross carried around, the divine enters with weakness and 
vulnerability to meet his suffering people. The procession in the 
Roombeek area is a sacramental return of the holiness of 
the everyday: a space where the extraordinary is retrieved in the 
ordinary. In this procession, the crossbearers return to ‘a liturgical 
ritual after the liturgy’ and meet a stranger who suffers and 
dies,  who empowers with powerlessness and who is weak and 
vulnerable. One whom they may or may not call God.
Letting go of God: A lamenting mother 
on the second screen
I want to learn to understand why my son was taken away this 
early,  in the prime of his life. I think we need him more than God 
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or Jesus [does], if they do at all exist. My faith had not been very 
strong, but it was completely taken away from me after the death of 
my 19-year-old son. How to explain this ‘in the love of Jesus’? To my 
mind that is not possible. Still, I walk along, virtually, maybe I will get 
an answer sometime. But frankly I expect nothing.201 (n.p.)
On 17 April 2014, a mother entered this text in the text box 
on the second screen, by way of motivation to join the virtual 
procession in Groningen. The text strongly reflects an anatheistic 
wager: is it not cruel that my son died, and should I not let go of 
an omnipotent God that takes people like this? It is the existential 
question of a mother, disoriented in life, not knowing where to 
go or how to believe. She leaps upon the anatheistic wager, 
knowing of death and suffering, bewildered by the meaning of 
existence, departing from the image of an omnipotent God, 
struggling with a God of love, because the death of her son was 
so unjust. Her writing exudes the atheist ‘no’ that may initiate the 
anatheist turn. And by clinging to the virtual procession, she 
makes this turn: ‘Still, I walk along, virtually’. Clearly not expecting 
to get one, virtually following the cross through the streets of 
Groningen City, she is hoping for an answer, for the return of God 
after his disappearance. In the existential darkness of her being 
as the mother of a deceased child, the cross comes to her in a 
virtual but no less real way, and she throws herself into the arms 
of this radical strange cross. In her ‘holy insecurity’, she keeps the 
possibility open for the divinity to come all the way back to her, 
in an instant. Her narrative is one big ‘no’; her walking along in the 
procession is a ‘yes’. Kearney writes that our response to the 
stranger is already a decision: a choice to commit. That is what 
this mother does, in a moment of truth, where she may not know 
the truth but does the truth. Indeed, ‘[o]rthopraxis precedes 
orthodoxy. Trust precedes theory. Action precedes abstraction’ 
(Kearney 2010:44). In the moment of her surrender to this virtual 
procession shape, of simply clicking the button ‘I walk along’ on 
201. Source: Excel sheet with motivations, acquired via EO. Translation from Dutch to English 
language by the first author.
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the screen, the highest deity kenotically becomes ‘the very least 
of these’. The word that pitched its tent with the people empties 
out of transcendence into the heart of her suffering, again 
becomes everyday flesh, transubstantiates to join this grieving 
mother. This example shows that the anatheistic space is about 
humans who in dark times have to let go: both of their children 
and of their images of God. God may be encountered right there.
An epiphanic tweet: A grandmother 
joining the Twitter hashtag procession
On the same day, a female user on Twitter posted the text: 
‘#iwalkalong special #thepassion I walk along for my grandson 
[name] who struggles on the IC of UMCG Groningen’202 (Female, 
17 April, Twitter).
The tweets that followed (replies by others and the woman’s 
response to those replies) showed that her grandson was very ill. 
The boy had been born after 25 weeks of pregnancy and had 
many health problems.203 By using the hashtag, and also by 
repeating the words, she virtually clasped the procession, joining 
other people in following the cross that was carried through the 
city. Although sending such a tweet is more volatile than virtually 
and physically following a cross through the streets of a city, the 
anatheistic wager is basically the same: in her days filled with 
anxiety about her hospitalised grandchild fighting for his life, the 
online procession suddenly appears. In this moment, she clutches 
to the cross, dedicating her own processional act to her grandson, 
connecting the cross of the suffering Jesus to the grandchild’s 
and her own suffering. Virtually behind the cross, she watches 
202. Tweet sent on 17 April at 17:17. For privacy reasons, the name of the Twitter account is 
not mentioned here. For verification of data, it is available upon request.
203. The mother of the boy keeps a blog on the Internet where she frequently posts medical 
updates about him. This section partly relies on information from that blog. For privacy 
reasons, the web link is not mentioned here. For verification of data, it is available upon 
request.
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with her grandson – unintentionally responsive to Jesus’ appeal 
to ‘watch with me for one hour’ (Mt 26:40) – and therefore with 
Christ. A sacramental inversion is taking place, a change of 
perspectives: by welcoming the cross, the God who is welcomed 
welcomes the grandmother with her grandchild.204 She had 
posted several tweets about him in the past; he had also been 
hospitalised several times in the past. This time, the processional 
tweet through, in and by which she links her grandson to the 
cross ‘somehow transubstantiates the empirical thisness [of her 
tweets] […] into something sacred and eschatological’, to use 
Kearney’s (2010:105) words. An ordinary practice becomes a 
processional ritual that converts the ordinary into a sacred 
practice. It becomes a sacramental vehicle that enables an 
encounter with the divine: the procession tweet acquires an 
epiphanic character (i.e. it becomes an embodiment of the 
sacred), giving future to past tweets.
Conclusion
In their reflections on the sacramentality of worship, Barnard, 
Cilliers and Wepener (2014:330) rightly claim that God’s presence 
cannot be manipulated. ‘God cannot be captured with or within 
our liturgical ritual acting. His “real” presence – presentia realis – 
is an answer to human faith, but never in a causal sense’. We do 
by no means intend to claim that the ana-liturgical ritual causes 
God’s presence. It is rather a matter of fides quaerens figuras: 
faith (and non-faith) searches for opened spaces and shapes in 
which to encounter the divine. Having said that, we return to our 
research question: in a 21st-century secularised society, how do 
participants in the processional shapes of The Passion encounter 
God? In Dutch late modern society where classical liturgy and 
Christian tradition for that matter are irrelevant in the eyes of 
many people, the media have reinvented the procession ritual. 
204. An adequate elaboration of this sacramental inversion is found in Marcel Barnard, Johan 
Cilliers and Cas Wepener (2014:323–354).
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They have managed to turn a large number of people with very 
diverse backgrounds into processioners. Apparently, the idea 
of the irrelevance of the Christian tradition (and in its slipstream: 
of God) makes religious practices no longer simply ‘not done’. 
This irrelevance thus seems to be the breeding ground for 
what  Kearney calls anatheism. The Passion is announced and 
organised, people see a strange cross approaching – a procession 
that obtains new, diverse and multilayered meaning. Part of this 
society welcomes the cross, either in the physical procession 
or  in the virtual shapes on the second screen or on Twitter. 
By  engaging in this procession ritual, participants very often 
turn  out to actively connect themes related to the procession 
(e.g. suffering, pain, cross, sacrifice and death) to events they 
(have) experience(d) in their personal lives, like in the examples 
that we discussed. In doing so, they may encounter the divine in 
a new way.
Our examples showed that in the moment and action of 
connecting their ordinary life, sorrow, grief, pain, health, loved 
ones and all darkness to the cross, a space is created in which 
God – who was never really gone – can return to people and 
meet them. A space in which they are (again) presented with the 
freedom to choose, to imagine different possibilities. This leads 
to the conclusions that Dutch society is not simply a society 
beyond God and that to its members the reinvention of liturgical 
ritual is of the utmost importance.
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In the epilogue of his book Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul 
Ricoeur places his reflections on ‘difficult forgiveness’ (and 
specifically on ‘gift and forgiveness’) in conversation with the 
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work of the South African TRC. Ricoeur rightly points to the fact 
that the work of the Commission was not driven by a punitive 
logic (as the criminal trials of Nuremberg or Tokyo were): 
‘“Understanding, not revenge” was the motto here’ (Ricoeur 
2004:483). Although Ricoeur was well aware of the fact (at the 
time he wrote these words) that it was too early to assess 
the  success of the TRC’s attempt at achieving reparative or 
restorative justice, he did feel that some provisional remarks 
pertaining to the limits and challenges inherent in such an 
undertaking were justified. In the epilogue, Ricoeur then reflects 
on the TRC project (with its focus on reconciliation rather than 
on punitive justice) from the perspective of both the victims and 
the perpetrators. If one considers the work of the Commission 
from the side of the victims, the benefits are for Ricoeur 
undeniable on a therapeutic, moral and political level. Since 
families and victims were able to express their pain and vent 
their anger in the presence of offenders and other witnesses, ‘the 
hearings truly permitted the public exercise of the work of 
memory and mourning, guided by an appropriate process of 
cross-examination’ (Ricoeur 2004:483–484).
Yet Ricoeur is also aware that the amnesty granted by the 
Commission did not necessarily represent genuine forgiveness 
on the part of the victims. If viewed from the side of the offenders, 
the verdict on the work of the TRC is even more mixed and 
equivocal. Hence, Ricoeur’s question: ‘Was not public confession 
more often a stratagem in view of obtaining amnesty, freeing the 
individual from judicial proceedings or criminal conviction?’ 
(Ricoeur 2004:484).
In these remarks by Ricoeur, one senses a tension that is 
also reflected in the ongoing discourse around the legacy of the 
TRC, namely the tension between reconciliation and justice, 
or  in  the language of Ricoeur the tension between the logic 
of  superabundance and the logic of equivalence, or between 
love  and justice (Ricoeur 1995:315–329). Ricoeur also draws 
on  this creative tension between love (or agape) and justice 
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in his reflections on mutual recognition in his book The Course 
of  Recognition. Ricoeur is sensitive to the difference between 
justice and agape (also with regard to the way in which this 
enters language, because agape is akin to the discourse of praise 
and declares itself, while justice makes arguments). Yet Ricoeur’s 
primal concern is the interconnectedness of justice and agape. 
Hence, his question: ‘Can we build a bridge between the poetics 
of agape and the prose of justice, between the hymn and the 
formal rule?’ (Ricoeur 2005:224).
In this essay, I want to engage – also against the backdrop of 
Ricoeur’s articulation of the tension between love and justice – with 
the work of the South African clinical psychologist Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela. Gobodo-Madikizela, who currently holds the chair for 
Historical Trauma and Transformation at Stellenbosch University, 
served as a member of the Human Rights Violations Committee of 
the TRC, and this experience has been formative of her extended 
reflections and publications over more than two  decades on 
notions such as trauma, memory, forgiveness, remorse, empathy 
and restitution. As she (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008a) writes:
My experience on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
has been the most profound moment in my life […] At the end of 
those many hours and days spent with the TRC, I came out with this 
one lesson, that there can be no adequate reparation for the horrors 
we have witnessed on the public stage of the TRC. (p. 170)
Gobodo-Madikizela is acutely aware of the controversy and 
critique around the fact that the TRC granted amnesty to 
perpetrators of human rights violations, and especially the 
argument that the TRC sacrificed justice for reconciliation 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 1997:271). Yet her work is also marked by an 
attempt to find a way beyond the logic that frames the notion of 
justice only in terms of punitive justice, especially in societies 
marked by traumatic conflict and historical injustices. In her 
engaged and extended struggle with notions such as remorse, 
forgiveness and empathy, she indicates how these notions (which 
can be associated with Ricoeur’s ‘poetics of agape’) can play 
a  role in the complex processes of dealing with the trauma of 
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the past in a way that has the potential to rehumanise victims 
and perpetrators.
Remorse, recognition and 
rehumanisation
In her acclaimed book A Human Being Died That Night: A South 
African Woman Confronts the Legacy of Apartheid, Gobodo-
Madikizela recounts her experiences of visiting and interviewing 
one of the most notorious of the apartheid assassins, Eugene 
de Kock. For many people in South Africa, he is the embodiment 
of evil, hence his nickname ‘Prime Evil’. As Gobodo-Madikizela 
rightly observes: ‘De Kock had not just given apartheid’s 
murderous evil a name. He had become that evil’ (2003:6). 
A specific event during the TRC hearings provided the impetus 
for Gobodo-Madikizela’s decision to interview De Kock in prison. 
De Kock testified for the first time before the TRC in September 
1997, admitting his role in the killing of three black policemen 
who died when a bomb blew up the car in which they were 
driving. They were attached to the Motherwell police station 
in  Port Elizabeth and the incident became known as the 
Motherwell bombing. These policemen had threatened to expose 
the involvement of white colleagues in the death of four young 
black anti-apartheid activists (known as the Cradock Four).
At the end of his testimony, De Kock requested a meeting 
with the widows of the victims killed in the bombing operation, 
and a meeting with two of the widows indeed took place. 
Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) writes:
A few days later I met with Mrs Mgoduka and Mrs Faku during a 
weekend of debriefing. ‘I was profoundly touched by him,’ Mrs Faku 
said of her encounter with de Kock. Both women felt that De Kock 
had communicated to them something he felt deeply and had 
acknowledged their pain. ‘I couldn’t control my tears. I could hear 
him, but I was overwhelmed by emotion, and I was just nodding, as a 
way of saying yes, I forgive you. I hope that when he sees our tears, 
he knows that they are not only tears for our husbands, but tears for 
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him as well […] I would like to hold him by the hand, and show him 
that there is a future, and that he can still change. (pp. 14–15)
Gobodo-Madikizela interpreted this gesture of the widow 
reaching out to her husband’s murderer as an extraordinary act 
of empathy, because she not only shed tears for her own loss but 
also for the loss of De Kock’s moral humanity. This left her with 
questions such as: ‘Was de Kock deserving of the forgiveness 
shown to him […] Was evil intrinsic to de Kock, and forgiveness 
wasted on him?’ (2003:15). Or to put this in the language of 
Ricoeur’s question in the epilogue on forgiveness in Memory, 
History, Forgetting: Is the unbinding of the agent and the act 
possible? (Ricoeur 2004:489–493).
In her 2002 article ‘Remorse, forgiveness, and rehumanisation: 
Stories from South Africa’, Gobodo-Madikizela also refers to the 
encounter between De Kock and the widows, and here she makes 
her claim explicit that ‘a remorseful apology can contribute to 
the vocabulary of forgiveness in the context of evil’. She is aware 
of the asymmetrical relationship between the admission of guilt 
and the word of forgiveness and that the request for forgiveness 
can have an empty ring to it, adding insult to injury. However, the 
power and significance of an apology lies in its ability ‘to perform 
and to transcend the apologetic words’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 
2002:13). The performance of empathy is powerful because:
Empathy is what enables us to recognise another’s pain, even in the 
midst of tragedy, because pain cannot be evil. Empathy deepens our 
humanity […] When perpetrators apologise and experience the pain of 
remorse, showing contrition, they are acting as human beings. (p. 20)205
This recognition of the humanity of the perpetrator, moreover, 
can be unsettling. In A Human Being Died That Night, Gobodo-
Madikizela recounts a memorable incident that happened when 
she asked De Kock about his meeting with Pearl Faku and Doreen 
205. Elsewhere Gobodo-Madikizela writes in a similar vein, ‘[I]t seems to me that when a 
perpetrator shows remorse, this has “moved” some victims or family members of victims 
to expressing empathy for the perpetrator, and sometimes even forgiveness.’ (2008b:342)
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Mgoduka, the widows of two men murdered as a result of his 
actions. During this conversation, Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) 
notes, De Kock became visibly distressed, saying with tears in 
his eyes:
I wish I could do much more than [say] I’m sorry. I wish there 
was a way of bringing their bodies back alive. I wish I could say, ‘Here 
are your husbands.’ He said, stretching out his arms as if bearing 
an invisible body, his hands trembling, his mouth quivering, ‘but 
unfortunately […] I have to live with it.’ (p. 32)
To her own surprise, Gobodo-Madikizela responded to these 
words by touching his shaking hand, only to feel that his hands 
were clenched, cold and rigid. Reflecting on her gesture, Gobodo-
Madikizela (2003) notes: 
This made me recoil for a moment and to recast my act of reaching 
out as something incompatible with the circumstances of an 
encounter with a person who not too long ago used these same 
hands, this same voice, to authorise and initiate unspeakable acts of 
malice against people very much like myself. (p. 32)
This unsettling encounter with De Kock left Gobodo-Madikizela 
(2003:33) with a sense of feeling guilty for having expressed 
some empathy, and this made her wonder if she had not ‘crossed 
the moral line from compassion, which allows some measure of 
distance, to actually identifying with De Kock’.
The encounter also had an impact on De Kock, and in one 
of their later meetings, he said: ‘You know, Pumla, that was my 
trigger hand you touched’ (2003:39). This remark, in turn, left 
Gobodo-Madikizela with a mixture of feelings. On the one hand, 
she felt vulnerable, angry and invaded, and on the other hand, 
she realised that De Kock’s statement might also carry another 
underlying subtext:
My action may well have been the first time a black person touched 
him out of compassion. He had previously met black people only as 
enemies, across the barrel of a gun or, for those who were on his side 
of the firing line, as comrades in murder. Perhaps de Kock recognised 
my touch as a kind of threshold crossing, a new experience for him. 
(p. 42; [authors’ added emphasis])
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In her reflections on the ‘trigger hand’ episode, Gobodo-
Madikizela seems well aware of the complexities and inherent 
contradictions of their encounter; yet, she seems to be able to 
recognise amidst these aspects De Kock’s humanity.206 As she 
writes (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003):
His world was a cold world, where eyes of death stared accusingly 
at him, a world littered with corpses and graves […] But for all 
the  horrific  singularity of his acts, De Kock was a desperate soul 
seeking to affirm to himself that he was still part of the human 
universe. (p. 39)
I will return to this ‘trigger hand’ episode as recounted by 
Gobodo-Madikizela, but for the moment it is important to note 
that for her it was the experience of De Kock’s expression of 
remorse that humanised him for her, albeit that one can also say 
that much depended on her ability to recognise his humanity.207 
Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) describes the act of remorse as a 
performative event:
A genuine apology focuses on the feelings of the other rather than 
on how the one who is apologising is going to benefit in the end. 
It seeks to acknowledge full responsibility for the act, and does not 
use self-serving language to justify the behaviour of the person 
asking forgiveness. It must communicate, convey, and perform as a 
206. About five months after the ‘trigger hand’ incident, Gobodo-Madikizela presented 
for the first time a psychoanalytical interpretation of her interviews with De Kock at an 
international conference in Cape Town. At this occasion, a colleague asked her if she had 
considered the fact that De Kock was ‘manipulating’ her. She had expected this question and 
was well prepared for it. But before she could respond, she saw in the audience Albie Sachs, 
a judge from the South African Constitutional Court. Sachs raised his arm, an arm that had 
been deformed by a bomb intended to kill him, and she deflected the question to him. He 
then spoke about ‘how much our hope as South Africans depended on reaching out to such 
glimpses of humanity in a spirit of compassion rather than revenge’ (cf. Gobodo-Madikizela 
2003:45).
207. Gobodo-Madikizela contrasts her experience of De Kock’s remorseful admission with 
the attitude of Eichmann that Peter Malkin describes in his book Eichmann in My Hands. 
Malkin, who captured Eichmann in Buenos Aires, mentions that, in an attempt to find some 
humanness in the hours he spent guarding him, he spoke about his sister’s son who was 
killed in Auschwitz, to which Eichmann responded, looking genuinely perplexed, ‘But he was 
Jewish, wasn’t he?’ (cf. Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:67–68).
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‘speech act’ that expresses a desire to right the relationship damaged 
through the action of the apologiser. (pp. 98–99)
This performative event of emphatic witness, which one can also 
describe as embodied performativity, enables – and is enabled 
by – mutual recognition of one’s shared humanity. In Gobodo-
Madikizela’s (2008a) words:
When remorse is triggered in the moment of witnessing, however, 
the perpetrator recognises the other as a fellow human being. At the 
same time, the victim, too, recognises the face of the perpetrator not 
as that of a ‘monster’ who committed terrible deeds, but as the face 
with enough humanity to feel remorse. (pp. 176–177)
Although Gobodo-Madikizela (2014) becomes increasingly 
weary of the use of the notion of ‘forgiveness’ in her work, she 
nevertheless states:
The spirit of forgiveness lies in the search – not for the things 
that  separate us – but for something common among us fellow 
human beings, the compassion and empathy that bind our human 
identity. (p. 1)
Mutual recognition and a hermeneutic 
of bodily performativity
Ricoeur often emphasises the importance of gestures (such as 
Willy Brandt kneeling at the Jewish memorial in Poland, or the 
handshake between Rabin and Arafat, following that between 
Sadat and Begin) in his reflections on themes such as forgiveness, 
gift exchanges and mutual recognition. In The Course of 
Recognition Ricoeur writes, for instance, that although such 
gestures ‘cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light 
the limits of justice of equivalence, and opening space for hope 
[…] they unleash an irradiating and irrigating peace’ (Ricoeur 
2005:245; cf. Wolff 2014). Gobodo-Madikizela’s account of 
her  experiences when touching De Kock’s trigger hand – with 
‘touch giving rise to thought’ – reminds me of Ricoeur’s emphasis 
on how gestures can serve as an embodiment of the poetics of 
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agape (which can be placed within a broader phenomenology 
and hermeneutics of the flesh). This points, I would like to argue, 
to  the fundamental emphasis that a responsible engagement 
with the past – especially in contexts marked by traumatic 
memory  and  historical injustices – requires a performative 
historical hermeneutic. Such an embodied and performative 
historical  hermeneutic is akin to what Richard Kearney calls 
‘carnal hermeneutics’ (Kearney & Treanor 2015:1). Carnal 
hermeneutics, that is, ‘the surplus of meaning arising from carnal 
embodiment’, engages with some important questions such as 
‘How do we make sense of bodies with our bodies?’ and ‘How do 
we read between the lines of flesh and skin?’ (Kearney & Treanor 
2015:1). Some South African theologians have recently noted the 
promise of carnal hermeneutics for narrative therapy (Meiring 
2016:1–11),208 as well as for engaging with questions pertaining to 
racial stereotyping and racial tensions on university campuses in 
South Africa (Pretorius 2016:1–9). Carnal hermeneutics, or so this 
essay also claims, indeed provides important perspectives in the 
search for an adequate performative hermeneutic for dealing 
with painful but interwoven memories and histories.
In some of his more recent work on Paul Ricoeur, Richard 
Kearney has engaged with the notion of flesh in Ricoeur’s work, 
indicating some of Ricoeur’s important insights on ‘carnal 
signification’ in his earlier phenomenological works (especially in 
Freedom and Nature 2007 [1950]). Yet in spite of his promising 
early work on the body and carnal diagnostics, Kearney notes, 
Ricoeur abandoned this trajectory in favour of a focus on the 
208. Meiring aligns himself with the corporal-linguistic turn in the 21st century and explores 
the idea of ‘body mapping’ within the contexts of narrative therapy. Body mapping is a 
process developed by Jonathan Morgan and Jane Solomon that emerged in 2002 as part of 
‘memory work’ with people living with HIV and AIDS in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The body 
mapping process ‘entails that [the] client or [researcher] draw a full-scale map of their body, 
using [colours], symbols and metaphors to recount the stories [they have] written on [or 
“inside”] their bodies’ (Meiring 2016:8). It thus functions as a type of carnal hermeneutics 
that seeks to decipher flesh.
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hermeneutics of texts, the so-called textual turn in the 1960s 
(cf.  Kearney in Davidson and Vallée 2016:31–40). However, 
Kearney continues, this is not Ricoeur’s last word on the matter. 
In Oneself as Another (in the section on ‘One’s own body, or the 
flesh’ in the final chapter) Ricoeur defines flesh as ‘the mediator 
between the self and a world which is taken with its various 
degrees of foreignness’ (Kearney & Treanor 2015:50–51). Hence, 
it becomes a key concern for Ricoeur to mediate between the 
immanence of Husserl’s Leib and the transcendence of Levinas’s 
Visage. Without going into the details of Kearney’s reading of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the flesh, one can note the implications 
that Kearney draws for the relationships between self and other 
(Kearney & Treanor 2015):
[T]he other who is stranger is also my ‘semblance,’ a counterpart 
who, like me, can say ‘I’ […] and at the same time it reveals the inverse 
movement of ‘she thinks and feels in a way that I can never think or 
feel. (p. 54)
For Kearney, drawing on Ricoeur, it is the task of carnal 
hermeneutics to find the right and just balance between the 
movement of same towards other and other towards same 
(in a way that is aligned with his own diacritical hermeneutics). 
Such a task, moreover, raises further questions and invites new 
dialogues. It is Kearney’s conclusion that the simplest phenomenon 
of touch thus leads to the most complex of philosophies and that 
Ricoeur’s way of addressing these questions ‘opens a door where 
phenomenology and hermeneutics may cross in the swing door 
of the flesh’ (Kearney & Treanor 2015:55).
In her work Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) often emphasises 
how an emphatic connection (through, for example, expressing 
remorse as an embodied performative act) is linked to the 
recognition of the humanity of the other. She expresses this 
conviction well when she writes:
The power of human connectedness, of identification with the 
other as ‘bone of my bone’ through the sheer fact of being human, 
draws us to ‘rescue’ others in pain […] We are induced to empathy 
because there is something in the other that is felt to be part of 
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the self, and something in the self that is felt to belong to the other. 
(p. 127)209
One notes in this quotation a view that resonates well with a 
Ricoeurian hermeneutics of the flesh (as interpreted by Kearney 
as carnal hermeneutics).210 In Gobodo-Madikizela’s work we find 
several discussions of testimonies of the encounters between 
family members and a perpetrator that conveys the power of 
words and gestures. In an article entitled ‘Intersubjectivity and 
embodiment: Exploring the role of the maternal in the language 
of forgiveness and reconciliation’, she writes that such encounters 
and dialogues ‘allow victims and survivors to revisit the sites of 
trauma, humanises victims, and confronts perpetrators with their 
inhumanity’ (2001:543). Gobodo-Madikizela further notes that in 
her interviews with mothers who reached out to perpetrators, 
she focused more and more not merely on what they experienced 
as a turning point that opened up space for forgiveness, but also 
on what they felt in their bodies as a sign that enabled such a 
response. She noticed how the mothers used ‘the Xhosa word 
inimba to describe the bodily signs of empathy and located 
its  source in the womb’ (2001:546–547; Gobodo-Madikizela 
2011:548). Inimba can be interpreted to mean the feeling of 
motherhood and can be translated as ‘umbilical cord’. Linking 
inimba to the African concept of ubuntu (the idea of 
209. A few pages later Gobodo-Madikizela writes: ‘When perpetrators feel remorse, they are 
recognizing something they failed to see when they violated the victim, which is that victims 
feel and bleed just like others with whom they, the perpetrators, identify. Remorse therefore 
transforms the image of victim as object to victim as human’ (see Gobodo-Madikizela 
2003:130; cf. 2008a:178).
210. Being a theologian, I also cannot but notice some interesting resonances (amidst possible 
differences) between Ricoeur’s and Gobodo-Madikizela’s views on mutual recognition and 
some statements by the 16th-century Protestant Reformer John Calvin. See, for instance, 
Calvin’s remark in Book 3 of his Institutes: ‘Therefore, whatever man you meet who needs 
your aid, you have no reason to refuse to help him. Say, “He is a stranger”; but the Lord has 
given him a mark that ought to be familiar to you by virtue of the fact that he forbids you 
to despise your own flesh [Isa. 58:7]. Say, “he is contemptible and worthless”; but the Lord 
shows him to be one whom he has deigned to give the beauty of his image’ (Calvin 1960:696; 
cf. Vosloo 2016:39–52).
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interconnected wholeness that a human being is a human 
being through other human beings), she writes (2001; Gobodo-
Madikizela 2011): 
As with Levinasian ethics, the guiding principles of Ubuntu are based 
on a morality that is Other-directed, concerned with promoting an 
ethical vision of compassion and care for others. Therefore, inimba, as 
an expression in which one extends oneself to reach out to the Other, 
signifies the expression of Ubuntu through the body […] Thus the 
body, be it paternal or maternal, points us towards understanding the 
body as a site of ethical engagement, a site for forging human links 
across time and space with the Other – even the Other responsible 
for irreparable loss. (p. 550)
Conclusion
Gobodo-Madikizela’s work, with its focus on dealing with the 
traumatic memory of the past in contexts of historical injustices 
and its emphasis on humanisation and rehumanisation, is 
permeated by a view – to use Ricoeurian language – that places 
mutual recognition of a common humanity within the unsettling 
but creative space between the prose of justice and the poetics 
of agape. In the process a productive hermeneutic of the flesh 
(or carnal hermeneutics) comes to the fore that points towards 
a  hermeneutic of embodied performativity in dealing with the 
trauma of the past.
Gobodo-Madikizela shares with Ricoeur the commitment to 
theorise within the space of ‘the in-between’, and she believes, 
with reference to the title of a book by Martha Minow, that it is 
possible to conceive an ‘in-between place’ – a place between 
vengeance and forgiveness (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008b:347; 
Gobodo-Madikizela & Van der Mewe 2009:157–159; cf. Minow 
1998). In Gobodo-Madikizela’s body of work there is a growing 
hesitancy to use the word ‘forgiveness’ and she seems to prefer 
the term ‘empathy’ or ‘empathetic repair’.211 She also warns 
211. In her essay, ‘Interrupting Cycles of Repetition: Creating Spaces for Dialogue, Facing 
and Mourning the Past’, Gobodo-Madikizela (2016:126–127) writes: ‘The word forgiveness, 
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against vengeance. As she puts it in an essay in her book Dare 
We Hope? Facing our Past to Find a New Future (2014):
South Africans face the challenge of how to embrace the past 
without being swallowed by the tide of vengeful thinking […] If 
memory is kept alive to cultivate old hatreds and resentments, it is 
likely to culminate in vengeance, and in repetition of violence. But 
if memory is kept alive in order to transcend hateful emotions, then 
remembering can be healing. (p. 103)
Yet there is also a growing awareness in Gobodo-Madikizela’s 
work that the ‘poetics of agape’ cannot be separated from 
the  structural and often slow violence of historical injustices. 
In a column entitled ‘Apologies aren’t enough’, first published in 
The Boston Globe in September 2013, she writes:
The lesson of the TRC is that one shouldn’t settle for utterances of 
apology and symbolic gestures of forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Instead, this transformative moment should be used to address 
strategies for real change […] if the greater challenge of economic 
transformation is not met, what has already achieved in South Africa 
could be lost […]. The next revolution might not necessarily be a 
racial one, but one in which the masses rise against the new breed of 
beneficiaries of privilege. (p. 59)
One can indeed say, with Ricoeur, that pardon (and other 
expressions of ‘the economy of the gift’ or ‘the poetics of agape’) 
gives memory a future (cf. Ricoeur 2000:144). Yet we should 
also note that histories of painful injustices give memory a past. 
And without dealing with the embodied memory of this past, 
remembering with the future in mind will be robbed of its healing 
and transformative power.
(footnote 211 continues...)
I argue further, is the wrong word for describing what unfolds in these victim-perpetrator 
encounters. Forgiveness seems to suggest a fixed position, or a coming to an end – ‘I offer 
forgiveness so that I can move on’. There is a subtext here that seems to signify an act of 
leaving something behind, moving on without looking back.’
It can be argued, though, that this description of forgiveness as something fixed and 
ahistorical represents a reductive account of forgiveness (cf. Vosloo 2001:25–40).
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I am fascinated and profoundly challenged by this question: what 
does it really mean to extend genuine hospitality to the stranger, 
especially when the stranger turns out to be a sworn enemy? 
I  am encouraged by Richard Kearney’s commitment to also 
grapple with this kind of question, in theory and in practice. With 
his Guestbook Project and his Irish roots mind, I want to engage 
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with him primarily from my experience as a reflective peace 
practitioner, with a deep appreciation of the counter-intuitive, 
counter-cultural, conflictual nature of genuine hospitality to 
the  stranger-as-enemy.212 Given Kearney’s anatheistic faith 
commitment (2011), I also feel it is appropriate to draw on my 
abiding interest in the connections between (contemplative) 
spirituality and cross-border compassion. I want to focus here on 
two huge subthemes, namely the dynamics of hospitality across 
bloody conflict divides and the spirituality of radically inclusive 
hospitality.
Hospitality between (former) 
enemies?
In view of Kearney’s philosophical appreciation of the embodied, 
poetic imagination within this messy world, I think it is appropriate 
to start with these lines from an Irish peace worker colleague and 
poet based in Northern Ireland, Pádraig Ó Tuama (2013:68–69): 
Flags
[…]
it’s only colours, coloured fabric, a construction, not an end
it’s only colours, coloured fabric, a construction, not an end
it’s only colours, coloured fabric, a construction, not an end
but it’s beautiful and it’s broad and it’s our blood and it’s our home
but it’s beautiful and it’s broad and it’s our blood and it’s our home
but it’s beautiful and it’s broad and it’s our blood and it’s our home
and they’re our colours, our histories, our boys who’ll not return
and they’re our colours, our histories, our boys who’ll not return
and they’re our colours, our histories, our boys who’ll not return
oh beckon us beyond the borders of our belonging
oh beckon us beyond the borders of our belonging
oh beckon us beyond the borders of our belonging
212. From 2001 to 2012, I worked as a behind-the-scenes storytelling and dialogue facilitator 




Left, left, left right left
Left, left, left right left
Left, left, left right left (n.p.)
Heartfelt hospitality and the 
dynamics of betrayal
How can someone steeped in the intergenerational, militarised, 
loyal patrolling of these ‘borders of our belonging’ genuinely 
heed the beckoning call of hospitality? What does hospitality 
really look and feel like when one dares to open a window in 
these borders and unlock a tightly bolted front door to some of 
Them – especially those with the blood of ‘our boys’ on their 
hands?
In the spirit of embodiment, take the rather uphill struggle of 
Gerard Foster. He is a former political prisoner from an Irish 
republican background. As a teenager from a tough Belfast, 
working-class and Catholic neighbourhood, he became a member 
of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) – ‘because they were 
the most active in fighting the British Army in our area’. During 
about five years in prison, his political commitment to a ‘socialist, 
united Ireland’ and the use of violence to help achieve this goal 
was deepened. Upon release, he was faced with ceasefires from 
mainstream loyalist (Protestant) and republican paramilitary 
organisations and growing acceptance of the need for political 
negotiations (mid-1990s). He therefore withdrew in disgust from 
community-based political activism, believing at that time that 
‘we lost the war […] we should have increased violence!’ Through 
a grassroots organisation focusing on the needs of (Republican 
Socialist) political prisoners and a fledgling radical political 
party (the Irish Republican Socialist Party), he re-engaged as a 
political activist from the late 1990s onwards. This included being 
delegated to represent his ‘movement’ at a series of behind the 
scenes political dialogues with (former) enemies.
Thus, Gerard became a participant – a very reluctant 
participant – in the Glencree Survivors and Former 
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Combatants  Programme.213 In the process, he slowly and 
pragmatically moved away from the current use of political 
violence while remaining passionate about the (exclusive) 
‘rightness’ of his political beliefs – until a heartfelt engagement 
with elderly family members of British soldiers who were killed 
by Irish republicans. Gerard (n.d.) recalls:
For me the biggest thing was that weekend at Glencree […] seeing […] 
for me, and I’ve said this before, genuinely seeing the hurt and pain 
of the enemy. Some of these people have lost their family members 
30 years ago. It was really frightening. My dad is buried near the 
INLA plot in Belfast, so you can’t go to one without the other. It was 
after that week end at Glencree that I really felt the strong sense of 
betrayal. I was up at my dad’s grave and they’re feet apart, the INLA 
plot is near enough next to it. I was looking down at the names on 
INLA graves, most of the names I knew. I was thinking by myself 
‘What would they think of me now; what would they be thinking of 
what I’m doing?’ I felt ‘I let youse down, lads.’ That was a part that 
was really strong within me, that I am not only letting them’uns down. 
I am letting myself down. A real struggle, but I couldn’t get past what 
I’d seen – it kept coming back to me what I’d seen that week end at 
Glencree.214 (n.p.)
Gerard’s story is, unfortunately, not unique. In my personal and 
professional experience – working closely with Alistair Little 
(Little & Scott 2009), a former loyalist, Protestant ex-prisoner – 
many politically motivated former combatants beginning to 
reach out to (former) enemies are faced with this profound 
challenge: if I shake those hands, am I betraying ‘our boys who 
will not return?’ Am I being disloyal to the ‘flag’ under which they 
‘sacrificed’ their lives (Lawther 2017; Verwoerd & Little 2018; 
Govier & Verwoerd 2004)?
213. For more detail, see www.glencree.ie.
214. Quotation from a transcript of the Ireland–Northern Ireland workshop within the 
international Beyond Dehumanisation research project, which I coordinated and co-
facilitated with Alistair Little and Brandon Hamber. Between 2012 and 2014, this project 
facilitated reflective, region-specific workshops with former enemies–peace practitioners 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel and Palestine and the USA. The main 




In the haunting words of Alistair at a recent reflective 
workshop:215
And this notion of betraying all of that, betraying all of what you’ve 
been conditioned to believe is the right thing to do. And if you speak 
out against that [conditioning], you’re accused: ‘you’re supporting 
the enemy!’ or ‘you’re agreeing with the enemy. And therefore the 
blood of those who died […] your friends, your community […] are 
also on your hands, ‘cause you’re supporting them!’ (n.p.)
At the same workshop, our colleague Brandon Hamber formulated 
the depth of this challenge in a way that strongly resonated with 
those present:
[T ]he issue of betrayal is so difficult because of the sacred nature 
of our engagements in conflict issues. So if you lose a loved one, for 
example, normally what happens in that process is that we engage 
in a set of sacred bonds with that person: ‘whatever happens, the 
truth will come out; one day justice will be done; somebody will pay 
for this’ [...] those bonds are really sacred. They’re not just about 
loyalty. They’re beyond loyalty. In the same way as we feel about 
our ideologies, whatever that might be. There’s a sort of sacredness 
about the way we make those connections – ‘Ireland will be freed!’ 
or ‘the Union will be protected’. And the problem with that is that 
one can’t ever properly break those bonds yourself because if you’re 
making the bond with some comrade who has died, they can never 
release you from that bond […]. And that, I think, is linked to issues of 
betrayal of a community, of yourself’. (n.p.)
Facilitated, vulnerable hospitality
Despite the profound nature of this dynamics of betrayal, there 
are grounds for cautious, humble hope that these ‘sacred bonds’ 
can indeed be transcended. Over the last 10 years or so, I have 
been privileged to witness, for example, how initial hostility 
between Gerard and Alistair at the early former combatant 
dialogue workshops at Glencree was transformed. In zigzag, very 
cautious fashion and without resolution of ongoing political 
215. As part of the international Beyond Dehumanisation project he and I co-facilitated.
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differences this animosity and mistrust started to shift. Hostility 
between two political enemies (who would have been prepared 
to kill each other a few years earlier) reluctantly began to give 
way to curiosity, to friendliness, to joint visits to pubs in ‘enemy 
territory’ and, eventually, to – in some sense the act of ultimate 
trust – the literal, reciprocal showing of hospitality in each other’s 
homes.216 
I doubt whether this remarkable, courageous journey of 
mutual rehumanisation would have been possible without initial, 
facilitated hospitality being shown in a ‘third space’ such as the 
Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation. This physical 
space – away from the intensity of (past) conflict in Belfast – 
itself symbolises the uphill journey from hostility to hospitality: it 
is a refurbished military barracks, built in the early 1800s in the 
Wicklow hills south of Dublin, to facilitate more effective 
suppression of rumblings beyond the United Irish Rebellion of 
1798. In the early 1970s, this became a residential centre for 
behind the scenes, inclusive, overnight political dialogue.
The main facilitation task was to help create a relatively safe, 
risk-accommodating, non-judgemental environment in which 
each person was given an equal opportunity to participate. 
Provision of joint meals and a pub facility – late into the night – 
became very important, informal aspects of the process. These 
dialogue sessions took place over at least two days and were 
repeated a number of times, guided by participants’ commitment – 
usually with support from their respective organisations – to help 
create a sustainable peace that would make it possible for their 
children not to go through another cycle of bloody violence.
Over time, this facilitated hospitality process developed, in 
close partnership with Alistair Little, to a point where we required 
a carefully selected, diverse group of only 15 participants to 
commit to a 12-month ‘journey through conflict’, including four 
216. Their respective homes are in neighbourhoods that remain highly segregated between 
British Protestants and Irish Catholics.
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to five multiday residential events. The introductory weekend 
typically took place in a place like Glencree; the next step was to 
do a two-day ‘storytelling’ life histories workshop, again in a 
remote venue with access to relatively unspoilt nature (Hamber, 
Little & Verwoerd 2017). This was followed by deep dialogue, 
which focused on discussing the proverbial elephants in the 
room. Where possible the deep dialogue strand became an 
extended five-day process in the Scottish Highlands with the 
highlight being a further two-week visit to South Africa, including 
a five-day wilderness trail in Imfolozi, KwaZulu-Natal. The final 
session had an evaluative and forward-planning emphasis, and 
ideally took place closer to home (Little & Verwoerd 2013).
The following interaction between a few participants at 
the  evaluative stage of their group’s process illustrates the 
importance of having homely spaces that encouraged unforced, 
cross-border humanisation through literal, mutual hospitality 
(Halperin & Weinstein 2004; Kröndorfer 2015):217
Irish republican ex-prisoner: ‘Where we were had a lot of character 
[…] and we developed the character there as well. That house was 
ours, this hotel isn’t, it is clinical. We are using this, there we were 
building and building something. This room doesn’t have the same 
character: there’s no fire, we’re not sitting around in arm chairs, 
getting a coffee, or making dinner, washing up […] we’re not sharing 
the physical experiences of everyday life.’
Protestant security force family member: ‘That whole working 
together in a social context of making the meals, lighting the fire 
and collecting the wood or whatever, that played a major part in 
what was actually going on in the living room whenever were in 
formal session time. Just being able to be in the kitchen […] because 
you are not just there for yourself, you are there to feed everybody. 
If it’s peeling the potatoes or chopping the vegetables, we were all 
mucking in and helping each other. That played a big part in the 
equal respect that everybody gave each other, so that when you 
entered that living room and sat in the circle you were going to be 
open and honest with each other.’
217. This conversation took place in a hotel near (London) Derry and the references are to a 
remote hunting lodge in the Glen of Tilt, about two hours north of Edinburgh.
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British loyalist: ‘It is one of those things that look insignificant or 
small, but actually the fact that people who were enemies, people 
whose families and themselves have been hurt by people in the 
organisations that they represented and who were there as well […] 
that they were actually cooking meals for each other, cleaning up 
after each other, making cups of tea for each other. That’s a big thing! 
Because if you were to tell people at home, ‘here is someone whose 
family was devastated by people who were in paramilitaries and 
someone from that background was present, and they were making 
tea for each other and helping with food’, those people would find it 
almost impossible to believe. And yet we were doing that […].’
Irish republican: ‘[…] without thinking about it […].’
Loyalist: ‘[…] without thinking about it.’ (n.p.)
This kind of process or ‘journey’ towards more inclusive hospitality 
was certainly neither linear, nor a quick fix. Given our experiences 
as facilitators in the Scottish Highlands and especially in the 
Imfolozi wilderness, our favourite metaphor for this process 
has become that of going on a wilderness trail. Humanising the 
enemy, transcending those ‘sacred bonds’ is like the vulnerable, 
risky, unpredictable, unchartered, up and down nature of a 
wilderness trail. This journey is too risky without experienced 
guides. Furthermore, adequate preparation and equipment are 
required, before moving into a ‘liminal space’ away from familiar 
territory. And the most difficult stage is returning home.218 Like the 
prisoner who escaped from Plato’s cave (Little & Verwoerd 2016).
Upon reflection, it also became clear that we adhered more or 
less to some of the key ‘contact conditions’, which a large and 
growing body of social psychology research has confirmed as 
prerequisites for transformative encounters between conflicted 
parties. These conditions include equalising power during 
contact, encouraging cooperative action and cultivating a shared 
vision of the future.219 I cannot see how hospitality between 
218. This process can also be interpreted in terms of the classic stages of ‘rites of passage’ – 
separation, unsettling liminal space, returning home (see Turner 1969; Bigger 2009).
219. See the large body of research on the ‘contact hypothesis’, or social contact theory, 
drawing on the work of Gordon Allport in the 1950s, for example, Pettigrew (1998).
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(former) enemies can fulfil its highly desirable, humanising 
potential without careful, facilitated attention to these formidable 
conditions.
Embodied hospitality without 
borders – inimba
Closer to home and with my own position as a white, Afrikaner 
South African in mind, I was given an opportunity recently to 
engage in person with Kearney, after his public lecture on 
‘Hospitality to the Stranger’.220 Returning to O’Tuama’s (2013) 
poem I asked: How does someone like me show hospitality to 
someone, or allow myself to be welcomed by someone, if ‘their’ 
blood is on my and my group’s hands? How does one deal with 
the deep-seated tendency to close the door on risky, vulnerable 
hospitality and focus rather on our ‘flag’ and loyalty to ‘our boys’, 
rather than truly face ‘our’ shared, compassionate responsibility 
for ‘their’ suffering? Especially when this blood on our hands – 
transmitted across generations – is not the result of direct, 
explicit, interpersonal, physical violence but the consequence of 
the systemic, structural violence of apartheid?
Faced with these existential questions I received unexpected, 
undeserved encouragement from the co-respondent on the 
night of Kearney’s lecture in Stellenbosch, Prof. Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela. I got to know her commitment to inclusive 
reconciliation when we both worked within the South African 
TRC (1995–1998). Rather than giving a conventional academic 
response, she (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008) chose to make this 
‘public space intimate’: she told a story of her recent visit with 
me to Orania – a whites-only, Afrikaner nationalist town, including 
a museum dedicated to the memory of Dr H.F. Verwoerd, former 
220. The lecture, on 17 May 2017, took place in the historic building of the Theology Faculty – 
closely linked to the white Dutch Reformed Church, which was highly influential politically 
pre-1994 in providing theological and institutional support to the Afrikaner Nationalist 
Apartheid government. 
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Prime Minister (1958–1966), widely known as ‘the Architect of 
Apartheid’. I am also his grandson. It was humbling to listen again 
to her retelling of what I experienced as a particularly striking 
embodiment of the extraordinary generosity of spirit that I have 
encountered among many black South Africans, despite what 
my skin and family blood represents. 
Because she is not in a position to flesh out her response 
for this publication I have her permission to include that story 
here, as well as an extract from a highly relevant follow-up 
conversation. 
A few years ago, on a cold winter’s afternoon, Prof. Gobodo-
Madikizela and I were standing in front of a display cupboard in 
the Verwoerd Museum in Orania. We paused in front of the 
blood-stained clothes Dr Verwoerd wore on 06 September 1966, 
the day of his dramatic assassination in parliament. I told her 
what my mother only recently disclosed to me: how the police 
brought the blood-soaked clothes to my parents’ home and how 
my mother ended up having to wash these clothes in baths of 
cold water, again and again, over a period of three to four days. 
When I finished she said softly, despite everything that Verwoerd 
represents for her and other black South Africans, ‘I feel for your 
mother […]’.
Later I had an opportunity to reflect with her on that 
experience:
Wilhelm Verwoerd: Can you tell me a bit more about what you were 
thinking and feeling when we stood there in front of that suit? 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: I remember thinking about what this 
moment means, you know, being a black South African and the story 
of this person who owned this suit, Verwoerd. There was a kind of 
initial strangeness. Here I was standing in front of this story – because 
for me it wasn’t so much a suit, it was a story of this person […] 
I thought about the historical tragedy, the origins of this story. But 
I also managed to be in the moment with you. And with the story 
you told me about your mother having to wash the blood-drenched 
clothes. I was deeply affected by the story of your mother […] even 
now in fact I am holding back tears […] what she had to go through. 
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What struck me the most was the repetition – the clothes had to be 
washed, again and again. The blood of the dead person, the dead 
father-in-law, was in her hands […] it is almost like it is written all 
over her hands, the pain is written right inside her. She is washing 
the clothes, but she is also washing off the pain, in a way. I have a 
headache now from just thinking about this thing.
Wilhelm Verwoerd: I am aware that we are talking about Verwoerd’s 
daughter-in-law. Was it easier for you to relate to her experience 
because she was a woman?
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: I felt close to her as a woman, yes. But 
there was also just the sense of loss. Remember you and I went for 
a walk the morning after? What occupied me overnight was just this 
question of ‘how can I not connect to this pain?’ This is a fundamental 
question in my work: how do we respond to the pain of the Other? 
What are our philosophical frameworks, our reference points to give 
meaning to these deeply emotional experiences like that day in front 
of the suit with your mother’s story in mind? It is not enough to draw 
lines and say, ‘this suit belonged to the architect of apartheid’. Those 
lines do not help us to connect with who we are […] I realise someone 
might say to me, ‘you are a sell-out!’ when I describe my whole 
experience. But does that criticism really capture what is going on? 
It doesn’t. In fact it glosses over some of the most profound aspects 
of what it is to be human one to another.
Wilhelm Verwoerd: In my experience of you and the work we have 
done there is no question of you trying to excuse or to deny the pain 
that he represents in terms of the system, given what your family, 
your whole community experienced […]
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: […] No! No! […]
Wilhelm Verwoerd: […] there is no denial, but somehow you are able 
to have that sense of the pain Verwoerd represents and at the same 
time be open, at a human level, not at a political level?
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: How do we build knowledge around 
these kinds of experiences? The canons of knowledge about how 
to respond is typically about disconnection. And yet here are 
experiences – through the South African Truth [and Reconciliation] 
Commission, and what happened to us that day in Orania – that tell us 
different. How do we take these experiences and produce something 
fresh and new for our age that will answer the question: who are we 
in relation to the Other?
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Wilhelm Verwoerd: As I understand it you are advocating a post-
critical ubuntu, a ‘second naïvete’ (Ricoeur), around this profound 
connectedness between us as humans, no matter what someone has 
done? And you cannot get to this ubuntu by romanticising about 
South Africa as a ‘rainbow nation’. This superficial, commercialised 
‘ubuntu’ has to be challenged, but if the critical spirit loses the truth 
about our fundamental connectedness, then the baby is thrown out 
with the bloody bathwater […]
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: Exactly, exactly! Because then it 
becomes criticism for criticism’s sake; it doesn’t go beyond to the 
depths of where this connectedness takes us […]
Wilhelm Verwoerd: My sense with people like Archbishop Tutu, 
with you and other black colleagues I am working with is that 
there is a depth of spirit that is beyond ‘apartheid’, beyond human 
separateness, without denying the pain and the unfinished business 
caused by apartheid.
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela: Yes, this is the ambivalence – how do 
we hold that space, where it is not simply about judging, or ‘selling 
out’ or all these terms that do not really open up the space for a 
richer conversation? In this regard I am now exploring further the 
knowledge of the body and particularly inimba, the isiXhosa word 
for ‘womb’. Because the womb is almost like the beginning of life, 
we need to locate the ethics of our relating to one another inside 
the womb – both the metaphoric womb and the actual womb. As 
a man you don’t have a womb, but metaphorically you locate it in 
the depths of your being. You go deep down to the start of life in 
the womb – that is where you feel when you want to connect as 
human beings, because that is from where we come into the world. 
We connect in our nakedness as we were in the womb.221
Apophatic hospitality and the 
transformation of ‘sacred’ bonds?
My understanding is that someone like Archbishop Tutu’s 
womblike ubuntu is strongly rooted in a (Christian) spirituality of 
221. See Gobodo-Madikizela (2011); also her book A Human Being Died That Night on 




radical inclusivity. As a peace practitioner, I am increasingly 
interested in the potential contribution of this universalist 
kind  of  spirituality to the cultivation of resilient, inclusive 
hospitality between enemies.222 I am particularly drawn to the 
promising connection between cross-border compassion223 and 
‘contemplation’ understood as an apophatic (beyond words) 
spiritual discipline in the footsteps of the 14th-century Christian 
classic The Cloud of Unknowing (2009).224
Let me explain the reason for this angle very briefly. The 
anonymous author (most likely a Carthusian English monk) 
carefully instructs his 24-year-old apprentice in the deceptively 
simple ‘work of contemplation’. ‘All’ that is needed is a 
wholehearted ‘naked intent’ to love Godself. During regular 
periods of silent, ‘learned ignorance’ (Augustine), one accepts 
that the Ultimate Reality we clumsily call ‘God’ is beyond the 
reach of any concept. Given the limits of intellectual understanding 
when it comes to the Infinite one humbly approaches a dark 
‘cloud of unknowing’. And all interfering thoughts, feelings, 
memories, sensations are kenotically, patiently let go of. In the 
language of The Cloud: these ceaseless, seductive beckonings of 
222. I am, of course, not suggesting that this promise is restricted to (Western) Christian 
traditions, but a more inclusive interfaith and interspiritual exploration is a future task 
(cf. Knitter 2009).
223. Borg, drawing on the work of Phyllis Tryble in her book God and the Rhetoric of 
Sexuality (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1978), drew my attention to the fact that in the Hebrew 
Bible (as well as in Aramaic) the ‘word usually translated as “compassion” is the plural of 
a noun that in its singular form means “womb”’. He also stresses that in the Hebrew Bible 
compassion is both a visceral ‘feeling with’ and ‘a way of being that flows out of that feeling’ 
(usually of the suffering of someone else) (Borg 1994:47, 62 notes 2–4). He notes that in one 
text, Genesis 43:30, there is even a reference to a man’s ‘womb’ being moved (62, note 5).
224. This apophatic emphasis (in which the scholastic ‘faculties’ of reason, imagination, 
memory and emotion are temporarily suspended [Bourgeault 2016]) is relatively neglected 
within the mostly ‘cataphatic’, word-centred spirituality of (Western) Christianity. This 
neglect applies even more in the scripture-focused Reformed tradition that I come from. 
On the (dis)connections between Protestant piety and just peace, see De Gruchy (1986) 
and Boesak (2012). 
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the mind are forcefully covered under a ‘thick cloud of forgetting’ – 
again, and again, and again.225
And then the anonymous author makes these very strong 
claims regarding the fruits of contemplation:
While engaged in this work [of contemplation], the mature 
contemplative has no special relationships with anyone in particular, 
whether family or stranger, friend or enemy, because everyone is 
family and no one is a stranger, and everyone is friend and no one is 
an enemy. (Ch. 24)
To do this work perfectly, you must neglect everything that is 
not God. [T]here’s no time for analysing people into the categories 
of friend or enemy, relative or stranger. Yes, of course you’ll 
continue to feel closer to some than to others. It’s only natural, 
and there’s nothing wrong with that. […] what I’m saying is 
that during the work of contemplation, you should feel the 
same intimate love for everyone, because your only reason to 
love is God. [This discipline] will make you so kind and dynamic 
in loving that when you stop doing it and mingle with the world 
again […] you’ll discover that you love your slanderer as much as 
your friend, and that you love any stranger as much as a relative. 
(Ch. 25)226
With the battle-hardened faces of many former combatants 
before me, it is very tempting to dismiss these claims as the 
pious rambling of an otherworldly monk. There is indeed a big 
difference between an enemy as a ‘slanderer’ and an enemy as 
a killer of those you, naturally and culturally, feel closer to. But 
then I am reminded that the author’s 14th-century context 
was indeed rather bloody – the Hundred Years’ War between 
England and France was raging, and in the summer of 1381, the 
Peasants’ Revolt began; it was also an age of pandemic, with 
the bubonic plague wiping out roughly half of England’s 
population.227
225. See The Cloud, Chapters 3–7, pp. 11–25 in Butcher translation; Finley (2005).
226. From the recent modern translation by Butcher (2009).
227. Butcher, Introduction (xiii–xiv).
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And I remember that Rowan Williams – a widely respected, 
politically aware faith leader – recently made similar claims about 
the ‘revolutionary’ potential of ‘contemplative humanity’: 
To be contemplative as Christ is contemplative is to be open to all 
the fullness that the Father wishes to pour into our hearts. With 
our minds made still and ready to receive, with our self-generated 
fantasies about God and ourselves reduced to silence, we are at last 
at the point where we may begin to grow. [W]e seek this not because 
we are in search of some private ‘religious experience’ that will make 
us feel secure or holy. We seek it because in this self-forgetting 
gazing towards the light of God in Christ we learn how to look at 
one another and at the whole of God’s creation. [A]s this process 
unfolds, I become more free – to borrow a phrase of St Augustine 
(Confessions IV.7) – to ‘love human beings in a human way’, to love 
them not for what they may promise me […] but as fragile fellow-
creatures held in the love of God. I discover how to see other persons 
and things for what they are in relation to God, not to me. And it is 
here that true justice as well as true love has its roots.228 (n.p.)
Williams does not refer explicitly to the profound challenge of 
loving enemies ‘in a human way’. Scripture commentaries on 
Jesus’ radical command to ‘love thy enemies’ also do not fully 
address – as far as I can gather – what I have witnessed as a 
peace practitioner working with politicised former combatants: 
the intense dynamics of betrayal often involved in becoming 
compassionate towards the demonised Other. But I still resonate 
deeply with the thrust of Williams’ basic agreement with The 
Cloud’s author regarding the fruits of (mature) contemplation. 
Both stress the (re)humanising potential of discovering even the 
furthest Other ‘in relation to God, not to me’ – as ‘fragile fellow-
creatures held in the love of God’. Actualising this humanising 
potential is, in my experience, typically a hesitant, labyrinthine, 
incomplete process. But I have also been privileged to witness 
and experience this ‘contemplative humanity’ convincingly 
embodied in someone like Archbishop Tutu, among a number of 
other black South Africans.
228. From Archbishop of Canterbury’s Address to the Thirteenth Ordinary General Assembly 
of the Synod of Bishops, Rome, 2012.
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Tutu’s (2009:74–75) ubuntu theology and spirituality 
commits him to the belief that no perpetrator is a ‘monster’, for 
perpetrators, ‘despite the awfulness of their deeds, remain 
children of God with the capacity […] to change’. Alan Boesak, 
a  prominent anti-apartheid, black, Reformed church leader, 
challenges white South Africans’ self-interested ‘domestication’ 
of Tutu’s ‘subversive piety’; Boesak (2012) reminds us how radical 
Tutu’s inclusivity and resulting, prophetic truth-telling is:
[Tutu’s faith] has no borders, knows loyalties beyond skin colour and 
culture […] [f]or that reason [Tutu] struggle[s] for justice for black 
people but also for Palestinians, women, gays […] and oppressed 
groups the world over. (p. 142)
I am acutely aware that many of the people I have worked with 
in highly divided contexts such as Northern Ireland–Ireland, 
Israel–Palestine and South Africa will be put off by explicit 
religious references to ‘Christ’ and ‘loving God’ and ‘children of 
God’. But any source that might contribute to the cultivation 
of  ‘loyalties beyond skin colour and culture’ is surely worth 
considering? And because we are faced with ‘sacred bonds’, it 
might be particularly relevant to draw on faith traditions and 
practices that respect the depth of these blood ties.
My colleague Brandon Hamber used the language of ‘sacred 
bonds’ in a secular sense to point to the strength and depth 
of  relationships between the living and those who ‘sacrificed’ 
their lives ‘for us’ during a bloody political conflict. But the 
roots of this language of blood bonds are clearly religious and 
closely linked to ancient blood sacrifice rituals. Take, for example, 
this commentary by Schreiter (1988) on Exodus 24:6–8 in the 
Hebrew Bible:
The blood ritual in the Exodus story was about covenant. The blood 
traced a line around the motley band of slaves and made of them 
something special. And that blood became for the Hebrews more 
than the blood of young livestock; it became the blood that made 
of them a family, that gave them a shared substance of life and 
purpose  – a shared substance that did not begin or end with any 
individual, but was part of a great stream carrying them from one 
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generation to the next. It made them important to one another and 
to God. (p. 17)
In the South African context, the (white) Afrikaner, Dutch 
Reformed group that I am from clearly applied this reading in a 
highly exclusive way to cultivate a sense of sacralised, covenantal 
ethnic belonging. And unquestioning loyalty to those of ‘us’ who 
were killed – such as the women and children in the concentration 
camps during the Anglo-Boer War and a Dr H.F. Verwoerd.229 
My  experience on the troubled island of Ireland suggests that 
this highly problematic, ethno-political use of biblical blood 
ritual  language (explicitly or implicitly) is a more widespread 
phenomenon.
The key facilitative question I am interested in for now is this: 
are there spiritual practices that can get to the roots of these 
‘sacred bonds’ and help to transcend them? More specifically, 
what is the potential of a committed practice of meditation and 
especially ‘apophatic contemplation’ to help cultivate a deeply 
rooted stance of hospitality that is able to reach through bloodied 
boundaries of belonging?230
At this stage, I can only mention, in very broad strokes, a few 
promising avenues for further exploration: 
 • Linguistic, epistemic humility: An important strand in 
transcending bloodied divides between Us and Them is, 
I  believe, the subtle softening of hardened conceptual 
boundaries; the thawing of frozen categories of ‘friend’ and 
‘enemy’. My sense is that the cultivation of this strand is 
part  of  the potential contribution of an apophatic practice. 
A foundational fruit of this practice is a humble stance towards 
the inexhaustible, ungraspable mystery of (Ultimate) reality. 
229. I am exploring this particular angle in more depth in a semi-autobiographical book, 
Bloedbande: ‘n Donker Tuiskoms (Verwoerd 2018).
230. For more on (long-term) benefits of meditation as confirmed by (contemplative) 
neuroscience; cf. Goleman and Davidson (2017).
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This humility is expressed in a healthy appreciation of the 
limits of language. Applied to enemy talk, this humility may 
encourage an openness to the possibility that the person 
before me is more than the dehumanising conflict labels so 
firmly, so blindingly attached to him or her.
• Liberating ‘forgetting’: I am also intrigued by the positive 
potential of a practice of regular periods of conscious 
‘forgetting’ in helping to loosen the stranglehold of conflict-
related memories and emotions. Increasing evidence of the 
mental health benefits of mindfulness and so on, including for 
war veterans and trauma survivors, is instructive in this regard 
(Goleman & Davidson 2017; Van der Kolk 2014). 
• Fruits of ‘self-compassion’: The underlying attitude of 
meditative practice is to maintain non-judgemental 
compassion towards yourself as you discover very quickly 
your inability to meditate or contemplate, that is, to stay 
present and awake, without clinging to or rejecting the 
inevitable distractions of thoughts, memories, feelings and 
bodily sensations (Finley 2005). A potential fruit of this inner 
attitude is that it tends to spill over into daily life; specifically, 
one’s ability to extend non-judgemental compassion to 
others can be increased.231 This would be a non-religious 
route to make sense of the strong claims regarding 
compassion for friend and enemy made by The Cloud’s 
author.
• ‘Post-apartheid’ consciousness: A more fundamental 
possibility for future exploration has to do with the potential 
connection between apophatic practice and the transformation 
of apartheid consciousness. In the above-quoted conversation 
with Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, she and I also talked about 
how deeply rooted the legacy of the systemic, dehumanising 
racism of apartheid is. We agreed that while the outer legacy 
of racialised inequality is glaringly obvious in post-apartheid 
231. For promising social psychological research in this regard (focussing on the positive 
potential of self-compassion on wrongdoer’s empathy towards those they have wronged), 
cf. Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis and Schumann (2018).
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South Africa, there is also an inner legacy of racial division and 
disconnectedness that continues to haunt us.
This contextualised inner ‘separateness’ might be understood 
as an extreme manifestation of what in interfaith ‘wisdom’ 
literature is called ‘dualistic consciousness’, with the seemingly 
unbridgeable divide between the categories ‘friend’ and 
‘enemy’ another such manifestation. Now, an apophatic 
practice is fundamentally about the cultivation of ‘unitive’, 
‘non-dual’ consciousness.232 I am therefore also very keen to 
explore its particular potential to contribute to the ‘reformation’ 
of Protestant-inspired apartheid consciousness. And, more 
broadly, to a non-dual, womblike spirit of hospitality that can 
begin to transcend all bloodied ‘borders of belonging’.
Hospitable language
I am grateful to Kearney for highlighting the deep cultural 
and  religious roots of the language of hospitality, especially 
towards ‘the stranger’ (Kearney & Taylor 2011). I have completely 
neglected this language in my work as a researcher within the 
South African TRC, with a heavy involvement in helping to draft 
the chapters ‘Concepts and Principles’ (Vol. 1) and ‘Reconciliation’ 
(Vol. 5).233 I’ve also failed to pursue ‘hospitality’, especially 
towards the stranger-as-enemy, in subsequent philosophical 
writing (Govier & Verwoerd 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Verwoerd 
2007).
As a peace practitioner, I have seen in action the power of 
(facilitated, wise) hospitality beyond the borders of ‘blood’. 
I  have also experienced how inhospitable the language of 
forgiveness and apology can be to people such as Gerard, Alistair 
232. Cf. Bourgeault (2016). Also cf. Merton (1997:248–259), especially on the radical 
inclusivity of a Christian spirituality of non-violence.
233. Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998).
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and many politically motivated ex-combatants faced with the 
dynamics of betrayal (Little & Verwoerd 2016; Verwoerd & 
Little 2018). 
For me Kearney has now opened up the possibility that the 
language of (realistic, radical) hospitality towards the demonised 
Other can enrich the family of related concepts, such as 
compassion, acknowledgement and understanding. ‘Hospitality’ 
can thus contribute – especially at early stages of processes of 
humanisation – to making the discourse of reconciliation more 
invitational. And so the practice of peace may become more 
welcoming, more lasting. Even between enemies with the blood 
of each Other on their hands.
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This chapter is a transcription234 of a dialogue that took place 
between the authors on 16 April 2018. The purpose of the 
conversation was to create an opportunity for Richard Kearney 
to engage with some of the questions posed by authors in the 
preceding chapters of the book.
Daniël P. Veldsman: Richard, it is a great privilege to have this 
conversation with you. We value your response to the 
perspectives from which the various contributors to the book 
have engaged with you. We are excited to present this publication 
to the world, as a first engagement of this nature between African 
thought and a philosopher representing some of the most current 
thought in Continental philosophy. 
Richard Kearney: Not at all, this is a pleasure for me too. I have 
to say, going through the conference papers that you’ve sent 
me, as well as the questions from the authors, the collection 
appears to be a very substantial body of work and I feel greatly 
honoured.
Yolande Steenkamp: I also wanted to say how much appreciation 
I had for the way you wrote your intellectual biography, for sharing 
so much of yourself. It was such a pleasure to read.
Richard Kearney: Thank you.
Daniël P. Veldsman: Let’s get on with the discussion then. It is 
a great privilege to debate Otherness with you from a number of 
South African perspectives. We’re going to start with the more 
philosophical questions, first by Justin Sands from North-West 
University, and then from Pieter Duvenage, a philosopher from 
the University of the Free State. Justin Sands says that he has 
always noticed a concern for the political throughout your 
thinking, both in your early philosophy of imagination and 
narrative and your later philosophy of religion and the stranger. 
He finds this especially so in your works that discuss Ireland and 
234. We express our sincere gratitude to Bernice Serfontein for the many hours she spent 
transcribing and editing this dialogue.
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its political situation and also in texts such as Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters (2003) and Anatheism (2011). He calls to mind a 
response to Merold Westphal where you considered a certain 
metaphysical, theistic concept of God as a ‘recipe for war’. Could 
you please elaborate on your concern for the political factors 
in  the philosophical projects you choose to undertake, and 
how  this concern for the political becomes integrated into 
your  hermeneutical–phenomenological method? Or, rephrased 
slightly more simply: How does your ethical concern for violence 
and your desire for hospitality to the stranger inform your 
decision to take philosophy to its limit?
Richard Kearney: I would say that my thoughts regarding 
politics were informed by my growing up in a country like Ireland, 
bitterly divided by political and religious ideologies. I experienced 
the damaging influence of two kinds of theocracy in both parts 
of the island. North of the border one had the ideology of a 
Protestant parliament for a Protestant people, while south of the 
border, in the Republic of Ireland, we had for many decades after 
independence from Britain a more or less Catholic parliament for 
a Catholic people. In the 1937 Constitution of the Irish Republic, 
there was a special privileged role assigned to the Catholic 
Church. So I grew up with a strong feeling that it was not good 
to have ‘national’ religions – Irish or British. Even looking at 
Europe, there were still several national religions: the sovereign 
Monarch of the UK was also the head of the Church of England, 
and Lutheranism was the national religion of some Nordic 
countries. This nationalising of religion was originally in reaction 
to the imperial legacy of the Holy Roman Empire (as was, in a 
more radical sense, the secular atheism of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution). But it still made for a certain confusion 
between Protestant church and state. 
So I grew up in the sixties and seventies in Ireland with the 
view that one should separate church and state. The idea of any 
sort of authoritarian ideology, be it political or religious – or 
worse the two together – was something I felt needed to be 
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unmasked and debunked with what my Paris mentor, Paul 
Ricoeur, called a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’. I agreed with 
Ricoeur’s call to set the ‘three masters of suspicion’ – Freud, Marx 
and Nietzsche – loose on all ideologies of power and dissimulation. 
It was necessary to smash the idols of power in order to let the 
symbols of genuine spirit speak. I embraced the idea that one 
needed to practise a radical critique of religion before opening 
up new possibilities for a ‘hermeneutics of affirmation’ (hope, 
love, justice, hospitality to the stranger). Already as a young 
student what I liked about phenomenology was that it began 
with the epoché: you bracket out all ideological presuppositions 
and prejudices in order to return to the ‘things themselves’ – the 
lived phenomena of experience as if you didn’t know the answer. 
One suspended all answers inherited from Party, Church or State. 
So in a sense my initial philosophical position towards religion 
was antinomian and anti-authoritarian  – beginning from not 
knowing as a way of opening paths for genuine faith. The methods 
of phenomenology and hermeneutics, as I understood them, 
prevented philosophy from becoming an ideology, an instrument 
of a hegemonic institution, religion or state. By recognising the 
finite limits of human reason, hermeneutic phenomenology still 
leaves space aside for a genuine experience of the infinite, 
whether you call it Ultimate Reality or any of the names for God 
found in the great wisdom traditions – or the absolute Other 
along with Levinas and Derrida, an infinitely demanding sense of 
justice that is always still to come. What I would later call ‘diacritical 
hermeneutics’, starting with Strangers, Gods and Monsters (2003), 
invigilates the limits between finite and infinite experience, 
preventing one from fetishising or fixating any one of our ultimate 
concepts as Cause, Substance, Idea or Being – lest we succumb 
to what Jean-Luc Marion calls ‘conceptual idolatry’. 
Daniël P. Veldsman: This actually ties in well with the second 
question: is your critical concern for the abuse of the political a 
reason why you are careful not to completely conflate philosophy 
and theology? Your texts pertaining to the philosophy of religion 
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are explicit about their scope, and in Anatheism, you directly 
state that you are not proposing a new theology of any sort. 
Does your concern for the political inform this resistance or is it 
more a professional preference of some sort?
Richard Kearney: It does, and in a way I think I’ve answered the 
second part of the question first, because my response was very 
much a critique of the theologising of politics, about which I have 
deep reservations. There are two main reasons for this: First of all, 
I’m not a theologian, and as such I am not competent. I haven’t 
been trained in theology, and I learned from Ricoeur and Derrida 
during my research with them in Paris that philosophy and theology 
are different disciplines. Theology presupposes Revelation, or at 
least this is what Husserl and Heidegger thought. If you answer 
the question of philosophy, namely ‘why is there something rather 
that nothing?’ with a theological answer – ‘On the first day God 
created the world’ – then you’ve got your answer before you begin. 
So  I  tried to practise what I would call a methodological 
agnosticism, which never meant I ceased to be a Christian or a 
believer, but that I never began by invoking the answers of divine 
Revelation to respond to the questions of philosophy. 
So that’s one reason. The second is the autobiographical one 
that I mentioned above. I grew up in an Irish–British context 
where politics – often a violent, exclusivist and repressive 
politics  – had been identified with the Protestant or Catholic 
religion, which I thought was a total betrayal of the authentic 
goodness of both Protestantism and Catholicism. In Kierkegaard’s 
terms I saw it as ‘Christendom betraying Christianity’. So I wanted 
to leave Christianity free for faith, and in a way free for genuine 
theology and a certain kind of Christian way of life – both as 
action and contemplation. I was aware of the limits of philosophy: 
it can go so far, and no further. You can of course raise the God 
question in a hermeneutic phenomenology of religion, but you 
can’t answer it. Responses, if they exist, belong not to philosophy 
as such but to the realms of prayer, liturgy and spiritual practice – 
and, at an intellectual level, theology proper.
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Daniël P. Veldsman: The next question, from Pieter Duvenage, 
research associate at Free State University, ties in very closely 
with the question of the role of religion. He is curious whether 
there is anything specifically Irish that set you on a path of 
becoming a very important interlocutor in the broad post-
phenomenological debate globally? To the point, he asks what 
there may be specifically in Irish Catholicism that finds an alliance 
with philosophical movements in the 20th century? Who were 
your Irish influences and mentors that set you on your way to do 
your postgraduate work under the Catholic-influenced Charles 
Taylor in Canada and the Protestant-influenced Paul Ricoeur in 
France?
Richard Kearney: Apart from the negative and repressive side 
of my Irish Catholic formation mentioned above I would also 
readily admit there was a positive side. First I would cite a deep 
sense of the sacramentality of everyday things. A sense of sacred 
times and places and saints and events deeply linked to the 
liturgical seasons. A sense that there was actually real presence of 
the holy in the life of ordinary incarnate things, of simple 
epiphanies. That’s what I learned from the Benedictine monks of 
Glenstal Abbey, where I attended boarding school, and from 
Patrick Masterson and Denys Turner, my professors of philosophy 
at UCD – the idea that there is a ‘mystery deep down things’, as 
Catholic authors like Gerard Manly Hopkins, Gabriel Marcel and 
Bernard Lonergan wrote. 
Phenomenology also resonated, in a certain way, with this 
Catholic sense of the depth of ordinary things. I remember 
reading Sartre saying phenomenology empowered us to 
philosophise not just about first causes and supreme beings but 
about ashtrays and lamplights – there was nothing ineligible for 
phenomenological investigation. And this insight into the 
profundity of the everyday, of our being-there-in-the-world, was 
also shared by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and feminists like 
Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, whose thought greatly influenced 
me during my studies in Paris and Montreal. The sentiment that 
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visible reality is an invisible gift. Es Gibt. This lineage also includes 
more recent colleagues like Jean-Luc Marion, with his 
phenomenology of the ‘saturated phenomenon’ as a pure 
givenness of the gift – a notion informed by a certain mystical 
Catholic spirituality going back to Patristic mystics like Dionysius 
the Areopogite and Gregory of Nyssa. When I worked with 
Charles Taylor in Montreal for my master’s degree in 1976–1977, 
I witnessed somebody who could be both a practising Catholic 
and a serious independent philosopher. Not that he did ‘Catholic 
philosophy’ as such, but his thinking displayed a very careful 
attention to ‘epiphanies’ of transcendence within immanence, as 
would later be powerfully expressed in the final section of A 
Secular Age235. Regardless of whether you interpret these sacred 
manifestations of word and deed as revealed signs of Christ, 
Buddha, Krishna or Yahweh – that is a matter for different 
theologians and believers to decide. You make that decision 
when you exit the phenomenological brackets, the epoché, and 
return to questions of religious faith and practice. 
Two other Catholic intellectuals who informed my 
hermeneutics of religion during my time in France were Stanislas 
Breton and Jean Vanier. Breton was a priest of the Passionist 
Order who taught at the Institut Catholique de Paris and served 
on the examining committee of my doctoral dissertation, 
Poétique du Possible236, along with Ricoeur and Levinas. Breton 
was very conversant with atheist postmodernists like Foucault, 
Althusser and Derrida, while remaining deeply committed to the 
mystical tradition of Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross and 
Theresa of Avilla. Perhaps, this early exposure to the vibrant Paris 
dialogues between theists and atheists was already sowing seeds 
for my later formulation of anatheism. Lastly, and also in France, 
I met and worked with Jean Vanier, who had been a professor of 





homes for young people to live and work with the disabled. Here 
I found an extraordinary witness to the ‘thisness’ of each person, 
a haecceitas that is utterly precious and invaluable – a Scotist 
notion with a certain Catholic valence. 
That said, however, let me add that from Paul Ricoeur and 
others I learned the very important Protestant gesture of critical 
distance and questioning, the value of limits and of critiques and 
not being taken over by mystery in a way that might lead to 
mystification, as can sometimes happen with people like 
Heidegger and the German idealists. This is all to say that I grew 
up in between Catholic and Protestant traditions of thought, in 
Ireland and later again in Canada and France. Not to mention the 
vital importance for me of Jewish thinkers like Levinas and 
Buber – and of Hinduism and Buddhism during my journeys to 
the East (India, Nepal, Japan) between 2009 and 2014.
Yolande Steenkamp: Thank you, Richard. Our next question 
comes from Anné Verhoef from North-West University in 
Potchefstroom. He sees a specific tension in your work. On the 
one hand, there is the need to have something more than ‘religion 
without religion’, more than faith without content, more than 
empty secularism. The need is for religion with its specificities, 
with its own foundation and spiritual depth, with its word, rituals, 
liturgies and traditions, or as formulated earlier: a notion of 
theism within ana-theism, of radical or ‘vertical’ transcendence 
within immanence. On the other hand, however, he detects the 
continuous move away from dogmatic formulae, a refusal of all 
absolute talk about the absolute and especially an opposition to 
religions that violently impose their own view of the Absolute on 
others. Religion should thus have content (it cannot be empty 
secularism), but on the other hand it should not be taken too 
dogmatically. His question then is whether this is possible. Can 
one have religion with only a ‘little bit religion’? When is the 
particularity, the content of the religion too much?
Richard Kearney: I see this as basically a call for a ‘discernment 
of spirits’, as Ignatius of Loyola said. Rather than swallow any 
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religion whole, without question or challenge, I think it is crucial 
to discern, discriminate and differentiate between the good and 
bad ‘bits’, before making a second more mature ‘anatheist’ 
recommitment. Regardless of our religion, are we not all obliged 
at some point to make distinctions between the ‘bits of religion’ 
that breed bigotry, scapegoating, hatred, exclusivism and the 
better, truer, more authentic and life-affirming ‘bits of religion’ 
that foster love, justice, good living and openness to the widow, 
the orphan or the stranger? I deem it responsible for us to jettison 
and deconstruct the perversions of religion (all too common in 
all traditions alas – is there any tradition exempt from abuse?) in 
order to retrieve the uniquely liberating and enriching gifts of 
religion. Philosophical critique is part of this work. 
So I do not see anatheism as an empty secularism void of 
content but rather as a purgative emancipation and transformation 
of tradition – rediscovering a second theism or post-theism after 
(ana) having rejected naïve dogmatic infantile theism. In this 
sense, anatheism is a catharsis of faith. ‘Smashing the idol to let 
the symbol speak’, as Ricoeur puts it. I reckon there is always the 
need for a certain discernment of spirits, a wager and choice for 
the bits that give life and the bits that don’t. Further, I wouldn’t 
say that the bit ‘that brings life and brings it more abundantly’ (as 
Christ says) is just a ‘little bit’. On the contrary, I would see it 
actually as the ‘big bit’ and the ‘most important bit’, although it 
comes through the ‘little things’ of nature or ‘the little people’ as 
Vanier calls the disabled and disinherited – the widows, orphans 
and strangers. The Samaritans and Syro-Phoenican women 
singled out by Jesus in the gospels. They may seem small but so 
does the mustard seed. The little children as portal to the kingdom 
of heaven (childlike faith is not the same as childish – infantile, 
blind – faith). The ‘big bits’ are often in the ‘little bits’. The first as 
the last and least of these. When Christ comes back, he doesn’t 
come back as a grand emperor or master of the universe. 
He  comes back as a fisherman, he comes back as a cook – a 
maker of breakfast on the shore of Galilee – or as a gardener to 
Mary Magdalene. Once again the fullness is in the  emptiness. 
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The  resurrection (anastasis) presupposes the emptying and 
letting go (kenosis), the arriving presupposes the departing and 
decreasing – in order to rise again, to be born again, to begin all 
over again (ana). 
I remember once talking to Chokyi Nyima, the great Buddhist 
Lama of the White Monastery in Kathmandu, about the Heart 
Sutra of Buddhism – ‘emptiness is form and form is emptiness’. 
He replied that there is nothing fuller than emptiness. In that 
sense, I would see the emptiness that comes from the atheistic 
voiding of dogmatic, theocratic, violent theism as a salutary 
kenotic emptying that precedes a new fullness. Like the 
phenomenological bracketing which empties us of our illusions, 
prejudices and attachments in order to get ‘back to the things 
themselves’ (zu den sachen selbst), so that we can rediscover 
the fundamental ontological meaning of being (Sein), a meaning 
normally covered over in our ‘natural attitude’ of ostensible 
fullness. When we are ‘full of ourselves’, cocksure, arrogant, self-
sufficient and supposedly sovereign in our ego world, we cannot 
hearken to the stranger in others and ourselves. Only after a 
spiritual voiding can we retrieve the secret mystery of things, to 
which we are habitually blind and inattentive. 
It is like the AA 12-step movement where the admission of our 
‘helplessness’ before our addictions and attachments is the 
necessary prelude for embracing the ‘higher power’ at work in 
our everyday lives – in community with others (there is no ‘cure’ 
in AA except in the community of fellow or former addicts). And 
the healing is always one day at a time, never once and for all. 
There is no big road to Damascus – or rather every moment is a 
potential road to Damascus, in the ordinary moments, the 
quotidian surrenders and responses to the call of reality and 
other people (our neighbours and strangers). In the Christian 
story, this cycle of emptying and rebirth is also at work, not only 
in the Pauline vision of kenosis as the father emptying himself to 
take on the form of the incarnate human son (Phlp 2) but also 
when that same son, Jesus Christ, descends kenotically into the 
void of hell during and after the Crucifixion, for three days, before 
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rising again (anastasis). So in my opinion, the Christian kenosis – 
the evacuating of power in order to embrace what Paul calls ‘the 
weakness of God’ – is actually the promise of a new surplus, a 
new fulfilling. 
It is interesting that Anné talks about a horizontal 
transcendence as opposed to a vertical transcendence, but 
I  actually do believe in vertical transcendence – what Levinas 
calls ‘Height’, what Paul Ricoeur calls ‘the Surplus’, what William 
James calls ‘the More’, what Derrida calls ‘the Other’, what I call 
‘the Posse’ always to be realised. There is always this ‘extra’ that 
we only fully appreciate when we’ve gone through the emptiness, 
but it’s a greater fullness. That allows for the notion of the Divine 
as excess, as the Stranger still to come, à-venir. So I acknowledge 
both kinds of transcendence – horizontal and vertical – and 
actually see anatheism as potentially richer, more life-fulfilling 
and more full of substance and content than most old conventional 
formulations of theism. Of course, it’s the same set of stories, it’s 
the same metaphors, the same teaching, the same memory, the 
same events, the same truths, but revived in another way – ana-
theistically.
Yolande Steenkamp: So if the Absolute, which you said we can 
think of in terms of love and justice, if the ‘big bit’ that is left of 
religion or theism in Anatheism, if that can give us access to the 
Absolute, then Anné’s second question is whether secularism 
can give us similar access to the Absolute, let’s say in the form of 
love or kindness to the widow, the stranger and the orphan. Put 
differently: While it is true that some sources beyond and beneath 
ourselves for hospitality and love can be found in religion, without 
understanding one’s religion as the exclusive access to the 
Absolute, his second question remains: can secularism offer us 
the same fulfilment, inspiration, hospitality and meaning as that 
which religions offer, with us thereby avoiding the risk of hyper-
transcendence and Absolutism? Is it not better to speak of 
‘religion without religion’, and to move away, so to speak, from 
the specificities of religion altogether, avoiding the risky wager 
of anatheism, to embrace a more horizontal transcendence? 
Across oceans
318
He wonders whether this risk of the anatheistic wager is necessary 
or worth taking? 
Richard Kearney: The Stranger, the Other is in every person, 
including secular people, in all relationships – in my relationship 
to a secular person and a secular person’s relationship to me. 
I  had this exact conversation with James Wood in a dialogue 
published as ‘Theism, Atheism, Anatheism’ in Richard Kearney’s 
Wager: Philosophy, Theology, Politics237 – a book which is very 
much a companion piece to this volume. He basically said, and 
I  paraphrase, ‘Look, I’m a secular humanist. I believe in doing 
good, I believe in breaking bread, I believe in welcoming the 
Syro-Phoenician woman and in sharing water with the Samaritan 
woman. But what I don’t get is, what has God to do with it?’ And 
my response to James Wood – and to Anné – is this: God is a 
word or notion used by billions of people since time immemorial 
to designate the miraculous exchange of radical hospitality and 
love – and all such exchanges take place in the profane world 
because the sacred doesn’t come from elsewhere, it’s in and 
through the profane, it’s the infinite in the finite, the transcendent 
in and through the immanent. This opens up a dimension which I 
call the Posse – or the divine possible beyond the impossible. In 
the realm of one’s human secular powers and possibilities, 
conventions and presuppositions, something else emerges and 
surges up. Religion, and in my case the Abrahamic religion, 
provides me with names for that – Yahweh, Elohim, Abba, Father, 
Christ; the Greeks call it theos in its various forms and guises. 
If there is one divinity, there are many names for it. The Buddhists 
have their words for sacred persons and phenomena – nirvana, 
sunyata, Bodhisattva, Guanyin, etc. – and the Hindus have 
hundreds of words. 
As Stanislas Breton says, the unnameability of God is the 
omni-nameability of God. Religions offer a set of parables, 
liturgies, narratives, memories, testaments, promises and 
missions that articulate that sense of the possible beyond the 
237. Kearney and Wood (2018:40–68).
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impossible, where hostility converts into hospitality, where hate 
converts into love, where the profane becomes sacred. We say 
about certain things and people in our ordinary language: ‘Oh, 
this place is sacred to me, this day is sacred to me, this person or 
thing is sacred to me’. It is in the ordinary and everyday that ‘the 
more’ surges up – the sacred is in and through the profane. It 
seems to me that religion provides us with a language and a 
liturgy for articulating this enigma, which the secular humanist 
has to do without. Even though it’s in many respects the same 
experience, religion provides us with a hermeneutic – not just 
any abstract or facile language but a special language of liturgy, 
a way of performing it, where I’m not alone in discovering the 
mystery. There are traditions. It’s been discovered before by 
communities, holy peoples and saints, by Jesus and Mary, by 
Jacob and Abraham, when they opened the door to the stranger, 
shared food with the alien, welcomed Gabriel so that a child 
could be born or broke bread on the road to Emmaus. Why go 
without these stories? 
Yolande Steenkamp: A cloud of witnesses […]
Richard Kearney: Yes.
Daniël P. Veldsman: Or from another angle, someone calls it a 
double vision […] it opens up a double vision.
Richard Kearney: This doesn’t mean that the religious person is 
better than the secular humanist. It simply means that the former 
may choose to make an anatheist wager, whether it’s conscious or 
unconscious, and that by reinscribing themselves anatheistically in 
the narratives of their sacred tradition (whatever that may be) they 
rediscover a ‘cloud of witnesses’ as you say, a community of saints, 
holy ones or wise ancestors, a scripture of ongoing testimony 
regarding the act of hosting the stranger – where one is not alone. 
Religion simply means I’m on a road with other people who have 
walked this way and taken this wager before me. One cannot invent 
wisdom traditions out of nothing. Now James Joyce, one might say, 
invented Finnegan’s Wake, a new language from his imagination, 
because he was a total genius – and because it was fiction. But even 
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Joyce, inventing an entirely new creative language to express the 
wonder of the universe, resorted to dozens of other pre-existing 
tongues, which he mixed and blended in the writing of his text. He 
was not working ex nihilo. He was not some omnipotent God 
creating from nothing but a human author recreating a new literary 
imaginary from a whole inherited thesaurus of linguistic possibilities, 
a rich archival memory bank of multiple languages and witnesses. 
If this is true of literary scripture, how much more true of sacred 
scripture? No man is an island when it comes to fiction or to faith. 
Although they are not the same thing. The later makes a truth claim 
to the divine; they latter does not.
Yolande Steenkamp: Moving on to Johann Meylahn’s first 
question, which he asked in the first section of his chapter, 
concerning the possibility of a book such as Anatheism. Is the 
fictional as if not the impossible possibility of configuring that 
which is beyond figuration? He points out that this question is 
not meant as a critique but as an attempt to understand his own 
role as an author in an age of literature (cinders there are), 
specifically when you argue that anatheism is not a fictional as if 
but a creedal as.
Richard Kearney: That’s a great question. Derrida implies that 
all we have are figurations; there is nothing outside of the text. 
In  my first book, Poétique du possible (1984), I explored 
a  hermeneutics of figuration – prefiguration, refiguration, 
transfiguration, configuration – in terms of our human attempts 
to come to terms with the big questions of Being and God. All 
seeing is a seeing-as, as both Heidegger and Wittgenstein agreed. 
All experience is interpretative, that is, figurative in some form or 
other (from the dreams of our unconscious to the parables of the 
Gods). Hermes goes all the way down and all the way up. But I 
see figuration not just as a finite limitation to what can be thought 
and said but also as a positive occasion – when it comes to sacred 
matters – for theopoetics. Figuration is good. It is better that 
God be translated into figures for us than that we would ever 
assume to have a literal and immediate possession of divine 
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mystery or alterity. That would be to ignore our finitude. It would 
be to presume that we possess God, that we can comprehend 
God, that we can be Hegel: the idealist presumption that human 
consciousness can actually identify with absolute consciousness. 
That’s the big temptation. So we are saved by figuration. We are 
saved by the figurative ‘as’.
Now the figurative ‘as’, when it comes to God, is in my opinion 
a way that works dually, like the ‘double vision’ Danie mentioned 
earlier. Theopoetics is divinity making itself accessible and 
available to us through figurations – through performances, rituals, 
liturgies, narratives, icons, cathedrals, synagogues, mosques and 
many other forms of religious art and architecture. We can access 
God through what Sufis like Ibn al-Arabi called the ‘imaginal’. This 
is an experience of the divine Other as a ‘figure’. After the 
resurrection, we see Jesus as a gardener, as a  fisherman, as a 
shepherd, as a breaker of bread, as a healer, as a wanderer on the 
road to Emmaus. The sacred stranger always manifests figuratively 
as this or that. And we finite humans respond with an act of 
interpretation, which is often a wager of faith in the call and 
promise of this Other as divine. It is faith rather than knowledge, as 
one can never know for certain; one can never be sure whether the 
figure is a figuration of something beyond us or a mere figment of 
our imagination, a pure supreme fiction projected by our minds. I 
have faith in you as gardener, giver of bread, cooker of fish or 
saviour. It is, however, a saviour as a particular figuration. 
Anthropoetics responds to theopoetics. God reveals divinity 
through figures, and we respond with an anthropoetics, which 
can go two ways. It can figure God faithfully as this or that, or 
fictionally as if God was this or that. For instance, the gospel 
narrative of Jesus crucified and resurrected is different from 
D.H. Lawrence’s fictional account of Jesus marrying Mary 
Magdalene and having children or Kazantzakis’ novelistic take on 
the crucifixion in The Last Temptation of Christ. It is wrong to 
confuse the two – the as and the as if – and to censor or condemn 
fiction writers for blasphemy when their fictional configurations 
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are not making any truth or faith claims as such. This is also true 
of the controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. 
It is a category mistake to confuse the different modalities of 
figuration. Literature is not religion. Though religion is often 
literature. That said, the two modes of figuration – creedal 
transfiguration and fictional configuration – can often supplement 
each other. Acts of hospitality represented in great works of 
literature – Homer, Joyce, Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables, Karen 
Blixen’s Babette’s Feast – offer deep insights into the act of 
sharing with strangers. Here the fictional as if opens our 
imagination to all kinds of possibilities, irrespective of whether 
we are theists or atheists, Christians, Jews or Hindus. 
Now, the creedal as comes about when my response to the 
stranger who comes takes the form of transfiguring (faith) rather 
than configuring (fiction). The creedal as takes another step, a 
second step, a step from imagination to prayer. And this involves 
a hermeneutic wager. Not that the two are incompatible. In fact, 
I would say that literature is often a powerful portal for genuine 
faith. In faith, the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ (Coleridge’s 
definition of poetic imagination) is accompanied by a second 
anatheist belief beyond disbelief (and of course beyond the first 
naïve ‘literalist’ belief that God is some kind of object, fetish or 
possession). It is this second belief beyond disbelief which 
involves a spiritual or creedal transfiguring – I have faith in you 
as a sacred Giver of life as well as experiencing you as a human 
person in a profane finite world. That second step of believing-
as is different from the imagining-as-if. They are distinct figural 
moments. For example, when Thomas is first told about Jesus 
returning he believes it is a ghost – a mere as if figment of the 
disciples’ configuring imagination – but when he encounters 
Jesus himself and declares ‘[m]y Lord and my God’, he is claiming 
it is true and thereby moving from configuration to transfiguration. 
When he has faith in Jesus as the Giver of life who is born again 
he has moved from the as if of the phantom to the commitment 
of fides and confidens – faith and trust that this is true. That’s the 
difference between literature and religion. They’re both acts 
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of  imagination but the latter is a trusting in the truth of the 
statement. 
Now that truth must never be, in my view, inflated to the point 
of dogmatism, in the sense of a smug authoritarian certainty. We 
should have humility about saying that we have confidence, we 
have trust, we have faith. Faith is a question of humour and 
humility, as I suggest in Anatheism. It is not ‘believing that’ 
but having ‘faith in’. Faith is having confidence in this person as a 
divine bringer of bread and life. But we must always remind 
ourselves that this cycle of figuring–configuring–transfiguring 
never ends, never escapes from the hermeneutic circle of as and 
as if. To pretend to be able to escape from hermeneutics, even as 
I am carnally touching the body of my saviour (like Thomas), is 
the radical temptation of turning stone into bread, which is 
precisely what Satan tempted Jesus with in the desert. It is the 
temptation of Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, namely to forget 
figuration. The flesh and blood of my saviour is a body transfigured 
by faith – flesh is always already figuration. Flesh is word and 
word is flesh. Or as Aristotle put it in the De Anima, ‘flesh is a 
medium (metaxu) not (just) an organ’. That is for me the 
importance of carnal hermeneutics. Creedal hermeneutics 
involves both carnal hermeneutics and poetic hermeneutics. 
Faith needs both flesh and imagination. The three are 
indispensable, I think, for any genuine understanding of the 
anatheist wager.
Yolande Steenkamp: So Johann’s second question, which is 
also from his chapter, is whether anatheism would not be the 
perfect state-religion of the liberal–intellectual centre of the 
European Union, at least for all those with slight leanings towards 
the left? As a South African he finds himself sensitive to any 
creedal as, and therefore he is more inclined towards a fictional 
as if. The reason is that the as if for him remains hospitable to all 
those who might find themselves welcomed by an as if, while an 
as always already excludes those who are not in that specific 
configuration of the as. 
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Richard Kearney: I think I have already touched on this. For me, 
faith is a creedal as that is always in dialogue with the fictional as 
if – which it made into a wager. The fictional as if doesn’t make a 
wager or leap of faith as such but opens an imaginary space – 
what Danie calls an ‘acoustic space’ – for new possibilities of 
epiphany and annunciation, of hospitality and caritas. I repeat: 
these possibilities can be read in either of two ways, (1) either 
purely fictionally – which is what I call configuration (after Ricoeur’s 
reading of Aristotle’s poetics of mythos-mimesis as fictional 
emplotment in Time and Narrative238, Vol. I) or (2) creedally in the 
form of an anatheist wager which triggers a transfiguring of our 
prefigurations (our everyday dreams and interpretations) and 
configurations (our texts and readings). And that’s where the 
divine becomes human and the human divine, theopoetics and 
anthropoetics entering into mutual play. That’s when the fictional 
as if is transformed into a creedal as. One may read the gospels in 
either of these ways: as pure literature or as sacred scripture. Or as 
both together. When I read Hindu myths or the Upanishads, for 
example, I read them not in terms of a creedal as – because I don’t 
actually believe in Rama, Vishnu or Krishna – but I marvel at the 
power of the literary as if. Likewise with Greek literature: I love 
reading Homer but I don’t believe in his gods. Let me repeat: 
I think all people who make a commitment to a creedal as need 
to remember that it never escapes figuration. It is always figural, 
never literal (or you get fundamentalism and positivism). In 
creedal figuration, in order to remain tolerant, you should 
constantly be able to take a step back every so often and 
remember that this is also a language of metaphor, myth, symbol 
and trope. We must have modesty about this, because it is always 
at some basic level an act of human imagination responding to a 
divine call. To forget this is to succumb to the danger of theistic 
dogmatism. 
So I believe that Johann is misreading what I mean by 




capability’ – being in a state of ‘mystery, uncertainty, and doubt, 
without the irritable reaching after fact and reason’ – to keep 
faith decent, open and tolerant. As such, negative capability may 
serve as a portal either to good poetry or to good faith. It’s 
potentially a portal to both, but you make your choice. For 
instance, I’m going to read Homer today as literature and Luke’s 
Gospel as faith because I happen to be Christian and am 
committed to the truth claims in the text (in  terms  of both a 
hermeneutics of affirmation and suspicion). However, if you go 
to the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association, 
many papers discuss the Bible, the Koran or whatever religious 
text they’re working with, in terms of the fictional as if. That’s 
perfectly legitimate, as all these texts are works of religious 
language. 
Anatheism implies a second step, as I  have been trying to 
explain, which is optional and which needs to be taken again and 
again. It’s not like something I do once and for all and I’m forever 
redeemed. We are never done with negative capability. Rather 
like Kierkegaard’s three phases – the aesthetic, the ethical and 
the religious. It’s not a necessary one-way dialectic, where you 
begin as an adolescent in the ‘aesthetic’ with your passion for the 
possible and your fantasies, then you become serious, get 
disillusioned and become ‘ethical’ (make your commitments, get 
married, have children, pay your taxes, get a job) and then finally 
you make your Abrahamic leap of faith at the end. No, these are 
‘stages on life’s way’ that are lived every day, in different measures 
and mixes, not as some preordained script with different 
sequential chapters. It’s not that when we make the leap of faith 
we’re saved forever. Abraham wasn’t. He made a leap of faith on 
Mount Moriah, but he was a bad bastard who did all kinds of 
terrible things. After he performed the inaugural act of sacred 
hospitality by welcoming the three strangers at Mamre, he cast 
his wife Hagar and son, Ishmael, into the desert. A leap of faith is 
never a done deal, once and for all. 
Furthermore, it’s very important to remember that in a creedal 
as there is already a gap  – the ‘qua’ which separates self and 
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stranger, word and action, imagination and reality. One must 
never forget that when one says, ‘I have faith in God’, that one 
believes in God as this or that experience; one is not saying, ‘I am 
God’, or, ‘I know God absolutely’. There is no absolute way to the 
Absolute; it’s always a figural path and we are always figuring it 
out. We are saved by the as: God is saved from us and we are 
saved from God. That difference, that little as which Stanislas 
Breton called the ‘little servant of the Lord’, saves us from the 
presumption of over-identification with the Divine. The as is 
prophylactic against fusion and confusion. There is deep modesty 
in the as, as well as an invitation to respond to the call. Anatheism 
is not a non-committal kind of European liberalism. It is deeply 
engaged, but not uncritically so. 
Yolande Steenkamp: We return to your professor of philosophy 
in Dublin, Patrick Masterson, when it comes to my question about 
steering a third way between transcendence and immanence. I’m 
curious how you would respond to the conundrum outlined by 
Masterson in this regard. At the same time, could you take this 
puzzle as a case in point to illustrate how a ‘third space’ operates 
in dialectical philosophy, so that, in between poles, you attempt 
to say more, not less?
Richard Kearney: Sure. I see the ‘between’ as a more rather 
than a less. Again, maybe it’s something I learned from Paul 
Ricoeur, that the way of mediation, the middle way, is a wiser 
way, because it’s a both/and rather than an either/or. I don’t see 
immanence and transcendence as an either/or. I think some 
philosophies go too far in the direction of transcendence and 
end up with nothing. This is the danger of Derrida, in my opinion: 
he so stresses the undecidability and asymmetry of alterity that 
he ultimately evacuates the other of any lived content and 
carnality. It is all text without context in the end. Other 
philosophies go too far in the other direction and get too caught 
up metaphysically in a great linked chain of Being which drags 
God down like an iron anchor of immanence: we basically reduce 
the Other to our anthropomorphic fixes of metaphysical presence 
(or what Heidegger and Derrida called ‘onto-theology’). 
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Therefore, when I talk in The God Who May Be of an ‘onto-
eschatology’, what I want to say is this: There’s a truth in the 
ontology of immanence, and there’s a truth in the eschatology of 
transcendence, and we need to hyphenate them rather than 
oppose them. We need to travel the middle path of both/and/
neither/nor. The truth is neither radical transcendence, nor mere 
immanence, but both one and the other. My friend William 
Desmond has coined the term ‘metaxology’ – a philosophy of the 
between (metaxu) – which he traces all the way back to Plato. 
But you find it in Aristotle too. In Carnal Hermeneutics239 I took 
the idea from Aristotle (1968, Book 2 of De Anima) that flesh is a 
medium, not just an organ of immanence to be opposed to 
a spirit of disembodied transcendence: flesh (sarx) is at all times 
a mediation which discriminates between differences. The body 
discerns. The senses make sense. The Buddha also preached a 
middle way; and I see Jesus as performing a mediational journey 
as both human and divine. In my opinion one finds versions of the 
middle way in most philosophical and wisdom traditions, where 
the between operates not as a function of less – as some lukewarm 
mediocrity to be spat out – but as a wiser and fuller way, a way 
beyond binary dualities, a double vision of the more.
Yolande Steenkamp: Thank you. 
Daniël P. Veldsman: We are going to move now to the 
understanding of strangeness and otherness. Schalk Gerber 
poses the following question: How, from a diacritical hermeneutical 
perspective, would one address the question of tradition? For 
example, are we completely predetermined by tradition, or 
should we abandon it in light of critique?
Richard Kearney: I see anatheism as a critical retrieval of 
tradition. I recall Ricoeur once trying to mediate between 
Habermas and Gadamer, with Habermas arguing for emancipation 
and Gadamer arguing for tradition. Ricoeur responded that 
liberation is itself a tradition; it wasn’t invented in the French 
239. Kearney and Treanor (2015).
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Revolution by chopping people’s heads off. Liberation was 
already being witnessed by the stories of Moses and exodus, of 
Christ and Resurrection, of Spartacus and Socrates. In other 
words, we have traditions inherited through narrative memories, 
and what I call ‘diacritical’ hermeneutics (in Strangers, Gods and 
Monsters) is always a reinterpretation of the old in light of the 
new, and vice versa. Here I take the term ‘ana’ very seriously: The 
diacritical is the between, but it’s also the after. The ‘ana’ goes 
back over sacred history and turns it into story. It takes the facts 
of the past and turns them into fiction or faith – a retrospective 
transfiguring of tradition in the name of the ‘messianic’ always 
still to come. Anatheism is not at all about getting rid of tradition 
but about reliving history as sacred story. 
Daniël P. Veldsman: Secondly, Gerber would like to know your 
thoughts on interpreting Otherness in terms of the universal and 
the particular?
Richard Kearney: Again, I would say that the ‘dia’ in diacritical 
hermeneutics is the ‘between’ that interprets the other in terms 
of a radical thisness of particularity, of singular haecceitas, while 
never abandoning the horizon of the universal. In the case of 
Jesus Christ, I would say that Jesus is the particular, singular, 
embodied haecceitas, whom Thomas touched with his finger, 
and who offered bread and wine, food and fish after the 
resurrection to his disciples; while Christ is the universal figure of 
redeemed humanity who Paul hails as neither man nor woman, 
neither Greek nor Jew, but who recurs again and again in each 
individual person. It’s the universal Christ figure, the cosmic 
Christ, the transindividual, transnational, transhistorical Christ 
who comes back again in each unique individual person. As the 
poet, Gerard Manly Hopkins powerfully puts it, ‘Christ plays in 
ten thousand faces, lovely in eyes and lovely in limbs not his, to 
the Father through the features of men’s faces’. That’s the 
universal in the particular, the cosmic in the embodied. The ‘dia’ 
is the hyphen between them. Perhaps it would be more accurate 




Daniël P. Veldsman: We come to Helgard Pretorius from the 
University of Stellenbosch. He asks of you: What, in your 
experience, are some of the biggest contemporary challenges 
(ideological, material, political) facing those institutions that we 
rely on for cultivating/formative tasks? What, for instance, 
threatens the cultivation of hospitality (and other virtues for that 
matter) in our institutions of learning? 
Richard Kearney: Helgard talks brilliantly about induction and 
initiation rituals and the liminal space. There’s so much to be said 
about these important things; I wish we had the space and time to 
cover everything. I think there is a huge need for rituals of initiation. 
I had a wonderful experience with my brother, Michael, at a sweat 
lodge with Native American Indians in Santa Barbara in 2015. 
People of different religions came and we all went down into a 
hollow cave scooped out of the earth together, inhaling the steam 
from water poured over red-hot volcanic rocks. It was a very 
powerful initiation rite and I believe people have a real need for 
such liminal journeys and crossings – of body and mind – and 
sometimes, if disillusioned with their own religion, look to ancient 
or so-called New Age rites for it. Yoga, for example, can serve this 
need, where you meet different searchers from different faiths 
(or  none) and pursue something that is spiritual. I very much 
believe that the Christian Eucharist could also serve as an 
interconfessional rite where people are received, initiated and 
welcomed while respecting their different spiritualities. I strongly 
advocate for the right to have dual or multiple belonging in 
religion. When I was in India I met several people who were both 
Catholic and Hindu (dual religious belonging); and I think that 
rituals and practices of liminal crossing are very meaningful here. 
It’s no accident in my view that the Song of Songs is an Egyptian 
love song that becomes the centre of Jewish and Abrahamic 
spirituality. There is a sort of mystical fiancialles going on there, a 
‘nuptial metaphoricity’, as Ricoeur says, which serves as a chiasmic 
initiation of Egyptians into Judaism and Jews into Egyptianism – 
and of course, the Egyptians were the enemy, as we know from 
the biblical tradition. 
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It is therefore very important to rethink our religious rituals in 
this way. On that note, I think that sport and rock music festivals – 
think of Woodstock in 1969 – can also at times operate as secular 
rituals that serve the important function of bringing different 
kinds of people together, across divisions of class, creed or 
colour. I saw the movie Invictus recently about Mandela’s meeting 
the South African rugby team, the Springboks. Given that rugby 
was traditionally such a ‘white’ sport it was a hugely symbolic 
gesture of reconciliation. Similarly in Ireland, the fact that 
Northern and Southern Irish play in the same Rugby team, 
regardless of whether they are Protestant or Catholic, is an 
example of an initiation rite bringing people together symbolically. 
I’m not saying that sport is the same as religion – as Nietzsche 
would – but I recognise that secular forms of initiation are 
important also. 
With regard to Helgard’s discussion of institutions of learning, 
I think that we’ve become very exclusivist in our models 
of  competition, rivalry and rankings. Everything has become 
quantitative, using performance units in order to justify more 
grants and funding. Numbers rule. Our institutions of learning 
are becoming paradigms of corporate power – pyramids rather 
than playrooms. The university should be a Spielraum – a place of 
free scholarly experimentation, of spiritual and intellectual 
immunity, as it was when it was first set up in the early Middle 
Ages in Bologna and Paris. This links up with your article, Danie, 
written with Mirella Klomp, about the Christian passion play 
being re-enacted as a contemporary street process and 
interactive Internet event. The play element is so important, 
without voiding the passion element. Universities have become 
artes surviles, as opposed to artes liberales, to use Cardinal Henry 
Newman’s famous distinction in his Idea of the University. We’re 
losing the idea of the university as a place of creation and 
recreation. Creation is recreation – hanging out together, 
dreaming out loud with one another without the pressures of 
fixed production outcomes and placements. When I was doing 
my BA in Dublin, we had no exams for the first three years; there 
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were only last year finals. So one was able to go to different 
lectures, to listen, learn and read without any formal assessment 
for years. You were free. Now every week students have tests 
and quizzes where everything is quantified and computed. A far 
cry from the celebration of play – ‘Imagination au pouvoir!’ – in 
the university revolutions of 1968 in Paris, Prague and Berkeley. 
Or to put it in the religious terms of the mystic Angelus Silesius, 
we need ‘God-play’ for gifts and graces to happen, for accidents 
and inventions to surprise us. I know it’s a bit utopian and people 
do have to do exams, but I’m a great believer that God is play. 
Education too!
Yolande Steenkamp: I think changing that might be a case of 
the impossible-possible.
Richard Kearney: Absolutely!
Daniël P. Veldsman: Let’s turn to Wessel Bentley from the 
University of South Africa, who makes things very concrete. 
It  seems to him that there is a resurgence of the drive for 
determining identity as a basis for exclusion/inclusion in the recent 
phenomena of American nationalism/patriotism, Brexit and the 
dilemma of receiving refugees in Europe. Why, in your opinion, is 
this exclusivism growing instead of calls for diversity and inclusion?
Richard Kearney: I would say that, first, it is an anxiety about 
belonging, an identity crisis of nationalism and tribalism driven 
by fear. It’s a desperate need to belong which fears the stranger 
or immigrant and projects these fears onto the other as enemy 
and scapegoat. One clings to one’s identity by disparaging the 
other. This was a main theme of my Strangers, Gods and Monsters 
and I have two things to say about this. The European Union, if it 
is to work, will have to operate on three levels. It has to be 
transnational, which entails opening the borders to other nations 
as the Single European Act (1992) decreed – and pooling 
sovereignty (which by definition, going back to Bodin, Hobbes 
and Rousseau, was defined as ‘one and indivisible’). The notion 
of national popular sovereignty has often been a recipe for war. 
The EU has been pretty good at sharing sovereignty and there 
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are still many who wish to move towards a kind of more confederal 
or federal Europe. At a second level, one has to respect nation 
states with their differences: they are not yet ready to disappear 
completely (as the Brexit backlash shows). And thirdly, finally, 
the EU requires a greater degree of regionalisation, where one 
recognises people in their local, municipal and regional identity. 
This is the problem of the Basques, the Catalans, the Bretons, 
and many other regional groups and dialects in Italy and the 
Balkans, for instance. If these three levels of federation–nation–
region are not equally respected, citizens will reject the open 
crossing of borders, retreating back into nationalisms and 
micronationalisms. We need to understand the need to belong. If 
we do not, people will withdraw into themselves and fixate on 
one particular identity, as is happening now in Hungary, Poland 
and with Brexit, and of course in the growing nationalist 
popularism, protectionism and isolationism of Trump’s ‘Make 
America Great Again’ movement. 
This is a danger for every nation. To overcome such fear and 
xenophobia we need to work towards an ethos of intercommunal 
hospitality. And I think genuine religion and spirituality has an 
important potential here for offering liturgies and languages of 
sharing, whether it’s around ritual, or the Eucharist, or the reciting 
of Psalms and the Scriptures. At an AA meeting, for instance, 
people come with their pain, their anxiety, their addiction and 
trauma, sharing narratives together. It is, as Thomas Merton said, 
one of the most important spiritual movements of the 20th 
century. Something needs to be done to supplement the political 
with the spiritual. Politics alone will not solve the problem. When 
he was helping to found Europe, Claude Monnet famously 
remarked that ‘Europe will be cultural, or it will not be’. In my 
opinion – and I am deeply committed to a more federalist-
regionalist model – Europe has not paid enough attention to a 
cultural–spiritual exchange of stories, a mutual and multilateral 
sharing of our historic narratives of wounds and of promises. 
Ricoeur has a beautiful piece called ‘Reflections on a new ethos 
for Europe’ (1995), where he talks about the need for interlinguistic, 
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interconfessional and intercultural translation between the 
different nations. I think this has been lacking; and it might even 
be true of America, too. The stories of the US Civil War need to 
be retold between north and south. The stories between black 
and white need to be told, as well as the stories between the 
Mexicans and Americans regarding their past wars. All these 
wounds and traumas need to be revisited with the help of a 
vigorous ethic of translation – a cultural and spiritual task which 
supplements the political. 
When Habermas says we need a ‘constitutional patriotism’ for 
Europe, he is right; but law is not enough to deal with the question 
of identity. Nobody lives or dies for abstract laws and constitutions. 
People need narratives, traditions, stories of belonging, because if 
you don’t feel in your heart that you belong, you cannot share 
your identity with others. If you don’t feel like you’re a host in your 
own home, you can’t open the door to the guest. For the guest to 
be welcomed there has to be somebody home! There has to be a 
host language to translate a guest language, to turn hostility into 
hospitality. The impossible can only work in terms of such a 
spiritual wager, a leap of imagination and faith. Politics cannot 
legislate for that.
Yolande Steenkamp: Moving on to Rian Venter from the 
University of the Free State, who considers the notion of (micro)-
eschatology to play a prominent role in your theopoetics – how 
does this relate to conventional Christian understandings of 
salvation, or soteriology?
Richard Kearney: Again, they are not incompatible for me. 
Micro-eschatology believes in salvation as an everyday salvaging. 
My new novel is called Salvage, but my next philosophy work 
could also be called Salvage. Maybe even Anatheism could be 
called Salvage, because it’s about salvaging the remainder – 
what’s left of God after the omni-God has crumbled or flown, in 
other words salvaging the little things, the little ones, the least of 
these (elachistos) as the gospel calls them. Abandoning the 
illusion of God as Mighty Magician, Grand Master of our servitude, 
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Superintendent of the world. That all needs to be debunked. The 
‘anti-Godsquad’ have a point, you know. Dawkins, Hitchens and 
so on are cranks, but what they are attacking is often the Alpha 
God of power and manipulation that the ‘three masters of 
suspicion’ (Freud, Marx and Nietzsche) rightly unmasked. So 
I would say salvation rightly understood is salvaging with humility, 
with ‘faith in’ rather than ‘belief that’. I don’t believe that there is 
a saviour, I have faith in a saviour as somebody or something that 
is left in the least of things, in the stranger of Matthew 25, after 
the omni-God has gone. So first and foremost, micro-eschatology 
attends to the little stories, the little people and simple epiphanies 
in which we find the Divine. It is not an evacuation of the divine. 
If anything, it is the reinvention of the divine in all things, a kind 
of panentheism.
Yolande Steenkamp: Rian then refers to an interesting comment 
in Strangers, Gods and Monsters, that ‘[…] not every notion of the 
Trinitarian God […] is a fetish of presence or hyperessence’ 
(2002:207), and wonders what you would consider a post-
metaphysical interpretation of the Trinity?
Richard Kearney: I am very interested in a theopoetics of the 
Trinity – the idea that God is an art, a play of sacred imagination 
between divinity and humanity. Hence the title of my recent 
edited book, The Art of Anatheism (2018). It is a post-metaphysical 
view which goes beyond the old ‘onto-theological’ model of a 
Trinitarian God as three male substances looking at each other, 
sufficient unto themselves. Breaking up that fetishised and frozen 
notion of God brings in movement again, the dynamism of 
divinity as ever new possibility (dunamis), as a dance around the 
core (khora), which of course is the feminine principle at the 
heart of the Trinity. Perichoresis, the Greek Fathers called it. At a 
more colloquial level, I would also see the Irish shamrock as a 
post-metaphysical figure, to return to a more popular figuration. 
There is the story of how Saint Patrick came to Ireland and 
explained the Christian Trinity to the native king by showing that 
the three leaves of the shamrock shared a single stalk. The Trinity 
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is already in nature, in the flora and fruits of the earth, everywhere – 
one does not need to go looking for it in some otherworldly 
Platonic heaven of Ideas, which is actually a form of ‘conceptual 
idolatry’, as Jean-Luc Marion rightly says. Of course, metaphysics 
never leaves us, and once you realise that metaphysics is 
metaphor, figuration and imagination, then metaphysics comes 
back to life, and we are able to see Aquinas, Scotus and 
Bonaventure as brilliant artists of the Divine. Also, it’s very 
important in a post-metaphysical interpretation of the Trinity to 
be open to signs and cyphers of the Trinity in other religions. In a 
way, St Patrick showing the shamrock to the king of Ireland is 
saying to a native pagan that the three-in-one is already to be 
found in his own nature-religion. And we should not forget that 
the Trinity is not just an idea of Western Christian metaphysics; it 
is also to be found in the Judaic story of the three strangers 
appearing to Abraham and Sarah at Mamre or the Trimurti in 
Hinduism. Interreligious dialogue is indispensable in this respect, 
helping us all to loosen up the Christian notion of God as a 
monotheistic metaphysical substance and to see it also as a 
movement, reintroducing the dynamism of post-metaphysical 
stories and tropes. Likewise, with ‘Salvation’, if you remove the 
upper-case ‘S’, saving becomes visible in everyday acts of salving 
(healing) and salvaging the sacred in the profane. This is my 
reading of soteriology as micro-eschatology. 
Yolande Steenkamp: Danie and Mirella Klomp wrote a 
fascinating chapter on The Passion – also published in your book, 
The Art of Anatheism – which is an annually organised popular 
musical representation in the Netherlands of the suffering, death 
and resurrection of Christ. This has now grown into a large, open-
air media event, and Mirella describes the event as a ‘ritual’ that 
‘appears to open a space that may be described as a nursery for 
religious experiences: a space where people’s hermeneutic ability 
to deal with the sacred is being activated’. Their question to you 
is whether The Passion in this sense is a concrete contextual 
example of your philosophical commitment to third ways to 
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create an acoustic space for hearing the ‘call of God’ anew and 
again.
Richard Kearney: I addressed this briefly earlier, but I am happy 
to return to it. The short answer is yes. It is a perfect example of 
a third way and I think that there should be far more such 
examples of poetic and aesthetic retrievals of the liturgies in our 
contemporary digital culture. Back in the Middle Ages Passion 
Plays were acted out on the streets and in the fields. When it 
became locked into churches, and only certain people could 
enter, it lost its sense of a theopoetics – which as I say calls for an 
anthropoetics, which is an anapoetics, a constant interplay and 
replay. I like the charged term of a passion play, because it allows 
for the passion to be relived and retrieved – rather like Freud’s 
famous example of the play of fort-da in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle as a poetic–therapeutic way to deal with the trauma of 
loss. Because the passion is trauma. It is only when it is replayed 
poetically, aesthetically, liturgically – where you’ve got the 
fictional as if coming together with the creedal as – that it 
becomes a creative recreation. Recreation in English can be a 
place of recreational play. The art of play does not mean artifice 
as merely made up. ‘Making’ is not ‘making up’ in the sense of 
pure fantasy. The work of religious imagination is very much alive 
in the passion play, and using contemporary technology to have 
it televised and viewable on the Internet in order to make the 
street procession more publicly available is a powerful way of 
bringing the sacred back into the profane, and vice versa. I am all 
for that. To return to Andrei Rublev’s famous icon of the Trinity 
as a play of perichoresis between the three divine persons, what 
we witness is a recreation of three persons in movement, which 
is constantly open to an endless hermeneutic, to repeatable 
viewings, representations, interpretations. That is the greatness 
of classic religious art. There is nothing more true than poetic 
play. Which is what Aristotle says in The Poetics: art as poeisis 
gives us access to an essential truth that history will never get to. 
Whereas history is a mere chronicle of facts – one thing after 
another – poetics as mythos-mimesis is a creative redescription 
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of lived action and suffering in a way that shows one thing 
because of another. It introduces ‘meaning’. This is what solicits 
the religious imagination of viewers to see Rublev’s icon or the 
Dutch passion play either as a fictional as if, or as a creedal as. 
If  the former, then one happily enjoys the art of a good 
performance. If the latter, one sees these plays and paintings as 
epiphanies of the Christian mystery. Like Mardi Gras, you can 
enjoy it simply as a festival of fun or as a crucial preparation for 
Easter. Or both. Very often these events can be viewed at both 
levels at once: poetically and confessionally. 
Yolande Steenkamp: Robert Vosloo from the University of 
Stellenbosch takes on the work of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela 
(who wrote the preface to our volume) and your focus on carnal 
hermeneutics. In her work, the notion of ‘empathy’ (or ‘emphatic 
repair’) plays a central role. The question Vosloo subsequently 
poses is: How do you think ‘carnal hermeneutics’ can be valuable 
in engaging with bodily signs of empathy, also in contexts marked 
by historical injustices and misrecognition? Also, in memory 
studies one often finds reference to ‘performativity’ or ‘performing 
memory’, where remembering is more than mere repetition. 
What perspectives can we glean from carnal hermeneutics in 
thinking about the embodied and performative aspects of 
memory? In a way, I think Robert’s question ties in nicely with the 
notion of ‘playing’ after the fact that you have been discussing.
Richard Kearney: Very much so. I would say two things, and 
because I address much of this in my intellectual biography in 
this volume, I will be brief. To begin with, I think the point of 
moving from retributive justice to restorative justice is very 
important, and as Ricoeur says, justice as restorative implies 
some ‘extra’ dimension of mercy or love. Love goes beyond 
justice (without dispensing with it) introducing what exceeds 
law, rules and moral judgement – the surplus of empathy, le petit 
miracle of pardon, the grace of super abundance, as Ricoeur says 
in his epilogue to Memory, History and Forgetting (2006). But 
leaving aside Ricoeur – I know he is a very important influence, 
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not only for me, but for Pumla and Robert as well – let us return 
to the idea of carnal performance. The therapeutic working-
through of suffering and trauma often involves a carnal 
performance which goes beyond the purely verbal – even the 
fort-da of Freud is not just verbal. The two words – ‘here-gone’ – 
comprise an embodied act of little Ernst, playing with something 
material (a spool of cotton), casting it away and pulling it back in 
a way which mimes the loss and retrieval of the love-object. We 
have here an act of healing through the double verbal–physical 
act of play, which in fact is a symbolic replay of actual loss and 
possible recovery (.e.g. the comings and goings of Ernst’s 
mother). The therapeutic detour of symbolic performance. The 
carnal gesture is just as important, if not more so, as the two 
words – fort-da – repeated again and again. But this embodied 
gesture of play is almost always overlooked by Freudian 
commentators. So I would see Pumla’s act of touching the hand 
of the killer De Kock as a ‘little miracle’ of impossible contact – 
with all the ambiguity involved. What prompted her? What made 
that impossible gesture possible? Just as we might ask, to move 
from South Africa to Northern Ireland: what made it possible for 
Ian Paisley to shake the hand of his arch-enemy Martin 
McGuinness, who was fighting Protestants while Paisley was 
fighting Catholics? And we might cite here other historic 
handshakes like those of Mandela and De Klerk or Sadat and 
Begin? It’s the carnal gesture of ‘chancing your arm’, which in 
each of these instances brought about an end to war and violence. 
There is something about the hand-to-hand that is more 
important than just giving our word. When Lord Fitzgerald put 
his bare hand through the door of Dublin Cathedral in 1492 and 
shook the hand of his enemy Lord Butler, it was more than just 
saying, ‘I promise if you come out, I won’t kill you’. It was actually 
laying his body on the line. Words into action. And we could go 
all the way back to Homer in the Iliad when Glaucus and Diomedes 
put down their swords and shake hands; or to Jacob and Esau 
physically embracing after Jacob had wrestled with the dark 
angel in the night. In all these instances, there is something 
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absolutely fundamental about the carnal gesture of exchange 
which supplements and surpasses the exchange of narratives 
and words. Both are necessary. Before and after words, the 
handshake. 
Yolande Steenkamp: We come to our last set of questions, 
which is from Wilhelm Verwoerd, senior researcher at Historical 
Trauma and Transformation at the University of Stellenbosch. He 
would welcome any further insights regarding the dynamics of 
betrayal when hospitality is shown to a (former) enemy. You 
referred to this in your intellectual biography, Richard, in saying 
how Pumla felt guilty for having felt compassion for De Kock. So 
how do you understand the accusation of betrayal when 
hospitality is given to someone with the blood of ‘our community’ 
on their hands? Any suggestions, firstly, regarding how to 
transform this dynamic? And secondly, Wilhelm is curious about 
your thoughts on the potential role of a contemplative, apophatic 
spirituality in the cultivation of hospitality towards the enemy.
Richard Kearney: This is why I endorse a hard-core, impossible 
hospitality, rather than some cheap mantra of ‘let’s be nice to 
each other’. When forgiving the enemy you may be accused of 
betraying your own. It’s hard. Betraying here has a double sense 
as both travesty and manifestation (as in ‘betraying your 
emotions or thoughts’). There can be a sense that you’re letting 
your own people down by siding with those who have been 
killing your people. The other sense of betrayal, however, is to 
show your inner secret instinct for ostensibly impossible pardon – 
translating it from inner spirit into external words and actions. So 
there’s always a huge risk and wager in hospitality, of taking 
something inside you – the desire to do the impossible, to make 
a leap of faith, love and empathy to the enemy – and translating 
it into an embodied act of forgiveness. In one sense, of course, 
this is the very core of Christianity – ‘forgive your enemies’ – and 
of Abrahamic hospitality (welcoming foreign desert 
strangers  into  one’s tent). But to actually do it (not just say 
or preach it) is very hard, almost impossibly hard, and we have 
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to recognise the hardness. That is what I really appreciate about 
Wilhelm’s question. Hospitality is not easy. If it is, it is not true. 
You are exiting your familiar comfort zone, your closed secure 
domestic space, exposing yourself to the incoming other with all 
the dangers that may imply. You are fragile, vulnerable, attentive, 
all eyes and ears and open hands. Like St Francis, when, at the 
height of the bloody Crusades, he went to meet the Islamic 
leader, Sultan al-Kamil: he went barefoot and unarmed and 
stayed with him for weeks in a tent. They shared words and 
prayers and bread together and Sultan al-Kamil recognised a 
saint in spite of their religious differences. Unfortunately, nobody 
listened to Francis when he returned back to the Christian camp, 
and the war continued. It was too hard for the other Christians to 
forgive and make peace. In his supping with the enemy Francis in 
a way betrayed his own, sitting down with Sultan al-Kamil for the 
time that he did. He chanced his arm. It was a Franciscan–Sufi 
moment of impossible hospitality made possible – for a moment. 
A moment at once mystical and carnal, where they prayed and 
ate together for three days and three nights – which alas could 
not be translated back into a more collective political settlement 
between the Christian and Islamic armies. Like Christianity itself – 
it was a failed experiment; but it leaves us a testimony of the 
‘impossible possibility’ of hospitality and pardon, which always 
remains a promissory note, an endless call which never goes 
away. 
Regarding Wihelm’s second question, whether there is a 
connection between contemplative spirituality and cross-border 
compassion? I think the answer is yes. This is certainly something 
I am committed to as founder-director of the Guestbook Project, 
not that I am a peacemaker to the degree that Pumla and Wilhelm 
are. In a small way I can speak from the perspective of Guestbook, 
however, and I would say that those working in Guestbook are 
inspired by the example of people like John Hume in Northern 
Ireland, Gandhi in India, Ernesto Cardinal in Nicaragua, Thich 
Nhat Hahn in Vietnam, Mandela in South Africa and so on, all 
figures who in their unique ways combined spiritual depth with 
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political peace-making. To repeat Ricoeur, in the impossible act 
of pardoning the enemy there is a ‘little miracle’ of superabundance 
at work that has more to do with love than justice. Now the ideal 
is to have love and justice together; but sometimes, with 
restorative justice, you need to go beyond retribution and the 
claims of wrongs and rights to something else. That doesn’t 
mean that it should be a travesty of justice, or a refusal of law – 
as Ricoeur says ‘there should be no amnesty without amnesia’ – 
but it recognises that justice has limits. 
In my own small way meditation and prayer have played a role 
in my modest efforts with Guestbook, spiritually guided by a 
contemplative neo-monastic movement inspired by Thomas 
Merton, Richard Rohr, Thomas Keating and Cynthia Bourgeault, 
where it is about getting beyond the ‘false self’ based on borders, 
boundaries,  fears – me versus you, us versus them – in other 
words, transcending the binary adversarial oppositions which 
characterise our normal social prejudices. Not that we all don’t 
need egos and borders, boundaries, and identities – up to a 
point – but you get to a level where that is less and less important. 
We need again a double vision – recognising questions of identity, 
belonging, borders and law as necessary realities, but also being 
able to cross those borders in a leap of impossible compassion. 
It is only impossible until it happens! The impossible occurs and 
then we realise for a moment that everything is possible! But 
when the impossible becomes possible one is rarely on one’s 
own. Or not for long. It is just too hard and too lonely to do the 
impossible on your own. That’s why in AA, the people who get 
beyond their addictions never do it alone. It’s always a group – a 
community sharing narratives, pains, traumas and recoveries. 
That’s what makes the impossible-possible: moving from the 
avowal that one is ‘helpless’ before one’s addiction, that one is 
incapable of overcoming them, until one surrenders to what AA 
calls a spiritual ‘higher power’ (however you define it). To 
surrender to a higher power – which makes the impossible-
possible – always invokes or convokes other witnesses. 
Testimonial contagion. I think that’s very important. Subsequently, 
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then, the person who recovers becomes a sponsor for others, 
in  an ongoing interplay of healing through testimony and 
compassion.
Daniël P. Veldsman: On that wonderful note, I’m going to say a 
trinitarian thank you, that is, a playful way to say I do not have 
any words of deeper appreciation for the wonderful conversation 
we have had across the oceans on a strange kenotic God, on 
Otherness and on hospitality. Richard, you have left us with much 
to ponder in our South African situation on God-talk that is crying 
out for many impossibilities to be realised in a deeply scarred 
society. May many little and exciting things follow in the wake of 
our conversation. Thank you, it has been a privilege.
Richard Kearney: Well, likewise from me.
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This collected work is presented as a dialogue between various scholars 
(mostly South African) and the work of the Irish religious thinker Richard 
Kearney. Its encyclopaedic setting is primarily philosophy of religion, 
although Kearney’s background in late French Continental philosophy and 
the turn to theology therein (especially in the thinking of Levinas, Derrida and 
Ricoeur) allows it to span several interdisciplinary contexts where questions 
of the meaning and relation between varieties of (a)theism and ethics are 
of interest. Both male and female, Western and African views are present. 
These are viewed against the backdrop of Kearney’s work on anatheism in 
general and his reception of Levinas and Derrida’s configurations of words 
like ‘hospitality’, the ‘stranger’ and/or the ‘other’, in particular. 
Prof. Dr Jacobus Gericke, Faculty of Theology, North-West University, 
Potchefstroom, South Africa
In their unity of theme and variety of expression and context, the 
contributions in this book reflect the heart and soul of Richard Kearney’s 
lifetime of scholarly work. They engage with the highly theoretical, 
hermeneutical and theological side of who he is and what he does; they get 
involved with the hands-on, messy, real-life struggle of what it means to be 
human in relation to ‘the stranger’ – be it a divine stranger, a human other, 
or a bitter enemy. With Kearney, they explore a ‘third space’ between polar 
opposites and return to God after God. 
Prof. Dr Yolanda Dreyer, Faculty of Theology and Religion, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa
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